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PREFACE 
Objectives of Financial Statements: Selected Papers includes many of the 
significant research, reference, and resource materials considered by the 
Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements in forming the con-
clusions expressed in its report, Objectives of Financial Statements. All of 
the papers in this volume, with the exception of the illustrative financial state-
ments and the bibliography, are research and study papers which reflect the 
views or opinions of the authors. Many of the papers were prepared by the 
staff of the Study Group; some were prepared by consultants. 
Many of these papers served as initial drafts for discussion and delibera-
tions by the Study Group. Consequently, they present, in some cases, more 
detailed or somewhat more divergent discussions of the issues and conclu-
sions included in the Report. This volume has been compiled to highlight 
relevant issues; only a portion of the data accumulated over the past two 
years is included. 
It is important to emphasize that the Study Group was not limited by any 
of the research and other materials available to it in reaching the conclusions 
set forth in its Report. The Preface to the Report describes the boundaries 
of the inquiry. 
An effort was made to compile and edit this volume as a self-contained 
unit, complementing the Report. The contents of this volume are grouped 
under seven chapter headings. The items included in each chapter are 
ordered and grouped to indicate the structure of the Study Group's delib-
erations and to develop sequentially the central theme of each chapter. 
Chapter 1 includes a discussion of the purpose and need for objectives, 
parameters to be considered in setting objectives, and two possible 
approaches to specifying objectives. In addition, two models for developing 
financial statement objectives are presented. Chapter 2 begins with a treatise 
that investigates the extent to which users have a right to receive information 
concerning the operations and status of the enterprise. The other papers in 
Chapter 2 focus on users and their needs for accounting information in 
making economic decisions. They contain expositions of complex theoretical 
aspects of accounting. The last paper in Chapter 2 reaffirms the importance 
of stewardship as a consideration in financial reporting. 
Chapter 3 presents three approaches to accounting theory. These con-
ceptual papers are accompanied by empirical studies conducted by research 
consultants who were provided relevant data by a cooperating enterprise. 
A compendium of views on the unresolved issue of liability associated with 
the inclusion of forecasts as part of basic financial statements is presented 
in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 deals with the increasing awareness of the need for more 
definitive guidelines for disclosing the impact of enterprise activities as they 
affect society. The two papers in this chapter consider the application of 
existing accounting techniques and economic theory in reporting such events 
and conditions. 
The illustrative financial statements in Chapter 6 are presented merely 
as an indication of some of the ways in which certain matters covered in the 
Report may affect financial statements. These financial statements must be 
evaluated with careful consideration given to the caveats set forth in the 
introductory section of the chapter. 
Finally, Chapter 7 is a relatively comprehensive bibliography of the many 
works that were reviewed and evaluated during the course of the inquiry. 
This volume is intended to provide a basis for further research on many 
issues. For additional background, the reader is directed to Volume 3, the 
public record of the Study Group's proceedings. This volume will be made 
available for public review at the New York offices of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants. 
1. Background and Organization 
of the Study 
Purpose and Need for Objectives 
George H. Sorter, Research Director, in collaboration with 
Martin S. Gans, Paul Rosenfield, R. M. Shannon and Robert G. Streit 
The Need for Objectives of Financial Statements 
The definite need for explicitly stated objectives of financial statements has 
been inferred again by the appointment of the Study Group on the Objectives 
of Financial Statements by the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants By implication, the following question deserves summary analysis: 
Why should objectives of accounting and accounting's basic output, financial 
statements, be rigorously defined and explicitly communicated in the absence 
of similar statements of objectives by many other areas of trade and profes-
sional endeavor? Consider, for example, the cobbler whose services are 
limited exclusively to the repair of shoes. It is generally agreed that there 
exists a one-to-one relationship between the cobbler and each individual 
customer in relation to services rendered, i.e., no third parties are involved. 
The objective of the cobbler is thus a private one of satisfying a specific 
customer who directly requests, and pays for, the shoe repair services. 
The relationship described above, which can easily be extended to 
professions such as law or medicine, can be compared and contrasted with 
the rendering of services by the certified public accountant. Accounting 
services are commissioned by specific customers or clients. However, there 
is more involved in this particular relationship. Financial statements of pub-
licly held corporations are produced by client companies but are not intended 
to primarily benefit these companies or its management. The primary purpose 
of financial statements is to serve the needs of various third parties. These 
third parties, such as existing or potential stockholders, creditors, suppliers, 
or employees, have diverse needs and do not directly employ the preparers 
or attestors of financial statements. In most instances these third parties also 
cannot directly nor effectively communicate their needs, desires, or requests 
to preparers or attestors of financial statements. 
Financial statements are responsive, and accountants are responsible, 
to third parties who rely on information contained in financial statements. 
To satisfactorily discharge this responsibility and to establish the responsive-
ness of financial statements to users' needs, it is necessary that there be an 
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explicit statement of objectives of the accounting profession, a statement 
that is not necessary for other trades or professions in which responsibility 
does not extend beyond the individual direct customer or client level. 
It is most important for objectives of financial statements to be stated 
explicitly to provide for effective evaluation and evolution of financial account-
ing standards, and to respond to the challenges posed by public criticism 
of the financial accounting process. Stated objectives should set forth the 
function of financial statements and provide an overall framework for deter-
mining financial accounting principles or standards. The objectives should 
also facilitate the determination of implementation techniques and formats. 
Objectives and Financial Accounting Standards 
Financial accounting principles or standards indicate 
. . . which economic resources and obligations should be recorded 
as assets and liabilities by financial accounting, which changes in 
assets and liabilities should be recorded, when these changes should 
be recorded, how the assets and liabilities and changes in them 
should be measured, what information should be disclosed and how 
it should be disclosed, and which financial statements should be 
prepared.1 
They are guides to be followed in the preparation of financial statements. 
Objectives of financial statements, on the other hand, are the functions 
that financial statements are designed to serve, the policies to which financial 
statements should conform, and the qualities financial statements should have 
to serve their functions and conform to established policies. 
Financial accounting standards, which represent specific choices for 
preparation of financial statements, should be selected to promote the objec-
tives of financial statements. "Financial accounting and reporting . . . must 
rest on . . . standards designed to achieve what are perceived to be the 
desired objectives of financial accounting and reporting."2 Agreeing on the 
objectives and stating them explicitly is indispensable to that process. Ideally, 
the objectives should be identified, and then methods of implementing the 
objectives should be selected as financial accounting standards. 
Stating objectives facilitates the following activities: 
1. Evaluation of present financial accounting standards. 
2. Adoption of proposed financial accounting standards. 
3. Evolution of financial accounting standards to respond to changes in 
objectives or in implementation technology. 
1 APB Statement No. 4, Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Finan-
cial Statements of Business Enterprises (New York: American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 1970), Paragraph 137. 
2 Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles, Establishing Financial Account-
ing Standards (New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1972), 
p. 19. 
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Evaluating Present Financial Accounting Standards 
Present financial accounting standards can be effectively evaluated only 
if the objectives which they are supposed to fulfill have been specified first. 
Without stated objectives, present financial accounting standards can only 
be evaluated against inconclusive criteria, such as the number of enterprises 
that follow the standards or whether the standards conform to traditional 
ideas. It is, however, impossible to determine whether a given standard is 
accomplishing the intended goal if that goal is not known or stated. "Articu-
lation of social goals is important for ascertaining whether they are being 
reached and even for reaching them. It is improbable, to say the least, that 
any goals can be reached by chance."3 
If a financial accounting standard were -adopted, for example, which 
specified a single method of depreciation as the only acceptable method, 
conformity of accounting practice to that standard could be determined. 
Whether the method was accomplishing the implicit objective which led to 
the adoption of the standard, however, could not be determined in the 
absence of an explicitly stated objective. Furthermore, whether practices 
such as changing estimates of depreciable lives have subverted the implied 
objective from which the standard was developed also could not be deter-
mined. Whether or not practices subverted the intended objective could only 
be determined if the objective has been previously specified. 
Adoption of Proposed Financial Accounting Standards 
Specifying objectives is necessary to reach agreement on sound changes 
in financial accounting standards or the adoption of new accounting stan-
dards. How can an analysis of proposed changes in standards proceed in 
a logical or rational manner unless the objectives to be served by these 
standards are explicitly stated and agreed to? If objectives are not explicitly 
stated, it is difficult to establish whether disagreement results because of 
differences in implied objectives of financial statements or because of differ-
ing conclusions concerning the efficacy of the proposed standards in achiev-
ing agreed-to objectives. The explicit statement of objectives allows for a 
more structured investigation of proposed standards and should facilitate 
resolution of conflicting positions. Disagreement may remain but would be 
confined to questions such as those concerning the efficiency of proposed 
standards in achieving objectives or the resolution of conflicts between 
objectives. 
Responding to Changes in User Needs or Technology 
Financial accounting standards at any time may be the best available 
means to achieve the objectives of financial statements, given existing needs 
and the implementation technology available. Both needs and technology 
may later change however. Stating the objectives of financial statements 
3 Nestor E. Terleckyj, "Measuring Progress Towards Social Goals: Some Possi-
bilities at National and Local Levels," Management Science, August 1970, p. B-765. 
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and the available implementation technology permits systematic re-examina-
tion of financial accounting standards in the light of changed circumstances. 
In the absence of stated objectives and without consideration of changes in 
implementation technology, financial accounting standards may become 
dogma, appearing as ends in themselves rather than as the pragmatic means 
aimed at accomplishing objectives. Enveloped in tradition, the original justi-
fication for the standard is forgotten and the standard becomes impervious 
to change. 
Conservatism is an example of a financial accounting standard that 
originally might have been a sound response to proper objectives. Since 
the objectives that the standard of conservatism was intended to accomplish 
were never made explicit, however, conservatism has achieved the status of 
an end and, as such, defies and hinders re-examination and revision. The 
following speculative analysis may be plausible: If the primary audience 
for financial statements originally were credit grantors, then conservatism 
may have evolved in response to an objective to provide useful information 
to credit grantors. Credit grantors must make decisions as to whether 
to grant loans. In making a loan, the credit grantor receives the benefit 
of interest payments but risks the principal of the loan. Since principal 
is almost always larger than interest, the lender has more to lose by 
making a bad loan (in which he loses the principal) than by not making a 
good loan (in which he foregoes the interest he could have earned). He 
therefore needs information that will minimize his chances of making a bad 
loan, even at the cost of not making loans that could and should have been 
made. Conservative accounting information may have resulted because of 
creditors' preference for information that would minimize the probability of 
making a "bad" loan. 
Since the audience for financial statements has shifted to a large degree 
from creditors to investors, the standard of conservatism may no longer be 
responsive to users' needs. Investors have as much to lose by not making 
a good investment as from making a bad investment. In fact, they have more 
to lose from not making a good investment since market appreciation is 
unbounded, whereas market loss is limited to the price paid for the security. 
It was never stated that conservatism was a standard intended to be 
responsive to creditor needs or any other objective. Instead we inherited a 
dogma, and no vehicle for modifying this standard is available to respond to 
a changed audience of users. Conservatism may, of course, have evolved 
in response to different influences. In any event, since the objectives originally 
to be served by the standard of conservatism were not identified or are now 
lost, no methods are available to determine if the objectives originally justi-
fying the standard are viable or obsolete. 
Another example may clarify this point. One of the most vexing prob-
lems confronting the accounting profession in the past decade has been 
the problem of leases or, more generally, of executory contracts essentially 
unperformed by both parties. Since the early twentieth century, accountants 
have accepted with little questioning the dogma that executory contracts 
essentially unperformed by both sides shall not be recorded. They have not 
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seriously questioned why this practice was adopted or what ends it was 
meant to serve. It is entirely possible that when this practice was adopted 
in the early twentieth century it represented a proper response to a valid 
objective: Information should only be reported in financial statements if the 
benefit of that information exceeds the cost of reporting it. 
In the early twentieth century most executory contracts were of short 
duration and essentially recurring. A typical example might be a one-year 
lease. Obviously any payments demanded by the lease contract were 
recorded as they occurred. Similarly, the utilization of lease facilities and 
the incurrence of any liability as a result were also recorded. Thus the 
question concerning leases at that point of time was not whether they 
should be recorded by the accounting process but rather how often. Pay-
ments under the lease were recorded, and utilization of lease facilities was 
recorded. The questions of whether the signing of the lease or the entering 
into the agreement should also be recorded became appropriate matters 
for consideration. Since under the conditions stated all three of these events 
were likely to happen within one year, the legitimate question could be 
raised whether the costs of recording the lease agreement as well as the 
payment and utilization of lease facilities were justified by the informational 
benefits of reporting such agreements. Very likely, a proper response would 
have been that there was little informational benefit to be gained by reporting 
the signing of the lease under such circumstances. However, no reasoning 
leading to the adoption of the standard was given and it was never specified 
what objective was meant to be served by the practice of not recording 
executory contracts essentially unperformed. Thus, as the nature of execu-
tory contracts changed from essentially short-term recurring contracts to 
long-term leases or long-term employment contracts, it was impossible to 
determine whether such changed circumstances should result in changed 
practices. Obviously, if the objective that led to the adoption of the rule 
that executory contracts essentially unperformed shall not be recorded was 
related to informational benefits and costs, then that relationship is drastically 
altered when the contract is a fifty-year lease rather than a one-year recur-
ring agreement. 
Response to Challenges and Criticism 
Stating objectives of financial statements is necessary not only to evalu-
ate and change financial accounting standards but also to preserve those 
standards that facilitate the achievement of proper objectives. Without stating 
objectives explicitly, proper standards cannot be effectively defended against 
challenges. Stating objectives of financial statements would strengthen the 
accounting profession's position for establishing financial accounting stan-
dards in the private sector. Demonstrating that the objectives of financial 
statements legitimately differ from objectives of fiscal or tax policy would 
provide a sound rationale for financial accounting standards that differ to 
some extent from rules of tax accounting, for example. Demonstrating that 
financial accounting standards represent appropriate and feasible imple-
mentation of stated and desirable objectives of financial statements would 
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reduce opportunities for political interference in financial statement con-
struction. 
Court decisions have recently held that conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles or standards is not necessarily a valid 
defense to a challenge against financial statements. The courts themselves 
have implicitly established objectives of financial statements and have deter-
mined whether given financial statements under challenge adequately meet 
the objectives. If the accounting profession agreed to and stated the 
objectives of financial statements and demonstrated that financial accounting 
standards serve those objectives, it could more easily justify the position 
that conformity with financial accounting standards should be the criterion to 
judge financial statements. In other words, the profession can then legiti-
mately argue that principles and standards are generally accepted because 
they are proper and right rather than that they are right and proper because 
they are generally accepted. 
The public has criticized the accounting profession for not being a 
positive force in the public sector. Stating objectives of financial statements 
clearly and establishing financial accounting standards that are responsive 
to objectives seem the best way to meet that criticism. The accounting pro-
fession could then be identified and evaluated in terms of the appropriate-
ness of visible goals and its effectiveness in achieving these. 
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Range of Potential Parameters 
George H. Sorter, Research Director, in collaboration with Martin S. Gans, 
Joshua Ronen, R. M. Shannon, and Robert G. Streit 
A statement on objectives must have a defined scope. The question is 
whether the scope evolves from the analysis of the problem being considered 
or whether it is imposed initially as a given. If it is imposed initially, the 
justification for the scope necessarily lies outside the inquiry of the Study 
Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements. However, if the scope does 
evolve from the deliberations of the Study Group, it must be justified by 
the nature of the study. 
As an example, four possible parameters that the Study Group might 
consider for this project could be discussed. One concerns the audience to 
which financial statements are directed; for example, the Study Group could 
define the objectives of financial statements exclusively for the audience of 
credit grantors. A second dimension concerns the format of financial state-
ments; the Study Group could, if it wished, limit the stated objectives of 
financial statements to the currently prepared financial reports, or to any 
specified set of financial reports. Third, there could be a restriction on the 
set of permissible accounting principles that can be used; e.g., the objectives 
of financial statements could be limited to statements prepared in conformity 
with presently atcepted accounting principles. Fourth, the Study Group 
could adopt a limit on the time during which the objectives can feasibly be 
implemented. For example, a possible combination of parameters would 
require the Study Group to investigate the objectives of currently existing 
financial statements prepared in conformity with prevailing accounting prin-
ciples aimed at an audience of credit grantors and capable of implementation 
within one month. 
If limits like these are adopted initially, the objectives of financial state-
ments would to a large degree be defined by initial givens and not through 
the inquiry of the Study Group. If a particular set of parameters is useful, it 
should evolve from the Study Group's endeavor instead of being imposed 
initially. Any initial exclusion limits the degree of freedom of the Study Group 
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to formulate the objectives of financial statements. The more that is initially 
excluded from the study the smaller will be the set of accounting variables 
that may be affected by the objectives. 
Thus, there is no set of unique objectives of financial statements that can 
be formulated. Rather, a set of objectives may be formulated for each set of 
parameters or "givens" that the Study Group accepts. This can, perhaps, 
best be illustrated by expanding on some selected parameters and how they 
may affect the possible conclusions. 
The Specified Accounting Principles 
If any prespecified set of accounting principles is accepted, only account-
ing methods compatible with these principles can be used. Thus, objectives 
that require methods which are incompatible with these principles cannot 
be considered. For example, if prevailing principles are assumed as given, 
the Study Group can only seek the most appropriate choice of historical 
cost depreciation methods most useful for formulating expectations about a 
firm's cash flows. This choice of methods is clearly a narrower objective 
than the choice of information useful for formulating such expectations 
without the historical cost constraint. This broader objective may necessitate 
deviating from prevailing principles; consequently, to assume these principles 
as given would preclude the formulation of such an objective. In terms of 
another example, if prevailing principles are accepted, human resources can 
be reported only in limited circumstances and then only in terms of cost. 
If these principles are not assumed as given, pre-set limits do not exist as to 
whether human resources should be valued and, if so, how they should be 
valued. 
Prespecified Standards 
The Study Group may not decide to designate prespecified principles. 
It may wish to consider accepting some prespecified standards such as 
relevance, quantifiability, or attestability. Such prespecified standards are not 
unduly restrictive if they are defined to cover a wide range. For example, 
anything is quantifiable in a sense through some system of assigning 
numerical values to attributes. For instance, a dollar value can be assigned 
to each letter of the alphabet so that every word can be quantified. If quanti-
fiability, however, is defined in terms of a specific system of assigning values 
or if attestability is similarly defined in terms of a specific form, then the 
setting of these standards becomes restrictive. For example, the appropriate 
form of attesting to forecasts may differ from the appropriate form of attesting 
to measures of historical transactions. If the form of attestation is limited to 
historical transactions, the formulation of objectives which incorporate fore-
casts may be precluded. This restriction could impede trade-offs between 
conflicting standards such as relevance and attestability. It is possible that 
more relevant data are less rigorously attestable. Specification of these 
standards in rigid or narrow terms lessens the flexibility in setting objectives. 
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Existing Financial Statements 
The Study Group could assume that presently required financial state-
ments such as a balance sheet, an income statement, etc., are the only ones 
that should be prepared. This would mean that only those objectives con-
sistent with preparation of these statements could be considered. Such an 
assumption would delimit the possible objectives since it would rule out 
other nontraditional sets of reports that may be required to reach broader 
objectives. It would also preclude eliminating presently required reports 
which may not be necessary in view of the proposed objectives or for which 
the cost of preparation might exceed anticipated benefits. 
The Users 
Objectives may be set in light of the need of one or more groups of 
users. Conceivably, the sets of objectives could differ depending upon the 
user group considered. For example, the objectives could differ if the deci-
sion needs of creditors only are considered, or if the decision needs of both 
creditors and existing investors are considered or if all potential users' needs 
are considered. The smaller the sub-set of user groups that is considered, 
the narrower the set of objectives. Consideration of only one group of users 
would implicitly and indirectly limit the scope of the study. 
General Purpose vs. Special Purpose Statements 
The objectives of financial statements could be formulated given the 
requirement that the same set of financial statements must be provided for 
all users. Alternatively, this requirement could be relaxed to allow for the 
provision of diverse statements for specific uses and for diverse users. 
Permitting the possibility of both general purpose and special purpose state-
ments facilitates the formulation of wider and more encompassing objectives. 
The possibility of special purpose statements permits serving the specific 
needs of more than one group of users that cannot be adequately served by 
a single set of general purpose statements. This possibility also permits the 
accommodation of more than one set of objectives for each user group. 
Diversity of Objectives and Circumstances 
As indicated, diverse sets of objectives could conceivably exist for any 
group of users or for any single user. These objectives will depend not only 
on the specific decision needs of the user at a particular point in time but 
also on the particular circumstances under which these decisions are made. 
The Study Group could consider all such possible circumstances and deci-
sion needs or it could limit itself to a sub-set thereof. 
The Reporting Entity 
Should the task of formulating objectives be limited to enterprises 
organized for profit or should it be extended to all types of enterprises in-
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cluding not-for-profit organizations, governmental bodies, etc? Objectives 
that are set in light of all kinds of organizations will probably entail more than 
just profit maximization. Thus, the more diverse the reporting entities that 
are considered, the wider the range of objectives that may be formulated. 
The Private and Social Sectors 
The objectives could be limited, for example, to provide information 
that facilitates the maximization of stockholders' wealth, or the objectives 
could be expanded to include the optimization of social welfare or social 
wealth. When social values (costs or benefits) do not diverge from private 
values as presently measured, the individual firm's goals—i.e., the maxi-
mization of stockholders' wealth—are consistent with the social goals, and 
no broadening of accounting objectives is needed to accommodate these. 
However, when there is a divergence between social values and private 
values, the maximization of the individual firm's short-run wealth as an ob-
jective may not be sufficient to bring about a social optimum. If the broader 
objective of optimizing the social welfare (as well as possibly the long-run 
private welfare) is accepted, the financial statements must be broadened to 
include the provision of information about social costs and benefits. 
The Descriptive and the Normative 
The objectives of financial statements could be considered only in light 
of decision models that should be used (normative models). Alternatively, 
the objectives of financial statements could be formulated by considering 
only the decision models and the goals that are actually used and imple-
mented by decision makers (descriptive models). Finally, the objectives 
could be formulated in light of both the normative and the descriptive. 
Implementation Time 
Independent of, but applicable to, all of the above is the possible re-
quirement that the objectives to be considered must be capable of being 
implemented within a given time period. It might be stipulated that the 
formulated objectives must be such that they could be implemented within a 
year, within five years, etc. If a short time span is adopted, this could serve 
to delimit the objectives to those essentially compatible with existing practice 
and beliefs since these require little time to implement. On the other hand, 
adopting an unreasonably long span of implementation could serve to limit 
the acceptability of the Study Group's conclusions. 
Conclusions 
All the above possible parameters are interrelated and many combina-
tions are conceivable. It has been demonstrated that the more "givens" 
that are assumed, the narrower and the more limited becomes the possible 
range of objectives; the less that is assumed, the broader and more encom-
passing the objectives can be. This interdependence makes the imposition 
of restrictions troublesome. If a large number of initial "givens" that are 
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unchangeable is specified, the Study Group will have implicitly defined a 
portion of the objectives that it was originally charged to formulate without 
justifying these through its work and deliberations. The foregoing analysis 
suggests that the parameters of the study should evolve from the work of 
the Study Group. 
Once the initial "givens" are agreed upon, the objectives may then be 
formulated at various levels. The absence of preimposed parameters does 
not mean that the objectives could only be formulated at the highest level of 
generality. In other words, the absence of givens would not imply that the 
Study Group's work is done by issuing a pronouncement that the objective 
of financial statements is to provide useful information. While this may be 
the desired objective in the most general terms, the task would then be to 
formulate more specific subobjectives at various levels consistent with and 
deriving from the more general objectives. Thus, while none of the parameters 
used as examples may be accepted as "givens," some or all of them may 
well evolve as subobjectives as a result of the study. 
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The Descriptive and the Normative 
Joshua Ronen and George H. Sorter 
Definitions 
Prescriptive models are those which are designed to help people make 
"better" decisions, in the sense of aiding them to behave consistently, with 
an a priori set of requirements or rules with which they want their choices to 
conform. These models are "prescriptive" or "normative" insofar as they 
prescribe how one should behave; that is, they set ideal norms. Descriptive 
models, on the other hand, are designed to describe how people actually 
behave. Both types of models allow for the assessment of expectations or 
beliefs about the structure of the environment, and about utilities which refer 
to personal tastes. 
In a treatise on the problem of measurement of values and probabilities 
for the purpose of predicting behavior, Churchman' ties together the pre-
scriptive and the descriptive aspects of choice in decision situations, main-
taining that prescription should emanate from prediction: 
The present suggestion is to assert that the "ought" in a recom-
mendation can be stated as follows: "X ought to do A in this 
environment" means "X would do A in the standard environment 
that defines value measurement." If a scientist states that an 
executive should follow a certain course of action, he says in 
effect, "I have measured the values of the executive—or his 
organization—for the various outcomes that may result from his 
decisions." These measurements predict what he would do if 
he were making his decision under the standard conditions of 
value measurements. When I say he ought to exhibit such-and-
such behavior, I mean that this is the behavior he would exhibit 
if these standard conditions held. Of course, he may not do what 
he ought to do; that is, the standard conditions may not hold in 
this environment. 
1 C. W. Churchman, Prediction and Optimal Decision (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), pp. 17-18. 
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If the prescriptive models were to take into consideration the human 
capability to process information and the tendency to "simplify" and elim-
inate part of the stimuli in the environment—then the "prescriptive" model 
becomes a descriptive model of actual behavior, as Becker and McClintock2 
indicate. They note that "imposing a requirement that a prescriptive model 
be realistic in its demands upon the users' capabilities tends to make the 
distinction between prescriptive and descriptive models ambiguous."3 
The descriptive and the normative models of behavior may require a 
common set of accounting data. However, they may differ in their input 
requirements. If so, accounting objectives based on descriptive behavior 
would require sets of data that are different on occasions from those required 
for accounting objectives based on normative or prescriptive models of 
behavior. 
Illustrations—Investment Analysis 
To illustrate the above, the discussion is restricted to one sub-set of 
users—security analysts. 
Many aspects of investment analysis are viewed as psychological in 
nature and one of these aspects is certainly the appraisal of man's capabilities 
for integrating information into a judgment or a decision. The analysts are 
called upon to make predictions, forecasts, diagnoses and evaluations on 
the basis of fallible information and with respect to parameters such as 
expected returns, growth rates, variability and volatility. These tasks are 
said to be facilitated by means of the statistics discipline. Very often, how-
ever, individuals bypass formal statistical procedures when making judg-
ments. When they do this, they are acting as "intuitive statisticians." 
The normative aspect of investment analysis relates to decision rules 
that should be applied to a variety of investment situations taking advantage 
of theoretically derived or empirically determined quantitative relationships 
between market factors and security performance. Do security analysts use 
these normative models as prescribed? 
While research in this area is almost nonexistent, related questions have 
been studied extensively within psychology and other disciplines (primarily 
medicine). Various techniques from these other disciplines were employed 
to identify and describe the descriptive models of financial decision-making. 
Geoffry Clarkson4 simulated the portfolio selection processes of a bank's 
trust investment officer. Clarkson studied the officer's verbalized reflections 
as he was asked to think aloud while reviewing past and present decisions. 
Using these reflections as a guide, the investment process was translated into 
a sequential branching computer program. A remarkable correspondence 
2 Becker and McClintock, "Behavioral Decision Theory," Annual Review of Psy-
chology (1967). 
3 Ibid, p. 241. 
4 G. P. E. Clarkson, Portfolio Selection: A Simulation of Trust Investment (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962). 
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was found between the simulated portfolios and the actual future portfolios 
selected by the trust officer. Similar research plans were used by Cohen, 
Gilmore, and Singer5 in simulating the decision processes of bank officers 
who granted loans. Other attempts to analyze the judgment process in 
medical diagnosis are described by Kleinmuntz6 and Rimoldi.7 
Techniques that are less complex than Clarkson's simulation but more 
sophisticated than the naïve approach of simply asking the decision-maker 
how he makes his judgments were developed. These are discussed by 
Goldberg,8 Slovic and Lichtenstein,9 Hoffman,10 Hammond, Hursch, and 
Todd.11 This approach requires making quantitative evaluations of a large 
number of cases each of which is described by various cue dimensions. 
Thus the financial analysts could be asked to predict price appreciation for 
securities that are defined in terms of P/E ratios, earnings, dividend yields, 
etc. Hoffman and Hammond, Hursch, and Todd suggested fitting a regression 
equation to analysts' judgments to capture their personal weighting policy, 
within the framework of a linear model. 
Also, information processing sometimes utilizes cues in a variety of 
nonlinear ways (e.g., in curvilinear functions). When analysts associate good 
investment decisions with complex and interrelated decision rules they prob-
ably are thinking in terms of configural relationships rather than linear. 
Studies of Probabilistic Processing 
Some attempts to detect deviations of the descriptive from the normative 
centered on the prescriptive models of decision theory which assert that 
opinions about the world should be cast in probabilistic terms. For example, 
according to the prescriptive model, rather than predicting that a stock will 
sell at a specific price, we should estimate a probability distribution across 
a set of possible prices. These probabilities can be used together with the 
5 K. J. Cohen, T. C. Gilmore, and F. A. Singer, "Bank Procedures for Analyzing Busi-
ness Loan Appl icat ions," Analytical Methods in Banking (Homewood, Ill inois: R. D. 
Irwin, 1966), pp. 218-251. 
6 B. Kleinmuntz, "The Processing of Clinical Information by Man and Machine," 
Formal Representation of Human Judgment (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 149-186. 
7 H. J. A. Rimoldi, "Teaching and Analysis of Diagnostic Skil ls," The Diagnostic 
Process (Ann Arbor: Malloy Lithographing, 1964), pp. 315-346. 
8 L. R. Goldberg, "Simple Models or Simple Processes? Some Research on Clinical 
Judgments," American Psychologist (1968), Vol. 23, pp. 483-496. 
9 P. Slovic and S. Lichtenstein, "Compar ison of Bayesian and Regression Ap-
proaches to the Study of Information Processing in Judgment," Organizational Be-
havior and Human Performance (in press) and Human Judgment and Social Interaction 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, in press). 
10 P. J. Hoffman, "The Paramorphic Representation of Clinical Judgment," Psycho-
logical Bulletin (1960), Vol. 57, pp. 116-131. 
11 K. R. Hammond, C. J. Hursch, and F. J. Todd, "Analyzing the Components of 
Clinical Inference," Psychological Review (1964), Vol. 71, pp. 438-456. 
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information about the payoffs associated with the various decisions and states 
of the world to satisfy an objective criterion such as the maximization of ex-
pected value or expected utility. 
When new information is gained the probabilities are revised. The 
normative model that prescribes how such revision is to be made is Bayes' 
theorem. However, psychologists, led by Ward Edwards and others12 found 
experimentally that men are conservative processors of information. While 
upon receipt of new data, subjects revised their posterior probability esti-
mates in the same direction as prescribed by Bayes' theorem, the revision 
was typically too small; subjects responded as though the data were less 
diagnostic than they truly were. Edwards suggested that while they perceive 
each datum accurately, men are unable to combine its meaning properly 
with the prior probabilities when revising their opinions.13 
Assessments of Probability, Variability 
And Co-variability 
The prescriptive portfolio models require that analysts estimate the 
variances and co-variances of expected returns which are then combined to 
optimize the investors' utility.14 For such a model to be actually used, there-
fore, estimates of probabilities and variances must be provided. But if it is 
found that the estimation of such parameters is affected by factors that are 
not specified by the normative models or if they are distorted systematically 
as a result of intervening psychological variables, then the prescribed port-
folio model in which such estimates are to be used may no longer be the 
optimal model. In this case, modification of the prescriptive model will be 
required to accommodate the human tendencies. In such a case the informa-
tion requirements implied by the first normative model may differ from those 
implied by the modified descriptive model. 
Such distortions were indeed found. For example, Tversky and Kahne-
man15 identified an "availability bias" in that judgments of an event's prob-
ability were found to be determined by the number of instances of that event 
that are remembered and the ease with which they come into mind. The 
12 W. Edwards, "Conservatism in Human Information Processing," Formal Represen-
tation of Human Judgment (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 17-52. W. Edwards, H. Lind-
man, and L. D. Phillips, "Emerging Technologies for Making Decisions," New Direc-
tions in Psychology: II (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1965), pp. 261-325. 
W. Edwards and L. D. Phillips, "Man as a Transducer for Probabilities in Bayesian 
Command and Control Systems," Human Judgments and Optimality (New York: Wiley, 
1964), pp. 360-401. W. Edwards, L. D. Phillips, W. L. Hays and B. C. Goodman, 
"Probabil ist ic Information Processing Systems: Design and Evaluation," IEEE Trans-
actions on Systems Science and Cybernetics (1968), Vol. SSC-4, pp. 248-265. 
13 Edwards, "Conservatism in Human Information Processing," pp. 17-52. 
1 4 See, for example, William F. Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets (New 
York: McGraw-Hil l Book Company, 1970). 
15 A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, "The Judgment of Probability by Retrieval and Con-
struction of Instances," Oregon Research Institute Research Bulletin (1971). 
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availability of instances is affected by such factors as recency, salience, and 
imaginability—all of which may not be related to the correct probability. 
In addition to this distortion, numerous other systematic biases in assess-
ments of probability were found such as misperceiving the probabilities of 
compound events (Cohen and Chesnick16 and Slovic17). Assessments of 
variability were found to be affected by the mean of the sequence and its 
regularity (Lathrop18). Thus people somehow judge absolute variability in 
terms of variability relative to the mean. Also, greater irregularity gives an 
illusion of greater variability. 
In addition to all the above, a great deal of experimental research on 
risk-taking behavior exists. This research may be relevant for investment 
decision-making and the information requirements for such decision-making. 
In this set of research (which is not discussed in this paper), subjects are 
asked to indicate their preferences and opinions among various gambles. 
Gambles are studied because they represent in an abstract form important 
aspects of real-life decisions. They contain elements such as probabilities, 
incentives and risks which are also the elements of real-life decisions. By 
using gambles, basic dimensions of risk situations can be manipulated, and 
hypotheses can be rigorously tested. Whether one can generalize that the 
results of such experiments simulate real-life decisions under uncertainty 
must be established by further research. 
To illustrate, Slovic19 found that perceived risk was not a function of the 
variance of a gamble. Instead riskiness was more likely to be determined 
by the probability of loss and the amount of loss. This result is congruent 
with Lorie's20 complaint that it was absurd to call a stock risky because it 
went up much faster than the market in some years and only as fast in other 
years, while a security that never varies in price is not risky at all—if the 
variance is used to define risk. If indeed descriptive models imply that either 
the amount of loss or the probability of loss is the main determinant of risk, 
would it not be concluded that at least from the standpoint of descriptive 
behavior, accounting information should concentrate on providing estimates 
for those two parameters? 
Summary and Conclusions 
In the above analysis, an attempt has been made to illustrate, with a few 
examples, some of the implications of the vast literature which describes 
1 6 J . Cohen and E. I. Chesnick, "The Doctrine of Psychological Chances," British 
Journal of Psychology (1970), Vol. 61, pp. 323-334. 
17 P. Slovic, "Manipulat ing the Attractiveness of a Gamble Without Changing Its 
Expected Value," Journal of Experimental Psychology (1969), Vol. 79, pp. 139-145. 
18 R. G. Lathrop, "Perceived Variabil ity," Journal of Experimental Psychology (1967), 
Vol. 73, pp. 498-502. 
19 P. Slovic, "The Relative Influence of Probabilit ies and Payoffs Upon Perceived 
Risk of a Gamble," Psychonomic Science (1967), Vol. 9, pp. 223-224. 
2 0 J. H. Lorie, "Some Comments on Recent Quantitative and Formal Research on the 
Stock Market," Journal of Business (1966), Vol. 39, Part II, pp. 107-110. 
28 
human behavior in relation to decision models that are actually used. If 
accounting information is to provide inputs to what people actually use, there 
is no doubt that a significant amount of research still remains to be conducted. 
Normative or prescriptive models are those which should be used, 
whereas descriptive models are those that are actually used. Given the cir-
cumstances underlying the task of the Study Group on the Objectives of 
Financial Statements, it is believed that an investigation of normative models 
utilizing accounting information deserves priority. 
First, the literature that is relevant to the investigation of descriptive 
models is both fragmented and indirect. Thus, to gather sufficient evidence 
that allows the formulation of a unified framework for descriptive models 
would be both difficult and overly time-consuming, thus placing severe limi-
tations on this approach. 
Second, the choice of models that are actually used may also be affected 
by the set of available information. Thus, to determine what information is 
required for a specified goal would require identifying the decision model 
employed; but, at the same time, the information provided to a decision-
maker may affect the decision model that is used. The circularity is particu-
larly crucial inasmuch as the Study Group is considering the possibility of 
enlarging or at least changing the available accounting information. There-
fore, the new information may change the descriptive models. 
These complexities make the exploration of descriptive models par-
ticularly difficult and lengthy. While such an investigation is potentially very 
useful, it is nevertheless suggested that primary emphasis be devoted to 
normative models at this stage. 
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A Framework for Developing 
The Objectives of Financial Statements 
Richard M. Cyert and Yuji Ijiri 
Introduction 
This paper is intended to provide a framework for developing the objectives 
of financial statements. It does not deal with what the objectives should be 
since this is to be discussed and decided by the Study Group on the Objec-
tives of Financial Statements. However, in explaining the framework for 
developing such objectives, some examples of objectives that the Study 
Group may consider adopting are stated. It should be emphasized that these 
examples are used to clarify the nature of the framework and are not neces-
sarily objectives which the authors think the Study Group should adopt. 
In discussing the objectives of financial statements, it is important to 
understand the level of objectives at issue. There are many objectives that 
may be arranged in a hierarchy of means-ends relationships. Unless the level 
of objectives at issue is known, arguments can be confusing. 
One way to focus attention on the level of objectives is to label a few 
important layers, using convenient names. Therefore the following hierarchy 
of levels of objectives is used for discussion purposes: 
1. Fundamental objectives 
2. Constitutional objectives 
3. Operational objectives 
4. Prescriptive objectives 
Fundamental Objectives 
Fundamental objectives are at the top of the hierarchy and are essen-
tially non-operational. Everyone agrees that they are the ultimate objectives 
of financial statements, but they are so remote from questions on accounting 
principles and procedures that they do not necessarily provide any criteria 
or guidelines to the questions. Accountability is an example of a fundamental 
objective. 
The American economy is based on a network of accountability relation-
ships. The separation of ownership and management of economic resources 
has created the basic need for accountability. But in our modern economy, 
accountability is not limited to the relationship between management and 
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owners. Within the management hierarchy, a subordinate is considered to be 
accountable to his supervisor for the management of resources entrusted to 
him. Externally, the firm is accountable not only to its shareholders but also 
to its creditors and governments at all levels. The recent emphasis on the 
quality of the environment (clean air, water) has added the public to the list 
of parties to whom a firm is accountable. 
Accountability normally refers to the past activities of an entity. However, 
in some cases an entity is accountable for its plans of future activities as 
observed in governmental budgets. In either case, accountability requires the 
recording and reporting of the entity's activities and their consequences. 
Acceptance of such a report by the party to whom the entity is accountable 
normally constitutes a discharge of the accountability for activities covered 
by the report. 
Accounting records and financial statements have been developed pri-
marily to satisfy such an objective. Although accounting records and financial 
statements are used for other purposes, the objective of providing the means 
for establishing accountability may be considered as a fundamental objective 
of financial statements. 
Implicit in this objective is the need to derive performance measures 
since the objectives of accountability include the entity's performance with 
respect to its goals. In the free enterprise system, one of the central goals 
of an entity is achieving a certain level of profits. Therefore, it follows that an 
important objective of financial statements is to report on this achievement. 
The concept of profit is not an easy one to define and quantify. In fact, 
it is almost as difficult to quantify as are many goals of society such as free-
dom, security, or economic prosperity. Economists have proposed various 
concepts of profit at an abstract level. Accountants, however, have had to 
devise operational ways of measuring profit and, furthermore, accountants 
have had to do it with a reasonable degree of objectivity because subjective 
measures cannot stand the legal and organizational pressure involved in 
accountability. Considering the magnitude of difficulty involved in developing 
a suitable profit measure, accountants have been quite successful in develop-
ing and maintaining a system of profit measurement, although the need for 
improvement has always existed and will always exist. 
Now accountants are under attack because some groups have suddenly 
discovered that elements of arbitrariness exist in the measurement of profit. 
To some extent this is true of any performance measure. For example, there 
is no reason why a touchdown in football counts six points while a field goal 
counts only three points. A team with a good kicker may argue for more 
points for field goals. But what makes such arbitrary factors legitimate is the 
agreement among the interested parties. In the case of profit measurement, 
there is an explicit or implicit agreement among the interested parties to 
delegate the function of profit measurement to accountants. Therefore, the 
mere existence of arbitrariness should not be cause for discarding a system 
that has been developed and maintained over many decades. 
However, it is also true that innovations in management and technology 
may call for new methods of profit measurement. In addition, new infor-
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mation such as the reporting of management plans or management's profit 
forecasts may be desirable to include in financial statements. 
In summary, at least one of the fundamental objectives of financial state-
ments may be stated as the need to communicate information on the dis-
charge of accountability of an entity to parties to whom the entity is account-
able. Although the contents of financial statements may change over time, 
this fundamental objective of financial statements seems to be invariant. 
Constitutional Objectives 
The next level of objectives is referred to as constitutional objectives in 
this discussion. Constitutional objectives are of a more operational nature 
than fundamental objectives. The determination of whether major questions 
are in line with the overall policy of the accounting profession (whether they 
are "constitutional" or "unconstitutional") can be made by comparing such 
questions with the constitutional objectives. For instance, the judgment that 
"financial statements should not contain information that might unduly impair 
the competitive advantage of the firm" might be a constitutional objective. 
Thus, particular pieces of information in financial statements may be included 
or excluded according to their effects on the competitive advantage of the 
firm. On the basis of these judgments, precedents will be established. How-
ever, constitutional objectives are themselves not operational; they should be 
viewed as criteria for evaluating the policy decisions of the profession. The 
constitutional objectives may be structured in various ways. 
One such way is this. The fundamental objectives of financial statements 
are stated first. Then, the constitutional objectives are developed logically 
from the fundamental objectives in order to provide guidelines on important 
issues. 
1. What are the bases for accountability? 
2. To what extent does each of the interested parties (shareholders, 
creditors, public in general) have the right to know about the activities of 
an entity and the consequences of such activities? 
3. To what extent does an entity have the right to withhold information 
concerning its activities and their consequences? 
4. At what level of detail should information be disclosed? 
5. At what level of reliability should information be disclosed? 
6. When should particular pieces of information be disclosed? 
7. What should the responsibility of auditors be? 
8. What organizational units should be authorized to define and main-
tain the operational objectives of financial statements? 
Thus constitutional statements covering questions 2 through 8 would 
need to be developed on the basis of the need for accounting to satisfy the 
fundamental objective of accountability. 
Operational Objectives 
Operational objectives deal directly with the criteria or guidelines for 
selecting alternatives in financial accounting. They are operational in the 
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sense that many practical problems in selecting alternatives can be solved 
by referring to the objectives. 
The problems in selecting alternatives in financial accounting and re-
porting may be classified according to the following four categories: 
1. Information content 
2. Information processing 
3. Information control 
4. Information dissemination 
Information content deals with the kinds of information that ought to be 
provided in financial statements. Currently there are many such questions. 
Should budgets for the next few years be included? Should information on 
outstanding orders be shown? Should commitments be described, and if so, 
in how much detail? Should current values of assets be disclosed? Should 
information on human resources—age, experience, dollar value—be in-
cluded? Among the seven qualitative objectives discussed in APB Statement 
No. 4, "Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial 
Statements of Business Enterprises," relevance and completeness may be 
considered as dealing with the information content of financial statements. 
The second category, information processing, is concerned with the way 
a given set of information should be generated. One possibility is to require 
all transactions to be recorded accurately in accounting ledgers based on the 
accepted bookkeeping principles. Another approach is to allow the use of 
statistical sampling to generate desired information without a 100 per cent 
transaction record. Still another possibility is to generate information on past 
events based on retrospective estimates using various source documents and 
other evidence instead of recording transactions as they occur. Perhaps the 
most liberal approach in information processing is to allow information to be 
generated on the basis of a purely subjective estimate of a single person. 
Among the seven objectives in APB Statement No. 4, perhaps neutrality and 
comparability may be regarded as dealing with information processing. 
The third category, information control, deals with the reliability of in-
formation. The firm may disclose any information it desires in its annual 
report. But information in financial statements is considered to be more 
reliable than other forms because a firm of CPAs has verified sources of the 
information and expressed its opinion as to fairness. To what extent should 
reliability be emphasized? Do CPAs have the required capability to test the 
reliability of information? Costwise, is it reasonable to expect a high degree 
of reliability? To what extent should reliability be traded for relevance and 
timeliness? These are the questions that can arise in information control. 
Obviously, verifiability, which is one of the seven objectives in APB Statement 
No. 4, is related to this category. 
There is another aspect that ought to be discussed in this category. In 
addition to controlling information and its quality, financial accounting has 
the objective of controlling resources. An accounting for all actual resource 
flows must be made because, under current accounting practices, all re-
source flows must be recorded. If there is any question on a particular 
resource flow, accounting records provide a basis for further checking. Thus, 
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a question may be raised as to whether the objectives of financial accounting 
include contributing to such resource control or whether the objectives 
should be limited to the purely reporting aspect of financial accounting. 
The last category, information dissemination, deals with the question of 
how financial information should be disseminated among interested parties. 
Understandability and timeliness, among the seven objectives of the State-
ment, are related to the method of dissemination. However, there seems to 
be a wide variety of questions that need to be answered with respect to the 
method of dissemination to be used in future financial accounting. For ex-
ample, if particular information to be disseminated is likely to change the 
investors' evaluation of the firm significantly, CPAs must develop a method 
of dissemination that is not unfair to some groups. The notion of equitable 
dissemination must be established. Understandability raises an issue of 
whether CPAs should limit their role to reporting facts with the minimum 
amount of interpretation, as newspaper reporters do, or whether they should 
provide their interpretation of the financial statements of the firm to the 
maximum extent possible. 
In summary, content, processing, control, and dissemination are the four 
essential problems that arise in defining the future states of financial state-
ments. Therefore, the operational objectives of financial statements must be 
capable of providing criteria or guidelines to answer these questions. 
Prescriptive Objectives 
Prescriptive objectives are not criteria for selecting alternatives in finan-
cial accounting. They are dicta used to indicate which alternatives should be 
selected. The establishment of such a set of objectives is the most direct 
way of solving the accounting objectives problem. "Assets should be valued 
on the basis of current replacement cost." "Budgets for the forthcoming 
period should be disclosed," are examples of prescriptive objectives. They 
are the policies adopted by the profession. Prescriptive objectives are more 
or less like opinions of an Accounting Principles Board or a Financial 
Accounting Standards Board designed to settle specific issues on policies 
and procedures. 
Conclusions 
Although there are many layers of objectives that may be considered, 
the above four layers should be sufficient for discussion purposes. It may be 
noted that the layers are formed in terms of goal-subgoal or means-ends 
relationships (e.g., constitutional objectives are the means to achieve the 
fundamental objectives), but their time horizons are quite different. Funda-
mental objectives may be applicable for a few centuries, constitutional objec-
tives for a few decades, operational objectives for ten or 20 years and 
prescriptive objectives for several years. 
It is significant that the accounting profession in the United States has 
realized the need to reevaluate the objectives of accounting and has decided 
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to make an extensive study to improve their contribution to the economy. 
Despite its conservative nature, there have been many changes in the 
accounting profession, and there will be many more in the near future. It is 
important, therefore, in guiding such changes to firmly understand the direc-
tions in which the profession should move. The attempt to identify and 
establish objectives of financial statements is aimed precisely at the goal of 
providing directions for the profession to develop itself in the future. 
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The Need for Accounting Objectives 
In an Efficient Market 
Joshua Ronen 
In light of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' recent 
appointment of the Accounting Objectives Study Group to formulate the 
objectives of financial statements, some questions were raised regarding the 
propriety of regulating accounting information through specifying the objec-
tives of financial statements. Arguments were put forth stating that, in view 
of the generally demonstrated efficiency of the marketplace, Adam Smith's 
invisible hand will cause the appropriate kind and quantity of accounting 
information to be communicated; and that therefore the regulation of account-
ing information by a group of interested preparers and users will be wasteful. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether—in view of the theory of, 
and the empirical findings related to, efficient markets—there is a justification 
for the specification of accounting objectives. 
The first part of this paper discusses the implications of the efficient 
market hypothesis and its related research with respect to the choice of a 
"best" accounting system. The second part is addressed to the question of 
whether there exist market incentives for firms to produce an optimal amount 
of accounting information which would eliminate the need for regulation. The 
issue is examined first by assuming that no disclosure laws exist, and then 
the existing disclosure laws are explicitly taken into consideration. 
The Implications of Efficient Market Research 
On the Choice Among Accounting Alternatives 
Recent research effort in accounting1 centers on the implications of the 
efficient market hypothesis and the empirical capital market research for 
1 Ray Ball and Philip Brown, "An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Num-
bers," Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1968), pp. 159-178. W. Beaver, P. 
Kettler, and M. Scholes, "The Association Between Accounting Information and 
Market Valuation of Securit ies," Accounting Review (October 1970), pp. 654-682. 
Will iam H. Beaver, "The Behavior of Security Prices and Its Implications for Account ing 
Research (Methods)," Supplement to the Accounting Review (1972), pp. 407-437. 
R. E. Dukes, "Market Evaluation of Alternative Account ing Information Systems" 
(Unpublished dissertation, Stanford University). Nicholas J. Gonedes, "Efficient Capital 
Markets and External Account ing," Accounting Review (January 1972), pp. 11-21. 
L. L. Lookabill, "A Study of the Relationship Between Accounting Information and 
Market Valuation of Securit ies" (Unpublished dissertation, Stanford University). 
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choosing among accounting alternatives. For example, it is stated that 
"observations of the market reactions of recipients of accounting outputs 
should govern evaluations of the actual informational content of accounting 
numbers produced via a given set of procedures and the informational con-
tent of accounting numbers2 produced via an alternative set of accounting 
procedures." The underlying contention is that in the context of competitive 
and efficient markets, transactors in the aggregate will not react to accounting 
information3 unless the accounting numbers have informational content.4 
Not much harm is caused by the assertion that when accounting numbers 
are used (as manifested in movement of stock prices), they have informational 
content. This is descriptive of a definition of what constitutes informational 
content and of actual phenomena, i.e., movement of stock prices. When it is 
asserted, however, that market reactions should govern the evaluation of 
accounting alternatives, the underlying implication is that when accounting 
numbers are used (i.e., the market reacts to them) they are also useful in the 
sense of satisfying the objectives of accounting. The problem with this 
approach is that it uses a definition and the manifested results of a descrip-
tive process to make a normative judgment (that market reactions should 
govern the evaluation of accounting alternatives). 
The assertion that market reactions should govern the evaluation of 
accounting alternatives is primarily justified by acknowledging that—assum-
ing that individuals are rational and that markets are efficient (as defined and 
shown in the efficient market literature)—one cannot expect the market to 
react unless accounting information is useful. However, the kind of useful-
ness that should be inferred from (a) the proposition that individuals are 
rational and from (b) the findings that markets adjust efficiently and un-
biasedly to information, may not necessarily be the kind of usefulness that 
we might care to require from accounting information. 
Evaluation of Usefulness 
In Light of Accounting Objectives 
Certainly, the kind of usefulness that is desired can be derived only from 
the objectives of accounting. For example, if among the criteria or objectives 
2 Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External Account ing," p. 12. 
3 Reaction to accounting information is generally measured via movements in the 
stock price through which the aggregate behavior of market transactors is manifested. 
4 Informational content of accounting output is usually implicit ly defined as those 
attributes of the accounting output that trigger market reaction. For example, Ball & 
Brown argue, "If, as the evidence indicates, security prices do in fact adjust rapidly 
to new information as it becomes available, the changes in security prices will reflect 
the flow of information to the market. An observed revision of stock prices associated 
with the release of the income report would thus provide evidence that the information 
reflected in income numbers is useful." (Ball and Brown, "An Empirical Evaluation of 
Accounting income Numbers," pp. 160-161.) 
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of accounting there is listed the efficiency in resource allocation and perhaps 
some criteria relative to the distribution of wealth,5 it may be discovered that 
the kind of usefulness inferred from market reactions does not necessarily 
satisfy these two objectives. In other words, the kind of market equilibrium 
consistent with presently available accounting information and the degree of 
efficiency of the market's reaction to this kind of information may not neces-
sarily be the desired equilibrium. (Note that equilibrium is a descriptive 
phenomenon and not in itself an indication that some normative criterion has 
been satisfied.) Thus, the manifestations of a present equilibrium which may 
be undesirable cannot be used as a normative criterion for choosing the 
accounting alternative which best satisfies an objective. The satisfaction of 
the specified objective may well require a different kind of market equilibrium 
which—if extant—would produce entirely different manifestations. 
To put things somewhat differently, imagine that there are two market 
equilibrium systems, A and B, and two distinct systems of accounting pro-
cedures resulting in sets of accounting signals X and Y, respectively. Then 
assume that X and Y are evaluated on the basis of the market's reactions. 
Suppose it turns out that under system A the market reacts to X but not to Y 
(thus indicating that X, and not Y, has informational content) while under 
system 3, the market reacts to Y but not to X (thus implying that Y, and not X, 
has informational content). Which is the better accounting system? Clearly, 
in this situation the market reaction is not a sufficient criterion. There is still 
open the question of which equilibrium system, A or B, better serves the 
objectives. This illustration could also be applied over time rather than across 
market systems. Presumably, a different market equilibrium system existed 
100 years ago and the accounting system undoubtedly was somewhat dif-
ferent from today's practice. How can the two systems be evaluated if the 
market reacted to both systems? How can a descriptive phenomenon be 
used to make normative judgments?6 
Exploration of the descriptive phenomenon is valuable in understanding 
the market mechanism and in generating hypotheses about the nature of 
decision-making in the marketplace. The descriptive phenomenon is also 
useful in testing the implications of hypotheses about how decisions are 
made in the marketplace. However, it cannot be the sole test of which 
5 While the means of achieving allocation of resources in the economy are subject 
to debate, probably none would question the desirability of efficient resource allocation 
as a goal. As to equity criteria relative to the distribution of wealth, they are clearly 
implicit as objectives. For example, Rules 10b-5, 10b-6 and Section 16 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and the Court rulings in the Texas Gulf case relate to insider 
trading and the disclosure of information. 
6 Indeed, it may be argued that technological changes modify the nature of the 
equil ibr ium over time. The proposition of an accounting alternative whose test of 
usefulness is not derived from extant equil ibrium can be viewed as a technological 
change in itself. 
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accounting alternative better satisfies our goals and should therefore be 
preferred. The appropriate test should depend, among other things, on pre-
specified accounting objectives.7 
The Argument That Accounting Operates 
In a Competitive Context 
The contention that accounting alternatives should be evaluated on the 
basis of market reactions is partially defended on the grounds that the 
accounting process provides information only in a competitive context and 
that there are alternative sources of information that investors could use.8 The 
contention that accounting operates in a competitive context is based on (a) 
the assumption that accounting numbers include information that reflects 
economy-wide events and industry-wide events that can also be obtained 
from other indicators such as industrial production reports and national 
income reports, and (b) the evidence of the existence of anticipatory price 
movements that precede the announcement of accounting numbers.9 Thus, 
it is argued that if there were no other sources competing with accounting 
information, one would expect to observe rapid price movements when 
accounting data are disseminated. As a result, it is postulated that ". . . 
market transactors in the aggregate do not blindly accept and use account-
ing numbers only" and therefore "the market's reaction to accounting num-
bers (e.g., the anticipatory reactions noted above) provides reliable indication 
of accounting numbers' informational content."10 
There are several problems with these contentions. Alternative sources 
of information with respect to economy- and industry-wide events that affect 
the value of the firm may well exist, but the likelihood of alternative sources 
of information about the existence of a firm's specific events is minimal. It is 
indeed possible that the latter does exist since such events usually constitute 
transactions involving other entities which, potentially, could provide the in-
formation. However, the cost of reconstructing the firm's specific events from 
numerous and possibly scattered sources is probably prohibitive. As a result, 
such a reconstruction of events may not be undertaken by investors since 
7 A framework for the formulation of accounting objectives is discussed by the author 
in "A User Oriented Development of Accounting Information Requirements," pp. 80-
103, this volume. 
8 See, e.g., Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External Account ing," p. 14: 
" In particular it appears that the accounting process—qua supplier of information— 
does not possess strict monopoly power over the supply of information pertinent to the 
evaluation of a firm. Instead, it appears that the accounting process—qua supplier of 
information—funct ions within a competit ive context." 
9 For example, Ball and Brown, "An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income 
Numbers." 
10 Gonedes, "Eff icient Capital Markets and External Account ing," p. 16. 
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the cost may exceed the perceived benefits.11 Thus, if some firm-specific 
information is not provided by the firm, even if it is available in the market it 
may not be used. This fact is consistent with an efficient market in which 
transaction costs are assumed to exist. 
Moreover, a market equilibrium in which transactors do not seek infor-
mation because of the high cost of search, even when they know that it exists, 
is consistent with the evidence collected about efficient markets. And when 
accounting information is provided about firms' specific events for which 
alternative sources of information are too costly to seek out, transactors are 
justified in relying on the accounting information. 
Thus, if it is found that transactors accept and use accounting numbers 
(this phenomenon has occasionally been referred to as functional fixation,12 
although the term has never been rigorously defined), this does not neces-
sarily imply that they do so blindly. Use of the accounting numbers by 
transactors may be explained by one or both of the following propositions: 
1. In equilibrium, investors rely on accounting information whenever the 
cost of seeking alternative sources about the same events exceeds the bene-
fits of searching. This is likely to be the case in particular with respect to 
firms' specific events.13 Thus investors' reliance on accounting information 
does not imply that they do so blindly, but rather that they make rational 
decisions about when to stop seeking information. 
2. The accounting system is a vehicle for management to communicate 
its expectations about the firm's cash flows, and it is likely that investors view 
accounting information as a surrogate for management expectations which 
they utilize since there are no alternative sources. 
A social organization that requires firms to report probably results from 
an implicit decision based on information economics. Delegation of the in-
formation provision function to the firm makes sense if the firm can produce 
the information at a lower cost than outsiders. This is consistent with the 
evidence that accounting information is anticipated through price move-
11 This is consistent with the phenomenon, for example, that in some developing 
countries the state enforces the disclosure of minimal accounting information (appar-
ently because individuals find it too costly to produce the information themselves). 
Turkey is a case in point. See Var Turgut, "The Turkish Uniform Accounting Plan," 
(Unpublished manuscript, University of Kansas). 
12 Yuji Ijiri, Robert K. Jaedicke, and Kenneth E. Knight, "The Effects of Accounting 
Alternatives on Management Decisions," Research in Accounting Measurement, edited 
by Robert K. Jaedicke, Yuji Ijiri, and Oswald Nielson (Evanston, III.: American Account-
ing Association, 1966). 
13 The cost to the firm of processing information about its specific events and trans-
actions is probably lower because of scale economies. While no evidence exists on 
this hypothesis, it is clearly empirically testable. It is also consistent with the observa-
tion that the SEC and other governmental agencies increasingly require more account-
ing information to be disseminated. To provide evidence against this hypothesis, it 
must be shown, for example, that anticipatory market reaction is caused solely through 
sources other than the firm and that the anticipatory reaction explains all reaction to 
accounting information (which has yet to be shown). 
40 
merits prior to the announcement date. There probably exist cheaper outside 
sources for information about economy-wide and industry-wide information 
that are tapped in advance of the announcement of accounting informa-
tion. Some firm-specific events could also be anticipated as a result of 
announcements by the firms' managements through releases issued by 
market newsletter services and through reports by the firm to the SEC, etc. 
These "leakages," however, all come from the firm itself and could well be 
viewed as part of its information or accounting system. In fact, it might be 
advisable to incorporate such announcements formally into the accounting 
system, since they would then be subject to audit and verification. 
In sum, the existing evidence on efficient markets may well be viewed 
as being consistent with the following statement: Market transactors, in the 
aggregate, accept and use accounting numbers as well as any additional 
information that they can obtain at reasonable search costs. Had accounting 
numbers not been provided, market reactions might have been different since 
the information contained in accounting numbers might then have been too 
costly to obtain elsewhere. Thus, market reactions alone do not provide a 
criterion for evaluating information alternatives. 
In particular, individuals' reliance on accounting numbers does not indi-
cate irrationality or psychological conditioning. Rather, it may reflect ration-
ality within the context of a competitive market in which information is costly 
and in which expectations about the value of different data are heterogeneous. 
Individual rationality is thus consistent both with the reliance on accounting 
data (without testing their informational content through seeking other 
sources), and with a competitive equilibrium that assumes costly information 
and heterogeneous expectations. And while the evidence from the efficient 
market research (both the weak and the semi-strong form) is consistent with 
that efficient market hypothesis which assumes costless information and 
homogeneous expectations, it is also consistent with an efficient market 
hypothesis that assumes costly information and heterogeneous expecta-
tions.14 
The Argument That Stock Prices Eventually 
Reflect "Inside Information" 
Finally, the argument is usually made that market reaction is a reliable 
indicator since it impounds any existing information, even that not made 
publicly available. It is contended that since there must be at least one 
person possessing the information who recognizes the inefficiencies that 
result from its nonpublic availability, he would—being rational—exploit this 
opportunity either by transacting directly in the market or by selling the in-
formation. Thus, the knowledgeable person (possessing the information) 
14 Stigler, for example, argues: "There is no imperfection in a market possessing 
incomplete knowledge if it would not be remunerative to acquire (produce) complete 
knowledge. Information costs are the costs of transportation from ignorance to omni-
science, and seldom can a trader afford to take the entire tr ip." (George J. Stigler, 
" Imperfect ions in the Capital Markets," Journal of Political Economy (June 1963), p. 
291, as quoted in Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External Account ing," p. 20). 
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will, through his own action, help to eliminate inefficiency in the market. 
However, while it is true that any new existing information is apt to be 
impounded eventually through an arbitrage mechanism, this mechanism may 
not be the most desirable process through which information should get 
impounded in market prices. This is particularly true from the standpoint of 
social optimum (considering both allocative and distributive criteria). The 
undesirability can result for several reasons: 
1. Assuming that inside information exists,15 there is uncertainty about 
the length of time needed for the arbitrage process to rectify the allocative 
inefficiency (resulting from nonpublic availability of the information). Since 
the time lapse is likely to be greater than it would be if such information were 
required to be immediately available to the public, the allocative inefficiency 
is apt to continue for a longer time period than if such a requirement were 
made. 
2. Insiders possessing information not available to the public or supe-
rior forecasting ability are likely to cause the information to be impounded 
in market prices with less efficiency than if they were to make the information 
immediately available to the public. This is likely to be the case for at 
least two reasons. First, they may not have the sufficient capital immediately 
available to carry out the volume of trading necessary to rectify the ineffi-
ciency. Second, they are not likely to have a comparative advantage in selling 
information or in offering portfolio management services. In comparison, 
if such information were required to be made immediately available through 
the accounting system, the process is likely to be more efficient, since there 
is a greater likelihood that individuals with sufficient capital and those who 
possess comparative advantage in selling information would be included 
among the recipients of the information. 
3. The likelihood of a single individual or a small knowledgeable 
group being able to interpret inside information properly is less than the 
likelihood of the same information being ably interpreted if it were available 
to many persons and many groups, i.e., if it were publicly available. In other 
words, the greater the number of participating rivals in the marketplace, the 
more efficient is the process of competitive equilibrium. 
4. Finally, the prospect of insiders becoming wealthier may not be 
palatable to those for whom criteria for desirable distribution of wealth are 
considered to be important. 
Existing Incentives to Communicate 
Desirable Information 
It is assumed in the efficient market literature,16 that the existence of 
super-analysts will eventually insure that actual market prices are, on the 
15 Some evidence on the existence of inside information is provided by Myron 
Scholes in "A Test of the Competitive Market Hypothesis: The Market for New Issues 
and Secondary Offerings" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1969). 
16 See, for example, Eugene F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices," Journal 
of Business (January 1965), pp. 34-105. 
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basis of all available information, best estimates of intrinsic values. But 
notice that the identity, on the average, between security prices and the 
intrinsic value ultimately depends on the ability to consistently predict the 
appearance of new information and the subsequent prediction of its impact 
on intrinsic values. Suppose there is new information which is neither made 
available to sophisticated traders nor predictable on the basis of presently 
known information (possibly because it does not fit into the familiar pattern 
of information dependencies learned by the analyst). It is conceivable that, 
had this information been made available, the stock price would have been 
changed as a result of impounding the content of the new information. It 
could be argued that, since equilibrium is reached in the absence of this 
information and the relative wealth of the investors is preserved, it is not 
crucial that the new information be reflected in actual prices. However, in 
that event, resource allocation is sub-optimal. Thus, from the standpoint of 
stating accounting objectives, the relevant questions are: 
1. What are the likely sources that possess new information which may 
not be made immediately available publicly? 
2. Does the existing market system provide incentives for those sources 
to make the information available? 
A likely source of new information is the firm itself. The new information 
consists of prospective cash flows that result from the decisions and plans 
being made continuously within the firm.17 These plans and decisions are 
first known to the management; they are the endogenous factors—peculiar 
to the firm—responsible for the firm's unique rate of return. Because man-
agement is the first to know its plans, it is also the first to make a prediction 
of the cash flows that result from these decisions. Thus, by systematically 
and periodically communicating expectations of cash flows, management 
can provide valuable information that is not, at the present time, made avail-
able systematically. 
The second question can best be examined by considering the system 
of incentives offered by the market that may induce the provision of such 
information with and without disclosure laws. 
Incentives for Producing and Communicating 
Information in the Absence of Disclosure Laws 
This question was investigated directly by Fama and Laffer18 and in-
directly by Hirshleifer.19 In spite of the different approaches, the two dis-
cussions reach many of the same conclusions. Since Fama and Laffer's 
17 While management's expectations of these flows may be communicated publicly, 
they are not part of the systematic and periodic accounting reports and they are 
generally communicated in an ad hoc and sporadic fashion at the present time. 
18 Eugene F. Fama and Arthur B. Laffer, " Information and Capital Markets," Journal 
of Business (July 1971), pp. 289-298. 
19Jack Hirshleifer, "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive 
Activity," American Economic Review (September 1971), pp. 561-574. 
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discussion is, however, more germane to the role of information produced 
by the firm vis-a-vis other sources, it is used as a basis for discussion. Their 
main conclusions are briefly stated, and their underlying assumptions are 
examined. 
The Fama and Laffer Conclusions 
And Assumptions 
Fama and Laffer conclude that the production of information for trading 
purposes only20 is not consistent with Pareto optimality. The production and 
communication of this information is costly since it uses resources merely 
to redistribute wealth and not to generate it. Thus "investors as a whole 
would be better off (and the producer would be no worse off) if they could 
simply pay the monopolist in order to induce him not to produce informa-
tion "21 
Since high transaction costs are associated with such side payments, 
the authors predict that, in general, there will be some socially sub-optimal 
information output. Other conclusions of interest are as follows: 
1. In equilibrium there will be a single producer of a certain type of 
information about a firm, and when this producer is an independent outsider 
(vis-a-vis the firm) his profits will always be greater if he sells the information 
rather than use it for his own trading. 
2. Under competitive conditions of producing information, a producer 
can cover his costs only by selling to investors. 
3. As a rule, under monopolistic conditions information will be sold. 
4. When a firm produces information about itself, it produces less than 
an independent outsider, since the firm considers the effects of its informa-
tion production on the firm's shareholders. 
5. In the interests of its shareholders, the firm has strong incentives 
to have all the information produced at its discretion. 
2 0 That is, information that neither reduces risk, thus reducing the supply of a non-
desirable commodity, nor improves operating decisions of the f i rm—thus bringing 
about savings in resources through their improved allocation. The authors concentrate 
on " information, as yet unavailable to the market, about decisions already made" 
("Information and Capital Markets," p. 291) that affects investor trading profits as a 
result of private access to new information. This type of information parallels what 
Hirshleifer ("Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive Activity," pp. 
563-564) describes as prior information about the true states of the world in a simplif ied 
world of pure exchange, in which all productive transformations among entities and 
commodit ies are ruled out and in which the endowments of individuals can be modified 
only by trading. This is the type of information that can affect only the wealth dis-
tribution and not the resource allocation. 
21 Fama and Laffer, "Information and Capital Markets," p. 294. While Fama and 
Laffer discuss the incentives to produce information under both monopolistic, com-
petitive and partially competitive environments, the thrust of the conclusion is not 
significantly affected by the economic environment assumed. In all environments, it 
is concluded that socially sub-optimal information will tend to be produced, and only 
the extent of sub-optimality and the identity of the producer may be affected. 
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In summary, Fama and Laffer conclude that, except in the case of 
monopoly or partial monopoly, and when the monopolistic producer is an 
independent outsider rather than the firm itself,22 the firm will tend to produce 
information about itself and prevent others from doing so. 
The Fama and Laffer assumptions of primary concern to our discussion 
are as follows: 
1. Firms are perfectly competitive in their product markets, and the 
capital market is perfect in the sense of zero transaction costs (costless 
access to publicly available information) and the existence of perfect sub-
stitutes for the firm's securities. 
2. Investors can trade in the market without identifying themselves as 
possessing new information. 
3. Investors have "homogeneous expectations" in that they agree on 
the implications of any given information set for the equilibrium prices of 
securities. 
4. A seller of new information insists that the purchaser guarantee 
against resale of the information. 
Moreover, it is assumed that any potential producer of information 
about a firm knows the probability distribution of market value changes 
associated with different levels of information expenditures, and that— 
should these distributions have a zero mean—this fact is costless information. 
As a result, market prices impound it, and the consequence of going from 
zero to some positive level of expenditure is a probability distribution of 
market value that has a zero mean. 
Implications for Accounting 
To examine the implications of the conclusions for the need to specify 
accounting alternatives, assume first that the firm is the sole producer of 
information. If the firm is a monopolistic producer, it will benefit its share-
holders by enabling them to sell their stock in the case of negative fore-
knowledge information. Positive information would eventually come to light 
anyway and will not affect the expected gain to the firm's shareholders. But 
in the case of discovery information23 the firm will release positive information 
and either suppress negative information or give shareholders the oppor-
22 Which is an unlikely situation when the type of information produced is one 
that relates to a firm's specific events (see discussion below). Moreover, Fama and 
Laffer state that " the firm is not limited to direct competit ion with independent 
producers for sales to outsiders, since the cost to an outsider of producing informa-
tion about a firm is likely to be somewhat in the firm's control." ("Information and 
Capital Markets," p. 298.) 
23 The dichotomy between foreknowledge and discovery information was first 
made by Hirshleifer ("Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive 
Activity"). Foreknowledge consists of events that will become known whether or not 
information about them is generated. Discovery involves things that would not become 
known without information production. 
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tunity to sell before the information reaches the market.24 
When information generation is competitive, the firm will prevent entry 
by independent producers, give its information output to its shareholders, 
and recover its costs entirely from sales to outsiders. In this case, since the 
information will be available both to the firm's shareholders and to outsiders, 
no investors will have expected trading gains. In the case of partial monopoly, 
the firm will act like a monopoly with respect to incremental information that 
the firm produces for which the marginal cost is below that of the next 
cheapest producer. 
Thus, except for the case of competitive generation of information25 
there are likely to be trading gains or losses, i.e., redistribution of wealth. 
In the absence of a requirement with respect to immediate dissemination of 
information generated or known to the firm, and given all the Fama and Laffer 
assumptions,26 there are incentives that induce firms and outsiders either 
to sell information or to trade on its basis—thus causing redistribution of 
wealth. This shift of wealth may violate social distributive criteria of welfare 
aside from waste of resources. Thus, a requirement that information known 
to the firm must be disseminated can help in preventing shifts of wealth that 
could be socially undesirable even when the information produced is 
assumed to have no allocative effects. 
It is apparent from the foregoing that production of information which 
has allocative effects27 may be consistent with Pareto optimality in the sense 
that the benefits resulting from production decisions based on the information 
generated may well exceed the costs of producing the information. Indeed, 
given the Fama and Laffer assumptions, both the firm and outside inde-
pendent producers would have the incentive to generate the information 
and either act upon it or sell it.28 
It now becomes important to carefully examine the Fama and Laffer 
assumptions to determine whether, indeed, there is enough incentive to 
generate socially beneficial information that has allocative effects. Indeed, 
it seems unlikely that any information would have only a distributive effect 
and would not improve production decisions or the consumption-investment 
opportunities of individuals. For example, positive information (whether 
2 4 Fama and Laffer, "Information and Capital Markets," p. 294. Notice that in the 
case of discovery information, negative information may be suppressed. In a case 
where discovery information has allocative effects (in that it leads to improved oper-
ating decisions), on the other hand, it probably would not be disseminated, thus 
causing sub-optimali ty even under the strict assumptions made by Fama and Laffer. 
25 As indicated, this is unlikely with respect to the f irm-specif ic information since 
the firm has first access to the transactions giving rise to such information. 
26 " Information and Capital Markets." 
2 7 Notice that Fama and Laffer postulated that discovery information may well be 
of the type that can improve production, i.e., have allocative effects. 
28 Except in the case of negative discovery information which, once generated, 
may be suppressed by the firm. 
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foreknowledge or discovery) released by the firm will bring about a positive 
revision in the prices of securities which in turn would reduce the cost of 
capital-raising. This, in itself, is bound to have an effect on resource alloca-
tion decisions within the firm. 
The assumption that the capital market is perfect and that producing 
firms are perfectly competitive in their product markets is needed so that 
information about a specific firm will not affect the consumption-investment 
opportunities of individuals except through its effects on their wealth. This 
is analogous to Hirshleifer's assumption of pure exchange29 in which only 
the endowment vector of individuals, rather than production, is affected by 
the information generated. But information about a product or an industry 
is likely to affect consumption-investment opportunities through its implica-
tions for changes in relative prices. Thus, in the case of nonperfectly com-
petitive product markets or a nonperfect capital market or in the case where 
information is generated about an industry rather than about a single firm, 
the information generation will probably affect consumption-investment op-
portunities of investors, and thus affect the reallocation of resources and not 
merely the distribution of wealth.30 
Another set of assumptions that is not likely to hold is (a) that investors 
can trade without indicating that they possess new information and (b) that 
the seller of new information insists that the purchaser guarantee against 
resale of the information. The first assumption (nonidentifiability of a pos-
sessor of new information) insures that returns from exclusive access to 
information can be maximized. Through the second assumption other poten-
tial purchasers can be guaranteed exclusive access to the information sold. 
To the extent that either of these assumptions does not hold, which is the 
likely case, the incentive to generate and to communicate new information is 
significantly lessened. It is usually difficult to observe the selling of informa-
tion about a firm, especially accounting information. Accounting information 
is provided at zero price. This is probably so because the transaction costs 
of guaranteeing exclusive access to the information and of maintaining the 
unidentifiability of the possessor of new information are very high.31 
Even if information were sold at a positive price, the ability of the 
resulting price to provide an appropriate signal and incentive for the genera-
29 "Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive Activity." 
30 These are probably the situations that Hirshleifer considers as " the more realistic 
regime in which production and exchange both take place." (Hirshleifer, "Private 
and Social Value of Information and the Inventive Activity," p. 566.) 
31 While information in the nature of "consul t ing advice" is sold by consult ing and 
management-services firms, the costs of policing the right and the exclusive access 
of the purchaser to the information are much smaller than those associated with 
guaranteeing access to information in the nature of " fac ts" about a firm. This is 
particularly true if we allow for heterogeneous expectations governing at the market 
place so that there is disagreement about the implications of facts. The interpretive 
processing by "advisors" can be viewed like any other commodity that commands 
a non-zero price in the market. 
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tion of information would be very limited. This is so because the ability to 
enforce the right to exclusive access to the information purchased determines, 
to a significant extent, the value of that information and its price. The ability 
of such enforcement is likely to be very limited in the case of information 
about a firm (including accounting information), and thus the private benefit 
for the seller is apt to be significantly below the social benefit.32 
The observance of zero prices for information about a firm (primarily 
accounting information) and the regulation of the amount and nature of 
information to be included in reports issued by the firm about itself are 
consistent with the assumption that the costs of policing information are ex-
cessively high. In other words, the reason that accounting information is 
presently regulated is probably because the property policing costs are too 
high to allow the market to generate accurate information on the social 
benefits of accounting information. In this situation, the SEC's, or preferably 
the profession's, determination of the objectives and nature of desirable 
accounting information may be the most practical way of coping with the 
nonfeasibility of guaranteeing exclusive access to information about the firm, 
just as government non-price rationing may be the most practical way of 
coping with high exchange costs. It should be noted, however, that the SEC's 
or the profession's rationing of information about the firm is costly and only 
second best to a market in which exchange and enforcement costs were low. 
Regulation, essentially a political process, would result in less efficiency 
than reliance on a market with low transaction costs. But, in the absence of 
the latter, regulation may be the only efficient way of ascertaining the social 
value of information about a firm unless the cost of regulation per se exceeds 
the benefits from rationing, in which case regulation should be eliminated.33 
Finally, the assumption of homogeneous expectations makes possible 
the proposition that there can be general agreement on the probability dis-
tributions of market value changes associated with different information 
expenditures and, if these have non-zero means, market prices will adjust 
unbiasedly. Once we allow for heterogeneous expectations, this will not 
hold and the likelihood that incentives for generating information would exist 
will not be assessable. 
If the above assumptions do not hold there may not be incentives in 
the market for generating information nor for overproducing information. In 
this case, and when the information has allocative effects (i.e., when informa-
tion affects resource allocation for productive purposes), the systems of 
incentives presently provided in the market may not induce the generation 
and communication of socially desirable information. 
32 For a lucid discussion of issues related to the impact of enforceability of rights 
to property on prices, see Harold Demsetz, "The Exchange and Enforcement of Prop-
erty Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, VII (October 1964), pp. 11-26. 
33 This " t ru is t ic" statement merely indicates the desirability of an extensive cost / 
benefit study of accounting information regulation. Such a study itself is not costless. 
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Effects of Disclosure Rules 
We now examine the possible effects of disclosure laws and regulation 
of information on the incentive for producing information about firms. If 
information that could potentially be produced by a firm has only distributive 
effects (e.g., for trading purposes), the present disclosure laws may lead to a 
social optimum.34 If the firm is a monopolistic producer of information it will 
generally lose its incentive to produce the information, since under the dis-
closure regulations it is prohibited from discriminating in favor of its share-
holders or from selling the information. This is also the case when the firm 
is able to produce the same information that an outside producer can gen-
erate at a lower cost. But as Fama and Laffer comment,35 there may be 
situations in which the disclosure laws can lead to inefficiencies in the sense 
that an outsider produces information that the firm could produce more 
cheaply were it not for the disclosure law that destroys the firm's incentive 
to produce. A more detailed analysis of the effect of the particular disclosure 
law in existence may help to clarify these points. For this purpose it will be 
assumed that the information discussed has potential allocative effects. 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, profits made within six 
months by a firm's officers through trading in the firm's stock inures to the 
firm [Section 78p(b) of the 15th U.S. Code], Moreover, Rule 10b-5 (of Title 240 
of the Code of Federal Regulations) prohibits the use of manipulative and 
deceptive devices, which are broadly construed to include making "any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security." Rule 10b-6 of the same regulation prohibits trading 
in securities by parties interested in their distribution. 
Under these rules a firm's officer, who is either in the possession of 
information or of the means to produce information which is either not likely to 
be revealed by an alternative source outside the firm within a period of six 
months36 or whose effect on price is expected to persist beyond six months, 
would have an economic incentive to maximize his gains from the infor-
mation by either trading in the stock himself or by selling the information 
to potential traders. (Notice that the law does not affect profits made through 
trading within a period that exceeds six months.) This does not mean that 
such an attempt to capitalize on information is costless. The attempt may be 
3 4 See Fama and Laffer, " Information and Capital Markets," p. 298. 
35 Ibid. 
36 The information could not likely be revealed by an outside source either if the 
insider has monopolist ic access to it (as a result of his position or decision-making 
function within the firm) or because the insider can produce the information more 
cheaply, thus enabling him to deter the production by outsiders. Notice that much of 
the relevant information possessed by firm insiders is an already manufactured by-
product of decision-making within the firm (e.g., cash flow forecasts necessary to make 
investment or divestment decisions), and the marginal costs of producing this informa-
tion for the firm insider (or decision-maker) is zero. 
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strictly illegal under Rules 10b-5 and 10b-6, and the expected consequences 
of illegal action must be perceived as part of the cost of trading or of other-
wise selling the information by the insider. In addition to this cost, there is 
the risk of the insider being held liable for misleading the firm's stockholders, 
thus jeopardizing his position in the firm. 
At any rate, the incentive for acting on inside information that is likely 
to be profitable within a period exceeding six months is greater than the 
incentive to act upon the information whose usefulness is limited to a period 
of six months, since in the latter case the profits—by law—would inure to the 
firm. To the extent that the insider acts upon it, the information will eventually 
be impounded in market prices37 thus securing allocative efficiency. Such 
trading, however, would violate the distributive goals implied in the Securities 
Exchange Act. 
When the profits from using information are expected to be made if 
trading is completed within a period of six months, firm insiders would have 
no economic incentive to trade in the firm's stock, since the profit from 
trading will inure to the firm. An insider can, of course, sell the information 
to outsiders (not including the firm's shareholders since a major shareholder 
of the firm is also considered as an insider by the law), although the transac-
tion costs of selling such information to outsiders are apt to be high both 
economically and legally (due to Rules 10b-5 and 10b-6). To the extent 
that insiders would sell such information in spite of the economic and legal 
costs, the information will be impounded in prices, although in the process 
some resources will be wasted through higher costs (as well as through 
increased risk to the sellers). To the extent that insiders would be deterred 
from selling information in this case, there may still be an incentive to gen-
erate the information (if it is not already known) and to make it available. 
In the absence of a direct economic incentive for the insider either to trade 
or sell the information, it would be to his benefit to make it available to the 
firm's shareholders so as to enable them to maximize their wealth and thus 
indirectly reinforce the insider. 
But a distinction must be made between positive information (i.e., 
information which if known will push stock prices up) and negative informa-
tion (information which if known will bring prices down). If the information 
is positive, it benefits the shareholders if the information is made publicly avail-
able immediately since the market value of their holdings38 will be increased. 
In fact, firms' officers do seem to make positive information available imme-
diately through press releases, analysts' conferences, and speeches. Such 
37 Subject to the inefficiencies that may result from communicat ing the information 
through insiders' actions for profit maximizing purposes versus immediately making 
the information available publicly, as discussed earlier. 
38 In the case of foreknowledge, the only benefits of immediately making available 
positive information from the point of view of shareholders is temporal, i.e., the price 
increase occurs immediately rather than later in time. In the case of discovery infor-
mation, however, the benefits consist of the total increase in wealth as a result of 
prices going up, since if information is not generated and communicated, it will not 
be known. 
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releases tend to be timed shortly before new issues or secondary issues of 
securities are offered even though this practice is illegal. This is understand-
able since the impact on prices of new information tends to reduce the firm's 
cost of raising capital. From the point of view of social optimal allocation, the 
public may be able to make more informed allocation decisions if specific 
information about a firm is periodically and systematically released so that it 
can be compared with information about other firms released at about the 
same time. The social benefit of such presentation which enables this com-
parison across firms may well exceed the private benefits perceived to inure 
to the firm as a result of such periodic reports. Thus, the firm may not have 
an incentive to communicate its information in such a manner, although such 
periodic and systematic communication—in addition to facilitating the com-
parison across firms—could enable potential investors to monitor and audit 
the information and thus assess its reliability. 
In the case of negative information, the firm will have no economic 
incentive to make the information public.39 It is again useful to make the 
distinction, however, between foreknowledge and discovery information. In 
the case of foreknowledge, since the information will become known later 
to the public, the firm will have an incentive to generate the information and 
make it known to its shareholders so that they can avoid capital losses by 
selling their stock. Because of the existence of the disclosure law, however, 
such trading will not enable shareholders to avoid losses. Since positive 
knowledge will only produce temporal benefits, the incentive to the firm for 
generating and communicating foreknowledge would be substantially reduced 
in cases where a disclosure law does not exist. Positive knowledge, being 
foreknowledge, will become known and inure to the benefit of shareholders 
anyway.40 When negative information is already generated as a by-product 
at zero marginal cost (as in the case of forecasts necessary to make deci-
sions which have to be made anyhow), such negative information will neither 
be acted upon by shareholders (in view of the law) nor publicly revealed 
(assuming that the firm will run the risk associated with Rule 10b-5). 
In the case of discovery information, the incentive for the firm to produce 
the information will be provided only through the positive information, since 
negative information will be suppressed (assuming again that the firm is 
willing to run the risk associated with Rule 10b-5). Positive information will 
be immediately made available so as to increase shareholders' wealth as 
soon as possible. Thus, the disclosure law is likely to exert only a small 
impact on inhibiting the production of discovery information.41 
39 Except for the risk associated with not disclosing known negative information 
due to Rule 10b-5 of Title 240, as explained above. 
4 0 But the identity of the benefitting shareholders may change between the point of 
time at which the foreknowledge would otherwise have been generated and the point 
of time at which it becomes publicly known. In that case, the temporal benefits re-
ferred to above and foregone as a result of late generation of the information would 
include wealth transfer from potential to existing shareholders. 
41 This slightly inhibiting effect results from whatever impact Rule 10b-5 will have 
on the l ikelihood that the firm will suppress negative information. 
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However if, as is likely, most of the insider information is foreknowledge 
(being results of decisions and actions already taken by a firm), it is highly 
likely that the net effect of the disclosure law will be to inhibit the processing 
and communication of insider information. To the extent that inside informa-
tion has potentially beneficial allocative effects, the net effect of the disclosure 
law would be harmful since it will not reveal information that improves the 
allocation of resources. Hence, the consideration of requiring, through regu-
lation or through specification of objectives, that inside information be 
periodically and systematically processed and communicated may well be 
worthwhile. 
Conclusions 
Considering the existing theory and evidence related to efficient markets, 
the choice among accounting alternatives cannot be determined solely 
through the examination of market price reactions to accounting information. 
Explicit formulation of accounting objectives is needed. 
Market incentives, even in the absence of present disclosure laws, may 
not be sufficient to insure the production and communication of economically 
useful information. The existing disclosure laws aggravate the problem and 
seem to reduce the incentive to produce and disseminate useful information. 
To the extent that information has potential allocative effects outside the 
firm, the existence of a disclosure law may be suboptimal because the firm 
would lack the incentive to produce information that could make resource 
allocation more efficient. Thus, present disclosure laws that prohibit the 
firm from selling information or from benefitting its shareholders vis-a-vis 
others can destroy the incentive to produce economically useful information. 
Presumably, the intent of present disclosure laws is primarily to prevent 
undesirable redistribution of wealth that could result from monopolistic access 
to information. In the process, however, the overall magnitude of wealth 
may be lessened as a result of impeding the production of desirable signals 
for resource allocation. If the wealth-distribution goal implied in the dis-
closure law is taken for granted, regulation of what information is to be pro-
duced and disclosed by a firm is needed to insure that information useful for 
allocation decisions is produced by a firm. 
In other words, if present disclosure laws must continue to exist to 
satisfy wealth distribution and other goals, additional regulation of account-
ing information by the private and/or governmental sectors seems warranted 
to nullify the adverse effect that the present laws may have on the production 
and communication of economically useful accounting information. More-
over, even if present laws are abrogated, market forces still do not seem to 
provide sufficient incentives for the production of useful information, thus 
implying that regulation appears necessary. The formulation of accounting 
objectives, preferably by the accounting profession and other directly involved 
parties, is a preliminary and a necessary step for such regulation. 
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2. The Conceptual Inquiry 
The "Right To Know"* 
David R. Herwitz 
Summary 
The question of who has a "right to know" what about a publicly held cor-
poration has emerged in the discussions of the Study Group on a number of 
occasions. At the moment it may be said that the law does not appear to 
recognize any general, unqualified right to information about the affairs of a 
corporation. There is an obvious trend under stock exchange regulations and 
SEC pronouncements toward requiring full and prompt disclosure of all ma-
terial facts and events relevant to the financial position of a corporation; but, 
at least in the case of the SEC developments, the focus seems to be as much 
on preventing unfair trading advantages for insiders as on validating anyone's 
right to know. Developments with regard to information about nonfinancial 
matters, such as protection of the environment and minority employment prac-
tices, are very much in a state of flux; but there does not appear to be any re-
quirement that corporations disclose such data unless it is financially relevant.1 
* This paper was submitted to the Study Group on the Objectives of Account ing 
in August 1972. Footnote one was added subsequent to that date. 
1 The fol lowing discussion does not deal with the question of whether stockholders 
by an appropriate vote can compel management to disclose non-financial informa-
tion. In recent years a number of stockholder proposals for disclosure of information 
about corporate activities in areas of public concern have been made under SEC 
Proxy Rule 14(a)-8; and while none of these proposals have attracted widespread 
support, they have dramatized the increased interest of the investing public and 
society at large in the matter of corporate societal responsibility. For an excellent 
discussion of this subject, together with the related topics of shareholder efforts to 
compel broader disclosure through actions to inspect corporate books, and interroga-
tion of management at the annual meeting, see Blumberg, "The Public's 'Right to 
Know': Disclosure in the Major American Corporat ion," The Business Lawyer, Vol. 28 
(1973), p. 1025. 
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Financial Information 
The starting point for any analysis of this topic is SEC Rule 10b-5, which 
expressly forbids misrepresentation or other deception in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security, and is viewed as impliedly requiring affirm-
ative disclosure of all relevant information. The entire thrust of federal securi-
ties legislation, as well as the express reference to purchase or sale of a 
security in Rule 10b-5 [and in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 under which the Rule was promulgated] indicates that Rule 10b-5 is 
primarily directed at financial information which would be relevant to existing 
or prospective investors (including, without further delineation herein, many 
types of creditors). Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act seems to be to the same 
effect, in requiring every issuer of a registered security to file with the Com-
mission such information and reports as the Commission may require "for the 
proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the security" 
(although perhaps the Commission could find support in this broad language 
for compelling disclosure on a broader front if it chose to do so). Accordingly, 
in thinking about whether and when there may be a right to know, it seems 
useful to look first at financial information, and consider later other types of 
data relating to an enterprise. (However, it must be kept in mind that any 
dichotomy along this line is far from clear-cut; for example, even if it is 
assumed that general information about a firm's impact on the environment 
is outside the normal bounds of financial data, certainly a clear prospect of 
liability under existing antipollution legislation would be relevant financial 
information under the most traditional standards.) 
To take the polar case under Rule 10b-5 first, there is no doubt that 
insiders (including the corporation itself) and their tippees must disclose any 
relevant nonpublic financial information they may have to existing share-
holders before purchasing shares from them. But notice that this result may 
rest entirely upon the notion of fair play on the part of insiders toward the 
stockholders they are supposed to be serving, and does not depend upon 
any general right to know on the part of stockholders. However, in view of 
the reference to sale as well as purchase in Rule 10b-5 it was perhaps 
inevitable that the Rule would also be applied to sales of stock (despite 
the serious technical obstacle that finding a civil remedy for buyers under 
Rule 10b-5 seems inconsistent with the express but somewhat qualified 
remedies for injured buyers under sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities 
Act of 1933). Finding liability to a buyer, of course, takes Rule 10b-5 beyond 
the confines of fair play on the part of insiders to existing stockholders, as 
does applying the Rule in the case of a misrepresentation by one who is not 
an insider (although that may be rested simply on the traditional legal pro-
hibition against affirmative misstatements). 
A more testing question as to the scope of Rule 10b-5 comes when 
one who is not an insider (whether he acts as buyer or seller) is guilty of 
mere nondisclosure, as distinguished from an affirmative misstatement (or a 
half-truth). Under common law principles, there was doubt whether any 
obligation to speak arose in an ordinary arm's-length transaction, absent 
some special relationship such as that of a fiduciary to his beneficiary. Hence 
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the construction of Rule 10b-5 (which, it should be recalled, does not ex-
pressly require disclosure except where necessary to prevent something that 
has been said from being misleading) to require disclosure by insiders to 
selling stockholders might have been premised on the view that the relation-
ship between insiders and stockholders was "special,"—quasi-fiduciary— 
leaving intact the common law insistence on some special relationship as a 
condition for requiring disclosure; and this indeed was the early view of 
Rule 10b-5. But the more recent developments indicate that the courts are 
moving in the direction of finding that Rule 10b-5 requires disclosure of any 
material, nonpublic information (except perhaps the product of a person's 
own effort or imagination) by any buyer to his seller, or vice versa. Even so, 
query how constructive it is to think of this as a right to know on the part of 
the complaining party; it may be as aptly thought of as a localized version of 
the abolition of "caveat emptor" in favor of "caveat vendor." 
Much more consistent with a general right to know on the part of in-
vestors is the growing trend toward requiring publicly held corporations "to 
make prompt and accurate disclosure of information, both favorable and 
unfavorable, to security holders and the investing public." Sec. Act Release 
No. 5092 (October 15, 1970) was expressly reaffirmed by the Commission in 
Sec. Act Release No. 5263 (June 22, 1972). Release No. 5092 emphasizes 
that this obligation is not satisfied merely by fulfilling the periodic reporting 
requirements to the SEC (including the required reporting of important events 
within ten days after the end of the month in which they occur); the company 
"still has an obligation to make full and prompt announcements of material 
facts regarding the company's financial condition." The disclosure policies 
of the various stock exchanges are in the same vein. For example, the New 
York Stock Exchange's "Policy on Timely Disclosure" starts with the follow-
ing statement: "A corporation whose stock is listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange is expected to release quickly to the public any news or informa-
tion which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for 
securities."2 
What is the authority for this requirement by the Commission and the 
Exchanges of prompt public disclosure? Of course the Exchanges have the 
power to promulgate reasonable rules governing the conduct of the com-
panies whose stock is listed thereon; and the Commission's Release seeks 
to draw some support from that, expressly referring to the "rules and direc-
tives of the major exchanges" embodying a "policy of prompt corporate 
disclosure of material business events." But the real enforcement arm here, 
potential civil liability, is more likely to flow from violation of SEC rules and 
regulations than those of the stock exchanges (although the possibility of 
suspension from trading or delisting by an Exchange must be kept in mind), 
so the Commission's posture becomes the most important one. In any event, 
note that this broad, general disclosure requirement goes beyond the scope 
of Rule 10b-5 as discussed thus far, for it is not confined to situations where 
2 New York Stock Exchange Company Manual, A-18; accord, American Stock 
Exchange Company Guide, pp. 101-114. 
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an insider or anyone else is personally taking advantage of the information 
not yet released to the public; in addition, it is not aimed principally at 
protecting existing stockholders of a company, as distinguished from the 
investing public at large. Instead, this insistence on immediate full dis-
closure seems to rest on a kind of "integrity of the marketplace" footing, or, 
a right to know on the part of all of the investing community. Indeed, the 
SEC Release concludes with the observation that prompt disclosure of 
material corporate developments is necessary "so that investor confidence 
can be maintained in an orderly and effective securities market." 
On the other hand, there are some intimations in Release No. 5092 
which indicate that it may stem largely from Rule 10b-5. Thus the Release 
notes that unless the policy of providing adequate information is followed, 
a company may not be able to purchase its securities, and the insiders may 
not be able to trade its securities without running a serious risk of violating 
Rule 10b-5. The Release does not contain any suggestion that a failure to 
make the prompt disclosures called for would subject the company or its 
management to liability to market buyers or sellers even if the company and 
its insiders were not trading. Is that because Rule 10b-5 would not support 
liability in such a case? Not according to Professor Bromberg, who suggests 
in his article, "Disclosure Programs for Publicy Held Companies—A Practice 
Guide,"3 that there could be liability under the Rule in those circumstances. 
As he notes, the Texas Gulf Sulphur case held expressly that the company 
could be liable to market buyers and sellers for publishing misleading in-
formation even though the company was not itself dealing in its shares.4 
However, it must be noted that this does not reach the question of whether a 
company has an affirmative obligation to disclose current developments, 
such as the ore strike in Texas Gulf. Similarly, in most of the other cases 
cited by Professor Bromberg there had been some affirmative statements, 
which became misleading upon the failure to go on to disclose other per-
tinent information, thus bringing the situation squarely within clause (2) of 
Rule 10b-5, prohibiting any omission to state a material fact which is "neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading." 
Of course, the line between simple nondisclosure, and a failure to dis-
close something which is needed to prevent what has already been said 
from being misleading, can be quite obscure. For example, Heit v. Weitzen,5 
one of the cases cited by Professor Bromberg, held that the publication of 
financial statements which did not disclose that substantial amounts of the 
corporation's income resulted from overcharging on government contracts 
constituted a violation of Rule 10b-5, for which market purchasers might 
recover against the corporation. While in a sense this might be viewed as 
3 Duke Law Journal (1970), pp. 1139, 1144. 
4 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968). 
5 402 F2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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"mere" nondisclosure of an independent fact—the overcharges on the gov-
ernment contracts—it is equally appropriate to regard the published financial 
statements as affirmatively misleading for lack of an offset to the reported 
income figure, and/or a contingent liability on the balance sheet. (Paren-
thetically, it might be noted that in making Rule 10b-5 applicable in this type 
of case, no one supposes that it will actually induce public revelations about 
overcharges; rather the hope is that the additional risk of liability under Rule 
10b-5 will lead to a cessation of overcharging.) 
In any event, the court in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case expressly dis-
avowed any unqualified obligation to publicize all material corporate develop-
ments immediately. Rather, the court specifically reserved the right of the 
corporation to refrain from publicizing information about the possible mineral 
strike long enough to allow the corporation to pursue its own interests by 
acquiring additional mineral rights in the area. As the court put it, "the 
timing of disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the corporate 
officers entrusted with the management of the corporation within the affirma-
tive disclosure requirements promulgated by the exchanges and the SEC."6 
However, this was coupled with the warning that insiders, including the cor-
poration, must refrain from dealing personally in the company's stock, or 
revealing the information to outsiders, during any such period of nondis-
closure. (The aforementioned disclosure regulations of the Exchanges also 
recognize that a corporation may delay disclosure in order to serve some 
legitimate corporate interest, but they call for immediate disclosure in any 
event if widespread rumors develop or there is evidence of trading by insiders 
or tippees; SEC Release No. 5092 is silent on this.) 
Thus it appears that the fundamental theme of Rule 10b-5 (and of the 
Exchange disclosure regulations as well) is the prohibition against unfair 
advantage to insiders or their tippees, not the right of the stockholders, or the 
investing community at large, to have prompt access to all relevant infor-
mation. (It may also be noted that protection of existing shareholders is not 
an absolute. For example, take a case like Texas Gulf, where it is good news 
that is not disclosed promptly although this may serve the best interests of 
the corporation and hence indirectly the main body of the stockholders, it 
will certainly put at a disadvantage any existing stockholders who sell during 
the period of nondisclosure, while benefiting any outsiders who buy the stock 
during the period of the market rise when the information is finally made 
public. Thus the interests of selling stockholders, once the principal bene-
ficiaries of Rule 10b-5, are subordinated to those of the corporation, so long 
as no insiders are taking advantage of the undisclosed information.) Inci-
dentally, Professor Bromberg acknowledges also that the basic thrust of Rule 
10b-5 is toward fairness more than information as such. In his book, Securi-
ties Law: Fraud, he comments that the primary goal of the Rule is to promote 
fairness in securities transactions by limiting the trading of insiders with 
secret information and then goes on to criticize those commentators who 
6 401 F2d at 850, note 12. 
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"have lost this perspective and treated 10b-5 as though it were an absolute 
requirement for disclosure."7 
Without attempting to make any forecast for the moment, I would not be 
surprised to see Rule 10b-5 continue developing more in the direction of this 
semi-penal emphasis on barring unfair advantage than toward a broader 
recognition of a right to know (although, of course, these two themes are 
often quite parallel). To illustrate, suppose an employee of the Federal 
Reserve Board, overhearing a decision to change interest rates which will be 
announced shortly, goes into the market for his own account before the 
public disclosure. I suspect that the employee would be found liable under 
Rule 10b-5 to those with whom he dealt (if they could be traced), in order to 
discourage this kind of conduct, although no one has a right to know this 
information until the proper announcement. Compare this with a case in 
which a company like Texas Gulf has made a major discovery on which it is 
delaying disclosure for bona fide corporate reasons. If the company were to 
disclose this information in the interim on a confidential basis to a lending 
institution with which it was negotiating for a promptly needed loan, I doubt 
that there would be liability to anyone else under Rule 10b-5, despite a 
general right to information on the part of the investing community, because 
the limited disclosure was in pursuit of a proper corporate objective (although 
the company might be liable if the lending institution breached the confi-
dence and used the secret information in the market). Of course the situation 
would be different if the company were dealing with several lending institutions 
and made the disclosure to some but not all; that would be improper, just as 
it would be if the company made the disclosure to a few favored stockholders 
or prospective stockholders. That is because investors must be treated fairly 
vis-a-vis one another, and not, it would seem, because of a right to know on 
anyone's part. 
Nonfinancial Information 
Assuming that a distinction can be drawn between financial and non-
financial information, the case for a right to know about nonfinancial matters 
would seem to be even weaker than with regard to financial data, at least 
under the regulations of the SEC and the Exchanges, with their heavy 
emphasis upon the integrity of the market and protection of investors. And 
former Chairman Casey of the SEC is on record in several speeches as 
opposing any effort to move the Commission beyond its normal sphere of 
financial data and into a kind of indirect policing of social policies like 
environmental protection and civil rights. Nevertheless, there have been 
some developments on the borderline between social responsibility and 
financial information that may be instructive. In Sec. Act Release No. 5170 
(July 19, 1971), the Commission called attention to the fact that some of its 
requirements governing disclosure of legal proceedings and description of 
registrant's business might well "relate to material matters involving the 
7 1971, p. 275. 
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environment and civil rights"; in particular, the Release notes that disclosure 
is required when compliance with legislation relating to environmental quality 
may necessitate significant capital outlays, or materially affect the earning 
power of the business, or cause material changes in the business. In addition, 
a company must disclose any material legal proceedings arising under 
statutes relating to the protection of the environment, such as the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act and the Clear Air Act. Similarly, disclosure is 
required of any legal proceedings arising under civil rights legislation which 
might result in the cancellation of a government contract, or termination of 
further government business, or sanctions imposed for violation of the non-
discrimination rules of any federal regulatory agency. 
More recently, Sec. Act Release No. 5235 (February 16, 1972) promul-
gated proposed amendments to the Commission's registration and report 
forms designed to specify more precisely the disclosure required in Release 
No. 5170 relating to environmental matters. The proposed amendments are 
generally consistent with Release No. 5170, but they go somewhat further in 
(1) apparently requiring disclosure of any pending governmental proceed-
ings, whether or not material amounts are involved, and (2) calling for dis-
closure of any proceedings "known to be contemplated" by governmental 
authorities against the company. 
These proposed amendments have been sharply criticized by Mr. 
Hornbostel of the Financial Executives Institute, as well as by a spokesman 
for an American Bankers Association Securities Subcommittee. One of Mr. 
Hornbostel's objections is that requiring disclosure of the effect that environ-
mental compliance "may have" on capital expenditures, earnings and com-
petitive position would amount to requiring forecasting, at a time when the 
legal and accounting issues involved in publishing forecasts are still very 
much under study. He also contended that a company should not be re-
quired to "forecast" the actions of government authorities by attempting to 
report on proceedings against the company that were merely "contemplated" 
by such authorities. 
However these current SEC proposals work out, they are obviously well 
within the traditional financial framework. As is well known, much of the cur-
rent debate goes well beyond this, pressing strongly for a greatly heightened 
corporate recognition of social responsibility, and urging more disclosure in 
general and development of accounting techniques in particular to help 
dramatize these concerns and measure performance relating to them. Thus 
Professor Schwartz of Georgetown Law School, who was very active in 
"Campaign G M," notes in his article, "Corporate Responsibility in the Age 
of Aquarius,"8 that securities laws are supposed to be concerned with not 
only protection of investors but also "the public interest," and he finds a 
public interest "in learning of the social performance of public companies." 
He urges "a study of disclosure rules under the proxy and periodic reporting 
requirements to devise areas of inquiry about the public sector of a com-
8 The Business Lawyer, Vol. 26 (1970), p. 513. 
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pany's activities," and adds that "accounting rules could be examined for 
means for describing social costs which at present are not absorbed by the 
company." 
In a subsequent article,9 Professor Schwartz criticizes SEC Release No. 
5170 for taking "a needlessly narrow concept of the role of the SEC"; he 
contends that instead "the SEC should search for ways to define clearly what 
must be disclosed and to develop understandable requirements that a court 
can enforce, rather than look for reasons not to do so." He describes the 
potential advantages of such a broader disclosure requirement in these 
terms: 
Shareholders need pertinent information about the impact of cor-
porate decisions, and not just for the purpose of being able to 
decide whether earnings or stock prices will be affected. Rather, 
since the shareholders' position in management's election is what 
legitimizes management's power, shareholders should be able to 
make decisions on the basis of adequate information before they 
make themselves part of the process. Institutions that are con-
cerned with public welfare should be especially mindful of this 
relationship. 
There is also a great indirect value involved in the disclosure of 
this kind of information. Disclosure can work like a market mechan-
ism. The disclosure of unflattering information imposes a cost— 
the cost of embarrassment—which might quickly turn into the cost 
of consumer retaliation. To avoid paying that cost, companies 
would have to change the facts required to be disclosed should they 
be embarrassing. Thus, disclosure would lead to the employment 
of more blacks, the abatement of pollution, or the production of safe 
automobiles so as to avoid recall. 
But there is another side to the disclosure coin in the social responsi-
bility area, as Professor Ruder of Northwestern University, who is largely in 
philosophical agreement with Schwartz, noted.10 After arguing that public 
corporations should use their corporate power and assets to satisfy public 
obligations, he adds the following observations (without any express recog-
nition of how disquieting they may be): 
Since it is probable that in the short run the earnings and dividends 
of a corporation which recognizes public obligations will not be as 
great as are those of corporations which do not recognize such obli-
gations, management's decision to forego short run profits will prob-
ably be material to the average shareholder. Thus, a management 
policy determination to pursue public obligations may become a 
material fact which must be publicly disclosed. Failure to do so 
9 Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 60 (1971), p. 57. 
10 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 114, (1965), p. 209. 
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may give rise to liabilities for the company and for corporate man-
agement. 
Whatever the merits of Professor Schwartz's views, the important point 
in the immediate context is that he does not purport to rely upon any basic 
legal right to know doctrine; rather he looks principally to a broadened scope 
for Rule 10b-5 and other traditional disclosure weapons (sparked perhaps 
by allegedly enlightened self-interest on the part of stockholders). Indeed, 
speaking more generally there does not appear to be any authority for a 
legally-recognized right to know on the part of society about the affairs of 
publicly owned corporations simply because they are large and powerful and 
may have a very significant impact on substantial segments of the public. 
However, one commentator, Schoenbaum, does claim to detect some devel-
opment of a doctrine along this line: 
In recent years a new policy basis for corporate disclosure has 
emerged. Its scope is not yet clear and it has not yet received 
formal recognition in the law, but its significance cannot be under-
estimated. This is the idea . . . that disclosure has a role in regulat-
ing corporations as major power centers of our society. Acceptance 
of this wider role of disclosure to any degree is to say that there is a 
direct relationship between corporate disclosure under the securi-
ties laws and corporate responsibility. 
The novelty of this view should be emphasized. It would mean that 
disclosure is not merely investor-oriented but society-oriented. The 
efficient allocation of capital resources is secondary to the ethical 
and moral aspects of disclosure—and ethics and morality encom-
pass more than merely restraining overreaching by insiders. The 
heart of the problem is getting at the impact of corporate behavior 
on society, not only as to its financial affairs, but also in the areas 
of civil liberties, the environment, health, safety and consumer 
rights.11 
It is to be noted that even Professor Schoenbaum looks ultimately to the 
SEC to develop this as a viable, working doctrine. He decries the barrier 
imposed by the current SEC emphasis on disclosure as relating merely to 
investors and the investing community. He observes that it is already "com-
monplace for corporations to recognize that disclosure should relate to the 
social influences of the business and its responsibility to society" in their 
annual reports, and urges the Commission to fashion rules requiring and 
governing the inclusion of such information in the annual reports. These 
additional comments may also be of interest: 
. . . the addition of society-oriented disclosure rules to present 
Securities and Exchange Commission regulation need not involve a 
11 "The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibi l i ty," 
Fordham Law Review, Vol. 40 (1972), pp. 565, 578. 
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departure from the principle of profit maximization or require the 
acceptance of a totally new concept of corporate duty. It would 
merely be a recognition of the fact that the large corporation is not 
a private and autonomous institution, but is a community asset 
which is public in its conduct, its mores and its impacts. The basis 
of increased disclosure is simply that although a corporation exists 
to maximize profits, society has a right to be informed of the un-
deniable public impact of its actions. 
Greater corporate disclosure requirements would have two impor-
tant effects. First, corporate decisions which have a societal impact 
would be more open to public view. There would be increased de-
bate among the public and among the corporation's shareholders 
concerning many decisions. Shareholder and public opinion would 
act as a check on management and stimulate executives to higher 
ethical standards regarding public interest matters. . . . 
A second result of increased disclosure would be to expose those 
areas of corporate behavior which cannot be reformed internally, 
but which must be dealt with through government action and legis-
lation. The theory here is that disclosure is the least restrictive form 
of regulation in that it provides an incentive for self-reform. But 
there will be matters which can be corrected only through direct 
action by government. Disclosure would provide a basis for know-
ing when new laws are needed and, just as important, when they 
are not needed.12 
It remains to be seen whether these views will ultimately prevail. 
Just for the sake of completeness, let me add that Leonard Savoie's 
article with the inviting title of "The Public's Right to Know,"13 does not reach 
these newer developments, but rather is addressed principally to traditional 
financial information and the importance to the accounting profession of 
satisfying the public's desires and needs in this area. And in an interesting 
reverse twist on the right to know, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
has just decided, in Frankel v. SEC, that the Freedom of Information Act does 
not require the Commission to allow a private plaintiff to inspect and copy the 
Commission's investigatory files on Occidental Petroleum, which had been 
the subject of a suit by the SEC for violations of Rule 10b-5, terminating in 
a consent decree. 
Whose Statements Are They? 
This question has arisen in a variety of contexts in the Study Group's 
discussions. In one sense, it is not really a live issue at all at the moment; 
for it is almost universally stated or assumed that a company's financial state-
12 "The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibi l i ty," 
Fordham Law Review, Vol. 40 (1972), pp. 565, 578. 
13 Financial Executive, Vol. 36 (1968), p. 20. 
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ments are both representations of the management and the ultimate respon-
sibility of management. True, there may be some inconsistency between this 
view and the acknowledged power of the accounting profession to dictate 
the rules under which management must prepare " i ts " statements, but this 
role of the profession has long been viewed as fully justified because of the 
need to control the inherent self-interest of management in the results shown 
by the financial statements. 
Nevertheless, the question of whose statements they are may have 
special relevance in connection with the right to know issue, especially in 
relation to nonfinancial information. For even if corporate managements have 
become somewhat inured to the control exercised by the profession over 
how to report financial results in the traditional accounting statements, there 
might be a good deal more resistance to any effort by the profession to 
determine what information is to be reported. After all, if there is any sig-
nificance in the notion that the financial statements are management's, it 
might at least be taken to mean that the question of what the financial state-
ments are to report upon is a matter for management to decide. So there 
might be some force in an objection to pressure from the accounting pro-
fession for the addition of a whole new dimension to management reporting, 
such as societal data; and this would be especially true if the profession was 
not prepared to take a significant share of responsibility in connection with 
the new reporting. (Incidentally, similar observations might be made about 
pressure on management to publish its forecasts.) 
Before concluding, it is worth mentioning that research to date has 
turned up only one searching examination of the "whose statement" question 
on the merits, not surprisingly by Mr. Herbert Miller.14 Mr. Miller observes that 
although the statements are usually said to be management's, the constraints 
of generally accepted accounting principles and the rules of the SEC leave 
management with only limited control over " i ts" statements. Thus the state-
ments end up as "the product of mixed responsibility, of compromises, of 
successful and unsuccessful persuasion by the CPA, and of chain-reaction 
imitation of what has been done in some other set of financial statements." 
He concludes with the following observation: "It seems reasonable to expect 
that all interested parties, including management, would gain if the CPA 
more aggressively sought and assumed greater responsibility in connection 
with the financial statements with which he is identified." 
14 "Audi ted Statements—Are They Really Management 's?" Journal of Accountancy 
(October 1964), p. 43. An article by Frese and Mautz in the March-Apri l 1972 Harvard 
Business Review accepts the traditional view and urges that management should 
accordingly become more deeply involved in accounting policy issues. 
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Economic Decision-Making and the Role 
Of Accounting Information 
George H. Sorter, Research Director, in collaboration with 
Martin S. Gans, Paul Rosenfield, R. M. Shannon and Robert G. Streit 
Individuals and private organizations that control or use economic resources1 
make decisions concerning them. Economic decisions involve production, 
distribution, exchange, consumption, saving, and investment of economic 
resources. 
Private and Public Goals 
Economic decisions are made to serve the goals of individuals and 
private organizations (private goals) and society as a whole (public goals). 
Private goals seek to increase present or prospective control and use of 
economic resources and to reduce uncertainty concerning the control and 
use of them. Public goals include protecting the economic welfare of indi-
viduals and increasing the economic welfare of society as a whole so as to 
effect an efficient allocation of resources. 
In a society such as the United States that emphasizes private enterprise, 
decisions made to serve private goals are encouraged by laws that define 
property rights, promote competition, and establish efficient markets. These 
laws are enacted in the belief that many decisions designed to serve private 
goals will result in an efficient allocation of resources. However, both private 
and public goals may change over time. Consequently, laws are modified 
when economic decisions that are designed to serve private goals conflict 
with public goals. Resulting changes in laws may either modify or control 
the ability of individuals and organizations to make economic decisions by 
transferring such decisions to governmental units. Laws are enacted, for 
example, to redistribute wealth or income, regulate monopolies, and improve 
social welfare and the quality of life. The economic decisions of persons 
1 "Economic resources are the scarce means (limited in supply relative to desired 
uses) available for carrying on economic activit ies." APB Statement No. 4, para-
graph 57. 
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and organizations are thus made continuously to serve not only private goals 
but also societal goals to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. 
Those who make economic decisions need information to achieve 
desired goals. Decisions made without adequate information result in the 
achievement of desired goals only by chance. The need to make informed 
economic decisions to serve private and public goals and to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources identifies the basic goal of financial state-
ments, expressed as follows: 
Financial statements should provide information useful in making 
economic decisions that result in an efficient allocation of resources. 
Achieving the Basic Goal 
In developing the objectives of financial statements for achieving the 
basic goal, the economic decisions made in an attempt to achieve private 
and public goals must be considered. Investigations must be undertaken to 
determine the information required for the decisions, and characteristics that 
make information useful for the decisions must be identified. Finally, the 
portion of the required information that can be best communicated in financial 
statements must be determined. 
Economic decisions are made by individuals and private organizations 
(private economic decisions) to serve private goals and also to serve public 
goals. Similar decisions are made by governmental units (public economic 
decisions) to serve public goals. Information provided by financial statements 
is required for both private and public economic decisions. Therefore, the 
objectives of financial statements must be responsive to the needs of decision-
makers in both the private and public sectors. 
Economic Decisions 
Economic decisions are made for the purpose of achieving a variety of 
goals. In spite of their diversity, all economic decisions have a feature in 
common: each decision involves benefits and sacrifices. Decision-makers 
are interested in determining how much they must surrender or give up 
(sacrifice) in order to receive something else which is presumed to be better 
(benefit). A benefit is defined as anything received that is considered to be 
advantageous or for the good of a person or thing; a sacrifice is defined as 
anything given up or the using up of something that is prized or desirable. 
Sacrifices and benefits are therefore considered to be anything given or 
received, respectively, including in each case foregone opportunities. Three 
dimensions of sacrifices and benefits are considered important for every 
economic decision, that is, the amount (how much?), the timing (when?), and 
the uncertainty relating to amount and timing (the risk). Economic decisions 
continually relate to transformations and trade-offs concerning these dimen-
sions of sacrifices and benefits. When borrowing money, for example, amount 
is sacrificed in exchange for timing. When lending money, timing and risk 
are sacrificed in exchange for a greater amount. The insured, in obtaining 
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casualty insurance, sacrifices amount and timing in exchange for reduced 
risk. By paying premiums before casualties occur, a sacrifice is incurred 
earlier than by not insuring. Premiums received by the insurance company 
are anticipated to be larger than the expected amount of the casualty losses 
by an amount sufficient to cover expenses and contribute toward profit; 
amount is also sacrificed in this case. The insured, however, receives cer-
tainty in exchange. 
Estimating Benefits and Sacrifices 
An economic decision-maker must explicitly or implicitly estimate the 
amount, timing, and related uncertainty of benefits and sacrifices affected by 
decisions. Since part or all of the benefits or sacrifices lies in the future, 
these variables cannot be known with certainty. 
A potential buyer of a security, for example, may know the sacrifice 
which would be incurred in buying the security, that is, how much money 
would have to be paid. The potential buyer, however, does not know the 
amounts, timing, or uncertainty associated with future receipts. A potential 
seller of a security, on the other hand, may know the benefits that would be 
received from selling the security, that is, how much money would be received. 
The potential seller, however, does not know the sacrifice which would be 
incurred. The sacrifice in selling the security is the benefits which would 
have been received had the security not been sold. Since the foregone 
benefits would have been received in the future, the potential seller does not 
know the amounts, timing, or uncertainty of the foregone benefits. Therefore, 
information in financial statements should help decision-makers to estimate 
the economic benefits and sacrifices which result from decisions. 
Comparing Benefits and Sacrifices of 
Alternative Courses of Action 
Some economic decisions consist of choosing between only two courses 
of action. Although only one alternative course of action may have been 
explicitly selected for evaluation, maintaining the status quo is treated as an 
alternative in all instances. Most economic decisions, however, involve 
choosing from among several competing alternative courses of action. Even 
the explicit consideration of multiple alternatives may result in selection of 
the status quo as being more desirable. Economic decisions therefore 
require a comparison of estimated benefits and sacrifices of competing 
courses of action. Information in financial statements should help decision-
makers to compare the estimated benefits and sacrifices associated with 
alternative courses of action. 
Controlling Benefits and Sacrifices 
Since some or all of the benefits or sacrifices of a decision may lie in 
the future, the decision-maker would like to control the outcome of the 
decision to the extent possible. This is the reason that a creditor, for 
example, may insist on certain indenture provisions, and why an owner may 
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be concerned with the conformity of enterprise activities with established 
goals as well as the safeguarding of assets. Various economic decisions 
provide different opportunities for control. Information in financial statements 
should help decision-makers to control the sacrifices and benefits that result 
from their decisions. 
Evaluating Past Events 
Past results are all that is known with certainty. Since all economic 
decisions concern the future, conjecture about what may happen is neces-
sarily based in part on information concerning what has happened. That is, 
knowledge about past events is not sufficient for predicting the future. Also 
required is an evaluation of past events in terms of the variables relevant for 
decisions under review. Thus, to facilitate the estimation, comparison, and 
control of future sacrifice-benefit relationships, information in financial state-
ments should help decision-makers evaluate past sacrifice-benefit relation-
ships. 
In summary, the foregoing analysis indicates four general criteria which 
characterize information considered useful for private economic decisions. 
Useful information helps a decision-maker to evaluate past benefits and 
sacrifices and to estimate, compare, and control the amount, timing, and 
related uncertainty of future benefits and sacrifices which result from decisions. 
The following important questions remain: (1) What types of information are 
needed to help the decision-maker to evaluate past benefits and sacrifices 
and to estimate, compare, and control future benefits and sacrifices? (2) 
What portion of such information should financial statements provide? 
Information Needed to Evaluate, Estimate, Compare, 
and Control Benefits and Sacrifices 
The decision-maker is of course interested in evaluating, estimating, 
comparing, and controlling benefits and sacrifices. For example, investors 
and creditors are interested in the amount, timing, and related uncertainty 
of cash inflows and outflows. However, benefits and sacrifices, as they relate 
to the achievement of the decision-maker's personal goals, are influenced 
by activities of the enterprise in which investors (present and potential) have 
an interest. 
Goals of each enterprise are either explicitly stated or implicitly held. 
They define the purpose and nature of the organization. All managerial 
decision-making and, in fact, all enterprise actions are directed toward the 
attainment of its goals. Information that enables users to evaluate enterprise 
goal attainment and to estimate, compare, and control the prospects for 
future goal attainment is the essence of all decisions concerning an enter-
prise. This is true whether these decisions are made internally by manage-
ment or externally by investors, creditors, donors, or governmental agencies. 
It might be argued that external decision-makers are merely concerned 
with information which relates to their own goals as opposed to information 
about enterprise goals. Investors might be interested only in the dividends 
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they receive and the market value of the stock they own, evaluated in terms 
of their own risk and return preferences regardless of the success of the 
enterprise in terms of its risk and return goals. Similarly, contributors to a 
university who are primarily interested in educational opportunities for a 
maximum number of students might look only to the number of students 
granted or expected to be granted degrees. These contributors may not be 
interested in the success of the university in terms of its teaching and 
research goals. 
However, the personal goals of external decision-makers are accom-
plished through enterprise activities aimed at accomplishing enterprise goals. 
While an enterprise may occasionally, through its actions, succeed in satis-
fying a decision-maker with divergent goals, this situation is not likely to 
persist. The external decision-maker must determine whether the achieve-
ment or prospective achievement of his goals is causally or accidentally 
related to enterprise goals. Each decision-maker is interested in the goals 
of the enterprise and how they relate to his personal goals. Information about 
past and prospective success of the enterprise in achieving its goals has an 
important impact on the decision-maker's perception of his personal goal 
accomplishment. 
In summary, information in financial statements should enable users to 
evaluate, estimate, compare, and control the goal attainment of an enterprise. 
Sacrifices and Benefits in Relation 
to Goal Attainment 
The goals of a specific organization define what is considered advan-
tageous or good, prized, or desirable and therefore define the nature of 
sacrifices and benefits for the organization. What represents a primary 
benefit or sacrifice for one organization may be a secondary benefit or 
sacrifice for another. For instance, a hospital which has profit as one of 
its goals may consider patient receipts as a primary benefit and thus 
take action aimed at maximizing such receipts. A not-for-profit hospital, 
for instance, is more willing to perform services for patients who cannot 
afford to pay. This is not to suggest that a not-for-profit organization is not 
interested in monetary matters but to indicate that its goals define primary 
benefits in a different manner. 
Given the definition of sacrifices and benefits, goal attainment for any 
enterprise involves an attempt to maximize benefits and minimize sacrifices. 
The maximization of benefits—in a broad sense—means increasing the 
quantity of benefits, accelerating the timing of the benefits, and decreasing 
the related uncertainty associated with amount and timing. Similarly, the 
minimization of sacrifices—in a broad sense—means decreasing the quantity 
of sacrifices, postponing the timing, and decreasing the related uncertainty 
associated with amount and timing. 
Therefore, the assessment of enterprise goal attainment requires infor-
mation which will facilitate analysis of sacrifice-benefit relationships. All 
purposeful events of an enterprise, since their primary purpose is to accom-
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plish enterprise goals, have certain sacrifice-benefit objectives. Events having 
a common sacrifice-benefit objective may be said to constitute an events 
cycle. For example, both the purchase and sale of inventory are distinct 
events that generally do not occur simultaneously, but they are clearly related 
in terms of purpose and consequently constitute part of the same events 
cycle. Cycles may be classified in terms of the three different stages of 
sacrifice-benefit relationships: events that are part of a completed sacrifice-
benefit relationship, events that are part of an incomplete sacrifice-benefit 
relationship, and events that are part of a contemplated sacrifice-benefit 
relationship. 
Completed cycles of events. These are cycles of events where all related 
events have occurred. They represent a completed sacrifice-benefit relation-
ship such as the purchase and subsequent sale of inventory. The sacrifice 
of having purchased the inventory will yield no future benefits and the benefits 
realized from the sale of inventory will require no future sacrifices. 
Incomplete cycles of events. An incomplete cycle of events represents 
a chain of events which are all part of an incomplete sacrifice-benefit rela-
tionship. A sacrifice may have been incurred, but a related benefit has not 
yet been realized; a benefit may have been realized, but subsequent sacri-
fices are required. For example, inventory that is purchased and awaiting 
sale represents an event which is part of an incomplete cycle. 
Contemplated cycles of events. This classification represents sacrifice-
benefit relationships which are planned although none of the events, that is, 
none of the sacrifices or benefits, have occurred. 
For purposes of evaluation, estimation, and control, these three cycle 
classifications must be distinguished. Criteria for evaluating completed cycles 
must differ from those used for evaluating incomplete or contemplated cycles. 
Since all related benefits and sacrifices have already occurred, a relatively 
comprehensive and definitive evaluation of events which are part of a com-
pleted cycle is possible. 
Incomplete cycles, on the other hand, must be evaluated not only in 
terms of the events that have occurred, but also by considering the pro-
spective outcome of related future events. Thus, an evaluation of incomplete 
cycles is much more conditional than in the case of completed cycles. 
Contemplated cycles also require evaluation. Since all events, how-
ever, are yet to occur, such an evaluation necessarily is more concerned with 
the planning process underlying the contemplated activities rather than infor-
mation about the activities themselves. 
Information about the different cycles is also utilized differently for 
estimation purposes. Information about past cycles can only be used infer-
ential^ in estimating the future; since the events constituting completed 
cycles lie wholly in the past and are interpreted to have no future conse-
quences, these events need not be explicitly considered in estimating the 
future. Rather, information about completed cycles constitutes an important 
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basis for projection after a judgment has been made as to what extent past 
relationships are considered indicative and relevant for the future. 
In contrast to the above, information about incomplete cycles must be 
explicitly considered in estimating the future. Information about incomplete 
cycles describes sacrifices that have occurred which are expected to yield 
benefits in the future and benefits that have been received which will require 
future sacrifices. In estimating future sacrifices and benefits, therefore, this 
type of information must be explicitly considered. 
Information about contemplated cycles is utilized in another, more 
different manner for estimation purposes. While information about plans and 
expectations is clearly relevant for estimation, such information is necessarily 
subjective and incapable of direct validation. It must therefore be separately 
analyzed and carefully distinguished from information capable of being 
partially or completely validated. 
Events which are part of a completed cycle, of course, can no longer 
be controlled. Information about completed cycles plays a role in the 
control process only to the extent that it indicates areas that might have 
been managed differently in the past. Such information may thus provide 
insight into the control of similar events in the future. 
Incomplete cycles are partially amenable to control and partially beyond 
control. Some costs are sunk, but the benefits to be realized from such sunk 
costs are to an extent controllable. Contemplated cycles are alterable to a 
much greater degree and thus provide the greatest opportunity for control.2 
Factual and Interpretive Information 
Financial statement users ultimately rely on their own assessment of 
past and future enterprise goal attainment. Two types of information are 
useful for enabling the user to make such an assessment. The first type 
is factual information about the occurrence of events which minimizes the 
judgments and interpretations of the supplier of information. The second 
type is interpretive information that incorporates the judgment of the supplier 
of information concerning the relationships among events in terms of goal 
attainment and the implication of past events in terms of future goal attainment. 
Factual information is not sufficient because the user is not in the best 
position to identify and assess the relationships of events in terms of goal 
attainment. Thus, given only factual information, a user would find it difficult 
to relate sacrifices made in one period with the related benefits realized in 
a subsequent period. On the other hand, merely providing interpretive infor-
mation that relates sacrifices and benefits and indicates contemplated future 
consequences of past events is not sufficient. If only interpretive information 
were provided, the user would have no available means for evaluating the 
interpretations of the preparer in terms of his own preferences and expecta-
tions. For example, the amounts presently disclosed on a balance sheet as 
2 The rationale for partit ioning enterprise activities in terms of cycles is more fully 
developed in the paper, "The Partitioning Di lemma," contained in this volume. 
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plant, buildings, and equipment reveal the portion of past sacrifices that are 
interpreted by the preparer to result in expected future benefits. Such inter-
pretive information is useful. However, factual information is also useful for 
describing the acquisition of buildings and equipment; such information is 
currently provided in funds statements. In conjunction with other information 
it can be used to validate or revise the judgments of preparers. 
Information Generated by the Accounting Process 
Accounting encompasses two processes: a data generation process 
and a data communication process. In generating data, accounting describes 
certain events or conditions principally in monetary terms using account-
ing terminology. For example, the purchase of 100 widgets for $1,000 gen-
erates accounting data in the form of an inventory increase of $1,000 and a 
cash decrease of $1,000. 
In the past, information communicated in financial statements has tended 
to be restricted to information generated by the accounting process. How-
ever, such a limitation does not adequately serve the goals discussed above. 
For instance, because of the many uncertainties involved, it may be unsuitable 
to generate an accounting description in terms of dollar amount of assets of 
the oil reserves of a particular concern. However, this should not mean that 
a nonaccounting generated description of oil reserves, such as the number 
of estimated barrels, should not be included in financial statements if such 
information is useful for the estimation, evaluation, and control of sacrifice-
benefit relationships. 
In summary, all decision-makers are interested in achieving their per-
sonal goals. Since the accomplishment of these goals is dependent upon 
the goal accomplishment of the relevant enterprise, decision-makers are 
interested in the past and prospective goal attainment of the enterprise. 
Therefore, decision-makers desire information useful for evaluating, estimat-
ing, comparing and controlling the amount, timing, and uncertainty of the 
sacrifices and benefits of an organization. Such information should consist of 
both factual and interpretive information, should separately describe com-
pleted, incomplete, and contemplated cycles of events, and should not be 
restricted to data generated by the accounting process. 
Information to Be Provided in 
Financial Statements 
The preceding section discusses information considered to be relevant 
for the evaluation, estimation, comparison, and control of benefits and sacri-
fices. However, financial statements are only one of many different sources 
of information, and not all information which is relevant can or should be 
communicated by financial statements. 
First, one cannot require that all relevant information be communicated. 
One must consider cost-benefit criteria. Information may be beneficial for 
assessing the goal attainment of an enterprise, but the cost of obtaining and 
disclosing this information may be greater than the potential benefit. Such 
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information should not be required to be reported by any information source. 
Any attempt to apply these cost-benefit criteria would be particularly bother-
some, because the benefits of information may accrue to parties who do not 
share in their cost. A company, for example, assumes the cost of preparing 
financial statements that will benefit prospective shareholders and the econ-
omy in general. Resolution of these conflicts is a difficult problem which lies 
with the business community as well as legal and political processes. It is 
important, however, to stress that information requirements must be subjected 
to a cost-benefit analysis. 
Second, even if the cost-benefit comparison is favorable, such that the 
information should be reported by some information source, it is not implied 
that all such information should be reported by financial statements. Infor-
mation should not be communicated by financial statements if other channels 
have a comparative advantage in communicating it. 
Third, information should be communicated in financial statements only 
if its credibility is reasonably ascertainable. Users have the expectation that 
information in financial statements is reliable, impartial, and unbiased. Such 
expectations provide a useful device for distinguishing financial statement 
information from other types. 
In summary, all information useful for the evaluation, estimation, com-
parison, and control of enterprise goal attainment should be provided in 
financial statements unless (1) the cost-benefit criteria are not met, (2) the 
information can be more advantageously communicated by other media, or 
(3) the information is such that its credibility is not reasonably establishable. 
Although the foregoing requirements are not inconsistent with existing 
financial statements, they indicate avenues for changing and improving pres-
ent financial reporting. The present content of the income statement closely 
approximates, in general, completed cycle activity; the existing balance 
sheet by and large describes incomplete cycles. In fact, each item on the 
balance sheet, whether asset or equity, either has a prospective dimension 
or else it would not be listed. Each asset connotes a future benefit and each 
liability a future sacrifice. In this sense, the above analysis provides a rationale 
and justification for the financial statements currently issued. 
The analysis also suggests, however, that the utility of the reports lies 
in highlighting sacrifice-benefit relationships. In the income statement the 
relationship between past benefits and past sacrifices is disclosed; in the 
balance sheet the relationship between past sacrifices and prospective bene-
fits (assets) and past benefits and prospective sacrifices (liabilities) is 
described. By implication, it seems that the balance sheet should disclose 
both sacrifice and benefit dimensions of assets and liabilities rather than 
only one or the other as is presently the case. Another implication can be 
reasonably justified: The relative certainty or uncertainty concerning the 
prospective benefits and sacrifices should be disclosed, and more detailed 
information under a separate classification should be provided for highly 
uncertain items. In addition, assets and liabilities should be grouped in terms 
of both the controllability of the prospective benefits or sacrifices and the 
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sensitivity of these phenomena to changes in the industry or economy. On 
the income statement the variability of sacrifice-benefit relationships should 
be highlighted through a proper grouping of sacrifices and benefits. 
The statement of changes in financial position or funds statement is not 
unlike the required statement presenting factual rather than interpretive 
information. The preceding analysis, however, provides a rationale for this 
financial statement; its purpose is explicitly stated as providing factual infor-
mation concerning events which are expected to influence goal attainment 
as opposed to mere description of how the events affect working capital. 
Conspicuously absent from present financial statements is information 
concerning contemplated cycles of events. This situation can be explained 
in many ways, some of which, however, are not appropriate in terms of the 
foregoing analysis. It is argued that accounting should deal only with history 
and therefore not deal with plans and forecasts. While the future is indeed 
the subject matter of forecasts, once formulated they become part of the 
past, that is, history. If forecasts are communicated, such communication 
does not imply that the forecasted events will occur, but rather that a plan 
or forecast concerning such events has taken place. Credibility concerning 
the occurrence of future events is of course impossible to establish, but it 
is possible to establish the credibility that a forecast was made and that it 
was formulated in a specified manner. Related to this issue is the assertion 
often made that forecasts are too inaccurate to be communicated. But the 
utility of a forecast as a type of financial statement is established not by the 
accuracy of the forecast itself, but rather by the accuracy of the resulting 
estimates made by users of financial statements. The central question is 
whether the estimates made by such users are more or less satisfactory 
with or without including forecasts as one of the enterprise financial state-
ments. 
The above analysis is applicable to all users and to all organizations, 
regardless of their specific goals. A brief application of this analysis for 
economic decisions which involve pecuniary benefits and sacrifices con-
cerning profit-making enterprises follows. 
Information Required for Credit and Investment Decisions 
Concerning Profit-Oriented Enterprises 
The primary decisions involving pecuniary benefits and sacrifices are 
credit and investment decisions. 
Credit Decisions 
A creditor loans money in exchange for a promise to receive money in 
the future. He knows his potential sacrifice, that is, the amount he expects 
to loan. Although he knows the amounts and dates of the promised repay-
ments, he nevertheless does not know what benefits will actually be received. 
He does not know if the borrower will be able to make the future payments 
when due. Thus, he is uncertain about both the amount and timing of his 
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future benefits. The borrower in a credit decision similarly knows the amount 
of money he will receive and the terms of the repayment that he promises, 
but he is not certain of his future ability to make repayments when due and 
the potential sacrifices that such repayments will entail. 
Since repayments lie in the future, they cannot be known with certainty, 
and both the lender and the borrower need information useful for evaluating 
the borrower's past success in meeting such obligations. They both also 
need information that will allow them to estimate the amounts, timing, and 
uncertainty concerning the future repayments. The lender needs to compare 
such information with alternative loan opportunities. The borrower needs 
information that will allow him to manage his resources and to control his 
activities such that repayment will be possible, and the lender needs informa-
tion to determine loan provisions to control the borrower's activity. 
Investment Decisions 
An investor makes two types of related decisions: whether to buy specific 
equity securities and whether to sell specific equity securities. His decisions 
involve choosing from among competing opportunities to buy and sell 
securities. He knows the sacrifice involved in buying securities, that is, the 
cost of the securities, but he does not know the benefits from the purchase, 
that is, the cash dividends he will receive and the proceeds from sale of 
the securities. Similarly, he knows the benefits from selling securities, that 
is, the proceeds from the sale, but he does not know the sacrifices involved 
in the sale, that is, the future cash dividends and selling price foregone. The 
unknown elements are therefore similar in both buying and selling investment 
decisions—the future dividends and selling prices of the security. The bene-
fits to be derived from credit or investment decisions, that is, the interest or 
dividends to be received from a firm and the proceeds to be realized from 
the sale of an investment, all depend on the cash generating ability of the 
firm. 
The principal goal of profit-oriented concerns is to return to owners 
of the firm over its life a maximum amount of cash over and above their 
original contributions. Thus, the attainment of this goal is also dependent 
upon cash generating ability.3 Therefore, there is a congruence of goals 
between creditors and investors and the goals of the firm in terms of maxi-
mizing cash generating ability. Consequently, financial statements of profit-
oriented concerns should be useful for evaluating, estimating, comparing, 
and controlling the cash generating ability of a firm. Sacrifices and benefits 
for such firms must be defined in terms of cash generating ability. Benefits 
for profit-making concerns are actual or prospective receipts of cash; sacri-
fices are defined as actual or prospective cash disbursements. 
The income statement, or statement of completed cycles, should provide 
information about cycles of events whose impact on the firm's cash generat-
3 This relationship is more fully discussed in the paper, "Earning Power and Cash 
Generating Abi l i ty," contained in this volume. 
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ing ability has been determined. Such a statement should report as revenues 
and expenses those benefits and sacrifices that have been realized in terms 
of cash generating ability. 
A benefit is realized and therefore recognized as revenue when a cash 
inflow has occurred or is highly probable and no further related unrealized 
sacrifice need be incurred. Similarly a sacrifice is realized and recognized 
as an expense when a cash outflow has occurred or is highly probable and 
when no further related unrealized benefit is expected. Actual receipt or 
disbursement of cash is not required for realization, but the cash impact of 
an event must be determinable with a high degree of probability in order 
for realization to occur.4 
The balance sheets of profit-oriented organizations should describe 
those cycles of events whose impact on the cash generating ability of a firm 
has not been determined with a high degree of probability. The sacrifice 
and benefit dimensions of assets and equities shown in such balance sheets 
should be measured in terms of actual or prospective cash impact. This 
provides a guideline for the valuation bases to be employed. The prospective 
dimension of each asset and liability (the benefit dimension of assets and 
the sacrifice dimension of equities) should be described in terms of the 
valuation base that most adequately reflects the amount, timing, and uncer-
tainty of the cash impact of the specific asset or liability. 
The statement of financial activities (the funds statement) should describe 
the factual aspects of events having, or expected to have, a significant impact 
on the cash generating ability of a firm. 
Not-for-Profit Organizations 
The broad requirements of financial statement information outlined in 
this paper are equally applicable to not-for-profit organizations. Of course, 
cash generating ability is not the goal of not-for-profit organizations. Benefits 
for these entities are not properly definable in terms of cash flows. Never-
theless, they have goals, and there are decision-makers who must evaluate, 
estimate, compare, and control the goal attainment of such enterprises. Thus, 
financial statements for such concerns should deal with goal attainment 
by reporting on completed, incomplete, and contemplated cycles of goal 
achievement events. 
Since the benefits for not-for-profit organizations are largely nonmone-
tary, while the sacrifices, to a large extent, are monetary, it may not be 
feasible to produce a dollar (bottom line) figure to describe the impact of 
completed cycles. It should, however, be possible to describe in non-
monetary terms the benefits realized by a concern's operations and the 
sacrifices required to produce such benefits. The final reckoning and evalu-
ation of the benefit-sacrifice relationship can properly be left to the user 
4 This concept of realization is more fully explored in the paper, "The Partitioning 
Dilemma," contained in this volume. 
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who should be provided with relevant information for making such a judg-
ment. It seems strange and somewhat illogical that financial statements of 
not-for-profit organizations presently have a greater degree of cash orienta-
tion than those for profit-oriented concerns. 
Public Economic Decisions 
Governmental units operate in a variety of roles while attempting to 
attain many different goals. In its role as the Department of Defense, for 
example, the federal government must evaluate, estimate, compare, and 
control significant amounts of cash receipts and disbursements. In its role 
as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the federal government must 
evaluate the information made available by firms for present and potential 
investors in accordance with specified laws. The federal government also 
has numerous other information needs when functioning as an employer, 
investor, creditor, or regulator. 
For some of those decisions the information detailed in the preceding 
sections is adequate. Governmental fiscal policy involving tax regulation and 
collection requires information on the cash generating ability of all firms 
and estimates of resulting cash flows to the government. Such policy deci-
sions are served by the information previously identified. 
Relevant information is also required for other governmental decisions. 
Government has the means to require the format and content of information 
it desires, while private sector users to a large extent do not have similar 
means. Nevertheless, describing some dimensions of information require-
ments of public sector decisions seems useful. 
The government must make economic decisions that consider the bene-
fits accruing to and the sacrifices extracted from society as a whole as 
opposed to private sector decision-makers who consider only their individual 
benefits and sacrifices. 
In some situations, benefits are realized by people other than those 
bearing the sacrifices, and sacrifices are extracted from people other than 
those receiving the benefits. Equitable resolution of such situations requires 
government action and cannot be left to economic decisions between private 
individuals. 
When the benefits or sacrifices received by some persons are not in 
the best interests of society as a whole, laws are enacted to bring the private 
benefits and sacrifices more in line with society's goals. In order to determine 
when legislation is needed, the government, acting on behalf of society as 
a whole, needs information concerning the social costs and benefits resulting 
from private economic decisions. 
To the extent that social costs or social benefits will have an effect on 
the cash generating ability of a firm, this information should be reported to 
facilitate decision-making in the private sector. However, a company may 
undertake activities which have social consequences that may not affect its 
cash generating ability in a manner which is easily measurable. This infor-
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mation may be essential for making decisions in the public sector. What, if 
any, role should financial statements play in providing this information? 
The answer may be found in the distinction between interpretive and 
factual information. There is a need for information concerning a firm's 
activities which have social consequences. A firm may have a comparative 
advantage in supplying factual information about such events. A firm is in 
the best position to design its information system to communicate information 
with social impact such as the number of minority group employees hired 
or the amount of pollutants produced by its activities. In communicating 
this information, however, firms are not in a position to evaluate the social 
consequences of these activities or to measure the achievement of social 
goals in the aggregate. 
As in the private sector, ultimate evaluation and judgment concerning 
the information should be left to the user—in this case, society and the 
government. Accordingly, the firm should communicate factual data in its 
financial statements concerning events having social consequences without 
attempting to evaluate such data in terms of its social significance. 
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A User Oriented Development of 
Accounting Information Requirements 
Joshua Ronen 
Introduction 
Accounting objectives should be based on economies of information, i.e., 
cost and benefit considerations.1 If accounting information were a commodity 
sold at the market clearing price, it could be argued that forces of market 
equilibrium could insure that accounting information would be produced and 
communicated at an optimum level consistent with equating the marginal 
methods and benefits and marginal costs of information. However, account-
ing information does not constitute a "private good" in the sense of ex-
changeability at the marketplace; rather, it is provided without charge by the 
firm to the consumers—in this case, the various users of accounting infor-
mation.2 Under these circumstances, the determination of the costs and 
1 Theoretically, the benefit of information is measured by the consequences of 
decision changes that occur as a result of the information. The cost of information 
is the value of resources committed to obtaining and communicat ing it. 
2 The aspects of private goods vs. public goods and the implications of optimal 
condit ions of welfare as well as the underlying factors in determining what constitutes 
public goods are extensively discussed in the literature. For a good example, see 
Harold Demsetz, "Some Aspects of Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics 
(October 1966), pp. 61-70. What makes accounting information in particular a 
public good is probably the difficulty in guaranteeing exclusive access to the in-
formation if it is sold. 
It could be argued that accounting information is indirectly sold at the market 
in that it is used in the determination of stock prices and thus an implicit price is 
stated through stock price movements. Notice, however, that this process is very 
indirect (unlike intermediate products which have established market prices) and 
is influenced by the uncertainty of the resulting benefit that would potentially accrue 
to the firm through provision of information. By contrast, in respect to private goods, 
firms are generally price takers in the context of a competitive market, and thus 
subject to much less uncertainties than in the case of accounting information. More 
elaborate discussion of this aspect appears later in the paper. 
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benefits must be made outside the market system. 
Although both costs and benefits need to be investigated, it is probably 
advisable first to identify the benefits of different kinds of information.3 Even 
when the cost of some accounting information is prohibitive, the search for 
alternative means of obtaining the information could be justified if the bene-
fits are large enough. Failure to consider some accounting information merely 
because its cost is high cannot be justified. 
There are various ways to investigate the benefits which could lead to 
identifying desirable accounting information: 
1. The information required by normative decision models of major 
user groups could be determined. 
2. Decision models actually used by major user groups could be iden-
tified through interviews, controlled experiments, etc., and their information 
requirements determined. These decision models could either agree with or 
differ (as a result of universal behavioral tendencies) from the normative 
models. 
3. Preferences of users as to different kinds of accounting information 
could be identified through interviews and questionnaires. 
While all three avenues should be followed4 primary emphasis should 
be placed first on information requirements of normative models because: 
1. The normative model is the procedure that a rational man follows in 
making a particular decision in a specified set of circumstances. Consensus 
among writers regarding the soundness of normative models indicates that a 
majority of users is likely to follow the normative model. Thus, the benefit of 
information used in the model would accrue to many users and the sum total 
of the benefits resulting from providing the information is apt to be large. 
2. Normative models can serve as a standard of reference to evaluate 
actual decision models. If deviations are found, to be systematic and uni-
versal across many individuals, the deviations could be used to modify the 
3 While there is a lower limit for costs (zero), the upper limit for benefits is 
indefinite. Thus, while costly information may not be eliminated from consideration 
(since the benefits could be even larger), information that has small benefit could 
be eliminated from consideration since the cost is bound to be positive. Starting 
the investigation with the benefits allows an eventually smaller subset of information 
to be considered and therefore saves research time and effort. 
4 The implication of the findings of the three avenues to the objectives may be 
inconsistent. Decisions as to whether (a) the normative model should be modified 
to accommodate systematic inconsistencies, (b) information should be provided 
so as to satisfy presently used models without paying attention to normative con-
siderations or (c) individuals should be trained or otherwise influenced to follow the 
normative models would have to be made. Unless all avenues are followed, however, 
such inconsistencies may remain unidentified. 
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normative model. Normative models are selected as a standard of reference 
since they are consistent with action or behavior that is generally found to be 
empirically valid. 
3. Accounting objectives inferred from expressed preferences of indi-
vidual users would be varied and would lead to a great number of sub-
objectives.5 Criteria would ultimately have to be developed to narrow the 
resulting multitude of objectives so that the accounting alternatives to be 
considered would be limited to a feasible subset. The criteria would be 
implied by prevalent normative decision models. It would be advisable to 
conduct inquiries into individual preferences in light of the requirements of 
the normative models. 
Benefits Identified Through the Analysis of 
Normative Decision Models 
If it can be determined that many decisions frequently made by more 
than one user utilize the same piece of information under a relatively large 
set of circumstances, then the sum total of these benefits may well exceed 
the cost of providing that information systematically. Thus, it is useful to 
identify distinct sets of decisions for which information requirements are 
relatively common and for which the relationships among the information 
used, the resulting decisions, and the consequences are relatively stable. Once 
these commonalities are discovered, the benefits would then be compared 
with the costs of systematically reporting the common information within the 
accounting system. 
Although individual users of accounting information have a multitude of 
goals and types of decisions, the broad objective of the economy as a whole 
is defined to be the efficient allocation of resources.6 
5 For example, consider the set of objectives that can be inferred from the ex-
pressed preference of an individual to be provided information on replacement costs. 
Some objectives that can be induced from this expressed preference and that are 
consistent with it (to mention only a few): (a) the wish to know the cost of repro-
ducing the firm and its operations, (b) assessing managerial ability to maximize 
holding gains and minimize holding losses, (c) evaluating the managerial decisions 
with respect to t iming of asset purchases, (d) judging the firm's future ability to 
f inance its operation if it were to replace its existing assets and thus assess its 
chances for survival, etc. From these objectives numerous higher level objectives 
could be induced, such as the prediction of future holding gains or losses (inferred 
from objective (b) above), assessing future managerial ability to maneuver and capi-
talize on new opportunities ( induced from both objectives (b) and (c) above), and 
evaluating the l ikelihood of default and material losses as a result of ceasing the 
firm's operations (inferred from objective (d) above). 
6 This includes the efficient allocation of resources within the firm as one part of 
the economy, and it thus implies the provision of information to control and motivate 
actions within the firm to insure efficient allocation of the firm's resources. 
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When this objective is pursued within a private enterprise system in 
which it is assumed that individuals seek to maximize their wealth, the 
accounting objectives must be formulated so that the use of accounting 
information by individuals to maximize their wealth causes resources to be 
allocated most efficiently in the economy.7 Therefore, we need to study 
decision models used by individuals to maximize their wealth. Inasmuch as 
it is unrealistic to discuss the multitude of decision models that vary across 
decisions and individuals, we must attempt to classify decisions into groups 
that are homogeneous in their information requirements. 
There are two primary classes of decisions generally made by individual 
consumers within the private sector of the economy: consumption decisions 
and investment decisions. The groups of decisions are interdependent. This 
discussion assumes a predetermined level of consumption as given and con-
siders investment decisions only. While different groups of decisions may 
require different information, there are many commonalities in information 
required for making investment decisions. 
Predictability and Comparability. Estimating the future levels of variables 
relevant to an investment decision is the basis for making the decision. For 
example, a decision to purchase a machine is based on an estimate of cash 
flows generated by it. The cash flows from an equity security are the divi-
dends that will be received while the security is held plus the market value 
of the security when it is sold. Since it is always necessary to predict rele-
vant variables to make investment decisions,8 one of the primary objectives 
of accounting is to facilitate the prediction of relevant variables. And indeed 
this objective has been extensively discussed in the literature in terms of 
the "predictive ability criterion."9 
In addition, investment decisions are not made in a void; they usually 
are made in the context of choice among alternative competing activities. 
Thus, given a particular level of wealth, the primary decision is how to allo-
cate that wealth among competing investment alternatives. Under these con-
ditions the task is to compare the estimates of future relevant variables of the 
7 Whether there are market forces which lead to optimal allocation as a result 
of individual actions or whether there are possible sub-optimalit ies that necessitate 
information regulation is discussed in Joshua Ronen, "The Need for Account ing 
Objectives in an Efficient Market," contained in this volume, pp. 36-52. 
8 Note that most of the current and noncurrent economic decisions in a firm can 
be viewed as investment decisions. Thus, an investment in a human resource is 
expected to generate services and therefore cash flows in the future. Advertising 
expenses that are related to public relations activities of the firm are no different. 
9 W . H. Beaver, J. W. Kennelly, and W. M. Voss, "Predict ive Ability as a Criterion 
for the Evaluation of Account ing Data," Accounting Review (October 1968), pp. 
675-683. 
83 
investment alternatives and to choose that alternative promising the highest 
expected benefits. Comparability among the investment alternatives therefore 
needs to be specified as another important objective for accounting reports. 
The Investment Model: Risk and Return. Stating the objectives of pre-
dictability and comparability is not sufficient. To make statements about 
the specific content of accounting reports, we must also specify what objects 
are to be predicted and compared. For example, predictability of future 
accounting income may be useful in satisfying the comparability criterion 
only to the extent that accounting income is the dimension along which 
different firms or their securities should be compared and ranked.10 
As the normative investment model most generally used is the one 
based on portfolio analysis, it can thus be used as a basis to determine 
desirable accounting output. But the portfolio model should not be viewed 
narrowly, irrespective of the role of securities in the capital market in effi-
ciently allocating the ownership of the economy's capital stock. Under 
equilibrium conditions, the savings made available through voluntary deci-
sions on postponement of consumption must be invested in the best com-
bination of securities, i.e., the combinations that produce the highest incre-
ment in social wealth (where wealth is understood to incorporate individual 
preferences of investors). 
The Relationship with Economy-Wide Goals. To provide appropriate 
signals for optimal resource allocation, there must be an environment in 
which firms can make production and investment decisions and in which 
investors are able to choose among the securities that represent ownership 
of the firms' activities on the assumption that security prices "fully reflect" 
all available information. It is precisely because the empirical research re-
lated to the operations of the efficient markets supports the contention that 
10 For a discussion of the impropriety of setting merely the predictability of 
accounting profit as a criterion, see Lawrence Revsine, "Predictive Ability, Market 
Prices, and Operating Flows," Accounting Review (July 1971), pp. 480-489. Any 
income is an artifact produced by a set of rules or "general ly accepted accounting 
pr inciples." It is quite plausible that accounting income could be a better predictor 
of future accounting income (which is measured on the basis of the same rules and 
conventions) than a measure of income reported on the basis of other measurements 
and rules such as current operating income, exit value income, etc. In fact, two recent 
studies support this contention. (See John K. Simmons and Jack Gray, "An Investi-
gation of the Effect of Differing Accounting Frameworks on the Prediction of Net 
Income," Accounting Review (October 1969), pp. 757-776, and Frank Werner, "A 
Study of Predictive Significance of Two Income Measures," Journal of Accounting 
Research (Spring 1969), pp. 123-136.) The real question is whether future accounting 
income is the proper measure to be forecasted to form the basis of comparison 
among firms and whether there are other measures either replacing or in addition 
to the historical accounting income that better serve that purpose. 
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security prices "fully reflect" available information at any t ime" that the 
portfolio model is an appropriate basis for determining the objects to be 
predicted using accounting numbers. This is so because the objects to be 
predicted from the normative viewpoint must also be utilized to become 
legitimate objects of accounting. 
Since security prices have been found to "reflect fully" all publicly held 
information and to react unbiasedly to new information, they can be said to 
reflect the intrinsic or "fundamental" value of the securities.12 But, for 
security prices to serve as appropriate signals for optimal resource allocation, 
the intrinsic value of the stock must coincide with the economic value of the 
firm, which is defined as the risk-adjusted discounted value of the firm's 
prospective cash receipts and disbursements.13 Unless the security's intrinsic 
value coincides with the economic value of the firm, allocation of resources 
in the economy is sub-optimal since the marginal cost of capital would not 
be equal to the marginal expected rate of return. Thus, Pareto optimality 
conditions are violated.14 
11 For an extensive review, see the following: 
Eugene F. Fama, "Eff icient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," 
Journal of Finance (May 1970), pp. 383-417; "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices," 
Journal of Business (January 1965), pp. 34-105; and "Random Walks in Stock 
Market Prices," Financial Analysts Journal (September-October 1965), pp. 55-59. 
Eugene F. Fama, L. Fisher, M. C. Jensen, and Richard Roll, "The Adjustment of Stock 
Prices to New Information," International Economic Review (February 1969), pp. 1-21. 
Benoit Mandelbrot, "The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices," Journal of Business 
(October 1963), pp. 394-419, and "Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets 
and 'Martingale' Models," Journal of Business (January 1966), pp. 242-255. 
Richard Roll, "The Efficient Market Model Appl ied to U.S. Treasury Bill Rates" (Un-
published Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1968). 
Paul A. Samuelson, "Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly," 
Industrial Management Review (Spring 1965), pp. 41-49. 
Myron Scholes, "A Test of the Competitive Market Hypothesis: The Market for New 
Issues and Secondary Offerings" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 
1969). 
Roger N. Waud, "Publ ic Interpretation of Discount Rate Changes: Evidence on the 
'Announcement Effect'," Econometrica (March 1970), pp. 231-250. 
12 As defined in Joshua Ronen and George H. Sorter, "Relevant Account ing," 
Journal of Business (April 1972), pp. 258-282, intrinsic value is the value that encom-
passes in an unbiased fashion all the relevant determinants of an entity. These 
intrinsic values depend on the earnings prospects of a company which in turn are 
related to economic and other factors some of which are peculiar to this company 
and some of which affect other companies as well (see Fama, "Behavior of Stock 
Market Prices," p. 36). 
1 3 S e e Eugene F. Fama and Merton H. Miller, The Theory of Finance (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), chap. 4, and M. H. Miller and F. Modigl iani, 
"Div idend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares," Journal of Business (October 
1961), pp. 411-433. 
14 For a discussion of Pareto optimality condit ions, see, for example, E. J. Mishan, 
"A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-1959," Economic Journal (1960). 
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If the portfolio model is used in making investment decisions that result 
in the determination of stock prices, then for optimal resource allocation, the 
information inputs utilized in the models should best reflect the economic 
value of the firm, i.e., the prospective cash flows and their risks.15 Stated 
another way, assuming that the portfolio model is used by investors and given 
that (a) security prices should reflect the economic value of the firm and (b) 
that security prices fully reflect the available information and unbiasedly and 
instantaneously adjust to new information, the primary objective of account-
ing emerges as providing information that facilitates the prediction of pro-
spective cash flows and their risks.16 The derivation of this objective is shown 
schematically in Figure 1, opposite. 
Reliability. Although predictability and comparability are two necessary 
ingredients (or sub-objectives) of the process of assessing future flows 
and their uncertainties, predicted and comparable flows and their uncertainties 
should not and probably will not be used if they are unreliable. Thus, relia-
bility is an objective that is deduced from the higher level objectives in the 
hierarchy and is presented as a third sub-sub-objective in Figure 1. 
Perhaps reliability can best be defined through its elements. Many 
factors can contribute to the reliability of information. One is whether the 
information resulted from a consensus about a value or an event that is 
contestable. The magnitude that results from the consensus would be more 
reliable than if the consensus involved noncontesting parties. For example, 
market prices result from the consensus arrived at by buyers and sellers. 
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15 The informational inputs to the portfolio model (which generally assumes that 
returns on stock are normally distributed) consists of (a) the one period return on 
securities which is defined as: 
r i t = d j t / P j t + (P j, t+1 - P j t ) / P j t . 
where r J t is the return on the security during time period t, d J t is the dividend payment 
during time period t, P j , t + 1 is the price of security at the end of time t, and p j t is its 
price at the beginning of time t, and (b) the risk associated with the expected return 
which is generally measured as a standard deviation of the normally distributed 
return, although other investigators [e.g., see Fama "Behavior of Stock Market 
Prices," Maurice G. Kendall, "The Analysis of Economic Time-Series, Part I: Prices," 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, XCVI (1953), pp. 11-25; Benoit Mandelbrot, 
"Variation of Certain Speculative Prices"; Arnold Moore, "A Statistical Analysis of 
Common Stock Prices," (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Graduate School of Business, 
University of Chicago, (1962)); M.F.M. Osborne, "Brownian Motion in the Stock 
Market," Operations Research (March-Apri l , 1959), pp. 145-173; S. James Press, 
"A Compound Events Model for Security Prices," Journal of Business (July 1968), 
pp. 317-335; and Richard Roll, "Efficient Market Model Appl ied to U.S. Treasury Bill 
Rates" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago (1968)] tested a broader 
class of distributions and, in particular, the class of stable Paretian or Pareto-Levy 
distributions which include the normal distribution as a special case. 
16 Clearly, it can be argued that this information need not necessarily be provided 
by the firm (either through its accounting system or otherwise). This particular point 
as well as the interesting question of whether market forces exist that guarantee the 
provision of this information without the necessity of formulating accounting objec-
tives is discussed by Ronen, "Need for Account ing Objectives in an Efficient Market." 
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Sellers wish to obtain as high a price as possible for the commodity sold; 
buyers wish to pay as little as possible. When these contesting parties come 
to a consensus as reflected in market prices, the market prices can be said 
to be reliable estimates of the future utility and benefits of the commodity. 
The ability to validate information or magnitude of events is another 
element of reliability. The magnitude of events such as forecasts can be 
validated through comparing the forecasts with actual occurrences over 
time. Future forecasts would be considered to be more reliable if the devia-
tions between past forecasts and actual results are small. Information can 
also be validated through the ability to verify the magnitudes in question. 
Verifiability can be obtained either through visibility of the magnitudes, for 
example, through actual cash transactions, or through documentation of the 
magnitude, as by a legal contract or court decision. The sub-objectives 
relating to reliability are depicted in Figure 2, page 88. 
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Benefits Obtained Through Actions Made Possible by Steps Required 
in Providing Information. The process of providing information yields two 
types of benefits. One type results f rom using the information; the other 
results from the actions of individuals motivated by the mere necessity to 
provide the information. The necessity to provide the information may cause 
actions that are either beneficial or harmful to the efficient al location of 
resources. The mere provision of information may facil itate the control and 
coordinat ion of factors of product ion ( including the f irm's labor force) and 
goal congruence (conformity of the actions of the f i rm's personnel with the 
goal of the firm as a whole). The data required for providing information may 
also be used to trace the actions of the various employees of the firm and to 
facil itate control. From the sub-object ives of control, coordinat ion and con-
gruence we can deduce the need for providing forecasts and budgets to 
coordinate future activities and also the need to keep a record of actual 
events for compar ison with forecasts. 
For optimal al location of the f irm's resources, managers and employees 
need to have profit maximization as a goal. This motivation can be faci l i tated 
both by the preparation of budgets and subsequent compar ison of results 
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with budgets,17 and also by compensation of the firm's personnel at amounts 
that equal their marginal productivity. From this latter objective we again 
derive the need to record actual events and performance. For the forecasts 
to be effective in producing desired benefits both within the firm and outside 
of it, internal and external forecasts should be the same. This aspect of the 
benefits of providing accounting information is schematically depicted in 
Figure 3, page 90. 
Timeliness and Availability of Accounting Information. To optimize re-
source allocation, it is also desirable to minimize the time lags between the 
point at which new information about expected cash flows and their uncer-
tainties first become known and the point at which allocation decisions are 
made. The faster that new information is made available, the shorter the 
time lapse until the decision is made and consequently, the shorter the 
period during which the economy's capital is not optimally allocated. There-
fore, information on expected cash flows and their uncertainties should be 
disseminated as fast as possible once it becomes known. This constitutes 
the sub-objective of timeliness derived in Figure 4, page 91. How fast 
information should be disseminated and the frequency of the dissemination 
depend on the cost/benefit relationships. 
To allocate resources optimally, it is also necessary to maximize the 
number of individuals who possess information on expected cash flows and 
their uncertainty about different firms. The wider the dissemination of knowl-
edge about alternative combinations of risk and return relative to different 
securities, the more likely are resources to be channeled to their best use as 
a result of competitive bids for the more profitable securities. Accordingly 
the sub-objective of wide public dissemination of accounting information is 
derived in Figure 4. 
Information for Social Goals 
Another derivative of the objective of optimally allocating resources 
within the economy consistent with private maximization of wealth is the need 
to equate marginal social cost and benefits with marginal private cost and 
benefits. Loosely speaking, where the actions of the firm affect only its own 
costs and benefits there would be no divergence between private values 
(costs and benefits) and social values. In this case, the decision and actions 
taken in pursuit of the firm's own interests will result in the optimization of 
both private wealth and the economy's wealth. Where the actions of an 
individual firm do affect, however, the consequences of other firms' or indi-
17 Budgets may have a beneficial effect in motivating the work force, but they 
could also reduce motivation as a result of the manner in which they are generated 
and their magnitude. The behavioral link between the preparation of budgets and 
ultimate productivity is complex. For a discussion of this issue, see Joshua Ronen 
and J. Leslie Livingstone, "An Expectancy Theory Approach to the Motivational 
Impacts of Budgets" (Unpublished manuscript, The University of Toronto, 1973). 
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viduals' actions, then pursuing only private benefits may not result in the 
optimization of social benefits or in an efficient allocation of resources. In 
this case, an accounting objective that is restricted to the consideration of 
private benefits and costs may require the communication of data that will 
not meet the social objectives. 
It is possible that private profit maximization by a firm will also bring 
about an efficient allocation of resources, even when the firm's actions 
directly affect the consequences of other firms' actions. This would be the 
case when the firm takes into account these effects before it makes its 
decisions. If the firm is to maximize its profits in the most rigorous sense, 
it must take into consideration the effect of its actions on other firms or 
individuals. These effects fall within the normal economic definition of oppor-
tunity costs and should therefore be explicitly considered along with other 
costs in making rational decisions. Reflecting opportunity costs make it 
possible for accounting report users to properly assess managerial per-
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formance. But, in addition, if income figures that result from actual past 
transactions are deemed to be at all important (both in providing a record 
of actual past transactions to fulfill the stewardship function of accounting as 
well as in providing the means to validate past managerial expectations), it 
is evident that these opportunity costs should be treated in the same manner 
as other production costs. 
The issue becomes more complex when the effect of the firm's actions 
on others is not or cannot be adequately considered when making decisions 
within the firm. This would be the case, for example, when the price mecha-
nism of the market, which enables the firm to consider such facts directly 
in its decisions, either does not exist or is too costly. Operationally, this 
means that transaction costs such as conducting negotiations, drawing up 
contracts and inspection are higher than the benefits of adjusting the firm's 
actions on the basis of the expected effects of these actions on other entities. 
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In this case, pursuing private interests will not lead the firm to bring about a 
socially desirable allocation of resources, and governmental intervention, 
through the legal determination of rights, regulations, and policing, may 
eventually become necessary.18 Indeed, because of its power, the govern-
ment may be able to bring about corrective action at a lower cost than would 
a private organization. Although the governmental machine may be extremely 
costly, it may be the alternative to private action. Under these circumstances, 
the gathering and communication of information about social costs are 
desirable even in the absence of a potential solution at the private level 
because: 
1. The communication of such information may (subject to the deter-
mination that the information is best processed by the firm creating the harm-
ful side activity) lead to a proper kind of governmental intervention that 
achieves efficient allocation of resources, also indicating that such informa-
tion should be helpful in determining which of the alternative social arrange-
ments is optimal for dealing with the externality. 
2. On the assumption that an efficient market would eventually lead to 
desirable social action, the communication of information about the cost to 
the firm that will probably be associated with whatever social arrangement 
emerges will provide the user of financial statements with better means to 
appraise the future prospects of the firm. 
In Figure 5, opposite, the sub-objective of equating marginal private 
costs and benefits with marginal social costs and benefits is therefore indi-
cated as a derivative of the optimal resource allocation within the economy, 
consistent with the optimal allocation at the individual level. Any divergences 
between marginal private costs and benefits and marginal social costs and 
benefits need to be reliably predicted and compared among firms. This need 
is reflected in Figure 6, fold-out, by an arrow connecting the objective of 
equating the private values with social values to the sub-objectives of pre-
dictability, comparability and reliability. 
The sub-objectives developed so far from the overall objective of optimal 
resource allocation (individual and economy-wide levels) can be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Providing information about future risk and return associated with 
the firm's security: This leads to the requirement of information about future 
cash flows and their uncertainty. 
2. Timeliness: Dissemination of information when first known in order 
to minimize the time lapse until allocation decisions are made. 
18 For a more lucid discussion of this issue, see R. H. Coase, "The Problem of 
Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960). Also, for a more detailed 
treatment of the accounting implications of social costs and benefits, see Joshua 
Ronen, "Account ing for Social Costs and Benefits," contained in this volume, pp. 
317-340. 
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3. Wide dissemination of information to expand the number of com-
petitive bids on alternative security investments. 
4. Providing information about divergences between marginal private 
costs and benefits and marginal social costs and benefits. 
From the objective of providing information on future cash flows and 
uncertainty, the sub-objectives of predictability, comparability and reliability 
were derived. That is, the accounting objectives so far can be summarized 
as the timely and wide dissemination of information that enables users to 
reliably predict and compare expected cash flows and their uncertainty, as 
well as predicting and comparing divergences between private and social 
values across firms. 
Elements of Predictability and Comparability. Elements of predictability 
and comparability are diverse and could vary in their degree of importance 
depending upon the firm's circumstances. However, some general guidelines 
can be developed as sub-objectives derived from predictability and com-
parability. Figure 6 which reflects the total hierarchy of objectives and sub-
objectives (and which incorporates Figures 1 through 5) depicts the develop-
ment of the predictability and comparability elements. 
93 
Prediction can be facilitated if the events that are to be predicted can 
be associated with other events or dimensions which are either known or 
more easily predicted.19 The most obvious information that helps predict 
future events is a record of the past occurrences of that event. Past occur-
rences of an event could be extrapolated into the future in accordance with 
simple rules (at the rudimentary level of analysis) or through use of a more 
formal and rigorous prediction model (e.g., time series analysis).20 Thus, 
we derive the sub-objective of providing information on past cash flows to 
improve the prediction of expected flows. 
Secondly, fluctuations in the firm's volume of output may explain varia-
tions in some of the costs. Therefore, knowledge of (or estimate of) future 
output volume may well facilitate the prediction of future levels of cost with 
more accuracy than if the nature of the association between volume of output 
and costs was either not known or not disclosed. Since costs fixed relative 
to output will occur at about the same magnitude and costs that are variable 
in relation to output will tend to fluctuate,21 providing information separately 
about these fixed and variable costs may make possible a better prediction 
of future costs. 
Certainly, output is not the only dimension or variable with which the 
movement of costs or any other variables that are to be predicted can be 
associated. Association can be made with inputs, with activities such as 
product lines and segments of firms, etc.22 In addition, present practice 
19This is the primary motivation for the common regression analysis. See, for 
example, George Benston, "Mult ip le Regression Analysis of Cost Behavior," Account-
ing Review (October 1966), pp. 657-672, and Robert Jensen, "Mult ip le Regression 
Models for Cost Control—Assumptions and Limitations," Accounting Review (April 
1967), pp. 265-272. 
20 For example, several studies revealed that accounting income could be a better 
predictor of itself, that is, of accounting income (if the latter is obtained through the 
same system of rules and measurement as the former) than the other types of income 
(such as replacement cost income). Also, studies under way explore the statistical 
properties of time series of events to develop criteria for improving predictions. 
Thus, providing information about cash flows may help improve the prediction of 
future cash flows either directly or through the development of such criteria. 
21 See, for example, R. S. Gynther, " Improving Separation of Fixed and Variable 
Expenses," NAA Bulletin (June 1963), pp. 29-39, and National Association of 
Accountants, Account ing Practice Report No. 10, "Separating and Using Costs as 
Fixed and Variable," NAA Bulletin (June 1960). 
22 The objective of associability leads (when associabil ity is made with product 
lines) to the separate reporting by product lines and segments that is the subject 
of much debate now. Clearly, the degree to which such information is to be reported 
on product lines is the subject of research into the cost of this form of reporting. 
Part of the cost may be the reduced motivation and ability to generate profits through 
revealing information beneficial to competitors. This latter occurrence would violate 
the objective of motivation and the sub-object ive of the equality of reward with the 
individual marginal product that appears elsewhere in the hierarchy as discussed 
above. 
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suggests that the associability of costs with manufacturing and selling and 
administrative functions may motivate the separate reporting of costs by 
functions. Predictability seems to be the implicit objective that accountants 
have in mind when they disclose the underlying components such as revenue, 
cost of sales, and operating expenses, which determine the resulting net 
income figure. In fact, recent evidence suggests that separate components 
of the income measurement process may be better forecasted than net in-
come itself which is an algebraic sum of the components. Thus, firms were 
found to be able to forecast revenues, for example, with more accuracy and 
precision than net income.23 
The Time Dimension. One of the major dimensions with which events 
are generally associated and which is important in prediction is the time 
dimension. Events that are associated with time are said to be recurring 
events. Those which are not associated with time are called non-recurring 
events. The items that are generally grouped as operating expenses and 
operating revenues tend to be recurring items, whereas the non-recurring 
items are usually labeled as extraordinary revenue or expense items. Predic-
tion on the basis of a series of past events is made with less errors if the 
process that generates these events and their measures is well defined and 
stable. The firm's return is generally the aggregate of many and different 
processes. When prediction is based on a separate component, each identi-
fiable with a particular generating process, it is apt to be more accurate than 
when it is based on an aggregate measure that obscures the underlying 
relationship. Thus, better prediction is presumably made possible by ana-
lyzing the time trend of income generated by recurring events more than by 
analyzing a trend of income that results from both recurring operations and 
less stable processes. Therefore, disaggregation of events along the dimen-
sion of recurrability becomes another criterion that facilitates prediction. 
Discriminability Among Information Sources. Associability of events of 
interest with past events or past dimensions is not the only criterion that 
may facilitate the improvement of prediction. An important element in 
facilitating prediction is obtaining estimates (even though subjective) from 
people who may possess information about the future that makes their own 
prediction of future relevant events an important input into the predictions 
of the users of financial statements. The persons who may have some 
knowledge about the future are likely to be the firm's management. 
As indicated earlier, the object of prediction is expected future cash 
flows and the uncertainty associated with them. But both the cash flows and 
their uncertainty depend on the specific plans and actions which are affected 
by and first known to the management of firms. Since such plans are de-
23 See R. A. Daily, "The Feasibility of Reporting Forecasted Information," The 
Accounting Review (October 1971), pp. 686-692. 
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signed to give the firm a competitive edge, they are bound to have significant 
informational content.24 
Because a firm's management is the first to know its plans, timely fore-
casts may prove to be a valuable input to the users of financial statements 
in predicting future cash flows. Management is in the best position to assess 
the effects that its specific plans (unknown to others unless communicated) 
have on future cash flows. It would therefore seem desirable for management 
to communicate its expectations concerning these cash flows.25 Managers, 
however, are not infallible. Expectations based on their plans may diverge 
from actual results because of the randomness of the underlying events or 
different interpretations of future events by managers and the market. The 
difference in interpretation may exist because of two major factors that affect 
future cash flows: (a) market and industry events that affect all the firms— 
exogenous factors, and (b) the particular performance of the firm in question, 
that is, the specific plans or resources, employment decisions made by man-
agement, etc. These specific firm decisions are responsible for whether the 
firm accumulates more or less value than the industry or the market. These 
are the endogenous factors. 
Exogenous factors, contrary to the endogenous, are primarily beyond 
the firm's control. They may be predicted by relying on the market's expecta-
tions as reflected in market prices, but the best source for predicting endo-
genous factors is probably the firm's management. Thus, the dimension of 
controllability of events becomes an important criterion in facilitating pre-
diction.26 The dimension of controllability facilitates prediction not only 
directly through identifying the source from which expectations are to be 
obtained—market transactions and market prices for the exogenous factors 
and management's forecasts for the endogenous factors—but it also facili-
tates prediction through enabling users to assess managerial performance. 
Clearly, the past ability of management to forecast, perform and carry out 
24 This is generally information that is not currently and systematically made 
widely available to the market. Some evidence on this is provided by Scholes, "Test 
of the Competitive Market Hypothesis," who found that corporate insiders often have 
monopolist ic access to information about their firms which if made available would 
contribute to a better allocation of resources (see Ronen, "Need for Account ing 
Objectives in an Efficient Market"). 
25 Notice that the detailed plans themselves do not have to be made available, 
only the management expectations concerning cash flows which are contingent 
on these plans. Consequently, there should be no reluctance by management, out 
of fear of leakage to competitors, to reflect this information. 
26 A perfectly competitive firm does not possess any particular advantages that 
allow it to affect its output price by varying its supply and will therefore not earn 
more than the normal rate of return. It can be said then that the firm's increment 
in its wealth is determined entirely by exogenous market and industry factors. A 
monopolistic firm possesses a unique asset (skilled labor force, managerial know-
how) that enables it to affect the price of its differentiated product. In this case, the 
firm can be said to bring its endogenous variables to bear on its output price aside 
from the industry-wide exogenous factors, and it can thus produce higher than a 
normal rate of return. 
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plans successfully is an indicator of future performance and therefore repre-
sents important input to the prediction process, Further, information about 
management's particular plans and their results provides insight into risk-
taking tendencies of management and, therefore, the future likelihood of 
engaging in risk-taking activities. Thus, the ability to identify potentially 
useful information sources can enhance the predictability of relevant events. 
This is indicated as one of the sub-objectives emanating from the predict-
ability and comparability objectives in the hierarchy shown in Figure 6. 
Controllability is only one dimension that could facilitate the identifiability 
of potentially useful sources (through indicating, for example, that manage-
ment is potentially a more useful force for predicting the endogenous factors 
under its control than for predicting the exogenous factors outside its control). 
Other dimensions may also make identification of the more competent 
sources for providing information on future events possible. For example, 
among exogenous factors, different information sources have different de-
grees of usefulness and competence in providing information about relevant 
events. Interest rate fluctuations, the money reserve, and credit terms are 
factors; information concerning them is probably best obtained from the 
Federal Reserve. Information on the availability of raw materials and future 
prices, on the other hand, is probably best obtained through observing 
trends in the supplying industries. However, while other dimensions could 
be identified, only the controllability dimension is shown in Figure 6 since it 
serves to indicate a major dichotomy between the exogenous and the endo-
genous variables. 
The distinction between the exogenous and endogenous variables leads 
(as shown in the hierarchy) to the identification of management as the most 
competent source for predicting endogenous variables. Since users are 
interested in expected cash flows and their uncertainty, management fore-
casts of endogenous variables can be communicated by assessing the endo-
genous effects on future cash flows accruing to the firm.27 
2 7 While there are many ways for managers to communicate future endogenous 
events, the forecasts of cash flows by management were chosen in the hierarchy 
because: (a) such forecasts provide a quantif ication of the endogenous variables 
in dollars and (b) since the effects on cash flows will depend on the assumptions 
implicit in management's forecasts with respect to exogenous factors, such assump-
tions would be reflected through the forecasts of the total cash flows. These 
assumptions could also be explicitly stated when management provides its cash 
flow forecasts. It is important for users to know these assumptions, since if they 
are considered unrealistic, the quantif ication of the endogenous effect on the cash 
flows can then be modified. By communicat ing future endogenous events via their 
effects on cash flows, an aggregate measure could be provided if so desired. 
Provision of management's assessment of endogenous variables through forecasted 
cash flows certainly does not exclude other ways of communicat ing this information. 
Further research is needed to point out the better alternative means. For a recent 
suggestion to communicate management's probability distribution of forecasts con-
dit ioned upon different expectations with respect to exogenous variables, see Amir 
Barnea and G. Joseph San Miguel, "The Relevance of Earnings Forecasts" (Unpub-
lished manuscript, New York University, 1973). 
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The best source for predicting the exogenous factors is probably the 
market itself. It has already been indicated that different sources could be 
of different competence or reliability in predicting exogenous factors. How-
ever, the research on efficient markets indicates that available information 
in a market (including information affecting exogenous factors relevant to 
the particular firm) is generally impounded in market prices (whether they 
are securities or other capital assets). Market prices, therefore, probably 
best reflect the effects of relevant exogenous factors on the firm. For ex-
ample, fluctuations in the price of a firm's output reflects anticipated changes 
in the demand for that output, which is an exogenous factor that is relevant 
to the firm. Similarly, fluctuations in the market prices of inputs would reflect 
expectations with respect to changing conditions in the supplying industry 
and/or the emergence of competing inputs. This leads to the conclusion 
that market prices should be the source for predicting the exogenous factors 
that impinge upon the firm's activities, as shown in Figure 6 by the arrow 
extending from the exogenous branch of the exogenous and endogenous 
dichotimization. 
Proceeding from the endogenous branch and the need for management 
to communicate its cash flow forecasts, it is necessary for users to assess 
reliability of the future forecasts. To do this they need to be able to assess 
management ability to forecast with reasonable accuracy. To assess man-
agement ability to forecast, comparison between management forecasts 
and actual events must be made.28 Thus, the recording of forecasts and 
actual events (to be compared with forecasts) emerges as a desirable 
objective. To highlight the deviations of actual events from forecasted 
events, it is desirable to distinguish between expected and unexpected results 
of operations in the records. The quantification of unexpected events pro-
vides a record of management's "errors" and would be useful in assessing— 
through the observation of the magnitudes of these errors over an extended 
period of time—the ability of management to forecast within a reasonable 
degree of accuracy. Thus, Figure 6 indicates the systematic distinguishability 
between expected and unexpected results as an objective of accounting. 
Assessability of Managerial Performance. Since the firm's progress 
hinges primarily on management performance, the ability to assess this per-
formance is an important element in facilitating the predictability of the 
firm's flows and the comparability of these flows across firms. But to facilitate 
28 Thus, it could be argued that in the short run, managers could deceive users 
by deliberately communicat ing biased forecasts. But it should be remembered that 
managers who are likely to do so, when required to communicate forecasts, will 
probably "volunteer" biased forecasts in the absence of such a requirement. (As 
is well known, managers presently communicate forecasts in an ad hoc, sporadic 
fashion.) The requirement to incorporate forecasts systematically and periodically 
within the accounting system serves at least to deter biasing forecasts since it 
makes possible the subsequent systematic and periodic comparison of forecasts 
with actual events. 
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the assessment of managerial performance, it is essential to distinguish 
between controllable and uncontrollable events. Thus, the dimension of con-
trollability is important in two respects: one for the identifiability of useful 
information sources and the other for the assessment of managerial per-
formance. In the hierarchy (Figure 6) several situations are encountered 
where the same objective is derived from more than one higher level objec-
tive. This is indicated by numbers reflected in Figure 6. For controllable 
events, a comparison needs to be made between management's plans and 
actual results. The degree of management's success is assessed through 
both the soundness of their plans and the ability to meet these plans. Further-
more, both management's plans and actual results need to be compared 
with alternative plans and actions that were available to management. From 
the need to facilitate such comparison and evaluation can be deduced the 
objective of providing a record of alternative actions which, for example, 
could be reflected through the communication of opportunity costs. Thus, 
from the objective of assessment of managerial performance, two sub-
objectives can be deduced which have already been derived through other 
objectives in the hierarchy. One is the communication of management's 
forecasts and the effect of specific plans on these forecasts and the record 
of actual events to be compared with the actual forecasts. 
Flexibility or Maneuverability. Of primary importance for predicting the 
risk associated with the firm's cash flows (but also for assessing return) is the 
degree of flexibility or maneuverability that the management of the firm pos-
sesses in employing its resources. The more numerous the alternatives open 
to management for utilizing its resources, the greater its resilience to adverse 
environmental effects such as a decline in demand for its product. A 
systematic record of the alternative employments of available resources and 
possibly the resources' opportunity costs will facilitate the assessment of 
such alternatives. One readily available alternative for the firm's resources 
is disposal of them. Market exit values of the firm's resources quantify 
this alternative and are therefore an objective that is derived from the higher 
level objective of providing information on the availability of alternatives. 
Market exit values also satisfy two other sub-objectives that may be 
derived from the flexibility criterion. These are the convertibility of the re-
sources into flexible means of exchange and the extent to which resources 
are specialized. Clearly, the more convertible the firm's resources into cash 
and the greater the magnitude of cash that could be potentially received for 
them, the more flexible is the firm's management and the higher the degree 
of maneuverability of the firm's resources. If the market exit values of the 
firm's resources are small in their relative magnitude, a small number of 
alternative uses of these resources outside the firm is indicated, and therefore 
the utilization of the resources within the firm will be highly dependent on the 
marketability of the firm's specific output. The greater the extent to which 
these resources are specialized (in the sense of being thus dependent) the 
lesser is the degree of maneuverability available for management and the 
less flexible is management in using the assets. 
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Another factor that affects management flexibility is the degree of fixity 
of the resources. That is, the extent to which adjustment costs need to be 
incurred to change the use of the resources. The higher the adjustment costs, 
that is, the greater the fixity of the resources, the higher are the risks asso-
ciated with the firm's flows in case adverse environmental effects cause the 
demand for the firm's output to decline. The flexibility and maneuverability 
criteria are sub-divided in the hierarchy into four separate (although in effect 
interrelated) sub-objectives: 
1. Convertibility of resources into flexible means of exchange—cash: 
This sub-objective leads to the objective of providing market exit values as a 
reflection of the proceeds of resources, if disposed of, less the costs incurred 
to dispose of the assets. 
2. Availability of alternatives: From this can be derived the need to 
record alternatives, such as opportunity costs. A readily available opportunity 
cost of the firm's resources is their proceeds. Thus, market exit values are 
derived again as a sub-objective. 
3. Fixity of resources: From this attribute can be derived the need to 
communicate adjustment costs to change the nature of the use of resources. 
4. The extent to which resources are specialized: To reflect the degree 
of specialization, there must be some indication of the dependence of the 
utilization of resources on output marketability. Such a dependence could 
again be reflected through communicating the possible alternative uses of 
resources, e.g., through use of market exit values. 
From the objectives of flexibility and maneuverability two sub-objectives 
seem important. These are market exit values of the firm's resources and the 
opportunity costs of such resources, that is, a record of the resources' value 
in alternative uses. The numbers shown beside some of the sub-objectives 
in the hierarchy indicate recurrence in the hierarchy. In other words, they are 
derived from more than one objective or sub-objective. While greater re-
currence of the sub-objective in the hierarchy does not necessarily indicate 
that a particular sub-objective is more important, this is likely to be the case. 
Ascertainability of Divergences Between Social 
and Private Costs and Benefits 
To make possible the prediction of future divergences between social 
and private values (costs and benefits) as well as the possible alternative 
means of dealing with these divergences either at the individual or the gov-
ernmental level, information must be provided about both past and present 
divergences between social and private values. The information needs to be 
provided concerning the following: 
1. The actual cost to a firm (including opportunity costs) of harmful side 
activity engaged in by other firms or entities: Probably, the firm is in the best 
position to measure and quantify the costs here in the form of direct expendi-
tures or in the form of lost income that it incurs because of harmful externality 
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(such as pollution, noise, fumes, etc.) caused by another entity. It follows 
therefore that quantification of these costs for either private action or govern-
mental intervention is best made and communicated by the firm itself, pos-
sibly as a part of its accounting system. 
2. The costs of avoiding the side effects of others' activities: Certainly 
if the cost of avoiding the harmful side effects is less than the cost of the 
harmful side effects if not avoided, the cost of avoidance is relevant quanti-
fication of the social costs of the side effects (if the side effects only affect 
this particular firm). For any governmental action, this cost which can prob-
ably be best estimated by the affected firm is a necessary factor in deter-
mining the optimal action. 
3. Another relevant factor in determining the optimal corrective action 
is the cost which the firm causing the harmful side effect would incur to 
prevent it. The magnitude of this cost must be compared to the cost of the 
side effect to the affected firm as well as to the cost of avoiding that effect 
by the firm before a decision about the appropriate corrective action can be 
made. 
Summary 
Figure 6 shows the hierarchy of objectives and sub-objectives. Each 
sub-objective was derived from the analysis of information needed to obtain 
a higher level sub-objective in the hierarchy. While the derivation of objec-
tives and sub-objectives flows in the figure from top to bottom, i.e., from the 
highest level and the broadest objectives to lower level objectives, the formu-
lation of the high level objectives was at least in part based on how and for 
what purpose presently provided information is used. 
The importance of the framework depicted in Figure 6 lies in the way 
that objectives or sub-objectives are derived. While both benefit and cost 
considerations are required to identify objectives, we first concentrate on the 
identification of the more common benefits to be derived from accounting 
information. The benefits are based on pervasive normative decision models 
of major groups of users. Once the overall objectives are formulated, sub-
objectives and sub-sub-objectives are derived until different proposed ac-
counting formats and alternatives can be discriminated by assessing and 
evaluating them in light of the hierarchy of objectives. 
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Accounting Income and Economic Income 
George H. Sorter 
Economic Income 
There is general agreement among economists who have written on this 
subject that income is to be regarded as a measure of the change in "well-
being" or "better-offness" occurring in some specific time period irrespective 
of whether it is measured statically or dynamically and regardless of the 
measurement bases used. 
A change in well-being can result through either immediate satisfaction 
or increased prospects for future satisfaction. Thus, income has often been 
defined as consumption plus investment. Consumption corresponds to imme-
diate satisfaction, whereas investment is identified as the postponement of 
present consumption with increased future consumption or satisfaction as 
one of its goals. 
Economic Income for Individuals 
Much of the controversy in defining income for individuals is based on 
the fact that either current or prospective satisfaction is necessarily subjective 
and based on individual preferences and the utility assessments of different 
individuals. A person's satisfaction or consumption may, to a large extent, be 
nonmonetary. Thus, one person may derive income in the form of personal 
satisfaction from viewing a painting, whereas another person may not. 
The same problem exists in defining investments of individuals. For 
some persons the ownership of art objects may be an investment over and 
above their monetary values. For others it may not, and so forth. 
Economic Income for Business Entities 
These definitional problems are not as acute for business entities. Such 
organizations (as opposed to individuals who may own the business) should 
not have utility functions. Their well-being is generally restricted to, and 
measured by, monetary benefits. 
In the case of business entities, consumption is defined strictly as divi-
dends; net investment is defined simply as the change in the value of the firm 
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itself (exclusive of any additional explicit stockholder investments in the 
firm).1 
Economic income for a firm is generally defined as the change in the 
value of the firm plus any dividends paid during the period. Almost unanimous 
agreement exists among economists that the value of an asset is quantified 
by the discounted value of the future cash flows attributable to the asset. 
The value of a firm, which is an asset itself, is also considered to be quantified 
by the discounted value of the future cash flows attributable to it. 
Should the measurement of economic income, or alternatively, an 
accounting income that corresponds more closely to economic income, be 
the objective of accounting? A negative response to this question is appro-
priate for reasons discussed in the next section of this paper. 
Economic Income and the Accountant 
Users of financial statements would like to know the cash proceeds 
that they will receive from investments that they make. In terms of equity 
securities these cash proceeds are measured by the dividends that the stock-
holder will receive and the market price at which he will be able to sell his 
shares, that is, his share of the economic income of the firm. This information, 
however, cannot be supplied by the accountant, at least not presently. 
Even in a world of relative certainty where the probabilities of all pros-
pective events affecting a corporation are known, the accountant still could 
not measure the prospective market values of a firm or its economic income. 
The price an individual is willing to pay or receive for a security is determined 
by (1) his expectation concerning future events, and (2) his personal prefer-
ences relating to these events. Individuals generally will be willing to pay 
less for a security which has a 50 per cent probability of returning $100 and a 
50 per cent probability of returning 0 than for a security which has a 100 
per cent probability of returning $50. Thus, most individuals are risk averse 
but they are risk averse in differing degrees. The extent to which an indi-
vidual is risk averse will determine how much less he is willing to pay for the 
security with a 50 per cent probability of returning $100 and a 50 per cent 
probability of returning 0. Individuals with different risk preferences will 
therefore be willing to pay different amounts for securities whose returns are 
subject to equivalent uncertainties. 
The market price of securities reflects a collective consensus of many 
investors and incorporates their collective risk preferences. Therefore, the 
accountant, in order to measure prospective market values and economic 
income, would not only have to know the probability of future events occurring 
1 Many problems of defining income, of course, remain. This definition of income 
as consumption plus investment can easily be used to analyze such problems as 
whether the measure of income should reflect deduction for imputed interest on 
stockholder investment and whether unexpected gains should properly be included 
in income. Analysis of these problems is not carried further in this paper, however. 
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but also the collective taste and preferences of investors. In actual fact, of 
course, he knows neither, and thus the accountant cannot prospectively com-
municate future market values of a company's shares. 
Financial statements can communicate the market value of these shares 
and the economic income of firms once these have been determined by the 
market, but this information is adequately communicated through other means, 
such as the financial press. 
It does not seem useful for accountants to describe market values of a 
firm's securities after the fact. But even if financial statements cannot 
measure in a prospective sense the market value of a firm's securities, it 
may be argued that the value of a firm can be described apart from the value 
of the securities of the firm. However, such an abstract or intrinsic value of a 
firm apart from the value of the securities does not exist. Value in each and 
every case represents an assessment by someone. Value as an abstract 
principle is meaningless. The value of a firm as a whole exists only as it is 
perceived by others. Value in terms of a dictionary definition of "the relative 
worth, merit, or importance" or as a useful construct in economics is always 
relative. Value does not exist in a vacuum; it must always be viewed as value 
in relation to someone or to some purpose. The "relative worth, merit, or 
importance" of an object must be defined in terms of the utility of that object 
in fulfilling goals or desires of individuals. A firm may have value in relation 
to its stockholders and/or in relation to its managers and/or in relation to 
its employees. It cannot have value in and of itself apart from these interests. 
Thus, since the notion of "abstract value" has no meaning, it clearly cannot 
and should not be measured by accountants. 
Even though there is no abstract value of a firm that can be measured 
by accountants, there are values of individual assets of a firm which may be 
measured. Aggregation of these asset values may be said to define the 
value of the firm. 
Certainly individual assets of a firm have value, and insofar as these 
values are known in the market—because of quotations or transactions— 
these market values could be communicated in financial statements. How-
ever, the market value of individual assets of a firm is determined by the 
utility of those assets as judged by many users with many intended uses. 
The particular use for which a firm owns an asset is only one of many deter-
minants of value. For example, the market value of an asset will be nil if it 
is so unique or specific that it can be used only by the firm holding it. No one 
else will demand the asset if it is of no use to them. Such an asset, however, 
can have significant value to the firm that owns and is able to use it. Perhaps 
the best illustration of this point relates to an automobile. It has often been 
said that an automobile loses one-fourth of its value when it is driven out of 
the showroom. Such a statement is both true and meaningful, as well as 
fallacious. If the intended use of an automobile is its sale, then the value of 
that automobile is in fact reduced when ownership passes from dealer to 
customer. The dealer generally possesses a comparative economic advan-
tage not enjoyed by the customer, and thus the car is more valuable if sold 
by the dealer than by the customer. If the intended use of the car, however, 
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relates to its transportation services, then it is fallacious to say that the value 
has decreased when the car is driven out of the showroom or when ownership 
passes from dealer to customer. 
Market values of individual assets do not always relate directly to their 
value to the firm holding them. Further, the use value of individual assets 
of a firm depends to a great degree on their joint use with other assets, and 
it is difficult to separate value of individual assets from a value of the firm. 
While market values of individual assets may indeed provide useful informa-
tion for users of financial statements, the recording of values of individual 
assets should not be thought of as a fundamental objective of financial 
statements. 
Therefore, income as defined in terms of changes in the market value 
of individual assets is also not particularly relevant in terms of a specific firm. 
Income so defined does not measure the progress or attainments of a firm in 
relation to some specific goal. In fact, it may be argued that a firm cannot 
have income. If income is indeed a measure of better-offness, can a firm 
be better-off apart and distinct from the better-offness of stockholders, man-
agers, or employees? People may be better-off but a firm, a fictional entity, 
cannot be better-off and thus does not have income. In our view, value 
should always be defined in relation to an individual's goal and not abstractly. 
Income also should not be defined in the abstract since it relates to the 
satisfaction of individual goals. 
The concept of economic value involves limitations which render it 
futile, both in terms of implementation and general acceptance, in the con-
text of accounting objectives. Consensus about economic value is properly 
the function of the market, not accounting. Information provided by the 
accounting process should be unambiguously characterized and communi-
cated as an input to evaluation models; it should give no pretense of being 
the ultimate output or result of evaluation models. 
Accounting information of all types, including income statements, bal-
ance sheets, funds statements, statements of cash receipts and disburse-
ments, etc., has an important role to play in allowing different users with 
different tastes, different assumptions, different decision criteria, and espe-
cially different risk preferences to evaluate and predict the future cash conse-
quences of the firm. Accountants have long been aware of this and have 
provided disaggregated information about such items as sales, cost of goods 
sold and different expenses. Accountants have tried to quantify different 
assets and liabilities and have provided a funds statement. Had accountants 
alternatively assumed that their only function was to communicate income 
and value, this could have been accomplished through a simple process of 
aggregation. That is, the various operations and events of an entity could 
have been reported in aggregated form, and only single numbers such as 
income and value would have been disclosed. 
If accounting should provide information useful for prediction, evalua-
tion, and control of certain key variables, rather than reporting the variables 
or estimates of the variables themselves the following question becomes 
paramount: Should the objectives of accounting be stated such that account-
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ing information facilitates the prediction, evaluation, and control of cash 
flows rather than the prediction, evaluation, and control of income? As stated 
earlier, the notion of income means different things to different people who 
possess different risk preferences. If the objectives of accounting are stated 
in terms of income, disagreements concerning proper implementation of 
accounting may arise due to different and diverse definitions of income. 
Individual A may argue for method X based on his definition of income, and 
individual B may argue against method X based on his different definition 
of income. Thus the argument and analysis concern not method X but the 
desired and different definition of income. Using the concept of cash flows, 
which is unambiguous and less abstract, this problem of definition is avoided. 
Disagreement can and probably will continue to exist, but such disagreement 
will not revolve around the many ambiguities which result from the many 
different concepts of income. Use of the concept of cash flows permits the 
argument, controversy, or analysis concerning the implementation of objec-
tives of accounting to take place on a common ground. 
Stating the objectives in terms of the prediction, evaluation, and control 
of cash flows provides a vehicle for assessing and evaluating all accounting 
information including income statements, balance sheets, funds statements, 
and the proper aggregation or disaggregation suitable for such statements. 
Insurmountable problems related to implementation, communication, and 
interpretation would result if accounting objectives are defined in terms of 
accounting income, because methods of assessing and evaluating the worth 
of different concepts of income are not provided. Thus, no vehicle would 
exist for making decisions about assets, liabilities, etc. 
An example may illustrate this point. Should price level adjusted data 
be used? If the objective of accounting is to measure income, then the 
argument can only be joined in terms of whether price level or non-price level 
adjusted income is superior and whether well-offness should be measured 
in terms of monetary or "purchasing power" terms. Such an objective, how-
ever, would not indicate how this controversy should be resolved. 
If, on the other hand, the objective of accounting is to predict, evaluate, 
and control cash flows, the price level controversy can be resolved, although 
the solution may differ given varying circumstances. 
For instance, accounting income currently describes the relationship 
between present inflows (revenues) and past and present outflows (cost). 
This information is useful for evaluating the past and may be useful for 
predicting future inflow and outflow relationships. It helps answer the 
question: What inflows will be generated by current and past expenditures 
for plant and equipment? Should the reporting of past costs be adjusted for 
price level changes in describing this relationship? The answer should be 
based on whether adjusted or unadjusted costs are expected to better pre-
dict future inflows. This may well depend on whether the past rate of inflation 
is expected to continue. If it is, then the relationship between current inflows 
and unadjusted outflows will better predict the future cash inflows in gross 
dollar terms. 
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The significance of these dollar inflows will of course be affected by 
price level changes. The evaluation of the extent of these effects will vary, 
however, depending on who will realize the cash flows and how they will be 
utilized. For instance, cash received by stockholders in the form of dividends 
will probably be spent on "market baskets" different from cash reinvested 
by corporations. The effect of changes in the general price level will differ 
to the extent that the usage of cash and preferences for different market 
baskets differ. This type of assessment is best left to users, since it depends 
on individual preferences and is necessarily subjective. Yet the method which 
serves the objective of predicting those cash flows is here capable of objec-
tive analysis. 
This brief example does not consider aspects of control and evaluation. 
It helps to illustrate, however, how a controversy like price level adjustments 
is capable of objective analysis using an objectives framework which relates 
to cash flows. 
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Earning Power and Cash Generating Ability 
George H. Sorter, Research Director, in collaboration with 
Martin S. Gans, Paul Rosenfield, R. M. Shannon and Robert G. Streit 
The paper entitled "Economic Decision Making and The Role of Accounting 
Information" includes a discussion of the cash generating ability of enter-
prises. The concept of cash generating ability and its relation to financial 
statement objectives requires elaboration. 
Cash Payments to Creditors and Investors 
The relevance of cash generating ability to the objectives of financial 
statements is derived from the importance of cash payments by enterprises 
to creditors and investors. 
Benefits to Creditors and Investors of 
Cash Payments by the Enterprise 
The primary benefits to creditors and investors of an enterprise consist 
of (a) future cash payments by the enterprise to them and (b) future cash 
proceeds from selling enterprise securities to others. 
Cash payments from the enterprise to its creditors and investors include 
interest and principal payments, regular and liquidating dividends, and pay-
ments for purchase of securities by the enterprise (purchases of debt securi-
ties before the principal is due and purchases of treasury stock).1 Creditors 
and investors are interested in three aspects of future cash payments: their 
prospective amounts, their prospective timing, and the related uncertainty 
associated with both the amounts and the timing. 
Cash proceeds from sales of securities to others depends on the pre-
vailing market prices, which are influenced by (1) anticipated cash payments 
1 The payments may be made voluntarily by the management of the enterprise or 
forced by legal action, stockholder action, merger, etc. 
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by the enterprise to security holders, (2) assessments of others' expectations 
of cash payments, and (3) other indirectly related factors which have an 
impact on determining cash payments by the enterprise to security holders. 
Market prices that are heavily influenced by factors other than expected 
cash payments by the enterprise to security holders are unstable. Some of 
the prices may be higher than they would otherwise be if only the amount, 
timing, and uncertainty of cash payments were considered; some may be 
lower. Arbitraging investors will drive the prices toward those levels reflecting 
expected cash payments.2 Securities that are underpriced in view of expected 
cash payments will be bought and securities that are overpriced in view of 
expected cash payments will be sold. 
Future cash payments by the enterprise to creditors and investors pro-
vide both direct and indirect benefits to creditors and investors. The receipt 
of future cash payments is a direct benefit. Expectations about future cash 
payments influence market prices of securities and thus indirectly affect 
prospective benefits or proceeds derived from selling securities. 
Conditions Required for Cash Payments 
By the Enterprise 
Three conditions are required for an enterprise to pay cash to creditors 
and investors. (1) Payments must not contravene provisions of laws or 
contracts. (2) The enterprise must be willing to make the payments. (3) Cash 
must be available for the payments. 
Legal and contractual constraints. Even if cash is available to pay 
creditors and investors, the payments may not be made because of legal 
or contractual restrictions. These constraints generally apply to payments to 
residual equity holders. Information about such legal and contractual con-
straints on cash payments by enterprises to creditors and investors should 
be provided. 
Propensity to make cash payments. Investors and creditors must form 
judgments as to whether an enterprise will make cash payments to them 
provided cash is available and not legally or contractually restricted. 
Since legal penalties are an effective spur, most enterprises pay debts 
when due. Preferred and common stock dividends, however, depend largely 
on enterprise policies. 
2 "Most modern stock valuation techniques are based upon the present-value 
theory, which was first set forth in detail by John B. Will iams in his Theory of Invest-
ment Value. Building on the earlier theoretical foundations found in Marshall, Bohm, 
Bawerk and Irving Fisher, Will iams argued that the present value of a share of stock 
is equal to the summation of all dividends expected to be received from it, discounted 
to the present at an appropriate rate of interest. He argued that tangible income to 
the investor—dividends—is the only appropriate base for consideration in the 
valuation of stock." See Paul F. Wendt, "Current Growth Stock Valuation Methods," 
Financial Analysts Journal, March-Apri l 1965, p. 91. 
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Financial statements should present information about the history of 
payments to creditors and investors. Information about the enterprise's plans 
for future payments should also be provided when the past history of pay-
ments is not indicative of future enterprise policy. Such information will 
enable creditors and investors to form judgments concerning the propensity 
of the enterprise to make cash payments. 
Deferred payments. Cash that is available for payment to creditors or 
investors but which for some reason is not paid out may nevertheless be a 
positive factor in terms of the enterprise's cash generating ability. Such 
cash will be available for investment and thereby will increase the potential 
for future cash payments. Thus, the deferral of payments by the enterprise 
may change an individual's evaluation of the enterprise. The three aspects 
of cash payments—amount, timing, and uncertainty—are changed by the 
deferral of payments, and an individual's preferences and assessment of 
these changed factors will influence his overall assessment. 
Availability of cash. Although the amount and timing of cash available 
for future payments to creditors and investors is not known in advance, 
financial statements should provide information that helps creditors and 
investors form judgments concerning future availability of cash for these 
payments. The future availability of cash depends on present holdings of 
cash and the ability to generate more cash. Financial statements obviously 
should report the enterprise's present cash holdings, but how can financial 
statements report on cash to be generated by an enterprise in the future? 
Earning Power 
The primary goal of most commercial enterprises from inception to 
dissolution is to return to owners of the enterprise more cash than they 
originally contributed. The principal activities of an enterprise over its life 
cycle involve using cash effectively to generate more cash. Enterprises which 
are successful at this process are said to possess earning power—the ability 
to generate earnings or income. Earnings over the life of an enterprise are 
eventually measured by the cash generated and returned to owners net of 
the amount they invested. Thus, for an enterprise to have earnings or earn-
ing power it must possess cash generating ability. In that sense earning 
power and cash generating ability are synonymous in the long run. Earning 
power can be defined as the cash generating ability of an enterprise. 
Cash Generating Ability 
Providing information concerning the ability of an enterprise to generate 
cash for payment to creditors and investors is a primary function of financial 
statements because of the importance of those payments to creditors and 
investors. Determining the types of information required depends on an 
understanding of the nature of cash generating ability. 
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Three features of cash generating ability are as follows: (1) it is a 
present condition; (2) it is a multifaceted condition; (3) it cannot be measured 
by describing existing cash flows. 
Present Prospects 
No one knows the actual amount or timing of cash generation in the 
future. The cash generating ability of an enterprise involves an evaluation 
of its present ability to generate cash in the future, not the resulting future 
cash generation. Cash generating ability is present prospects, not future 
accomplishments. Cash generating ability changes with future events. 
The existence of cash generating ability does not mean that cash will 
automatically be generated in the future. The existence of cash generating 
ability means, as the term indicates, that the ability to generate cash in the 
future is thought to be present. Cash will only be generated in the future to 
the extent that the ability is utilized. 
Cash generating ability must be distinguished from both past cash 
receipts and disbursements and actual future cash receipts and disburse-
ments. The relationship between cash generating ability and cash flows is 
analogous to the relationship between potential energy and kinetic energy. 
Multifaceted Concept 
Cash generating ability is a multifaceted concept that is not subject to 
simple quantification or unique assessment. Individuals with the same infor-
mation may estimate the cash generating ability of an enterprise differently 
because (a) they estimate its components differently (for example, people 
may differ on the cash generating potential of an invention), and (b) even 
if they estimate the components alike, they may evaluate the components 
and their relative weights differently, because different people have different 
preferences as to amount, timing, and uncertainty of prospective cash gen-
eration. 
Since the cash generating ability of an enterprise comprises a complex 
of attributes of the enterprise that are evaluated differently by different people, 
information cannot be provided that presents cash generating ability per se. 
Cash generating ability, rather, provides an objective for the structure of 
information. Information should be structured and presented to aid users 
in forming their own judgments about the cash generating ability of an enter-
prise. Information should also permit users to weight the amount, timing, 
and related uncertainty aspects of cash generating ability in accordance 
with their own preferences. 
Cash Generating Ability Distinguished From 
Present Cash Flows 
Information about present cash flows is insufficient for evaluating cash 
generating ability. Cash outflows for a machine or for inventory, for example, 
may increase cash generating ability because the cash generation attributable 
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to or expected from the machine or inventory is larger than the outflow 
necessary to acquire the asset. Similarly, present cash inflows such as from 
a loan or a sale of equipment under a distress condition may in fact indicate 
a decrease in cash generating ability. 
Information Useful for Assessing 
Cash Generating Ability 
In developing the objectives of financial statements, information can be 
separated into two categories: (1) information useful for assessing cash 
generating ability that should be included in financial statements and (2) 
information which, although useful for assessing cash generating ability, 
should be provided by other means. The first category of information is dis-
cussed below. 
Information about elements of enterprise resources, obligations, and 
activities (assets, liabilities, owners' equity, net income, revenue, expenses, 
financing, and other descriptions of operating and investment events) com-
prises data from which users can estimate and compare cash generating 
ability. Particular aspects of these elements bear on the implementation of a 
reporting system which assists users. 
The cash generating ability of an enterprise is not simply the ability to 
obtain cash from the resources presently held. Someone who wants to assess 
cash generating ability must estimate the proximate future net cash receipts 
as well as future relationships between cash sacrifices (outflows) and cash 
benefits (inflows). Financial statements should therefore provide information 
not only about probable future cash benefits from resources held, but also 
about relationships between cash sacrifices and benefits that have occurred 
and factors that may cause changes in those relationships in the future. 
Information about relationships between sacrifices and benefits can and 
should take various forms. Income statements, balance sheets, funds state-
ments and forecasts may all present useful information. Neither taken alone 
presents sufficient information. 
Balance sheet: Sacrifice and benefits of resources held. The acquisition 
of most resources requires a sacrifice by the acquiring enterprise. Resources 
held, by definition, are expected to provide benefits. One type of relationship 
between sacrifices and benefits that can be presented in financial statements 
is the relationship between sacrifices and expected benefits of resources held. 
For example, the sacrifices involved in acquiring resources held could be 
presented in one column of a balance sheet, and the expected benefits 
from those resources could be presented in a parallel column in the balance 
sheet. This presentation would aid users in predicting cash consequences 
of existing assets and liabilities. 
Such information could also be used to facilitate attempts to extrapo-
late future relationships between sacrifices and benefits and thus predict 
cash consequences due to reinvestment. 
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The spread between sacrifices and benefits can be used to help appraise 
the uncertainty of expected benefits. For example, a large spread between 
sacrifices and expected benefits indicating unusually large expected returns 
may indicate considerable risk. 
The helpfulness of information about the relationship between sacri-
fices and benefits of resources held is not without limits, however. First, the 
benefits are not known and must be estimated. Second, the relationships 
between sacrifices and benefits of resources held may not be typical of past 
relationships; indeed, they may actually represent a one-time phenomenon. 
Even if the present relationships are typical of the past, the future may be 
anticipated to vary significantly from the past. Thus, present relationships 
are not sufficient for estimating probable future relationships beween sacri-
fices and benefits. In other words, balance sheet information is not enough. 
Income Statement: Completed relationships between sacrifices and 
benefits. Information concerning completed relationships between sacrifices 
and benefits plays a dominant role in the assessment of cash generating 
ability. The income statement could be designed to present information so 
that revenues are considered to be past benefits that will require no future 
sacrifices, and expenses are past sacrifices that will produce no future 
benefits. Income is therefore the excess of past benefits over past sacrifices 
for which the relationship between benefits and sacrifices has been com-
pleted. 
Attributes of the income statement. An income statement reporting 
completed relationships between sacrifices and benefits describes those 
events whose impact on the cash generating ability of an enterprise has 
already occurred. Information about events whose total impact on cash 
generating ability is not yet determined is reported in the balance sheet. 
Income statement information of this nature can only be used infer-
entially to assess cash generating ability. It presents historical relationships 
between sacrifices and benefits (between cash outflows and their related 
cash inflows) that can be used in estimating what such relationships may be 
in the future. It does not, however, present explicit information about present 
or contemplated activities and their cash generating impact. 
The funds statement, or statement of financial activities. This statement 
conveys factual information about events which are presumed to have 
significant cash consequences. However, this statement does not present any 
interpretation or analysis concerning the cash consequences. The statement 
informs the user what has occurred, what has been received or paid, but 
neither indicates the relationship between these events nor the significance 
of these events in terms of what is to occur. The income statement and 
balance sheet represent information about events that have occurred; both 
sources analyze and interpret these events in terms of past and future con-
sequences, whereas the funds statement makes no such analysis or inter-
pretation. This factual statement is clearly useful as background for the 
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interpretive statements. It is also useful for revealing either continuity or 
departure from past patterns of operation. 
Forecast information. Forecasts inform users about management's ex-
pectations, knowledge of which is an integral element for the assessment 
of cash generating ability. However, forecasts are necessarily based upon 
expectations and are possibly biased. The user has no assurance concerning 
the likely success or attainment of these expectations. Forecasts are neces-
sarily subjective, dealing solely with the future; their validation must await 
the passage of time. As events occur, each of the other financial statements 
will report information about events which validate or negate the forecasts. 
Each of these statements, therefore, provides different information 
relevant for assessment of cash generating ability. All of these statements 
seem necessary to the user in his role of assessing cash generating ability. 
If the user only considers reported income in making his assessments, he is 
assuming that the trend of past earnings will continue and remain unchanged 
in the future. If his analysis is limited in this way, the user would be ignoring 
many factors reported in other statements, such as sacrifice and benefit 
relationships reported in the balance sheet, factual information concerning 
the occurrence of events with expected cash consequences found in the 
funds statement, and forecasts about expected events. Thus, just as the 
ability to generate cash is dependent on many factors of enterprise activities, 
so is the assessment of that ability dependent upon many kinds and sources 
of information. Financial statements cannot provide all of the information 
needed for this assessment; however, the objective should be to provide the 
structure for information which helps users to assess enterprise potential 
from more than one dimension. No single financial statement satisfies this 
objective. 
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The Partitioning Dilemma 
George H. Sorter 
The events and happenings which affect a firm form the basis for the informa-
tion found in financial statements and represent a continuum that defies easy 
partitioning or classification. In like manner, enterprise goals are never finally 
achieved and cannot be definitively evaluated prior to its dissolution. Never-
theless, evaluations and estimations concerning an entity must be made con-
tinually, and information useful for this task needs to be supplied periodically. 
The relevant question deals with how to organize, classify, and partition 
the interrelated and continuous activities of an enterprise so that they can be 
reported in various financial statements, especially the balance sheet and 
the income statement. The prevailing view is that all enterprise activity 
which results in favorable or unfavorable consequences during a given period 
shall, to the extent that these consequences are recognized, be reported in 
the income statement. Favorable or unfavorable consequences are described 
in these statements as increases or decreases in the net assets of the firm. 
As a result, the income statement presently reports all recognized changes 
in the net assets of the firm apart from incremental equity investments or 
disinvestments. Accounting theories and theorists, of course, differ as to 
what changes in net assets should be recognized—transaction based changes 
(historical cost), exit value changes, current cost changes, and so forth. But 
as far as we are aware, all accounting theorists agree that the accounting 
income of a firm should be the aggregate of all recognized value changes. 
All events that produce recognized value changes, therefore, are reported 
in the income statement. These same events and these same value changes, 
as well as events considered neutral in terms of value changes, are also 
reported in the balance sheet. Sales and cost of goods sold, for example, 
are part of the income statement and the effect of these events on inventory, 
receivables, and retained earnings is also reported in the balance sheet. 
The two statements are said to articulate and thus in some sense are redun-
dant, since all events reported in the income statement are also reported in 
the balance sheet, although from a different perspective. 
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In a sense then, events are currently partitioned in terms of their favor-
able or unfavorable consequences. This is consistent with the economic 
notion of well-offness. In the period that changes in well-offness are recog-
nized, the events interpreted to have produced such changes are reported 
in the income statement. These events, as well as events that have not (as 
yet) produced recognized changes in well-offness, are reported in the bal-
ance sheet. 
Is this type of partitioning or classification necessarily optimal in terms 
of financial statement objectives? The answer depends on what user needs 
are and what information best fulfills these needs. In this paper it is assumed 
that decision-makers interested in a firm, like decision-makers interested in 
any economic asset, are essentially concerned with the net cash expected to 
be generated by that asset. In the case of an asset which has an assumed 
indefinite life, such as a firm, the primary predictive problem centers around 
estimating the on-going relationship between cash outflows and resulting cash 
inflows over an indefinite time horizon. It is this relationship that has been 
defined elsewhere in this volume as the cash generating ability of a firm. 
In order to make such predictions, it is also assumed that users essentially 
1. Examine the long-run relationships of past cash inflows and outflows. 
2. Attempt to identify present factors that would occasion changes in such 
relationships. 
3. Examine future prospects and plans in terms of how these would likely 
affect future cash flow relationships. 
Because of the particular nature of financial statements, it is paradoxical 
but true that these financial statements are better suited for phases 1 and 3 
of the predictive process described above than for phase 2. Financial reports 
are structured and take time to prepare. They are not the ideal medium for 
communicating fresh news. By the time financial statements are issued, it 
is likely that the fresh news will already have been reported via other informa-
tion channels. Financial statements have a comparative advantage for pro-
viding a framework involving relevant past relationships and contemplated 
future relationships. While this framework enhances the user's ability to 
evaluate and analyze the significance of current happenings, it does not 
emphasize either the description or evaluation of fresh news. Financial 
statements cannot describe fresh news because they are not produced on a 
timely basis. Financial statements are not suited for evaluations of fresh 
news because the significance of news is interpreted differently by each user 
in terms of his own preferences. 
The above are only assumptions, but they appear to be logical and 
to support what has been defined as a cycle approach to the partitioning of 
economic events in accounting statements. Under this view, cycles of events 
are classified in terms of whether they are complete, incomplete, or contem-
plated in terms of cash generation. Separate statements should describe 
information about each of these cycles. This view essentially envisions 
partitioning of events on a cash generating project basis. Events that are 
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part of a completed project would be reported in a statement similar to the 
present income statement; events that are part of an incomplete project would 
be reported in a statement similar to the present balance sheet, and contem-
plated projects would be reported in a budget or forecast statement. 
Establishing when a project is complete in terms of cash generation 
is not a simple matter. An enterprise engages in many kinds of projects or 
investments. These investments vary in duration—some are completed in a 
few days and some extend over a protracted period of time. Investments 
also vary in terms of whether the investment goal is directly or indirectly 
related to cash generation. 
The investment in one unit of merchandise inventory is part of a project 
directly related to cash generation. The project essentially consists of a 
cash purchase to be followed by a cash sale. At the other end of the spectrum 
in complexity is the purchase of a building that could be used for manufac-
turing. The purpose of the building is to house machinery which is employed, 
along with labor inputs, to convert raw materials to finished goods that are 
intended to be sold. In this example, many projects are interrelated: the 
purchase and use of plant, the purchase and use of machinery, the purchase 
and use of raw materials, the purchase of labor services, the undertaking of 
an advertising campaign, and many more. In a complex situation of this 
type, when is a project or series of projects defined to constitute a completed 
cycle for reporting purposes? It might be suggested that such a cycle is 
complete only when the longest lived project is complete, that is, when the 
plant is sold and when all goods produced in the plant have been sold. But 
at that time, of course, other related projects might be under way, such as 
machinery purchases, advertising campaigns, the purchase of goods, etc. 
Therefore, during the life span of the enterprise, all series of projects can be 
considered incomplete. An extreme conclusion could be reached that no 
project and no cycle is complete before all projects are considered complete 
and that the only completed cycle of an enterprise is its total life cycle. 
According to that view, of course, dissolution of an enterprise would be the 
only appropriate time for rendering accounting reports based upon completed 
cycles. 
The preceding definition of completed projects would not be very useful. 
Alternatively, a cycle can be defined as complete whenever a realized sacri-
fice-benefit relationship is established. This definition is more useful. A 
cycle is defined as complete whenever an actual or highly probable cash 
inflow (realized benefit) has occurred and all sacrifices related to that inflow 
represent either actual or highly probable cash outflows. Essentially then, 
a cycle is considered complete whenever the cash consequences of a series 
of activities are predictable with a high degree of confidence. 
Obviously this definition of completed cycles is not free from measure-
ment difficulties primarily because of the jointness of sacrifices and/or 
benefits. Inventory, for instance, is often bought in lots, and a realized sacrifice 
is made for the lot rather than for individual units. Nevertheless, a cycle is 
defined as complete whenever a unit is sold, even if others remain unsold. 
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Similarly, a sacrifice is made for a plant as a whole. The plant, as in the 
case of an inventory lot, can be considered as a collection of units or assets. 
Services of the plant during each period may be considered as an individual 
asset; a cycle is completed when some but not all of these individual assets 
are utilized. The completed cycle notion, therefore, is not free of measure-
ment and allocation problems. However, it does restrict income statement 
events to those actions where all cash consequences have occurred or are 
predictable even though the measurement of these consequences may 
involve subjectivity and allocation. 
The balance sheet, under this partitioning scheme, should report the 
relationship between actual and potential cash consequences of events that 
are part of incomplete cycles. Assets should in most instances be described 
both in terms of the realized sacrifice necessary to obtain the asset and the 
potential benefit expected to be gained as a result of acquiring the asset. 
Liabilities should in most instances reflect the past benefit obtained and the 
future sacrifice demanded as a result of the liability. Some assets and lia-
bilities, however, such as cash and accounts receivable and payable, repre-
sent realized rather than potential benefits and sacrifices. These benefits and 
sacrifices have already been realized because they represent actual or highly 
probable cash receipts or disbursements. These assets and liabilities never-
theless can be considered as part of incomplete cycles. Continuity of opera-
tions implies that realization defines both the end of one cycle and the 
beginning of the next. The total of net realized liquid assets, to the extent 
that they are held and not distributed, reflects the start of another incomplete 
cycle. 
If events are partitioned in this manner, the financial statements would not 
articulate but rather would report distinctly different information. Information 
about changes in value, prospects or plans, for instance, has no place in 
the completed cycles statements but would be communicated either in the 
incomplete or contemplated cycles statement. This is thought to be of more 
utility than existing partitioning schemes. 
The existing partitioning schemes either advocate that all value changes 
be reflected in accounting income (fair or current value schemes) or they 
reject the reporting of any value changes except those that result from trans-
actions (historical cost). The fair value approach does not recognize that 
different kinds of value changes relate in different ways to the assessment 
of cash generating ability; further, this approach does not provide for struc-
turing the information in terms of pertinent benefit-sacrifice relationships. 
Value changes of specific assets impact differently on potential cash 
generation. The change in the exit value of an asset held for sale, for 
instance, may be directly related to changes in potential cash generation. 
Changes, on the other hand, in the exit value of specialized assets held for 
use may have only a very remote impact, if any, on cash generation. The 
impact of changes in entry value (current cost) upon cash generation is also 
complex and will also vary with different assets and different management 
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plans. In any case, these value changes do not directly relate to or describe 
cash generation. An income statement based on such value changes also 
does not describe benefit-sacrifice or inflow-outflow relationships. If a firm 
acquires an asset at a cost of $100 and this asset increases in value to $120 
at the end of period 1, the income statement of that period would show $20 
income, but would not relate this income to any sacrifice. Therefore, no 
inflow-outflow or sacrifice-benefit relationship would be described in that 
period. In year 2, assuming that the asset is sold and that no further value 
changes occur, the revenue-expense description for that period would be 
$120-$120 and reflect zero income. Thus, the historical record which 
describes the relationships between outflows and inflows is masked and 
obscured, because data which describe potential cash realization are com-
mingled with data which describe realized cash generation. Such commin-
gling of data is not considered to be adequately responsive to users' needs. 
The present analysis suggests that it is the historical record which 
describes the relationships between outflows and inflows for many projects 
over many successive time periods which is utilized by investors as a basic 
framework for predicting the return (cash inflow) a firm is likely to experience 
as the result of making certain investments (cash outflow). The cash inflow-
cash outflow relationship for many projects over many successive time periods 
is apt to provide a better framework for predicting future relationships than 
one which incorporates different and possibly volatile value changes. 
Changes in current values can reflect information about the present, the 
here and now, that needs to be considered. However, as argued above, 
such information about the present is not well suited for financial statements. 
Current values are no longer current by the time they are communicated. On 
the other hand, the description of completed cash relationships retains utility 
to the extent that it is considered part of a predictive framework. 
The preceding discussion, however, does not imply that a historical 
record of value changes is not important and should not be reported. Value 
changes may indeed provide useful evidence concerning the likely prospects 
for activities presently underway, that is, the likely benefit which will result 
from the utilization of assets and the discharge of liabilities. By contrasting 
the sacrifice-expected benefit relationships reported in the balance sheet with 
the historical sacrifice-benefit relationships in the income statement, the user 
may be made aware of changed circumstances that he can utilize in his 
decision-making. 
Since value changes do provide useful information, even though they 
do not represent the totality of all useful information, they should be reported 
and not excluded from financial reports. Information about value changes 
that has an indirect impact on the potential cash generation of assets and 
liabilities currently held is utilized in a different manner from information 
about completed cash generating cycles. Therefore, the two types of infor-
mation should not be merged and aggregated in terms of a net income 
figure. They should be separately reported. If nothing else, defining the 
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income statement in terms of completed cycles will alert users to the fact 
that not all relevant information about a firm can be impounded in a single-
value bottom line figure. Clearly, to make informed judgments about an entity 
requires more than completed cycle information. On the other hand, attempt-
ing to incorporate in the income figure all value changes might give the 
impression to users that it is possible to make an absolute determination 
of the change in well-offness of an enterprise for a given period and to 
adequately quantify such a change by one single-dollar amount. 
The preceding analysis suggests the following: The partitioning of events 
on the basis of a cash generating project basis is necessary for disclosing 
useful information concerning enterprise earning power. In addition, financial 
reports should be structured on the basis of nonarticulated statements which 
separately reflect completed, incomplete and contemplated cycles. This 
approach highlights appropriate benefit-sacrifice relationships and is there-




Views in the accounting literature on the concept of stewardship and its place 
in financial accounting vary widely. Specific issues include the function of 
financial statements as reports on stewardship, the types of responsibilities 
that are encompassed by the stewardship concept, the parties to whom 
stewards have stewardship responsibilities, the accounting standards that 
reflect the view that financial statements are reports on stewardship, and the 
relationship between the function of financial statements as reports on 
stewardship and other functions of financial statements. 
Views on Stewardship 
Financial statements as reports on stewardship. Numerous authorities 
hold that a function of financial statements is to report to those to whom 
stewards are responsible on the discharge of their stewardship responsi-
bilities.1 Although many authorities emphasize other functions of financial 
statements and do not mention stewardship, none that I can think of deny 
that reporting on stewardship is a function of financial statements. 
Types of stewardship responsibilities. Views differ on the responsibili-
ties that are reported on in financial statements as stewardship responsi-
bilities. At one extreme is the view that they are confined to physical safety 
of cash (5)* or of assets (1). Next is the view that financial statements report 
on the use of assets by stewards without any standard for their use implied 
(2, 7). Another view is that financial statements report on efficient, eco-
nomical, or effective use of assets by stewards (9). Finally, at the other 
extreme is the view, apparently most widely held, that stewardship responsi-
bilities reported on in financial statements consist not only of safeguarding 
assets but also of making progress toward the goals that the stewards are 
1 A representative list of references on the concept of stewardship is contained in 
the Appendix to this paper. 
* Numbers in parentheses refer to references quoted in the Appendix to this paper. 
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expected to achieve. The view is stated in terms of performance, using assets 
gainfully, productive use of assets, profitability, success or failure, producing 
earnings or profits, and so forth (4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 16, 17). 
Variation of stewardship responsibilities by nature of enterprise. The 
variation in views expressed concerning stewardship responsibilities reported 
on in financial statements to some extent reflects variations in the nature of 
the enterprise concerned (2, 16). Custodians, escrow agents, executors, 
administrators, trustees, guardians, managers of public funds, managers of 
not-for-profit organizations, and managers of business enterprises obviously 
have different responsibilities, all of which may be described as stewardship 
responsibilities and are reported on in financial statements. 
To whom are stewards responsible? Specifying reporting on steward-
ship as a function of financial statements requires identifying those to whom 
the stewards are responsible. To a great extent that depends on the opera-
tion of law or contract (2). Beneficiaries, wards, donors, dues payers, mem-
bers, and citizens are among those to whom stewards of entities other than 
business enterprises are responsible. Owners are obviously most commonly 
cited as the ones to whom managers of business enterprises are responsible. 
Some writers appear to indicate that managers of business enterprises are 
responsible to report only to owners (7, 9). Others specify parties in addition 
to owners to whom managers of business enterprises have stewardship 
responsibilities: creditors (6, 8), present investors (16, 17), those having 
bona fide interests (8), the investing public, government (6), and all of society 
(4,6). 
Accounting standards entailed by stewardship concept. Some writers 
indicate that the function of financial statements as reports on stewardship 
entails particular accounting standards in the preparation of financial state-
ments. The standard usually cited is historical cost (5, 11, 17). Some use 
the stewardship concept to deny a place in financial accounting to current 
or liquidating values; others, however, state that this is a misinterpretation 
of the stewardship concept, and that holding gains and losses should be 
part of a report on stewardship (17). 
Relationship to other functions. Views vary concerning the relationship 
of the function of financial statements as reports on stewardship to other 
functions of financial statements. Many apparently believe that reporting on 
stewardship is the only function of the basic financial statements (4, 6, 7, 
12, 16). At least one observer vehemently denies that financial statements 
have other functions (7). Others recognize that readers of financial state-
ments would like them to serve other needs, but insist that basic financial 
statements are not and should not be designed for other needs. Some com-
mentators recommend that users look elsewhere for information for other 
purposes. Others recommend that readers with other needs use financial 
statements designed as reports on stewardship as best they can but that the 
design should not be altered for their needs. Still others recommend no 
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change in the basic financial statements but recommend presentation of 
supplementary data for other needs (2). 
Other authorities contend that reporting on stewardship is only one of 
several major functions of financial statements, each of which apparently is 
sufficient justification to report the necessary information (2, 5, 9, 11). Several 
authorities indicate that the function of reporting on stewardship is part of the 
broader function of facilitating investment decisions (1). 
Tangled Terminology 
One cause of the differences of opinion in the accounting literature in 
the area of stewardship is that the terminology used is often vague and 
ambiguous. The main culprits are the words steward and stewardship. The 
Merriam-Webster unabridged dictionary lists fifteen definitions for steward, 
ranging from custodian to manager (15). Readers attach their own prefer-
ences to the words when their meaning is not made clear in the context, 
which often occurs in the accounting literature. Synonyms for steward used 
by those who discuss the concept also reflect the range of meanings, includ-
ing custodian, trustee, guardian, fiduciary, and manager. Communication is 
hampered by words that mean many things to many people. 
Accountability 
Cyert and Ijiri (6) and others recommend that the term accountability 
be used to designate the function of financial statements termed stewardship. 
That is a good suggestion because accountability does not have separate, 
differing connotations depending on the types of entities and responsibilities 
involved. 
Accountability denotes the responsibility to others that one or more 
persons have for their behavior. Accountability pervades human relation-
ships. Common examples are the responsibilities that children have to 
parents, students to teachers, employees to employers, and citizens to other 
citizens and society. A person who is accountable to another person for his 
behavior may be required to report his behavior or its results to the other 
person; in any event he is subject to reward or punishment depending on 
whether the behavior for which he is accountable fulfills his responsibilities. 
Accountability for resources. Persons who control or use resources are 
accountable to others concerning the resources. Even persons who own the 
resources they control or use are accountable to others for certain behavior 
concerning them—an automobile owner, for example, is accountable to 
others for unsafe operation of his automobile. Under a wide variety of cir-
cumstances determined by law, contract, or custom, many persons who 
control or use resources are responsible to others for reporting regularly to 
those to whom they are responsible concerning the resources. At one ex-
treme is a broker who must report regularly on securities he holds for safe-
keeping. At the other extreme are the managers of an international business 
enterprise that has thousands of owners, creditors, employees, suppliers, 
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and customers and that affects the lives of millions of people. The managers 
are accountable to all of these people in various ways. 
Accountability as an objective of financial statements. Financial state-
ments provide "a continual history quantified in money terms of economic 
resources and obligations of a business enterprise and of economic activi-
ties that change those resources and obligations."2 The nature of financial 
statements makes them reflect on the control and use of resources by those 
who are accountable for their control or use. Since the function of reporting 
on the accountability of those who control and use resources cannot be 
avoided, financial statements should be designed to serve that function. That 
requirement can be stated as an objective of financial statements: 
An objective of financial statements is to report on the control and 
use of resources by those accountable for their control and use to 
those to whom they are accountable. 
Stating accountability as an objective, of course, does not rule out other 
objectives of financial statements. 
Financial Statements as Accountability Reports 
Characteristics of statements. Specifying that financial statements serve 
as reports on accountability leads to certain required characteristics. The 
characteristics are not necessarily all-inclusive—that is, although the objec-
tive of accountability makes certain characteristics necessary, other objec-
tives may make other characteristics necessary. 
Persons to whom reports are directed. As reports on accountability, 
financial statements are directed to specific persons—those to whom the 
persons reported on are accountable. The persons to whom the reports are 
directed have a right based on accountability to know the results of others' 
behavior. Their right is based on a relationship that existed during the period 
reported on, for example, the right of owners of a business enterprise to an 
accounting by the managers. Prospective owners may have a need to know 
the affairs of the business during the period, but they do not have the right 
to the information on the basis of accountability: managers are not account-
able to prospective owners. Prospective owners, of course, may have the 
right to the information on other grounds. 
The person to whom accountability is owed depends on law, contract, 
and custom, and may change over time (11, 14). Accountants cannot specify 
those to whom accountability is owed but may be able to anticipate changes 
in accountability requirements and prepare for them in advance. As corpo-
rate management becomes increasingly accountable to the public on corpo-
rations' impact on social costs and benefits, for example, the managers may 
be required to report that impact. Accountants can be prepared to modify 
financial statements so that they serve that new reporting requirement. 
2 APB Statement No. 4, (New York: AICPA, 1970) paragraph 41. 
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Accountable behavior. The behavior for which those who control or use 
resources are accountable also depends on law, contract, or custom and 
also may change over time. All persons who control or use resources of 
others are responsible for their safekeeping. But custodial responsibilities 
are usually just the beginning. Persons who use resources that are not their 
own—for example, managers of public funds, not-for-profit organizations, 
and business enterprises—are responsible for using the resources for the 
purpose intended and not to squander them. Many of them have the further 
responsibility to achieve goals in the use of the resources and are account-
able for the degree to which the goals are met. Managers of a business 
enterprise in particular are responsible for achieving the goal of operating 
the business successfully. Financial statements, as accountability reports, 
must be designed to indicate the degree to which the responsibilities of those 
who control or use resources have been fulfilled. If the responsibilities in-
clude achievement of goals, the financial statements must be designed to 
reflect the degree of achievement. Thus, the narrow view of some that the 
subject matter of financial statements as stewardship reports is confined to 
the safeguarding of assets does not reflect the requirement of most persons 
who control or use resources to account for all of their responsibilities con-
cerning resources. 
Specifying that accountability reports reflect the achievement of goals 
opens difficult issues. If the goals are not established explicitly between the 
parties, they must be inferred (2). Whose goals should they be: those who 
are accountable? those to whom they are accountable? the entity's? One 
source (6) states that the goals should be those of the entity, but the idea 
that an entity has goals apart from the goals of the persons who participate 
in it needs examination. 
Since those to whom an accounting is owed will judge the fulfillment of 
the goals, the goals should either be their goals or they should at least agree 
with the goals. Producing satisfactory profits may be a goal of management, 
for example, but owners may desire maximum profits and may hold manage-
ment accountable for that goal. Even the definition of success or profits may 
depend on the goals of those to whom the accounting is made. The defini-
tion should be incorporated into the design of the financial statements. 
Standard of achievement. Persons who are accountable to others are 
judged by an ideal standard—by behavior or results that would be ideal in 
the circumstances. No one is expected to act ideally in a given set of cir-
cumstances, of course, but he may be judged by how far short of the ideal 
he falls. The key to the standards is the circumstances. They are peculiar 
to the reporting framework, so that the standard is tailored to each report. 
New management of a company on the verge of bankruptcy, for example, is 
not expected to achieve the same results as the established management of 
a company with a history of recent success. 
Those who are accountable are therefore not judged directly by com-
paring their behavior or results with those of other persons or even with their 
behavior or results at other times. The criterion is not how well they did 
compared with how well others did or how well they previously did, but how 
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well they might have done in the circumstances. Evidence of how well those 
who are accountable might have done may be gained from comparing their 
results at other times or the results of others, but due allowance must be 
made for differences in circumstances. Intercompany comparability is there-
fore not an indispensable quality of financial statements as accountability 
reports. Those who object to the overriding goal of the accounting profession 
in recent years to achieve intercompany comparability are right from that 
perspective. Making financial statements comparable without also detailing 
the differences in results because of differences in circumstances is not fair 
from the standpoint of holding persons accountable for their behavior. 
Improving intercompany comparability of financial statements of enterprises 
in relatively similar circumstances might provide useful evidence for judging 
accountable behavior, but it is not a panacea. In the final analysis, behavior 
and results for which people are accountable must be judged in their own 
peculiar circumstances. Financial statements should be designed to facili-
tate appraising accountable behavior based on that standard. 
Accountability and economic decisions. Financial statements designed 
as accountability reports are not meant to be simply historical recitations, 
mere curiosities. Their purpose is to permit those to whom an accounting is 
owed to make informed decisions concerning the persons who are account-
able. Other functions of financial statements might permit informed economic 
decisions in other areas, for example, using the resources, but accountability 
reports are specific to decisions concerning the persons accountable. The 
actions that are available depend on the type of entity and the relationship 
between the persons who are accountable and the persons to whom they are 
accountable. Unsatisfactory behavior by those accountable can be met, for 
example, by terminating their control or use of the resources (changing 
custodians, firing managers, etc.) or by requiring restitution. Less drastic 
responses include reducing the authority of those held accountable to use 
the resources (e.g., removing discretionary powers from a stock broker) or 
reducing their compensation. Satisfactory behavior can be rewarded by in-
creasing authority or compensation. 
The proliferation of parties to whom persons who control or use re-
sources are accountable diminishes the ability of specific individuals to take 
action directly to affect those who are accountable (13). Large corporations 
may have thousands or millions of stockholders, none of whom is able singly 
to apply sanctions directly to the management. The managers are not un-
accountable, however, and the need for reports on their accountable be-
havior is as great as for one-manager, one-owner businesses. Sanctions are 
available, and though they are indirect they are effective enough for the 
managers of large corporations to be vitally interested in the contents of the 
financial statements. Management cannot survive without the confidence of 
the company's investors. Without that confidence, stock prices fall, credit 
dries up, and one way or another management finds itself restricted or even 
removed. Successful discharge of accountability by management, on the 
other hand, brings them rewards such as acceptance by stockholders of 
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higher management compensation levels, profits from stock options, and 
increased prestige and opportunities for career advancement. 
Implications for accounting standards. As reports on accountable be-
havior, financial statements should contain information on past events. People 
are not accountable for the future, at least not until it arrives. Accounting 
standards used to prepare accountability reports should provide that they only 
report on the past. Formulation of plans, budgets, and expectations about 
the future may be part of the report. 
The idea that the function of financial statements as stewardship reports 
calls for accounting based on historical cost needs reexamination. It is prob-
ably based on an interpretation of stewardship as custodianship. Historical 
cost perhaps helps check on the custodianship of cash or its surrogates 
("flow of costs") but does not necessarily serve to report on the achieve-
ment of goals expected of management. Standards that serve that purpose 
should be discovered and adopted. 
Since financial statements report on the results of management's be-
havior, management would prefer that their subject matter be confined to 
events over which they have direct control—transactions. Perhaps that also 
contributes to the support for historical cost accounting, particularly among 
managers. Managers are responsible for exposing the resources to events 
not directly under their control, however, for example, changes in prices or 
in the general price level. To fairly appraise the results of management's 
behavior, therefore, events that affect the resources but that are not directly 
under their control should not be excluded from the reports. 
Financial statements may be prepared by those who are accountable or 
by others. Those who are accountable usually are most familiar with the 
information to be reported, but are not disinterested. Conservative reporting 
standards and independent audits can help overcome their conflict of interest. 
Conservative reporting standards are not so necessary if the financial state-
ments are prepared by persons other than those who are accountable, but 
that is often impracticable. Devising accounting standards that are consis-
tently conservative in reporting progress, however, may be difficult or perhaps 
even impossible. 
The standards by which accountability reports are prepared can affect 
the behavior of those held accountable. If the standards imply one standard 
of success or failure and not another, managers will tend to try to achieve 
the standard implied. That may be a mixed blessing. If the standard is to the 
short-run benefit but long-run detriment of those to whom the managers are 
accountable, for example, the process may be harmful. The effect of account-
ing standards on the behavior of managers should be investigated to deter-
mine that they are not counterproductive. 
Financial statements as accountability reports are designed to serve 
persons who are accountable. The statements serve as a means for those 
accountable to discharge their obligation to report to those to whom they are 
accountable. Information for appraising those held accountable is provided 
by financial statements. In this function they are not designed to serve others, 
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especially not to the detriment of those to whom the accounting is owed. 
Accounting standards that help the competition of the entity therefore run 
counter to this function of financial statements. 
Relationship Between Accountability and 
Other Objectives of Financial Statements 
As indicated in a previous section, many contend that stewardship or 
accountability is the only objective of the basic financial statements. How-
ever, many uses are made of financial statements other than to appraise the 
control and use of resources by those accountable for them. There is no 
question that at least some of those who put financial statements to other 
uses have the right to the information for those purposes, and that providing 
information for those uses is therefore an objective of financial statements. 
For example, the Securities Act of 1933 is self-described as 
An act to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securi-
ties sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, 
and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.3 
Financial statements must therefore provide full and fair disclosure to those 
who buy and sell securities in interstate and foreign commerce and through 
the mails. They are not necessarily the persons to whom the management 
is accountable, and the purpose is basically to enable the users to evaluate 
investment opportunities and not simply to evaluate management's account-
able behavior (although that may aid in evaluating investment opportunities). 
As early as 1943, G. O. May listed ten "uses of financial statements": 
1. As a report of stewardship; 
2. As a basis for fiscal policy; 
3. To determine the legality of dividends; 
4. As a guide to wise dividend action; 
5. As a basis for the granting of credit; 
6. As information for prospective investors in an enterprise; 
7. As a guide to the value of investments already made; 
8. As an aid to Government supervision; 
9. As a basis for price or rate regulation; 
10. As a basis for taxation.4 
At least five of the uses, numbers 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 should be served by 
general-purpose financial statements, and only the first is directly dependent 
on financial statements serving as accountability reports. 
Determining what the objectives of financial statements are or will be or 
should be in addition to accountability is a task of the Accounting Objectives 
3 Federal Securities Reporter, Volume 1, p. 1551. 
4 George O. May, Financial Accounting (New York: The Macmil lan Company, 1943) 
p. 3. 
130 
Study Group. The study will require, among other things, determining needs 
to have information and right to information and the proper response of 
accountants when needs are not accompanied by rights. One thing is certain, 
however, and that is that accountability is an objective of financial statements 
because of both the need and right to the information by those owed an 
accounting and the fact that financial statements will reflect accountable 
behavior whether or not they are specifically designed to do so. 
Historical perspective: Accountability, an early objective. Some insight 
into the relationship between accountability and other objectives may be 
gained by speculating on the history of the objectives of financial statements. 
When business was rudimentary and those who owned resources also con-
trolled and used them and businesses rarely if ever changed hands, any 
statements of the status and progress of the enterprise that may have been 
drawn up were essentially management statements and not financial state-
ments. Nevertheless, even in the earliest times the control and use of re-
sources were transferred from the owners to others for a number of purposes: 
safekeeping, control of the resources of a minor, and taxes, to name a few. 
Unless the resources were taken by force, an explicit or implicit duty to 
account for their control or use was part of the transfer agreement. Reports 
of one kind or another surely were required: oral or written, formal or in-
formal, perhaps on the exception basis of reporting only when something 
went wrong. Thus accountability developed as early as any other objective 
of reporting on resources controlled or used by others than the owners. 
The procedure of reporting on accountability for resources was trans-
ferred to business operations as soon as the control or use of business 
resources was separated from their ownership, also probably an early de-
velopment. 
Development of other objectives. Another early objective of reporting on 
the control or use of resources by others than the owner was to keep the 
owner informed on his stock of resources so he could choose from among 
available opportunities for their use. Other objectives probably developed 
slowly. At first, financial statements with other objectives were probably for 
special, one-time purposes, for example, to terminate a venture or to sell a 
business. The earliest continuing objective of financial statements of busi-
ness enterprises other than reporting on accountability and available re-
sources probably was to inform creditors, present and prospective, of the 
security for their loans. 
The objective of informing those who bought and sold securities of 
business enterprises came much later, with the development of enterprises 
with indefinite lives and transferable shares. 
Continuing importance of accountability. The development of other ob-
jectives has not diminished the importance of accountability. It remains as 
the most important objective of financial statements of some entities, for 
example, the statements of executors and administrators of estates and of 
managers of public funds, charitable organizations, and many other not-for-
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profit organizations. Accountability is as important as ever as an objective 
of financial statements of business enterprises. Other objectives may now be 
more important than accountability but that does not mean that accountability 
is any less important than it ever was. 
Cultural lag. A kind of cultural lag may exist in accounting because 
objectives of financial statements did not all develop at the same time. Finan-
cial statements designed to serve one objective may not necessarily serve 
equally well objectives that develop later. Accounting standards designed 
for financial statements as accountability reports are still needed for that 
purpose. Indeed they should be improved to serve it better—but they may 
not serve other important objectives satisfactorily. Financial statements may 
now be ill-suited to serve all of their major objectives. 
Possible differences between the requirements of different objectives. 
Multiple major objectives might be served well by financial statements with 
similar or even identical designs or they might require different designs. 
Research is needed to discover implementation needs once objectives are 
identified. To illustrate possible differences, however, accountability may be 
compared with another major objective, the need to inform persons who buy 
and sell securities of business enterprises. The comparison at this stage in 
advance of further research can only be exemplary and suggestive. 
Accountability 
1. Users have had an interest in the 
enterprise during the reporting 
period. 
2. All parties see reports as serving 
accountability. 
3. Intercompany comparability is 
not a basic requirement. 
4. Conservatism may be helpful. 
5. The economic decisions of the 
users concern the future of those 
held accountable. 
Buying and Selling Securities 
1. Users may be only contemplating 
a future interest. 
2. Those accountable may see 
reports as accountability reports 
only while users see them as 
information for investment 
decisions. 
3. Intercompany comparability is a 
basic requirement. 
4. Accuracy, not conservatism, 
should be the goal. 
5. The economic decisions of the 
users concern the future risk and 
return on the security. 
Conclusion 
Stewardship or accountability is neither the only major objective of 
financial statements nor an unimportant or nonexistent objective. It is one of 
several major objectives. Furthermore, stewardship does not necessarily lead 
to financial statements as they have been traditionally prepared. Confused 
terminology and the absence of analysis have deterred accountants from 
discovering just where it leads. 
132 
Appendix 
Selected References on Stewardship 
Stewardship is discussed widely but not thoroughly in the accounting 
literature. Usually it is merely mentioned; sometimes it is treated in a few 
paragraphs. No single work is devoted exclusively to stewardship. The 
Accountants' Index, which catalogues the entire collection of the AICPA 
library, contains no entries under the heading "stewardship." 
The following is a bibliography on the topic of stewardship together with 
quotations from the sources cited. Most of the quotations reflect all that is 
mentioned about the topic. A few are representative of the comments con-
tained in the sources. 
1. Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4, Basic Concepts and 
Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enter-
prises, October 1970. 
"Examples of these users and of the types of evaluations . . . for which 
they use financial accounting information are: Owners . . . evaluate the use 
and stewardship of resources by management." (par. 44) 
"The basic purpose of financial accounting and financial statements is 
to provide quantitative financial information about a business enterprise that 
is useful to statement users, particularly owners and creditors, in making 
economic decisions. This purpose includes providing information that can 
be used in evaluating management's effectiveness in fulfilling its stewardship 
and other managerial responsibilities." (par. 73) 
2. American Accounting Association, Committee to Prepare a State-
ment of Basic Accounting Theory, A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory, 
1966. 
"The objectives of accounting are to provide information for the follow-
ing purposes: . . . 3. Maintaining and reporting on the custodianship of 
resources." (p. 4) 
"The function of stewardship or custodianship may be a managerial 
function, as in the cases of boards of directors of enterprises organized for 
profit, or it may be a fiduciary function, as in the cases of trusteeships and 
guardianships. The interests of society are paramount in defining this func-
tion and have been expressed in the corporation codes of the various states 
and in the laws governing the activities and responsibilities of fiduciaries. 
Providing information relating to compliance with these laws is essentially an 
accounting function, (p. 5) 
"Many external users are concerned with one or more of the dimensions 
of stewardship. These range from the most elemental level of custodianship 
to responsibility for acquisition, utilization, and disposition of resources 
embracing the whole scope of management functions in a business entity. 
In this broad scope of concern, there is a correspondingly broad spectrum 
of judgments and decisions to be made. 
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"At the most elemental level of stewardship responsibility it may be 
adequate to report only the kinds or numbers of resources received and 
disposed of, as might a custodian of securities, or the executor of an estate 
reporting on the distribution of property in kind. As the size and complexify 
of the resources administered increase and managerial responsibilities ex-
pand correspondingly, the need for variety in information emerges. Questions 
must be answered regarding the efficiency of administration of a profit-
making enterprise or of its segments, and of effectiveness and efficiency in 
the use of resources to accomplish programmed goals. Similar questions 
arise with respect to stewardship in charitable and governmental organiza-
tions. Concern for the prudence of decisions made to retain or to sell assets 
in the light of available alternatives also is involved. (p. 22) 
"Stewardship. Highly varied relationships exist in society in which one 
party entrusts resources to another. These range from a simple custodian-
ship in which the specific asset is to be returned intact, to a donor-donee 
relation in which the donor expects no material return but may require a 
report of use and effectiveness. Within these extremes lies the familiar in-
vestment of funds for profit by either a creditor or a proprietor. Seldom if 
ever are economic resources entrusted by one person or entity to another 
without the expectation of an accounting for the resources; even the donor 
of an X-ray machine to a hospital may request a report of the number of 
cases served. Notwithstanding the great diversity of information involved, 
the accountant is increasingly expected to be a major processor of informa-
tion in these relationships. In some cases the informational needs are too 
simple to warrant specific attention here; in others, such as the specific 
informational needs of customers looking to the entity as a major source of 
supply, the measures are not as yet entirely clear and are merely mentioned 
in this statement. 
"Accountants can prepare meaningful reports of stewardship only to the 
extent that they are aware of or can postulate accurately the provisions of 
the agreement between the parties to the stewardship arrangement. In the 
many cases of externa! reporting, the parties themselves (i.e., the external 
users) are not clear on the nature or extent of the responsibility delegated; 
thus the accountant finds that he must impute some relationship between the 
entity and the users, and from this draw conclusions as to what information 
is relevant to the users' needs. 
"The latter point is illustrated by the reporting of cash receipts and dis-
bursements that has become customary for many not-for-profit entities, 
without giving any clear indication that the responsibility of the entity is lim-
ited to administration or custody of the cash assets or both. If the entity is 
to be held responsible for efficient administration, periodic reporting on an 
accrual basis would be required. For example, taxes receivable, with adjust-
ment for possible uncollectibles, should be reported if the entity has re-
sponsibility for levying and collecting taxes. Measurements in current terms 
of resources entrusted to not-for-profit entities are relevant primarily for 
choosing between alternatives in the acquisition, maintenance, and dispo-
sition of such non-cash assets." (pp. 25, 26) 
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3. American Institute of CPAs, Report of Special Committee on Opin-
ions of the Accounting Principles Board, Spring 1965, 
"What are financial statements trying to present? Are they primarily an 
account of management stewardship, or primarily for investor guidance?" 
(pp. 12, 13) 
4. Herman W. Bevis, Corporate Financial Reporting in a Competitive 
Economy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965). 
"Whenever a continuing mission of importance requires the assignment 
of responsibility and delegation of authority among people, the relationship 
usually also involves a periodic accounting of the uses of these responsi-
bilities and powers. Society has, in general, assigned to corporate directors 
and management the responsibility of employing resources gainfully; after 
delegating commensurate discretionary authority over the utilization of capi-
tal, society expects, and receives, the accounting to which it is entitled, (p. 7) 
"Taken literally, what are corporate financial reports—the end products 
of today's concept of corporate accountability? They are communications 
from specific people to specific people. Originating these communications 
are identifiable members of the management and the board of directors. 
Receiving them are equally identifiable people—those on the stockholder list 
at the cutoff date for mailing the report. The fact that these reports sooner 
or later may be received by thousands of other persons should not obscure 
the fact that they are essentially communications rendering accountings to 
present stockholders from the stewards of their resources. Moreover, the 
fact that prospective investors may use the information contained in the 
report to assist them in making projections in connection with investment 
decisions does not belie the report's essential nature and purpose as an 
historical accounting of what has taken place, (pp. 8, 9) 
"The foregoing assessment of the place of the financial report in the 
corporation-stockholder relationship suggests that it is a semiprivate com-
munication or, at least, that interest in it is narrowly confined to those who 
are, or who would be, investors. But this is not so. Concern about the welfare 
and progress of our large corporate enterprises clearly transcends that 
portion of the society made up of stockholders. Interest in corporate financial 
reports involves much more than mere curiosity on the part of outsiders. 
Whether the corporation makes profits or suffers losses, especially over a 
period of years, is an indicator of the potential security or stability of 
employees, sometimes of entire communities, of creditors, competitors, sup-
pliers, customers, and governmental revenues from taxation. Take all corpo-
rations together and the interest and concern of society are widespread and 
obvious. It is this fact that suggests that the responsibility-authority-account-
ability chain of the corporation and its management be examined more 
closely, (p. 9) 
".. . corporations . . . are required to, and do, render accountings 
which, although addressed to stockholders, also serve the purpose of society 
at large, (p. 12) 
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"If . . . society looks to corporations to accomplish the same general 
objectives that the stockholders set for them, it is not accidental that corpo-
rate financial reports to stockholders also adequately discharge the corpo-
rations' accountability requirements to society. (p. 15) 
". . . financial reporting may be looked upon . . . as the accounting 
which society receives for the responsibility and authority lodged for produc-
tive use of a significant portion of the nation's resources [or it] may be 
thought of in its literal sense as a report to stockholders from their stewards." 
(p. 19) 
5. Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Be-
havior (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966). 
"Perhaps the most universal justification for holding [the historical cost] 
doctrine is the so-called stewardship notion, the import of which is that 
business managers are accountable for the money tokens that come into 
their hands. No doubt they are, but a cash account is all that would be 
required to serve this function. The superstructure of accounting processes 
and financial statements generally would have no justification if this were 
the primary function of accounting." (p. 354) 
6. Richard M. Cyert and Yuji Ijiri, "A Framework for Developing the 
Objectives of Financial Statements," contained in this volume. 
"The American economy is based on a network of accountability rela-
tionships. The separation of ownership and management of economic re-
sources has created the basic need for accountability. But in our modern 
economy, accountability is not limited to the relationship between manage-
ment and owners. Within the management hierarchy, a subordinate is con-
sidered to be accountable to his supervisor for the management of resources 
entrusted to him. Externally the firm is accountable not only to its share-
holders but also to its creditors and governments at all levels. The recent 
emphasis on the quality of the environment (clean air, water) has added the 
public to the list of parties to whom a firm is accountable. 
"Although accounting records and financial statements are used for 
other purposes, the objective of providing the means for establishing account-
ability may be considered as the fundamental objective of financial state-
ments. 
"Implicit in this objective is the need to derive performance measures 
since the objectives of accountability include the entity's performance with 
respect to its goals. 
"In summary, at least one of the fundamental objectives of financial 
statements may be stated as the need to communicate information on the 
discharge of accountability of an entity to parties to whom the entity is 
accountable." 
7. Walter F. Frese and Robert K. Mautz, "Financial Reporting-By 
Whom?", Harvard Business Review, March-April 1972. 
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"The traditional view, again, is that financial statements represent a 
stewardship report by management in which it accounts for its use of the 
resources entrusted to it by the owners of the company. The report has thus 
been used as a basis for determining whether that stewardship has been 
adequately discharged or not. In other words, how effective has manage-
ment been? What is the nature of its accomplishment? 
"But a new view with respect to the purpose of financial statements is 
gaining adherents. A number of writers now say that the major purpose of 
financial statements is to enable stockholders, analysts, and others to predict 
the financial future of the company. 
"One of the interesting features of this view of financial statements is 
the almost complete absence of concern about the resulting impact on 
business activity and management." (p. 8) 
8. Paul Grady, Accounting Research Study No. 7, Inventory of Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises, 1965. 
"The separation of ownership from management of the business entity 
is a primary factor in imposing on the entity the fiduciary accountabilities to 
its stockholders." (p. 26) 
" 'Account for' is intended to comprehend the entire fulfillment of cor-
porate fiduciary accountabilities to stockholders, creditors and others having 
bona fide interests. Investors have entrusted their capital to the corporation 
to be invested in the kinds of assets and activities required to produce the 
products and services which constitute the corporate economic purposes. 
The fulfillment of this trust includes all the planning, selection and training 
of people, the development of products and services, and the conduct of 
purchasing, manufacturing, distribution and administrative functions. Good 
faith and due care on the part of directors and management in the conduct 
of the business are inherent requirements for meeting their fiduciary account-
abilities. Due care includes attention to the establishment of a system of 
internal control adequate to safeguard the corporation's assets, check the 
accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency 
and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial policies. Thus 'account 
for' as used in this summary of generally accepted accounting principles 
comprehends the actual performance of the corporate business as well as the 
reporting on the financial status and results of operations." (p. 55) 
9. Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory, Revised Edition (Home-
wood, III.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970). 
"Stockholders who have an effective control of management need in-
formation to be able to judge the relative efficiency of management. 
". . . different sets of principles may be required to meet the several 
objectives of accounting. 
"Consideration is also given to meeting the objectives of general social 
and economic interests of a nation or geographic area." (p. 2) 
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10. Eric L. Kohler, A Dictionary for Accountants, Third Edition, (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963). 
"fiduciary Any person responsible for the custody or administration, or 
both, of property belonging to another; as, a trustee. 
"fiduciary accounting 1. The preparation and keeping of accounts for 
property in the hands of a trustee, executor, or administrator, whether under 
the direct jurisdiction of a court or acting by virtue of a private deed of trust 
or other instrument of appointment. 2. Estate accounting." (p. 214) 
11. George O. May, Financial Accounting (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1943). 
"Accounting conventions should be well conceived in relation to at least 
three things: first, the uses of accounts; second, the social and economic 
concepts of the time and place; and, third, the modes of thought of the 
people, (p. 3) 
". . . major uses of accounts . . . 1. As a report of stewardship. . . . 
(p. 19) 
"[For this use] there is an attempt to appraise the past, and to measure 
the cumulative achievement to date; there is no attempt to use the past as a 
measure of the future. . . . (p. 20) 
". . . conflicting objectives of those who would continue to regard 
financial statements as reports of progress or of stewardship, and those who 
would treat them as being in the nature of prospectuses, (p. 21) 
"Accounts as a report of stewardship by the management of a corpo-
ration are in many respects similar in purpose to reports of trustees to bene-
ficiaries. It is natural that the management should account for the assets 
coming Into its charge on the basis of cost to the corporation, and that only 
on rare occasions, if any, should any reflection of changes in value that have 
not been realized be considered." (p. 24) 
12. The Securities and Exchange Commission, 4 SEC 721. 
"The fundamental and primary responsibility for the accuracy of in-
formation filed with the Commission and disseminated among the investors 
rests upon management. . . . Accountants' certificates are required not as a 
substitute for management's accounting of its stewardship, but as a check 
upon that accounting." 
13. Donald E. Stone, "The Objective of Financial Reporting in the 
Annual Report," The Accounting Review, April 1967, pp. 334, 335. 
"Under what might be called the traditional concept of the corporation, 
there was a close relationship between the stockholder, the productive prop-
erty, and management. The business 'belonged' to the stockholder. Manage-
ment was hired by and responsibile [sic] to the stockholders. The stock-
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holder's meeting was often an important affair where the stockholders took 
an active part in top management decisions. If enough stockholders were 
dissatisfied with the managerial performance, they might effect a change in 
management. In fact, decisions to keep or change the top management team 
and/or their policies were among the more significant decisions faced by 
stockholders. 
"Today, such direct control over management is virtually non-existent 
except in small, closely-held corporations. . . . The stockholder's range of 
significant economic decisions has been reduced to that of deciding whether 
to increase, decrease, or maintain his holding of common stock in the cor-
poration." 
14. Leonard Spacek, Comments In Maurice Moonitz, Accounting Re-
search Study No. 1, The Basic Postulates of Accounting, 1961. 
"My own view is that the one basic accounting postulate underlying 
accounting principles may be stated as that of fairness—fairness to all seg-
ments of the business community (management, labor, stockholders, cred-
itors, customers and the public), determined and measured in the light of the 
economic and political environment and the modes of thought and customs 
of all segments." (p. 57) 
15. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: 
G. & C. Merriam Company, 1961). 
"steward . . . 1: one called to exercise responsible care over posses-
sions entrusted to him . . . 2c: one employed on a large estate usually to 
manage its affairs, supervise workmen, collect rents or income, and keep 
accounts . . . 5a: an officer in charge of finances . . . 8a: one who actively 
directs affairs; MANAGER. 
"stewardship . . . 1a: the office of steward b: the administration of the 
office of steward and of goods or duties entrusted to one's care." (p. 2240) 
16. Rufus Wixon, Walter G. Kell, Norton M. Bedford, Accountants' Hand-
book, Fifth Edition (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1970). 
"Financial Reporting. This field of accounting is primarily concerned 
with . . . reporting . . . to . . . outside parties . . . those without any direct or 
frequent managerial contact with the organization. . . . The traditional premise 
of such reports is that of stewardship or accountability to those who supply 
the capital to the organization and those who participate in the financial 
success or failure of the company, (sec. 1 . 3) 
"The essence of fiduciary accounting is the ascertaining to what extent 
the person holding . . . delegated powers has fulfilled his duties and to what 
extent he is still accountable. He is charged with all property coming under 
his control, and he is discharged by any lawful disposal of it for the good of 
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the estate. . . . The basic accounting equation used by the fiduciary is 
assets = accountability, rather than assets = liabilities + equity, which is 
used in proprietorship accounting." (sec. 25 .11) 
17. Arthur L. Thomas, "Revenue Recognition," Chapter 10 in Sidney 
Davidson, Editor-in-Chief, Handbook of Modern Accounting (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970). 
"The accounting literature contains many reasons for refusing to recog-
nize holding gains until the related nonmonetary assets are sold. The follow-
ing seem to be the main arguments: 
1. Accounting should report management's stewardship of amounts 
committed by investors; these amounts are reflected in historical costs; hold-
ing gains are irrelevant to this purpose. 
"The following replies might be made to the previous arguments: 
1. The stewardship responsibilities of management extend far beyond 
mere custodial responsibility for the amounts committed by investors. Man-
agement must use these assets, increase them—and holding gains are just 
as much part of business life as are revenues from providing goods or 
services. Stewardship cannot be evaluated by ignoring a major element in 
total company profitability." (pp. 10-27) 
140 
3. Valuation Methods 
CONCEPTUAL PAPERS 
Discounted Cash Flow Accounting 
Joshua Ronen 
Discounted cash flow accounting is an attempt to measure the wealth of a 
firm at a particular point in time and the changes in wealth over time, that is, 
economic income. The economic income concept is viewed as a change in 
state of wealth that occurred in the past, knowledge of which may be useful 
for decisions of users of financial statements, but is not necessarily derived 
from their decision-making requirements. According to this view, there exists 
an underlying "true" state of the world and changes therein. The construct 
called "income" is supposed to denote an aspect of the changes in the 
"true" state of the world. The concept of economic income, however, could 
also be useful in satisfying the decision-making requirements of users of 
financial statements. 
Traditionally, economists referred to the changes in the "true" state of 
the world as changes in well-being during a given period.1 Whether this view 
of the underlying state of the world implies that income measurement is the 
process of describing only past occurrences or whether the measurement 
process also necessarily reflects the measurer's beliefs concerning future 
occurrences depends on the definition of well-being. Broadly, well-being 
can be understood to reflect the overall "happiness" or "felicity" or "utility" 
of the organism or entity whose income is measured. In a descriptive sense, 
this view of well-being would include attitudes, satisfaction levels, and other 
psychology-related states of felicity in addition to wealth. In the normative 
sense and in the absence of formalized methods of quantifying psychological 
states of felicity, the well-being of the holder of a firm's stock derives from 
the "wealth" or "value" of that firm and the risk associated with that value, 
1 Thus, J. R. Hicks defined a man's income for a week as being " the maximum 
value which he can consume during the week and still expect to be as well off at 
the end of the week as he was at the beginning." Value and Capital, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 
1946), p. 176. This concept, originally developed relative to a person's income, has 
been adopted by some writers as the concept of business income. Edgar O. 
Edwards and Philip W. Bell, The Theory and Measurement of Business Income 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961). 
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where the value of the firm is understood to be the present value of its 
expected net cash flows. 
The Case of Certainty 
Indeed, it has been repeatedly shown that, irrespective of the utility 
preferences of individual consumers and investors, if they are to be able to 
maximize their utility in a world of certainty and in a perfect capital market, 
the firm's objectives should be to maximize the market value of their equity 
in the firm, that is, the discounted value of future cash flows.2 This corre-
sponds to the ordinary theory of production in economics where the decision 
variables are determined on the basis of the market prices for the alternative 
outputs, the costs of the various factor inputs, and the technological possi-
bilities of production. Once a production scheme has been determined so 
as to maximize the owners' equity value, they can spend their shares of the 
proceeds on whatever pattern of consumption possibilities appeals to them 
most at various points in time. 
The maximization of wealth or the value of equity to owners is identical 
to the maximization, as of a given point in time, of net returns or profits. That 
is, there is no conflict between the stock and flow forms of the criterion of 
wealth maximization. The value of the firm is the weighted sum of the returns 
per period, the weights being the discount rates applied to these returns. 
The only situation in which the criteria of maximizing profit and maximizing 
market value of the firm conflict is when increases in returns for some periods 
involve reductions in other periods. In this case the universally applicable 
market value criterion should be used.3 
In a world of certainty and perfect capital markets, the value of the firm 
is the present value of its expected net cash flows or the present value of 
the expected stream of dividends to stockholders. The discount rate in a 
world of certainty would be the market rate of interest which is assumed, 
through the arbitrage system, to be unique and common for all investments 
in the capital market. 
For example, a valuation model based on dividends would stipulate the 
total value of the firm at time period zero (to) to be 
∞ n(o) d(t) 
(1) v(o) = n(o)p(o) = Σ (1+r) t 
t = 1 
Where: p(o) = the market price per share at the start of period O. 
v(o) = the total value of all shares outstanding at the start of 
period O. 
2 See, for example, Eugene F. Fama and Merton N. Miller, The Theory of Finance 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972) for a lucid and elaborate proof of 
this rule. 
3 We do not get into the controversy about whether management will in fact act in 
the best interest of the firm's owners or rather in its own best interests. It is usually 
argued that incentive and sanction systems work to bring management to identify 
stockholders' goals as its own. 
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n(o) = number of shares outstanding at the start of period O. 
d(t) = dividend per share at the beginning of period t, assumed to 
be paid only to holders of record as of the start of period t-1. 
r = the one-period market rate of interest. 
That is, the present value of the total dividends to be paid in future periods on 
the shares outstanding at the beginning of period zero. 
Alternatively, we can emphasize the stream of cash earnings generated 
within the firm as 
∞ R(t) - W(t) - l(t) 
(2) v(o) = S (1+r) t 
t = 1 
Where: R(t) = the firm's receipts at t from operations. 
W(t) = wages and similar outlays for the services of factors of pro-
duction not owned by the firm. 
I(t) = outlays on capital account at t. 
Thus, R(t) - W(t) - l(t) = net cash flow at t. 
To express the present value of the shares currently outstanding in terms 
of the stream of "net cash flows" generated in the firm, we define X(t) [iden-
tical to R(t) minus W(t)] as the "net operating cash flow" at period t. 
We then have 
D(t+1) + G(t+1) = X(t+1) 
[r(1 — k) ] 
r - k r * 
4 See Fama and Miller, Theory of Finance, pp. 86-98. 





t = 1 
X(t) - l(t) 
(1+r) t 
as the basic formula for the current market value of the firm.4 
This equation for the firm's value can be expressed in terms of accounting 
earnings as follows: If we let Z(t) equal the depreciation estimate at period t, 
A(t) equal R(t) minus W(t) minus Z(t), i.e., the accounting earnings, and N(t) 
equal l(t) minus Z(t) (which is net investment in the sense of net change in the 






A(t) - N(t) 
( 1 + r ) t 
An equation for the valuation of the firm using accounting earnings is therefore 
equivalent to an equation using the net cash flows, provided the proper 
elements are incorporated. 
Moreover, the returns to stockholders (i.e., dividends plus capital gains) 
are equivalent in any period to the total cash earnings of the firm, provided 
the firm has no special growth opportunities in the sense of investing at a rate 
of return, r*, that is higher than the market interest rate, r. Thus, if G(t+1) is 
the total capital gain during period t to stockholders of record as of the start 
of t and D(t+1) is the total dividend at t+1 , it can be shown that5 
6 See Fama and Miller, Theory of Finance, p. 97. 
7 For example, Fama and Miller, Theory of Finance, p. 84, in refuting the bird- in-the-
hand argument emphasize that " . . . the independence proposit ion does not require 
stockholders to be indifferent as between a present dividend and a future dividend 
or capital gains. It says, rather, that once management is committed to undertake 
and finance a given investment program, an increase in the dividends in any period 
will simply lead to a corresponding reduction in the ex-dividend value of the shares 
in the same period. . . ." 
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where r* is the rate earned on internal investments and k is a constant pro-
portion of total cash earnings that is invested so that 
Xk(t+1) = l ( t+1) . 
Now, if r* = r, the stockholders' returns equal X(t+1), the total cash 
earnings. Otherwise, if the firm has special growth opportunities, the returns 
are greater than the cash earnings by a factor of 
r ( 1 - k ) 
r - k r * 
, which is greater 
than unity. If we concentrate on capital gains, G(t+1), we find that G(t+1) = 
k rX(t+1) + kX(t+1) 
r * —r 
r—kr* 
where the term k rX(t+1) is retained cash earn-
ings at t+1 . That is, capital gains are equal to retained earnings when the 
firm has no growth opportunities (r* = r). However, when r* > r, capital gains 
exceed retained earnings by the quantity kX(t+1) (r* — r) / (r—kr*) which is 
the interest on the total market value at t of the firm's future investment 
opportunities.6 
Notice that all these generalizations apply only to the case of perfect 
markets and a world of certainty. Once the assumption of perfect markets is 
abandoned, we can no longer use maximization of the firm's market value as 
a proxy for maximization of the utility of owners. In an imperfect market, 
without explicit assumptions as to the stockholders' tastes and how they are 
comprised, we cannot identify a unique investment pattern for the firm which 
maximizes the welfare of all stockholders. We can only make the weak state-
ment that the preferred position lies within a certain range of such investment 
pattern. 
However, when perfect capital markets are assumed, the maximization 
of current value as a proxy for the maximization of owner's utility also implies 
that, given the pattern of investments selected by the firm, the market value 
of the firm and thus the shareholders' wealth is independent of the firm's 
dividend and financing decisions; thus, operating and financing decisions 
can be made independently. This principle, in turn, implies that appreciation 
in the price of stock is equivalent, for the investor, to a dividend payment. 
In other words, if a stock appreciates in price, regardless of whether the 
investor actually sells the stock, for him this appreciation is equivalent to a 
cash receipt since he always has the opportunity of selling the stock for its 
cash equivalent. This appreciation is an opportunity cash receipt in the sense 
that, had the investor not decided that keeping his funds in the firm is more 
profitable than selling it, he could have sold the stock and received the 
market appreciation in cash.7 
Having thus shown that the value to a stockholder of his holding is 
identical to the present value of his expected stream of dividends or to the 
present value of the firm's cash earnings, it is now relevant to ask whether 
accounting should quantify this value. After all it could be argued that, if 
such identity exists, the value of the firm is already quantified through the 
market mechanism in the price of the stock. Thus, there would be no need 
to quantify it in the accounting report. 
The Case of Uncertainty 
However, if the assumption of a world of certainty is relaxed, the market 
value of the stock reflects not only the present value of expected dividends 
or cash flows to the firm but also the uncertainty associated with the flows. 
In other words, the uncertainty and the degree of risk associated with the 
occurrence of the expected cash flows are considered by transactors in the 
marketplace when they determine the market value of capital instruments 
through supply and demand. 
In a world of uncertainty, the expectation of the firm's management with 
respect to both the magnitude of cash flows and their uncertainty may differ 
from that of transactors in the general marketplace. As a result, the market 
value of the securities will not necessarily be identical to the present value 
of cash flows as expected by the firm's management. But management ex-
pectations regarding future cash flows and their uncertainty may represent 
useful information which enables market transactors to predict cash flows 
and their associated uncertainty. Transactors must make these predictions 
in order to facilitate their own decision-making. 
Both the future cash flows and their uncertainty depend on the specific 
plans and actions that are implemented by, and first known to, the firm's 
management. Since such plans are designed to give the firm a competitive 
edge, they are bound to have significant informational content. Because the 
firm's management is the first to know its plans, timely forecasts by manage-
ment with respect to future cash flows may prove to be a valuable input to 
the users of financial statements in their predictions of future cash flows. 
Management is in the best position to assess the effects of its specific plans 
on cash flows. The question is, are there market forces that would make 
these plans and the cash flows derived from them known to the market in the 
absence of a requirement for forecasts to be published by management? 
This question is discussed in detail in the paper entitled "The Need for 
Accounting Objectives in an Efficient Market," pages 36-52, where it was con-
cluded that there is a need for management to communicate its forecast of 
cash flows. 
Cash Flow Expectations. Generally, cash flows that a firm generates are 
influenced by two major factors: 
1. Market and industry events that affect all firms, i.e., exogenous factors. 
2. The particular performance of the firm in question, i.e., the specific plans 
and decisions made by management. These firm-specific decisions are 
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responsible for whether the firm accumulates more or less value than the 
industry or the market. These are the endogenous factors. 
It is of particular importance that management communicate the cash flows 
contingent on its plans.8 Since these plans are under management control, 
any deviation from them would reflect on management ability to predict 
and/or to perform. Exogenous factors, contrary to the endogenous, are pri-
marily beyond the firm's control and may be predicted by relying on market 
expectations as a whole as reflected in market prices. However, the best 
source for predicting endogenous factors is probably the firm's management 
itself. As indicated, by obtaining management predictions of endogenous 
cash flows, users can assess management predictive ability and possibly 
performance. Also, information about management's particular plans and the 
actual results provides insights into risk-taking tendencies of management 
and therefore its future likelihood of engaging in risk-taking activities. How-
ever, since cash flows are a joint result of both endogenous and exogenous 
factors, management can only communicate, its forecasts of the total cash 
flows resulting from both factors; but at the same time it could, and perhaps 
should, explicitly state its assumptions relative to the exogenous factors. In 
fact, management could provide forecasts of cash flows that are conditional 
on different assumptions regarding the exogenous factors. By doing this, 
users can evaluate these assumptions and make adjustments, if necessary, 
in the forecasts for their own decision-making purposes. 
It is suggested that management communicate its forecasts of cash flows 
separate from its consideration of uncertainty associated with them. The pri-
mary reason for the separation is that users' preferences and their assess-
ments of the risk inherent in future events (both exogenous and endogenous) 
may differ from management's. If management's prediction of the magnitude 
of cash flows is disclosed separate from its judgment concerning risk and 
uncertainty, users will be able to combine the components to fit their own 
judgments and preferences toward risk. Users cannot do this if they are 
given only one value, that is, the magnitude of cash flows combined with the 
risk and uncertainty perceived by the firm's management. 
Management is thus potentially a more useful source for predicting the 
endogenous factors under its control than for predicting exogenous factors. 
For example, with respect to exogenous factors, different information sources 
have different degrees of usefulness and competence in providing informa-
tion about relevant events. Interest rate fluctuations, the money supply, and 
credit terms are factors, information on which is probably best obtained from 
the Federal Reserve; whereas, information on the availability of raw materials 
and future prices is probably best obtained through observing trends in the 
supplying industries. With respect to some events, the best source for pre-
8 Since the detailed plans do not have to be made available, but only the manage-
ment's expectation of cash flows that are contingent on the plans, there should be 
no reluctance on management's part to communicate this information out of fear of 
leakage to competitors. 
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dieting the exogenous factors is probably the market itself. The research on 
efficient markets indicates that available information in a market9 (including 
information about exogenous factors relevant to the particular firm) is gener-
ally impounded in market prices of securities or other capital assets. Market 
prices therefore best reflect the effects of relevant exogenous factors on the 
firm (although publicly available endogenous information would also be re-
flected). For example, fluctuations in the price of a firm's output reflect antici-
pated change in demand, which is a relevant exogenous factor affecting the 
firm. Similarly, fluctuations in the market prices of inputs would reflect ex-
pectations with respect to changing conditions in the supplying industry and 
in the industries of competing inputs. 
Reporting Both Discounted Cash Flows 
And Exit Values 
In a frictionless market, prices are unique; that is, entry and exit values 
are identical. But they may differ in a market in which transaction costs exist. 
Since we also wish to provide measures of risk separately from expected 
magnitudes of cash flows, it seems reasonable to provide market prices at 
exit values of firm's assets rather than at entry values. Exit values of assets 
reflect not only the opportunity costs of holding assets within a firm10 but also 
the potential cash proceeds that are available to the firm in case of unfavor-
able market conditions. Consequently, both management forecasts of ex-
pected cash flows and the exit values of the firm's assets and liabilities should 
be communicated.11 
Ronen and Sorter12 provide a detailed discussion of the advantages of 
such combined reporting and recommend the accounting reports to be com-
municated. Ingredients of this system consist not only of expected cash flows 
and exit values but also actual transactions. The latter will enable users to 
assess the reliability of future forecasts by comparing management forecasts 
and actual events. Expected and unexpected results of operations are also 
distinguished to highlight the deviation of actual events from forecasted 
events. The quantification of unexpected events provides a record of man-
9 See, for example, Joshua Ronen, "The Need for Accounting Objectives in an 
Efficient Market," pp. 36-52, and Eugene F. Fama, "Eff icient Capital Markets: A Review 
of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance (May 1970), pp. 383-417. 
10 The marginal cost of capital services per unit equals rpb + (pb—pe) where 
pb and pe are the prices per unit of capital at the beginning and end of the period 
respectively, and r is the one-period rate of return. The optimal investment of an 
asset is found at the point at which this cost is equated with the marginal cash flow 
that can be generated by the asset (see, for example, Fama and Miller, Theory of 
Finance, p. 117). 
11 Exit values are also discounted cash flows. But these reflect the consensus ex-
pectations of market transactors with respect to both the magnitude of cash flows 
and the risk associated with them, as discussed below. 
12 Joshua Ronen and George H. Sorter, "Relevant Account ing," Journal of Business 
(April 1972), pp. 258-282. 
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agement's "errors" and would be useful in assessing—through the observa-
tion of the magnitude of the errors over an extended period of time—the 
ability of management to forecast within a reasonable range of accuracy. 
A summary of the combined Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)-Exit Value 
System is presented below in order to make this presentation as self-con-
tained as possible. 
The DCF-Exit Value System. Generally, discounted cash flow accounting 
refers to the quantification of the firm's value or "wealth" by discounting its 
expected net cash flows over a specified time period. The total value of a 
firm would thus be communicated in the annual report at the present value 
of cash flows as of the report date; this value may be separated into specific 
assets and liabilities reflecting for each asset and liability the present value 
of the expected contributions to the cash flows of the firm.13 While the indi-
vidual values assigned to assets and liabilities—reflecting expected contri-
butions to cash flows—would not necessarily add up to the total value of the 
firm, the separate communication may be useful for evaluating the manage-
ment of the individual assets and liabilities. 
By communicating both the total value and its decomposition into assets, 
a statement of resources is provided. The equities side of the balance sheet 
reflects particular configurations of the means with which the firm's manage-
ment chose to obtain resources. To emphasize the importance of the asset 
side in the decision process that underlies a commitment of resources to 
enhance value to owners, it is useful to include both sides of the balance 
sheet under the statement of resources. Assets are employed in a particular 
manner so that they grow in value. The increment in value inures to the 
owners and creditors and is reflected in the equities side of the balance 
sheet. Viewing resources in this fashion provides a dynamic perspective 
within which the relation between resources and income can be interpreted. 
Thus, a statement of resources is not just a static reflection of wealth and 
the liabilities of the firm at an arbitrary point in time. Instead it is a procession 
of accumulated values at discrete points in time that reflects how resources 
change in value. 
Annual income (assuming no dividends) is merely the difference in the 
value of the firm at the beginning and the end of the year. In this sense, the 
income statement articulates with the statement of resources. It converts the 
stock or value into a flow per period. Flow or income can also be separated 
into components; the particular segregation should be the one that helps 
users most in predicting cash flows and their uncertainty. For example, in-
come can be separated into changes in the individual values of assets and 
liabilities. 
There exist two quantifications of expected cash flows: the cash flow 
that is expected by the firm's management and the cash flow that is expected 
by all others. The latter is quantified through the market value of assets of 
the firm (which reflects the cash flows expected to be generated by the indi-
vidual assets and the associated risks as perceived by market transactors). 
13 This aspect will be discussed later. 
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The market value of the firm is reflected in the market price of its stock. The 
former, that is, discounted cash flows as expected by management, quantifies 
management's specific expectations of flows that jointly result from the ex-
ogenous, uncontrollable events of the environment, and management's own 
plans and decisions, i.e., the endogenous events. One possible quantifica-
tion of market prices of assets that reflects the cash flow as expected by the 
market is exit values. These values reflect the net proceeds that would be 
received if the assets were to be sold separately in the ordinary course of 
business. In a perfect, frictionless market, exit values and entry values are 
identical, and both uniquely determine a market price for an asset. In a 
market where there are transaction costs, however, these values would di-
verge. Exit values are preferable because they also reflect the minimum 
opportunity costs of the asset, that is, their value if they are sold.14 
In addition to the exit values of the separate assets as a quantification of 
cash flows as expected by the market, the contribution of these assets to the 
present value of cash flows as expected by management should be reported 
even though the total of these former values would not necessarily be identical 
to the present value of cash flows for the firm as a whole as expected by 
management. The difference between the latter and the sum of the values of 
the separable assets would reflect any assets for which there exists no 
present market, such as managerial know-how and the ability to combine the 
factors of production in a more efficient way than competitors. The present 
value of the firm's cash flow expectations would simply be the sum of the exit 
values of the separable assets plus the discounted value of the additional 
cash flows generated by special opportunities. Exit values reflect the ex-
ogenous value of the assets, whereas the difference between the discounted 
cash flow value and the exit values reflects the incremental cash flows that 
management expects to result from the endogenous factors. 
In order to present a general outline of the combined DCF-Exit value 
system it is usful to summarize its various elements separately. 
The Market Risk-Determined (MRD) Value of the Firm. We discount the 
expected cash flows at the market average rate of return to obtain the total 
value of the firm which we call the market risk-determined value (MRD).15 
By discounting the expected cash flows at the market rate of interest which 
reflects only general market risks, we provide a value for the firm which 
does not reflect the firm's specific risks. The reasons for doing this were 
14 Although there may be within the firm alternative employments for the assets 
that generate larger benefits than those obtained when the assets are sold, these 
alternatives are both decision and time specific, and it is difficult to report them con-
tinuously and on a systematic basis through the accounting system. Selling the assets, 
however, is an alternative that is always available, and quantif ication in this case is 
usually reliably ascertainable. See, for example, J. C. McKeown, "An Empirical Test 
of a Model Proposed by Chambers," Accounting Review (January 1971), pp. 12-29. 
15 This value is ascertained by discounting expected cash flows at the average rate 
of return on all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange which would thus 
incorporate the average market risk. 
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explained above. The primary objective of reflecting value and risk sepa-
rately is to allow different users to attach their own weights to the various 
determinants of value. Thus, by providing disaggregated information, users 
will be able to identify and evaluate the components of risk and value in line 
with their individual preferences. 
Economic Income. The economic income of the firm is simply the change 
in its MRD value. It consists of two major elements: the time growth of the 
discounted cash flows and the revision of expectations concerning these cash 
flows. The time growth is an increment of the MRD value resulting from the 
passage of time. It is quantified by applying the market rate of return to the 
MRD value of the firm, and it indicates that all previously expected cash flows 
are now expected one period sooner. The second element is the revision of 
expectations which would result if the newly gained information will cause a 
change in either the magnitude of the expected cash flows or their time 
pattern.16 
Exit Values. The individual assets and liabilities of the firm are quantified 
at their exit values. Exit value is the proceeds that could be obtained from 
selling an asset (in the case of an asset) or the payment needed to discharge 
an obligation (in the case of a liability or stock equity), net of transaction 
costs.17 The exit value of net assets is the difference between the exit values 
of assets and liabilities. 
It is recognized that the assets of the firm have both a universal and a 
particular value. The exit value of an asset is its universal value, that is, what 
the asset can generate when not a part of bundles of unique assets that define 
the particular firm. The particular value of the asset is its marginal contri-
bution in producing the firm's cash flows. The particular value of the firm's 
assets taken as a whole is the MRD value. A distinction is made between the 
exit values of two groups of assets: cash assets and noncash assets. Less 
uncertainty is associated with the realization of cash assets (cash, market-
able securities, and accounts receivable). The consensus on the exit value of 
cash assets is more readily available than for other assets. Their conversion 
to cash is either guaranteed or required by law. This is generally not the case 
for other assets such as inventory, where conversion into cash depends upon 
events partially controlled by others. The degree of controllability affects the 
realization and thus the uncertainty associated with the different assets. 
16 Alternative ways exist for quantifying expectations. For example, probability 
distributions of cash flows could be presented rather than point estimates. Also, cash 
expectations could be presented by time periods rather than aggregated through 
discounting them. However, point estimates rather than probability distributions 
and discounting to a present value are necessary if quantif ication by means of a 
single number is desired. At any rate, further investigation is needed to discriminate 
among the alternative quantifications and presentations. 
17 Groups of assets could be quantified in the aggregate rather than individually. 
Theoretically the exit value of the assets would be measured and communicated with 
respect to those groups of assets for which the total sales value less transaction 
costs is maximized. 
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Therefore, the exit values of cash assets and other assets are separately 
reported. 
Risk Indications. Comparison of the MRD value with the exit value of the 
firm's net assets can provide insights into some aspects of risk.18 The differ-
ence between them is defined as the specific advantage of the firm. The 
difference between the firm's MRD value and the exit value of stockholders' 
equity is defined as the specific residual. 
The specific advantage reflects that part of the expected flows that can-
not be realized unless the firm continues its specific operations and continues 
to assume the risks associated with these operations. Exit values of the firm's 
net assets represent the cash flows that could be realized if the firm does not 
continue its specific operations; they are independent of uncertainties asso-
ciated with the specific operations. 
The specific residual reflects that portion of the expected flows that has 
not been captured by the market value of the firm's securities either (a) 
because the market assigned a risk factor that is higher than the general 
market risk to the firm's expectations, (b) because the market does not accept 
the magnitude of the future cash flows as reflected in the firm's expectations, 
or (c) through a combination of these two phenomena. 
Both the specific advantage and the specific residual provide insights 
into aspects of risk and need not necessarily coincide. For example, the 
higher the specific advantage, the greater are the uncertainties associated 
with the realization of the firm's expectations, and the greater is the firm's 
exposure to an eventual decline in its value. Also, the expected variability of 
cash flows is likely to be higher for the firm which has a higher proportion of 
specific advantage to MRD value. Several factors contribute to the relation 
between the specific advantage and the specific residual and risk. These 
factors are fully discussed in Ronen and Sorter, "Relevant Accounting," cited 
in note 12, above. 
The MRD value need not necessarily equal the firm's exit value (the 
market price of its stock equity). The difference between the two would reflect 
the difference in expectations between the managers and the market with 
respect to cash flows and their uncertainty. The firm's exit value (the market 
price of the stock equity), which is the market's expectation of flows that 
15 Risk depends on the fol lowing major elements: (a) Probabilities associated 
with expected cash flows, (b) the covariance of the expected cash flows with the 
alternative cash flows available to information users (see, for example, Fama, "Eff icient 
Capital Markets," pp. 383-417), and (c) the degree of uncertainty associated with the 
realization of the expected flows. (While the degree of uncertainty may manifest 
itself in the variability of cash flows, there are advantages to considering these 
elements separately, in the absence of explicit knowledge about the extent to which 
such uncertainty affects the probability distributions.) Another element of risk 
associated with the above, that deserves to be separately identified, is (d) the 
extent to which the realization of these expected cash flows is within the firm's 
control. For instance, cash flows expected through the collection of accounts re-
ceivable are generally more within the firm's control and less under the influence 
of others than the cash flows expected through the sale of most products. The more 
controllable the realization of flows, the less risk may be associated with these flows. 
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incorporates their uncertainty, is the opportunity cost to the investors of hold-
ing their capital in the firm. If investors retain their holdings in the firm, the 
implication is that the value to them of that investment—what management 
hopes to be generating for them—is at least as great as the price of the stock, 
whereas the market value of the stock indicates to them what they can pres-
ently generate by selling the stock. Whether the investor would tend to keep 
his investment within the firm depends on how reliable he believes manage-
ment forecasts to be relative to the market's expectations. The divergence 
between these two values thus indicates to investors the inherent risk of 
retaining their investments that they must assume in exchange for the return 
promised by management. 
The difficulty of assessing the reliability of management's expectations 
of flows can be reduced if the investor obtains the past series of the actual 
events. An examination of how the two series behave vis-a-vis one another 
can give a good indication of the degree of reliability that can be attached to 
management's performance and forecasting ability. Moreover, comparison of 
management's forecasts with the actual events and cash flows would also 
enable the investor to assess the reliability of management's expectations. 
If actual events are exactly as anticipated by management, and if the 
market's expectations are identical to management's expectations, the actual 
increase in stock prices plus dividends during any specified period would be 
identical to the market rate applied to the MRD value of the firm as of the 
beginning of the year. On the other hand, if events do not occur as expected, 
management may revise its expectations of future cash flows, and the result-
ing income would consist of the discount rate applied to the firm's value plus 
or minus the positive or negative revision in expectations respectively. Thus, 
the difference between expected and unexpected consequences may also be 
reported to improve future prediction and performance evaluation. 
Notice also that even if actual events occur as expected so that income 
is identical to the market rate of return applied to the MRD value, the same 
income may not equal the rate of return on the stock unless there is agree-
ment between the market and the firm regarding expected flows and unless 
the risk attaching to these flows is no more than the average market risk. 
Information About Actual Events. The foregoing discussion indicates the 
need to provide retrospective data. Data on past events are also needed to 
discharge the stewardship function of management and to allow the formu-
lation and improvement of managers' and investors' predictions. To facilitate 
the evaluation of management, retrospective data should be separated into 
expected and unexpected elements.19 Also, retrospective data about the 
changes in exit values of assets and in the exit value of the firm (the market 
19 If probability distributions of expected cash flows are provided rather than point 
estimates, there would be a question of how to quantify the unexpected flows and 
revisions of expectations. As one possibility it is suggested that the differences 
between the means and the standard deviations (assuming a normal distribution) 
of the posterior and prior probability distribution derived from a Bayesian analysis be 
used to quantify the unexpected element of cash flows. 
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value of the stock equity) must be communicated in order to provide a record 
of the market's acceptance and validation of the firm's unique function and 
expectations. 
Summary and Discussion of 
Some Benefits of the System 
By separately communicating economic return and risk, this system 
reflects aspects of both benefits and costs that accrue to a firm: the changes 
in the magnitude of expected cash flows and the changes in the uncertainty 
associated with the realization of these flows. Corresponding to these two 
elements of benefits are two elements of costs. The actual costs that are 
incurred by a firm to obtain the said benefits include both the decline in the 
magnitude of expected cash flows and the unfavorable shift in their time 
pattern as well as a shift in the asset's composition from less risky assets to 
more risky assets. If these elements are provided separately, investors and 
other users of financial reports are better able to evaluate the performance 
of one firm relative to other firms and thus to evaluate the attractiveness of 
one investment vis-a-vis other investments.20 Moreover, these costs and 
benefits are also provided in a relativistic setting in the sense that a measure 
of opportunity costs is provided as a standard of comparison against which 
the particular value of the firm, its expected cash flows, and its actual cash 
flows, can be contrasted. At any point in time, the exit value of the firm's 
assets represents the universal opportunity costs of holding these assets to 
which the particular benefit of holding and employing these assets—the MRD 
value of the firm—can be compared. Over a period of time, the benefit of 
the firm can be contrasted with the period opportunity cost of continuing to 
operate the assets. This is measured by the interest that could have been 
earned by severing the assets from the firm initially plus the decline in the exit 
value of the assets over the time period. The period opportunity cost may be 
measured both ex post and ex ante. The ex post information is provided by 
applying the market rate of interest to the assets' exit values and communi-
cating changes in exit values during the period. The ex ante measure con-
sists of estimates of expected changes in exit values plus imputed interest. 
The ex post and ex ante measures of opportunity cost can be compared 
with ex post and ex ante measures of benefits. Ex post benefits include the 
changes in expectations and the pattern of realizations. Ex ante, the benefits 
are expected realizations plus the time growth of expectations. Furthermore, 
the opportunity costs can be disclosed to both the firm and the stockholders. 
By separating events into expected and unexpected components, the 
system allows the assessment of the reliability of past forecasts. Both man-
agement's plans and the degree to which these plans have been accom-
plished are communicated. Comparison of expected flows and actual flows 
provides variance or measures of deviation that should, over time, be useful 
2 0 Examples of such a cost and benefit statement and other financial statements 
highlighting different aspects of concern to investors are provided and elaborately 
discussed in Ronen and Sorter, "Relevant Accounting " 
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in assessing the success of the firm and of its management. When such devi-
ations are reported for all firms as a result of wide adoption of the system, 
comparative measures of deviation will thus be provided making it possible 
to evaluate the performance and the capability of managements of different 
firms. Also, the general adoption of the system will allow investors to con-
trast and measure the covariability of the given firm's flows and expectations 
with the flows and expectations of other firms.21 
Appendix 
Reconciliation with Valuation Models 
The purpose of this Appendix is to reconcile the cash earnings for any 
one period with the accounting income generated in the discounted cash 
flow (DCF) system. Alternatively, is the system consistent with valuation 
models of the firm? Since it was demonstrated in the literature that a divi-
dends valuation approach is identical to a cash earnings valuation approach, 
it would be sufficient to show that the proposed system is consistent with 
one of these valuation models: The cash earnings model is chosen for this 
analysis, 
To show that the one-period accounting income that was suggested is 
consistent with a cash earnings approach to valuation, note that equation 
(3) can be rewritten as follows: 
X(1) — I(1) ∞ X(t) —I(t) 
(5) V(o) = Σ 2 . 
1 + r t = 2 (1 + r)t 
But 1(1), which is the outlay on investments in period 1 (assumed to occur 
at the end of the period), is equal in equilibrium22 to the asset's exit value and 
to the discounted value of net cash flows that the asset is expected to gen-
erate. That is, 
∞ X(t)-I(t) 
(6) 1(1) = exit value = Σ 
t = 2 (1 + r ) t - 1 
where NF(t) I ( 1 ) is the net cash flow generated in period t from investments in 
period 1. But these net cash flows are simply the revenue resulting from 
employing these investments minus the outlays associated with operating the 
21 A conceptual reconciliation of the system with the firm's valuation models is 
provided in the Appendix. 
22 The condition of equilibrium will be relaxed later to show that the consistency 
of the accounting income with the cash earnings valuation model is also maintained 
when I ≠ e x i t v a l u e ≠ d i s c o u n t e d net cash flows, which is the more realistic case. 
Also, this model assumes certainty; consequently, it is assumed that the capital 
budgeting decision is based on known cash flows, disregarding the issue of variability 
and correlatedness with other streams of income. 
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investments, and they can be described as R(t) I (1 )— W(t}1(1) or X( t ) I ( 1 ) . Thus 
(6) can be rewritten as 
(7) 1(1) = 
X(2)I(1) 
1 + r 
+ 
∞ Σ 
t = 3 
X(t)I(1) 
(1 + r ) t -2 
1 
1 + r 
X(2)I(1) At(2) 
1 4- r 
+ 
1 + r 
where At(2) is the value of assets acquired in period 1 [1(1)] as of the begin-
ning of period 2 or, equivalently, the exit value of period 1 investment as of 
the end of period 1. 
Similarly, with respect to investments made at the beginning of period 
0 the following can be formulated: 
(8) l(o) = 
X(1)I(1) 




t = 2 
X(t)I(1) 
(1 + r ) t - 1 ; 
1 
1 + r 
X(1)I(1) 
1 + r 
+ 
At(1) 
1 + r 
where At(1) is the value of assets acquired in period 0 [I<0)] as of the begin-
ning of period 1, or, equivalently, the exit value of period 0 investment as of 
the end of period 0. 
But X(t) I ( 0 ) is included in the total cash flows from operation for period 
t1. Therefore, we can decompose X(t) into X'(t), the net cash flows resulting 
from assets excluding investments in period 0 [l(o)], and X(t) I ( 0 ) , which is the 
period t cash flows resulting directly and specifically from assets acquired in 
period 0. Thus, (5) can be rewritten as 
(9) v(o) = 
X(1) — 1(1) 




t = 2 
X'(t) + X(t)I(1) - l(t) 
(1 + r)t 
The following equation results after rearranging: 
(10) v(o) = 
X(1) 




t = 2 
X(t) I ( 0 ) 
(1 + r ) t - 1 
1 
1 + r 
1(1) 
1 + r 
+ 
∞ Σ t = 2 X(t) - l(t) 
(1 + r)t 
But since 
∞ Σ t = 2 X(t)I(1) 
(1 + r ) t - 1 
1 
1 + r 
At(1) 
1 + r 
equation (10) reduces to 
(11) v(o) = 
X(1) 
1 + r 
+ 
At(1) 
1 + r 
1(1) 
1 + r 
+ 
∞ Σ t = 2 X'(t) - l(t) 
(1 + r)t 





t = 2 
X(t)I(1) 
(1 + r ) t - 1 
1(1) 
1 + r 
∞ 
Σ 
t = 2 
X(t)I(1) 
(1 + r ) t 
(12) 
Since X(t) I ( t ) is included in X'(t), X'(t) can be decomposed to X"(t), the 
net cash flows resulting from assets excluding investments in periods 0 and 1, 
and X(t) I ( 1 ) , which is the period t net cash flows resulting directly and specifi-
cally from assets acquired in period 1. Thus, (11) can be rewritten as 
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23 It can be similarly shown that when investments are made during the period, the 
discounted cash value of these investments at the time of purchase should be similarly 
subtracted to obtain the period's income. 
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(13) v(o) = 
X(1) At(1) 1(1) 
1 + r 1 + r 1 + r 
∞ 
Σ 
t = 2 
X(t)I(0) 
(1 + r)t 
∞ 
Σ 
t = 2 
X"(t) - l(t) 
(1 + r)t 
By combining (13) and (12) the following equation is obtained: 
(14) v(o) = 
X(1) At(1) 
1 + r 1 + r 
∞ Σ 
t = 2 
X"(t) - l(t) 
(1 + r) t 
But by reiterating the above manipulation, it can be shown that the sum-
mation term on the far right in equation (14) finally vanishes, and the following 
results: 
(15) v(o) = 
X(1) At(1) 
1 + r 1 + r 
In other words, the value of the firm at the beginning of period 0 is the 
net cash flows received at the beginning of period 1 plus the value of the 
firm or the value of all its assets, at the beginning of period 1, both discounted 
back one period at the one-period market rate of return. 
But v(o), the value of the firm at the beginning of period 0, is the total 
value of its assets at the beginning of period 0. That is, v(o) = l(o). Thus, 
we can write 
(16) l(o) = 
X(1) At(1) 
1 + r 1 + r 
or, l(o)(1 + r ) = X ( 1 ) + A t ( 1 ) , 
and the income which is the value of the firm multiplied by the one-period 
market rate of return is 
(17) l(o)r = X ( 1 ) + A t ( 1 ) - l ( o ) . 
That is, the income for period 0 is the net cash flow X(1) plus the differ-
ence between the discounted cash value of the firm's assets at period 1 and 
0.2 3 
The fact that income is not identical to the one-period cash flows results 
from the necessity of explicitly taking into account the future cash flows ema-
nating from the current period's assets. 
Note that the income in (17) may also be interpreted to be the net cash 
flows minus depreciation (Z): 
(18) l(o)r = X(1) — Z 
where 





t = 1 
X(t) I ( 0 ) 
(1 + r)t 
∞ 
Σ 
t = 2 
X(t)I(0) 
(1 + r ) t - 1 
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Thus, under conditions of equilibrium, when the discounted cash value, 
the exit value, and the entry value are all identical, the accounting income 
based on entry value or replacement costs will provide flows which are con-
sistent with the firm's valuation models. 
When the assumption of certainty is relaxed, allowance must be made for 
possible changes in the expectations of cash flows. In this case, both the exit 
values and the capitalized economic advantages as of the end of period t may 
be different when expected as of the end of t from their value when expected 
as of the beginning of period t. Thus from (3), 
(20) V(t) = 
∞ 
Σ 
i = t + 1 
X(i) - l(i) 
(1 + r )i-t 
where both X(i) and l(i) are the net cash flows from operations and the capital 
outlays respectively, as envisioned at the beginning of the t th period. Also, 
(21) V ( t + 1 ) = 
∞ 
Σ 
i = t + 2 
[ X ( i ) - I ( i ) ] + A [ X ( i ) - l ( i ) ] 
(1 + r)1_( t+1) 
+ [X(t + 1) - l(t + 1)] + [X(t + 1) - l ( t + 1)]. 
Where [X(i) — l(i)] represents the change in the originally anticipated 
i t h period net cash flow now envisioned from the beginning of the period 
t + 1, and [X(t + 1) — l(t + 1)] is the change in the previously anticipated 
net cash flow as of the beginning of period t + 1. Subtracting (20) from (21) 
yields the period t's economic income (hence Y): 
(22) Y = 
∞ 
Σ 
i = t + 2 
[X(i) - l(i)] 
(1 + r ) 1 + 1 ) 
∞ 
Σ 
i = t + 1 (1 + r )i-t 
X(i) - l(i) 
[X(t + 1 ) - l ( t + 1)] 
+ [X ( t+ 1) - l ( t + 1)] + 
∞ Σ 
i = t + 2 (1 + r)i-(t+1) 
,[X(i) - l(i)] 
Now the following definitions can be presented: 
Ye = expected income 
∞ 
Σ 
i = t + 2 (1 + r ) i - ( t + 1 ) 
[X(i) - l(i)] 
∞ 
Σ 
i = t + 1 (1 + r ) i - t 
X(i) - l(i) 
+ [X(t + 1) - l(t + 1)], 
Yue = the portion of unexpected income relating to the current period 
cash flows = [X(t + 1) - l(t + 1)], 
and 
Yuf = the portion of unexpected income relating to future cash flows 
∞ 
Σ 
i = t + 2 (1 + r ) i _ ( t + 1 ) 
[X(i) - l(i)] 
Thus Y is broken down into three components 
(23) Y = Ye + Yue + Yuf. 
It should be noted that the expression for Ye is equivalent to the oper-
ating current cash flows X(t + 1) less the economic depreciation which equals 
∞ 
Σ 
i = t + 2 (1 + r ) 1 _ ( t + 1 ) 
[X(i) - l(i)] ∞ 
Σ 
i = t + 1 (1 + r ) i - t 
X(i) - I(i) 
l ( t + 1 ) 
where according to the previous notation, 
∞ Σ 
i = t + 2 (1 + r ) i - ( t + 1 ) 
[X(i) - l(i)] 
: At(t + 1); 
∞ Σ 
i = t + 1 (1 + r ) i - t 
X(i) - l(i) 
At(t) 
and so the expression for depreciation would be: Z = At(t + 1) — At(t) — 
l(t + 1) where in this case At(t + 1) includes not only the original assets 
At(t) but also the additional assets acquired at [l(t + 1)]. 
But the expression for Ye can be rewritten, after performing the indi-
cated subtraction, as follows: 
(24) Ye = 
∞ Σ 
i = t + 2 
[X(i) - l(i)] (1 + r) - [X(i) - l(i)] 
(i + r ) i - t 
X ( t + 1) - l ( t + 1) 
1 + r 
[X(t + 1) — l(t + 1)] 
∞ Σ 
i = t + 2 (1 + r ) i - t 
[X(i) — l(i)lr X ( t + 1 ) - l(t + 1 ) 
1 + r 
[X(t + 1) — l(t + 1)] 
∞ Σ 
i = t + 1 
[X(i) - l(i)]r 
(1 + r ) i - t 
r 
∞ Σ 
i = t + 1 (1 + r ) i - t 
X(i) - l(i) 
V(t)r 
by equation (20). 
Thus it is found that Ye = V(t) • r, that is, expected income equals the 
value of the firm as of the beginning of the period multiplied by the one-period 
market rate of return. 
From (17) and (24) is obtained 
Ye = V(t) • r = X(t + 1) + At(t + 1) - At(t) (25) 
if l(t + 1) = 0 and 
(26) Ye = V(t) • r = X(t + 1) + At(t + 1) - At(t) - l(t + 1) 
in the more general case where l(t + 1 ) ≠ 0 . 
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Usefulness of Exit-Value Accounting Statements 
In Satisfying Accounting Objectives 
James C. McKeown 
The basic objective of accounting statements is the provision of information 
which aids users in making economic decisions. Accordingly, the focus of 
this paper will be on the purposes which can be served by exit-value account-
ing statements and the relationship of these purposes to user decision needs. 
Exit-value accounting statements present to the user information which 
can be used for three basic purposes: 
1. To determine the liquidity of the firm. This is generally believed to 
be the sole purpose for which exit-value information is relevant. 
2. To appraise the effectiveness of managerial decisions involving 
assets. This largely unrecognized purpose may be the most powerful use of 
any accounting statements whose preparations are currently feasible.1 
3. To estimate past economic income or predict future economic 
income. 
The following sections of this paper will lay the foundations for these 
purposes and relate them to perceived user decision needs. It should be 
recognized that decisions require comparison of two or more measurements 
(usually expressed as numbers). For most decisions no more than one of 
these numbers can be determined from any single accounting system. The 
feasibility of the use of exit-value information for some of the functions which 
will be described is dependent upon the availability of certain other informa-
tion. An explicit identification of these limitations will be presented at the end 
1 Accounting statements whose preparation is considered currently feasible include 
historical cost, historical cost adjusted for changes in price level (general or specif ic), 
replacement cost and exit value. Although replacement cost and exit-value state-
ments have not been proven feasible in general, the available empirical research 
(including that presented elsewhere in this volume: Lawrence Revsine, "A Test of 
the Feasibility of Preparing Replacement Cost Account ing Statements," and James 
C. McKeown, "A Test of the Feasibility of Preparing Exit-Value Accounting State-
ments") has disclosed no problems which would support a conclusion of general 
impracticality. 
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of the paper, with particular attention given to those functions which require 
future cash flow projections since the availability and accuracy of those pro-
jections have not been demonstrated to date. 
Liquidity 
The most commonly discussed purpose which can be served by exit-
value statements is determination of the liquidity of the firm. The liquidity or 
"adaptive ability" of the firm can be determined directly from the exit-value 
statements which measure assets at the net amount which could be realized 
from their disposal within a short period of time after the balance sheet date. 
This purpose is the primary basis for Chambers' elaborate justification 
of the use of "current cash equivalents."2 He says: "What men wish to know, 
for the purpose of adaptation, is the numerosity of the money tokens which 
could be substituted for particular objects and for collections of objects if 
money is required beyond the amount one already holds."3 Stated another 
way the alternatives available to a firm or person depend upon two quantities: 
(a) the resources available to invest in a contemplated project and 
(b) the investment required to engage in that project.4 
It is important to remember, in any discussion of the use of exit-value 
information to determine the resources which could be generated by the dis-
posal of assets, that measurement on this basis does not assume that the 
assets will be sold. Exit-value measurement only indicates the expected 
results if one particular alternative (selling particular assets) available to 
management is selected. This information could help statement users who 
are interested in determining risk related to investment in the firm, a floor on 
the firm's worth, or the amount the firm stands to lose if particular operations 
are discontinued. 
The risk of investment in a firm has been stated5 to be related to the size 
of the difference between the expected discounted cash flows of the firm and 
its exit value (the specific advantage).6 The potential loss if expectations 
are not realized is limited to this specific advantage.7 Thus a firm with a small 
2 Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior (Engle-
wood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966). 
3 Ibid., p. 92. 
4 Robert R. Sterling, "Confl ict of Income Measurement," Working Paper No. 43 
(Lawrence, Kansas: School of Business, University of Kansas, 1971), p. 24. 
5 Joshua Ronen and George H. Sorter, "Relevant Account ing," Journal of Business 
(April 1972), pp. 258-282. 
6 Although the expected discounted cash flows might have to be determined by 
use of information not contained in the exit-value statements, exit-value information 
can be particularly useful in these projections. (See the section "Estimation of Eco-
nomic Variables.") 
7 A decline in exit values would occur only if the demand for the output of all like 
firms decreases and the demand for all other services which can be performed by 
these assets also decreases (Ronen and Sorter). Thus it is possible, but unlikely, 
for a decrease in expectations to be accompanied by a similar decrease in exit value. 
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specific advantage would generally be considered less risky than one with a 
large specific advantage. Chambers makes a similar point when arguing that 
presentation of a highly specific asset at an exit value of zero informs the 
investor that the usefulness of that asset is entirely related to its income 
producing prospects. If these prospects disappear, the asset has no utility.8 
The principal statement users who would be interested in the estimation of 
risk would be the present and potential investors and creditors of the firm. 
Exit value indicates a floor on the worth of the firm in two ways: 
1. Exit value indicates a known value of the firm, that value which could 
be obtained currently by sale of the assets and settlement of the liabilities 
(orderly liquidation). This value could, in extreme cases, be obtained by 
stockholder action to force liquidation. (Although unlikely, the decision to 
force liquidation can only be made with knowledge of the firm's exit value.) 
2. The fact that management holds assets indicates, by implication, 
that management believes that the value which can be obtained from these 
assets through use is at least as great as their exit value. 
Again present and potential investors and creditors would appear to be 
most interested in this use of exit value. 
In conjunction with an estimate of management's expectations regarding 
certain assets, knowledge of the exit value of a firm's assets gives parties 
negotiating with the firm an estimate of the amount the firm stands to lose 
upon (and consequently the amount it would pay to avoid) discontinuation of 
all or part of its operations. This knowledge would be useful to any state-
ment reader who was in a position to force cessation of operations. This 
group would include for example, labor unions, other monopsonistic sup-
pliers, and government regulatory agencies. Included among other financial 
statement users who might wish to know the excess of the present value of 
management's expectations over the exit value of the assets involved as an 
indication of the probability of continued operations would be (present or 
prospective) long-term suppliers, customers or employees. Each of these 
users may be required to make decisions (regarding commitment of scarce 
resources) which will be influenced by the probability of the firm's continued 
operations in a particular area at a particular level. 
Appraisal of the Effectiveness 
of Management's Decisions 
The need of external financial statement users for information that will 
facilitate an evaluation of management performance has been noted by sev-
eral authors. These authors range from accounting committees ("The pre-
diction of such [management] effectiveness would appear to be highly impor-
tant to virtually all groups of external users of accounting information . . ."9) 
to individual accountants ("Security analysts, searching for key criteria for 
8 Raymond J. Chambers, "Second Thoughts on Continuously Contemporary 
Account ing," Abacus (September 1970), pp. 47-48. 
9 Committee to Prepare a Statement of Basic Accounting Theory, A Statement of 
Basic Accounting Theory (American Accounting Association, 1966), p. 25. 
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use in predicting business success, are interested, of course, in measured 
profit and statements of financial condition. Yet they usually give even greater 
recognition to management capability and human technical know-how."10) to 
statement users ("the [financial and other] information ought to enable a 
competent person to judge the abilities of the corporation management."11). 
No uniform list of information requirements emerges from these writings, 
but all indicate an interest in (accounting) information which will aid the ex-
ternal user in his attempt to judge the effectiveness and efficiency of manage-
ment. Although the objectives of financial statement users have not been 
determined, the assumption will be made that the statement user (particularly 
a stockholder) desires management to take actions which will maximize the 
present value of the future cash flows to the company.12 Therefore, to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of management, the reader will wish, possibly among 
other uses, to utilize financial statements to determine whether management 
has made any decisions which result in a lower present value of future returns 
than the present value which would have resulted from a known alternative 
course of action. In order to identify incorrect asset acquisition or disposition 
decisions, an external financial statement user would need information which 
would enable him to answer the following questions: 
1. Did the management acquire assets which it should not have 
acquired? 
2. Did the management pass up profitable opportunities to acquire 
assets? 
3. Did the firm dispose of assets which should have been held? 
4. Did the firm hold assets which should have been disposed of? 
It is suggested in this paper that the use of accounting valuations based 
on exit-value measurements, with "income" determined by deducting a type 
of imputed interest (defined below) as an expense, would provide information 
useful in developing answers to some of these questions. To support this 
10 R. Lee Brummet, "Account ing for Human Resources," Journal of Accountancy 
(December 1970), pp. 62-63. 
11 Corliss Anderson, "The Financial Analyst's Needs," Berkeley Symposium on the 
Foundations of Financial Accounting (Berkeley: School of Business Administration, 
University of California, 1967), p. 100. 
12 Alternatively, it can be assumed that although a particular reader may not desire 
management to take actions which will maximize the present value of future returns 
to the company, he will assume that management's goal is to maximize present value 
of future returns and evaluate management's effectiveness in achieving their per-
ceived goal. Another view leading to the same conclusion indicates that although 
investors may have non-economic goals, these motivations cannot " form any basis 
for a structure of ideas about how to account. If a firm has liabilities stemming from 
its social responsibilit ies, those liabilities are relevant to investment decisions aimed 
at maximization of returns, but the political and social view of the management are 
not within the realm of accounting except as they affect the firm's f inances." W. J. 
Kenley and G. J. Staubus, Objectives and Concepts of Financial Statements, Account-
ing Research Study No. 3, (Melbourne: Account ing Research Foundation, 1972), p. 43. 
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suggestion, information believed to be appropriate in developing answers to 
each of these questions will be identified, defined and analyzed. This infor-
mation will then be compared with that provided by the exit-value reporting 
system. 
"Exit value" is defined here as the maximum net amount which can be 
realized from the disposal of an asset within a short period of time (not a 
forced sale situation, but not long enough to allow disposal of fixed assets 
through ordinary use of services). "Net amount" is defined as the selling 
price less disposition costs including tax effects, all discounted to the point 
of measurement. The imputed interest expense to be deducted in determin-
ing "income" is computed by the application of an interest rate (set by the 
user) to the beginning owner's equity—exit value of assets minus exit value 
of liabilities. 
It is assumed throughout most of this section that the returns attributable 
to a particular asset can be determined for all past periods during which the 
company has held the asset. This assumption is not as restrictive as it may 
seem since all that is required is the determination of the incremental con-
tribution of the asset. That is, the measurement required is the amount of the 
reduction of a past cash flow which would have occurred had the firm not held 
a particular asset. This amount should, in general, be determinable. Although 
in some cases practical problems might occur in attempting to determine it, 
this measurement appears likely to be feasible in most cases, and it is cer-
tainly conceptually valid in that it does not require an arbitrary allocation of 
the total cash flow of the firm among all of its assets with the condition that 
the sum of the cash flows assigned to the individual assets is equal to the 
total cash flow of the firm. 
1. Did the management acquire assets which it should not have ac-
quired? Evaluation of past decisions to acquire fixed assets requires, for each 
asset acquired, comparison of two values: the acquisition cost of the asset 
and the sum of net cash receipts attributable to the asset discounted to the 
time of purchase. If the cost was greater than the discounted value of the 
receipts, the acquisition decision must be judged incorrect. The argument 
may be made that the decision might have appeared correct based upon the 
estimates of future returns which were available at the time of purchase. This, 
argument ignores the fact that these estimates are one of two distinct areas 
of managerial performance involved in a decision of this type: 
(a) the preparation of accurate estimates of the increase in future re-
turns which would result from the purchase of the asset and 
(b) the determination of the correct acquisition based upon the esti-
mates prepared in (a). 
Unless management is prepared to publish the long-range estimates 
which were used in their asset decisions, the accountant will not be able to 
provide information to permit evaluation of the two areas separately. The 
appraisal of management will have to be based upon the evaluation of the 
decision made. The cause of an incorrect decision may lie with either the 
165 
estimates or the decision based upon the estimates or both. The fact remains, 
however, that the wrong decision was made.13 
In attempting to supply the information necessary to evaluate past man-
agement decisions to acquire assets, the accountant may encounter four 
situations requiring measurement of different attributes: 
1 A. If the asset is still held at the time of measurement, computation of 
the sum of net returns attributable to this asset discounted to the time of 
purchase will require knowledge of receipts subsequent to the end of the 
period. In general, this projection of future receipts will be a difficult one to 
make. If the accountant could make this projection for all assets, he could 
measure directly the change in discounted value of future receipts of the 
firm and would simply present that information to the user. 
1B. In certain cases where the asset is still held at the time of measure-
ment, projection of future returns would not be necessary. The purchase of 
a fixed asset can be evaluated simply by knowledge of the relationship 
between the acquisition cost of the asset and the sum of the discounted 
returns attributable to the asset. The acquisition decision can be established 
as correct if the information presented enables the user to determine that the 
sum of the discounted returns will be greater than the acquisition cost even 
if the information presented does not allow the user to compute the amount 
of the discounted returns. This will be the situation if the sum of the past 
receipts plus the current exit value, all discounted to the time of purchase, is 
greater than the cost. Since the asset could be sold immediately to gain a 
total discounted return greater than the cost, the acquisition decision can be 
judged correct without projection of future returns. The proposed accounting 
system would help the user reach this conclusion by reporting the current 
exit value. 
It may appear that the analysis in the previous paragraph ignored the 
possibility that the firm may hold the asset for some period subsequent to the 
reporting date and receive returns that result in a sum of returns discounted 
to the time of purchase which are less than the asset's cost. This possibility 
exists, but could only occur if the sum of the receipts subsequent to the 
current reporting date, discounted to the current reporting date, were to be 
less than the current exit value. (See Appendix, pages 176-177.) 
1C. If the asset has been sold, the receipts (including net receipts from 
the sale) are known and the sum of those receipts discounted to the point of 
purchase can be computed. If this amount is greater than the acquisition 
cost, the acquisition decision was correct although the statement user may 
wish to investigate intervening decisions to hold (as discussed in section 4, 
pages 168-173) or sell the asset. Most accounting systems would enable the 
user to evaluate this situation if sufficiently disaggregated information is 
provided. 
13 Although this evaluation criterion may seem rather harsh, no management is 
expected to be clairvoyant. Thus, a good management performance would be dem-
onstrated by a low percentage of incorrect decisions rather than a complete avoidance 
of incorrect decisions. 
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1D. If the asset has been sold and the sum of receipts discounted to 
the point of purchase is less than the cost, management has made at least 
one incorrect fixed asset decision. The original decision to acquire the asset 
was probably incorrect, but it is also possible that the present value, at the 
time of sale, of receipts which could have been gained had the asset been 
held, might have been greater than the net amount realized from the sale. 
In this case, the decision to dispose of the asset was incorrect, and the pur-
chase decision might have been correct. The possibility of an incorrect de-
cision to hold the asset at some point before the sale has been discussed 
above in section 1B. Although the exit-value system would facilitate identifica-
tion of previous incorrect hold decisions, most accounting systems would 
provide information which would enable the statement user to determine that 
at least one incorrect asset decision had been made. 
The analysis above indicates that the exit-value system would allow 
identification of one class of correct asset decisions, those cases where the 
cost of each asset was less than the discounted sum of past receipts plus 
current exit value. Only a system which discloses exit values will permit 
identification of this class of decisions. The validity of acquisition decisions 
in which the assets have been sold can be judged by using sufficiently dis-
aggregated information which would be generated by almost any accounting 
system, although classification of the incorrect decision may be facilitated by 
the fact that the exit-value system provides information which allows increased 
statement user evaluation of decisions to hold fixed assets. The exit-value 
system does not help to determine the validity of acquisition decisions where 
the assets are still held and the cost of each asset is greater than the dis-
counted sum of past receipts plus current exit value. The validity of these 
decisions can only be determined by use of projections of future returns. 
Therefore, the exit-value system does as well as any other in providing infor-
mation which permits judging of acquisition decisions related to assets which 
have been sold and provides better information than systems not providing 
exit-value measurements for some of the other acquisition decisions. 
2. Did the management pass up profitable opportunities to acquire 
assets? Evaluation of past decisions to refuse to purchase assets requires, 
for each asset not purchased, the comparison of two amounts: the cost which 
would have been incurred had the asset been purchased and the sum of net 
cash receipts which could have been gained, discounted to the time at which 
the asset could have been purchased. The first problem the accountant has 
in presenting this information to the external user is the determination of the 
assets about which information is desired. The assets of interest need not be 
limited to those which management considered purchasing, since failure to 
even consider a profitable opportunity is as much a mistake as a conscious 
decision to pass up the same opportunity. Since this unlimited approach 
would require information related to numerous diverse assets, the practical 
user would probably be content to evaluate only those refusals to purchase 
assets similar to those used in the firm or some other proper subset of total 
asset purchase opportunities. 
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Even if the subset of assets of interest to all external users could be 
determined, the information required by the users could generally not be 
provided by any accounting system. Although the amount of the hypothetical 
cost might be approximated by use of the cost of a similar asset purchased 
at the same time, this situation will generally not be true. The determination 
of the overlooked benefits would require the same type of information as is 
needed to measure the benefits of assets which were purchased (Question 1), 
with the additional difficulty that the receipts foregone in the past would be 
hypothetical. Measurement of the hypothetical past receipts would require a 
knowledge of the receipts generated by a similar asset in a similar company. 
The similar firm could, of course, be our firm although this would require 
verification that the asset not purchased could have been used in the same 
manner as the similar asset which was held. 
In summary, the information required to determine whether profitable 
opportunities to purchase assets have been neglected is not likely to be 
provided by any accounting system, due to the difficulties of selecting assets 
of interest to report upon and measuring their hypothetical returns. The exit-
value system does not provide the information necessary to evaluate man-
agement actions in this area. 
3. Did the firm dispose of assets which should have been held? The 
information required to evaluate each decision to dispose of an asset is the 
relationship between the net amount realized from the disposal and the sum 
of the receipts, which could have been secured had the asset been held, 
discounted to the point of sale. If the net proceeds from the sale are less 
than the discounted net returns foregone, the disposal was incorrect. While 
most accounting systems would report the proceeds of the sale, the presen-
tation of the receipts foregone would require solution of the problems out-
lined above (Question 2) concerning measurement of hypothetical receipts 
foregone by refusing to purchase an asset. That is, the past receipts re-
linquished could only be approximated by measurement of the receipts gen-
erated, subsequent to the time of sale, by a similar asset in a similar company, 
while future receipts foregone must be estimated. The exit-value system and 
other accounting systems do not provide sufficient information to evaluate 
management decisions in this area. (The exit-value system has one related 
advantage. Although the method of disposal is not the focus here, the exit-
value system would allow some evaluation of this. If the disposal occurred 
at or near the beginning of a period, knowledge of the exit value at the end 
of the preceding period would give some indication about the effectiveness 
of the disposal method.) 
4. Did the firm hold assets which should have been disposed of? 
Evaluation of decisions to hold assets requires, for each such decision, 
knowledge of the relationship between the net amount which could have been 
realized at the time the decision was made (exit value) and the maximum 
sum of later receipts which can be generated from the asset, discounted to 
the time of the decision (economic value). If the exit value of the asset at the 
time of the decision was greater than the economic value of that asset 
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at the same time, the asset should have been sold. While the proposed sys-
tem will obviously report the exit value at each balance sheet date, the 
system will not present the economic value. 
Fortunately, as discussed previously, it is not always necessary to know 
the value of two numbers to determine their relationship. It is possible, using 
the exit-value accounting system, to obtain some information concerning the 
accuracy of management's decision, made at the end of a period, to hold an 
asset. (The probably superior function of more frequent evaluation of hold 
decisions could only be accomplished by increasing the frequency of finan-
cial reports. That is not the focus here.) 
To demonstrate this, assume that the user wishes to evaluate a decision 
to hold an asset at the end of a previous period and let 
r = interest rate 
NRVi = exit value of asset at the end of period i 
IPVi = present value (at the end of period i) of receipts generated 
subsequent to period i through the internal use with the 
maximum present value of future receipts. (Internal use is 
defined as any use which does not involve disposal at the 
end of period i) 
TPVi = maximum present value at the end of period i 
= the greater of IPVi or NRVi 
CFi = net cash flow into the firm during period i attributable to 
the asset (either occurring at the end of the period or 
translated to the end—it is only necessary to know when 
the cash was received) 
Yi = income for period i measured according to the proposed 
= CFi + NRVi - NRV i_1(1 + r) 
Assume that the current time is the end of period T. Since the asset 
could be sold immediately, 
TPV T ≥NRV T (1) 
This does not assume that management will make the correct decision at the 
end of period T. It simply means that the maximum discounted present value 
of receipts available to management is no less than NRVT. 
TPVT + CFT, 
Since IPVT_X = (1) implies that 
(1+r) 
NRVT + CFT 
IPVT-1≥ 
(1+r) (2) 
the income reported under the proposed system for period T would be 
Y T = C F T + N R V T - N R V t - 1 ( 1 + r ) 
or 
y t c f t + n r v t 
= N R V T _ 1 . 
(1+r) (1+r) (3) 
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From (2) and (3) 
Y T ≤ IPV T - 1 - N R V T - 1 
(1+r) (4) 
If YT ≥ O then IPVT_1 — NRVT_1 ≥ 0, or the discounted present value of 
the asset at the beginning of the period was greater than the exit value at that 
point. Thus if the income reported for the period was positive, the decision 
to hold the asset at the beginning of the period is known to have been 
correct. Reported income of zero would mean that the rate of return on equity 
was at least r. If r is a satisfactory rate of return, the hold decision at T-1 
is still known to have been correct. Even though the inverse is not true 
(negative reported income does not mean that an incorrect decision was 
made), the user is still able to determine that those assets for which the in-
come figure is positive should have been held. This conclusion is possible, 
without knowledge of the future, simply by reference to current markets. 
The user is able to divide the hold decisions at time T into those which he 
knows were correct and those which might have been correct. If it is possible 
to make estimates of discounted present value at some expense and the user 
wishes to evaluate all hold decisions at time T-1, he need only incur the 
expenditure necessary to estimate economic values of the assets whose re-
ported incomes were negative. 
Before leaving the hold decision, the conditions under which the correct 
decision was made to hold the asset at time T-1, but for which the reported 
income was negative, will be examined. For the hold decision at time T-1 
to have been correct,14 
IPVT_1≥ N R V T _ 1 and T P V T > N R V T or T P V T = I P V T . (5) 
S i n c e I P V T _ 1 I P V T + C F T 
(1+r) 
14 If T P V T = NRV, 
then IPVT , = 
T 
C F T + N R V T 
(1+r) (a) 
Since Y T < O 
C F T + N R V T — N R V T _ 1 ( 1 + r) < O 
C F T + N R V T < N R V T _ 1 ( 1 + r) 
C F T + N R V T < N R V T _ 1 . 
(1+r) (b) 
From (a) and (b), IPVT_1 < NRVT_1 
Therefore, the hold decis ion cannot have been correct if the income under the 
proposed method is negative and there exists at the end of per iod T no internal use 
with greater present value of receipts than the NRVT . 
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IPV T _ 1 (1+r ) = IPVT + CFT 
or IPVT_1 - IPVT = CF t - r IPVT_1 . 
From (3), negative reported income implies 





NRVT_1 ( 1 + r ) > C F T + NRV T 
NRVT_ 1 - N R V T > C F t - r NRV, 
 —1  
T—1. (7) 
(7) - (6) gives 
(NRVT_ 1 - NRV T ) - ( I P V T _ 1 - IPVT) > 
( C F t - r N R V T _ 1 ) - ( C F T - r l P V T _ 1 ) 
or 
(NRVT_1 - NRV T ) - (IPVT_1 - IPVT) > r(IPVT_1 - N R V T _ 1 ) . (8) 
This means that the decrease in exit value during period T must exceed 
the decrease in economic value in internal use to the firm by more than the 
discount rate times the difference between the economic value at time T-1 
and the exit value at time T-1. The right side of inequality (8) is non-negative 
since r is positive and (IPVT_1 — NRVT_1)≥ O by inequality (5). The 
frequency with which this situation will occur can only be determined em-
pirically, but a priori reasoning would indicate a fairly low frequency. Further, 
a negative reported income would not arise each time inequality (8) was 
satisfied, since that inequality represents a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a negative reported income resulting from a correct hold deci-
sion. The difference at time T between the economic value to the firm and 
the net realizable value is likely to be greater than (1+r ) times that differ-
ence at time T-1 for two reasons.15 
1. The market structure has changed to cause the difference between 
discounted present value and exit value to increase either due to an increase 
in proportionate frictions or an increase by more than a factor of (1+r ) in 
the value of the asset. Frictions include such costs as commissions on pur-
chase and sale, costs of preparation for sale, effect on seller's tax liability 
and purchaser's cost of preparation for use. Many frictions decrease as the 
asset value decreases. Therefore, an increase in asset value might cause a 
larger difference between economic value and exit value. In either case the 
entire market for similar assets should be affected in the same way and the 
effect should be apparent from statements of other firms in the same industry. 
The increase in value of the asset would probably not result in negative 
reported income anyway since that could only result from negative cash flow 
if the exit value increased by a factor greater than 1+ r . 
15 Inequality (8) can be rearranged to 
(IPVT - NRV t ) > (1 + r ) (IPVT_1 - NRVT_1). 
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2. The management's estimate of the returns which the firm can realize 
from future use of the asset is higher than the estimate of other actors in 
the market. Given that the friction structure remains the same and asset value 
does not increase, if the other actors in the market hold an estimate of the 
economic value of the asset equal to management's estimate, then exit value 
should be driven up to that estimate minus the total friction of purchase and 
sale. The difference between economic value and exit value would then be 
held to an amount no higher than the corresponding difference at time T-1. 
It is entirely possible for management to correctly hold an estimate of eco-
nomic value higher than that held by other actors in the market, but the 
negative reported income would only appear in a period during which the 
difference between management's estimate and other estimates increases. 
The users of the financial statement may wish to examine these situations 
closely in their appraisal of management. 
The exit-value accounting system therefore enables the user to divide 
the management's decisions to hold assets at the beginning of the period into 
two sets. The first set contains those decisions affecting assets for which a 
non-negative income figure was reported. These decisions are known to 
have been correct. The second set contains decisions concerning assets 
for which a negative income figure was reported. There are three possible 
causes of these negative income figures. 
(a) The friction structure in the market was altered (or much less likely, 
the value of the asset increased by a factor of more than 1+r) . This effect 
should be apparent on the financial statements of other firms in the same 
industry. 
(b) Management's estimate of the economic value of the asset at the 
end of the period is higher than the estimates held by other actors in the 
market. The user will probably wish to follow these situations closely to 
determine the accuracy of management's estimates. 
(c) The decision to hold the asset at the beginning of the period was 
incorrect. 
Thus the user can investigate the second set of decisions to determine 
which of the three causes was responsible for the negative reported income 
figure. The relative frequency of decisions which fall into the first set and 
the various subsets of the second set can only be determined empirically, 
but the number of decisions in the first set should be large enough to signifi-
cantly reduce the expense of evaluating management's hold decisions. It is 
possible that the frequency of negative reported income figures would pro-
vide a good practical surrogate to the answer to Question 4. The information 
necessary to evaluate refusal to purchase is unlikely to be provided by any 
accounting system while the proposed system, by presenting the exit value 
of assets as of the end of the period, will provide the information necessary 
to evaluate purchase and sale decisions if it is possible to evaluate them 
(cases where the sum of past receipts plus current exit value discounted 
to the time of purchase or sale respectively is greater than the consideration 
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given or received). The claim can be made that the exit-value system would 
provide users with information more suitable for appraising the individual 
asset decisions of management more accurately than the information pro-
vided by current accounting practice. 
None of the discussion above concerning evaluation of hold decisions 
depends on the asset being an individual asset rather than a group of assets 
which are used jointly to produce revenues. One problem concerning the 
use of the proposed system to evaluate buy, sell, and refusal-to-buy decisions 
for groups of assets is that purchases and sales are made at different points 
in time for different assets in the group. For evaluation of purchase decisions, 
at least, this problem might be solved by simply considering replacement 
expenditures as negative cash flows of the period concerned. Therefore, the 
exit-value system could be used to help evaluate hold decisions even when 
the past returns attributable to each individual asset could not be determined. 
In this way, statements prepared as suggested for the entire firm could pro-
vide a basis for an evaluation of management. In addition, information con-
cerning separate "profit centers" could be analyzed and either presented in 
detail or summarized. In this context a "profit center" is a group of assets 
whose returns stream can be segregated from the returns attributable to 
other assets or groups of assets held by the firm. Even for those firms whose 
total reported income was positive, the disclosure of individual profit center 
analysis could provide users with information for the appraisal of manage-
ment in greater detail. 
In response to the legitimate objection that publication of financial state-
ments containing the disaggregated information necessary to evaluate hold 
decisions for individual assets or small groups of assets is impractical, the 
financial statement reader can be given almost as much information by 
including in the report a table indicating frequency of observation of the 
various exit-value rates of return of individual assets or small groups com-
puted by— 
exit value (end of period) + cash flow (during period) — exit 
value (beginning of period) 
exit value (beginning of period) 
This rate can be calculated without knowing the user's discount rate. The 
user can then consult the table and determine the number of assets (or 
groups) for which the income figure suggested above was non-negative by 
computing the number of assets (or groups) which had an exit-value rate of 
return greater than or equal to the user's discount rate. 
It is clear that income reported with assets measured at exit value 
would give investors considerable information useful in evaluating manage-
ment's decisions to hold assets. The maximum benefit from this measurement 
method could probably be obtained by leaving the computation of imputed 
interest to the individual user since he is best able to determine the rate 
appropriate to him. The accountant could, of course, clearly present income 
before imputed interest on equity and then deduct his best estimate of the 
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proper interest. The exit-value system also gives more information for 
evaluation of management decisions to acquire and dispose of fixed assets 
than any system currently in use for reporting to external users. 
The present or prospective investor or creditor could use the evaluation 
of managerial performance described above in conjunction with other in-
formation to form his projection of the firm's future prospects. 
Estimation of Economic Variables 
It is assumed here that the user (investor or creditor primarily) is inter-
ested in estimating the present value of the future cash flows which would 
accrue to him if he invested (lent) or maintained his investment (loan) in the 
company. 
To do this, he could attempt to predict the future cash flows of the firm 
and estimate the discount rate which should be used to derive the present 
values. Variables which the user might attempt to estimate/predict are risk, 
present and future investment opportunities and their rates of return, likeli-
hood of investing in those projects, and possible effects of changes in the 
competitive environment of the firm and the economy. 
1. Ceiling rate of return on projects available to the firm. If it is possible 
to identify those assets or groups of assets for which management's estimates 
(for the past year) were correct, the lowest exit-value rate of return of these 
projects can be used as an estimation of the highest rate of return obtainable 
on investment proposals which were available at the beginning of the period, 
but not accepted at the time.16 Exit-value rate of return is computed as: 
exit value (end of period) + cash flow (during period) — exit 
value (beginning of period) 
exit value (beginning of period) 
The inference here is that management would have sold the assets whose 
expected rates of return were lowest if an investment proposal (of suitable 
size) with a higher rate of return was available. 
2. Resources available to invest in available projects. Although the 
set of projects available to the firm will not be disclosed by exit-value account-
ing statements, the exit-value statements will give directly the resources 
available (through internal financing) to invest in these projects. Knowledge 
of the resource constraint should give the user a better basis for prediction 
of the set of investment proposals which will be accepted. 
3. Risk. As indicated in the first section of this paper the specific 
advantage (difference between the present value and the exit value of the 
firm) should give an indication of the uncertainty involved in the estimate of 
the present value of the firm. This indication could be used to aid the investor 
in his determination of the appropriate risk adjustments. 
16 This inference procedure assumes that for the low yield asset the difference 
between economic value and exit value did not increase during the year. 
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4. Rates of return from projects. One cash flow which must be pre-
dicted to compute the rate of return from a project is the salvage value of 
the assets involved at the conclusion of the project. This value is simply 
the future exit value of these assets. Prediction of future exit values should 
be facilitated by knowledge of the pattern of current and past exit values of 
similar assets. The current and past exit values of similar assets would be 
available on exit-value accounting statements if the project involved an area 
in which the firm was already active or an area of operations for other firms 
for which exit-value statements were available. 
Summary 
This paper has briefly discussed the ways in which exit-value accounting 
statements could be used by external financial statement readers. The 
relevance of exit-value statements is based upon their usefulness in three 
areas: 
(1) Determination of the liquidity of the firm; 
(2) Determination of the effectiveness of managerial decisions; 
(3) Estimation and prediction of economic income. 
As a guide to the feasibility of the use of exit-value information for some 
of the functions described in the paper, the following list identifies the in-
formation other than exit value necessary for each purpose. Those purposes 
requiring future cash flow projections are listed separately since the avail-
ability and accuracy of those projections have not been demonstrated to date. 
Uses not requiring future cash flow projections. 
1. Resources available for investment, etc.—no other information.17 
2. Known value of the firm—no other information. 
3. Implication of management's estimate of value—assumption that 
management is acting to maximize future cash flows or has some equivalent 
objective for decisions. 
4. Appraisal of the effectiveness of management's decisions involving 
asset acquisition and disposal—past incremental cash flow. (This use is 
marginal because it can be accomplished more completely by use of future 
cash flow projections. The intent in listing it here is to indicate that this 
purpose can be accomplished to a substantial extent without projections.) 
5. Ceiling rate of return on projects available to firm—identification of 
areas where past managerial estimates were correct and related past cash 
flows. 
Uses requiring future cash flow projections. 
1. Risk of investment—indication using no other information.18 
2. Amount the firm would pay to avoid discontinuation of all or part 
of its operations—no other information. 
17 None other than exit value. 
18 None other than exit value and future cash flow forecasts. 
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Probability of continuation of operations in present areas at particular 
levels—indication as described above using no other information. 
3. Evaluation of asset hold decisions for which exit-value rate of return 
was less than user discount rate—past incremental cash flows. 
4. Rates of return from projects—no other information. 
The potential ability of exit-value information to aid external statement 
users in their decision-making strongly suggests that accounting statements 
should present exit-value information. 
Appendix 
To demonstrate that if the sum of past returns plus current exit value all 
discounted to the time of purchase is greater than the acquisition cost, the 
sum of all returns (including proceeds from eventual sale) of the asset can 
be less than the acquisition cost only if the sum of receipts subsequent to 
the current reporting date discounted to the current reporting date were to be 
less than the current exit value, let 
r = rate of return 
NRVi = exit value of asset at the end of period i 
AC = acquisition cost of asset (at end of period O) 
CF i = net cash flow into the firm during period i attributable to 
the asset (either occurring at the end of the period or 
translated to the end) 
n = period whose end is the current reporting date 
N = end of period in which the asset is sold. 
At the current reporting date, the discounted sum of past returns plus 










i = 1 (1+r) i 
(i) 
When the asset is finally sold at the end of period N, the discounted sum 
of past returns is less than the cost. 
N 
2 CFi < A C ( C F n includes proceeds from the sale, N R V N ) 
i = 1 (1+r) i 
n 
Σ 
CFi N Σ CFi 
< AC + 









i = 1 (1+r) i (ii) 
(i) and (ii) produce the transitive inequality 
NRVN 
( 1 + r ) n 
> AC -
n Σ 
i = 1 ( 1 + r ) i i = n + 1 ( 1 + r ) i 
CFi 
> 
N Σ CFi 
NRVn 
( 1 + r ) n i = n + 1 (1 + r ) i 
> 
N Σ CFi 
or 
Multiplying both sides by (1 +r ) n assuming r > — 1 gives 
NRVn > 
N Σ CFi 
i = n + 1 (1 + r ) i _ n 
which clearly shows that an incorrect decision to hold the asset was made 
at or subsequent to the reporting date. (The evaluation of decisions to hold 
assets is discussed in more detail above.) Therefore, even if this situation 
occurs, the original conclusion that the purchase decision was correct is still 
valid. 
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Replacement Cost Accounting: 
A Theoretical Foundation* 
Lawrence Revsine 
Our objective in this paper is to develop a foundation that supports the theo-
retical relevance of replacement cost accounting.1 In order to establish this 
foundation, it is necessary to specify the linkages between replacement cost 
information and the information needed to satisfy users' decision models. 
A complete analysis of the relevance of replacement cost accounting 
would entail a rather lengthy multi-stage research process. The various re-
search stages can be summarized as follows: 
1. A series of normative decision models for various user groups would have 
to be developed and the information needs of the various models iso-
lated. 
2. Empirical tests would have to be performed to determine whether the 
normative decision models and information needs conform to actual 
models and actual needs.2 
3. A theoretical model would have to be developed which links the output 
* The material in this paper parallels, in condensed form, certain sections of 
Lawrence Revsine, Replacement Cost Accounting (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1973). The permission of Prentice-Hall, Inc. to reproduce this material is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
' The basic characteristics and computational methods underlying replacement 
cost accounting are developed in Edgar O. Edwards and Philip W. Bell, The Theory 
and Measurement of Business Income (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of 
California Press, 1961). 
2 Some authors would contend that a valid empirical specification of users' decision 
needs is hopelessly circular and would lead to suboptimal reporting systems. If 
true, this would mean that user needs would have to be normatively derived. Thus, 
the second stage tests described above would be unnecessary. For a development 
of this argument, see Robert R. Sterling, "A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory: 
A Review Art icle," Journal of Accounting Research, (Spring 1967), p. 106; and Ster-
ling, "On Theory Construction and Verif ication," The Accounting Review, (July 1970), 
pp. 455n-456n. 
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generated by replacement costing to the normative information needs of 
users. 
4. The theoretical model developed in (3) would have to be tested in actual 
practice.3 
Obviously, a project of this magnitude is beyond the scope of the present 
study. Our analysis will instead be confined to stages (1) and (3), i.e., develop-
ing a linkage between the identified data needs of a single user group and 
the information generated by replacement costing. Furthermore, the empirical 
evidence required in stages (2) and (4) is currently unavailable. However, by 
developing a theoretical foundation for replacement cost reporting to one 
user group, we simultaneously provide a framework for subsequent empirical 
testing. 
Introductory Considerations 
A Basic Premise. Observation suggests that the audience for financial 
reports is quite diverse. One characteristic of this diversity is that there are 
probably differences in the objectives of various categories of users. These 
differences in objectives imply that there could be differences in the decision 
models used to achieve these disparate objectives. If the decision models 
vary among groups of users, then it is also possible that the information 
needed to satisfy the respective decision models varies among groups. That 
is, diversity in decision models implies (but does not necessarily guarantee) 
diversity in needed information. As a consequence of this potential diversity 
in information needs, accounting reports prepared under one measurement 
basis may be relevant for the information needs of one group and irrelevant 
to other groups. 
In light of these observations, it seems reasonable to suggest that uni-
versally relevant accounting measures may not exist. Accordingly, the rele-
vance of a particular income measure is probably best assessed by refer-
ence to the information needs of individual categories of statement users. 
This is the approach that will be followed in this paper. The information needs 
of long-term equity investors will provide the basis for analyzing the theo-
retical relevance of replacement cost accounting.4 
Normative Decision Model for Long-Term Equity Investors. In the ab-
sence of an empirically specified decision model for long-term equity in-
3 Once this research process is completed, we will have some measure of the 
absolute utility of replacement cost accounting. However, in order to determine the 
relative utility of various income measures, this research process must be repeated 
for each alternative measure (e.g., historical cost, exit value, etc.). 
4 A more general analysis of the relevance of replacement cost accounting would 
require specification of the information needs of other user groups. Once these infor-
mation needs are isolated, the ability of replacement cost in generating information 
relevant to these needs would also have to be examined. It is possible, of course, 
that other user groups may have information needs similar to those of long-term 
equity investors. Were this the case, the generalizability of our analysis would be 
increased. 
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5 This model is adapted from a report of the Committee on External Reporting, "An 
Evaluation of External Reporting Practices, A Report of the 1966-68 Committee on 
External Report ing," Committee Reports, Supplement to Volume XLIV, The Account-
ing Review (1969), pp. 82-83. For simplicity, income tax effects are ignored. 
6 Ibid., pp. 84-87. 
7 Obviously, these estimates of future operating profits would be used in conjunc-
tion with estimates of the other flow variables in order to generate more refined 
dividend predictions. These other variables can often be predicted from supple-
mentary sources, such as annual report textual disclosures. 
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vestors, a normative model will be used. From this decision model, we will 
derive normative information needs for this user group. 
With regard to investment decisions involving individual securities, one 
model has achieved prominence in the theoretical literature. This model sug-
gests that expected future cash flows should govern the selection of invest-
ment securities. Given existing market prices, the strategy is to select those 
securities whose expected future cash flows promise the highest return at an 
acceptable risk level. This model can be formalized in the following fashion:5 
Vo = 
n Σ Di i In n 
- lo 
i=1 ( 1 + β )
1 ( 1 + β ) n 
where: 
Vo = the subjective net present value of one equity share pur-
chased at time (O) at price lo 
D i = dividend per share expected during period (i) 
i = certainty equivalent factor which makes an investor indiffer-
ent between Di and a totally riskless cash flow Di i if the 
investor is risk averse, O < i < 1 
β = opportunity rate for a riskless investment (assumed, for ease 
of exposition, to be constant over the foreseeable horizon) 
ln = expected market price of one share at the terminal date of 
the planning horizon (n). 
It is evident that this model requires information regarding the expected 
level and variability of future dividend flows, D i. The Committee on External 
Reporting suggested that these dividend flows are themselves a function of 
several variables, such as operating profits, nonoperating profits, stockholder 
investments, purchases and dispositions of assets, random events, and man-
agement dividend policy.6 With the exception of operating profits, most of 
these elements are erratic and some are material only when aggregated. But 
operating profits—which usually comprise the bulk of total net enterprise 
flows—are generally considered to be more regular, and hence predictable. 
Thus, if an investor is able to generate tolerably accurate predictions of oper-
ating profits, then his ability to predict future dividends is greatly enhanced.7 
Given this normative long-term investor decision model, replacement 
cost data would be relevant insofar as such data aid in the prediction of 
future operating flows and facilitate estimates of the risk associated with these 
flows.8 (For simplicity, we will analyze the relevance of replacement cost 
information to individual security decisions. Doing so allows us to avoid the 
complexities of portfolio theory, which are beyond the intended scope of 
this paper.) 
Dividends and Distributable Operating Flows. Observation suggests that 
managers of publicly held corporations strive to avoid lowering the estab-
lished dividend rate. Since, in the long run, operating flows generate the bulk 
of the total resource flows needed to pay dividends, this desire to maintain 
dividend levels immediately translates into a desire to (at least) maintain 
operating flow levels.9 
Now, future operating flow levels are a function of two variables: (1) the 
physical level of future operations (i.e., how many machines are employed, 
how much inventory is used, etc.), and (2) the prices which will prevail in the 
future for the firm's inputs and outputs. Since future prices are usually dic-
tated by external conditions, management's real controllable variable in 
striving to maintain operating flow levels is to maintain the existing physical 
level of operations on the presumption that future input and output prices will 
remain constant. Thus, while management will do better if it can, we contend 
that at a minimum, management strives to maintain its existing level of physi-
cal operations. If physical operations do later rise to a higher level, then the 
process would begin anew. That is, management would then strive to at least 
maintain future operations at the new, higher physical level. 
Let us define "distributable operating flow" as that portion of the re-
sources generated by operations which can be distributed to owners without 
8 Because of space limitations, this paper will not discuss the utility of replacement 
costing for evaluating the risk associated with expected operating flows. This topic 
is explored in some depth in Revsine, Replacement Cost Accounting, Chapter 7. 
Briefly, the rationale for suggesting that replacement cost numbers may be useful for 
the evaluation of risk associated with individual securities relates to certain char-
acteristics of replacement cost financial ratios. One could contend that replacement 
cost ratios do not inject arbitrary valuation and t iming differences into the assessment 
of firm performance. As a consequence, a reliable basis for intertemporal and inter-
firm comparisons exists. Such comparisons over time and between firms provide 
evidence of extraordinary profitability, its persistence, and its variability. This is 
precisely the type of evidence that is needed to evaluate the risk associated with 
future flows in an individual security setting. 
In a portfolio setting, the riskiness of a security is a function of the covariance of 
its expected returns with those of other securities in the portfolio (this is termed 
"systematic r isk"). Thus, traditional accounting ratios, which are thought to reflect 
the individualistic risk of a security, would seemingly be of little benefit for risk evalua-
tion in a portfolio setting. On the other hand, if individualistic risk and systematic 
risk are themselves positively correlated, then accounting ratios may also be a 
surrogate for systematic risk. Indeed, this surrogate relationship is consistent with 
the limited evidence currently available. (See Will iam Beaver, Paul Kettler, and 
Myron Scholes, "The Association Between Market Determined and Accounting Deter-
mined Risk Measures," The Accounting Review (October 1970), pp. 655-659.) 
9 It should be readily apparent that, ceteris paribus, if operating flows fall, then 
total enterprise flows will fall, and if this condit ion persists, eventually dividend pay-
ments must fall. 
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reducing the level of future physical operations (and thus future dividends). 
Our final premise in this paper is that this distributable operating flow is 
(perhaps intuitively) monitored by management and constitutes an important 
element in final dividend decisions.10 Thus, 
Di = f(Do, X) 
where: 
Di = future dividends 
Do = future distributable operating flows 
X = row vector of other dividend variables. 
Given this dividend model, and the normative investor model introduced 
above, it follows that investors are interested in predicting future levels of 
distributable operating flow. That is, since investors are primarily interested 
in D i, and since Di is strongly influenced by Do, then investors' estimates of 
Di will be improved to the extent that their ability to predict Do is enhanced. 
Relevance of Replacement Costing 
Introduction. To be relevant for the information needs of the normative 
long-term equity investor model described above, a reporting concept must 
be useful for generating predictions—preferably predictions of future distribu-
table operating flows. 
There are two general means by which accounting data regarding past 
events can provide users with a basis for generating predictions:11 
1. An accounting measurement system may impound certain external events 
which serve as lead indicators for future events. Accordingly, such finan-
cial statements could allow the user to discern emerging forces which 
are expected to affect the firm. 
2. An accounting measurement system which incorporates past data re-
garding relevant variables could afford users a basis for extrapolating 
trends of such variables in order to generate desired predictions. 
This first method for providing a predictive basis will be called a lead indi-
cator approach while the second method will be referred to as an extrapo-
lation approach. 
The relevance of replacement cost information rests upon two separate 
and distinct arguments regarding the predictive basis which this measure-
ment method supposedly provides to long-term investors. The first rationale 
suggests that total replacement cost income is a lead indicator for future 
distributable operating flows. The second rationale implies that the current 
10 This immediately follows from our earlier observations that (1) management 
desires to at least maintain existing dividend levels, and that (2) physical operating 
level is their only controllable operating variable for achieving this end. 
11 An essentially similar view was adopted by a recent American Account ing Asso-
ciation committee of which the author was a member. See "Report of the Committee 
on Corporate Financial Reporting," Committee Reports, Supplement to Vol. XLVII, 
The Accounting Review, 1972, pp. 525-528. 
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operating profit component of total replacement cost income provides an 
extrapolation basis for estimating future distributable operating flows. 
The theoretical foundation underlying each of these potential uses for 
replacement costing will be explored, individually, in the following sections. 
Total Replacement Cost Income as a Lead Indicator. The contention 
that replacement cost income is a lead indicator for future distributable oper-
ating flows rests on the ability of replacement cost income to approximate 
economic income.12 It can be shown that, under certain circumstances, re-
placement cost income is a surrogate for economic income. Since economic 
income directly incorporates future expectations, if replacement cost income 
is indeed a surrogate for economic income, then replacement cost income 
would also incorporate future expectations. Insofar as expectations provide 
an accurate predictive basis, the resultant replacement cost measures would 
be useful to those interested in forecasting future events. The relationships 
which underlie this position will be discussed in the sections which follow.13 
Replacement Cost as a Lead Indicator in Perfectly Competitive Environ-
ments. The correspondence between replacement cost income and economic 
income will first be developed for a perfectly competitive economy.14 In this 
type of environment perfect resource mobility exists, and the price of net 
assets at the beginning of the i t h period (Pi) is equal to the discounted 
present value of the net cash flows which, at the beginning of the i t h period, 
are expected to be generated by asset operations (Vi); that is, 
(1) P i = V i . 
Now the total economic income figure which results from comparing the 
change in the value of an enterprise between two points in time can be 
separated into two components: (1) expected income and (2) unexpected 
income.15 The expected income (Ye) component of total economic income is 
12 The definition of economic income which is used in this study is a comparative 
statics income concept. That is, income for a period is computed by comparing the 
end of period net assets of a firm with beginning of the period net assets. At any 
moment in time, the value of the net assets of a firm consists of two components. 
The first component is the discounted present value of the future net cash flows 
expected to be generated by the productive assets of the firm. The second com-
ponent consists of the value of the net l iquid assets on hand. Thus, economic income 
for a period incorporates both changes in realized l iquid assets and changes in the 
cash generating potential of the firm. 
13 These relationships were first developed in Lawrence Revsine, "On the Corres-
pondence Between Replacement Cost Income and Economic Income," The Account-
ing Review, (July 1970), pp. 513-523; the discussion and development is amplif ied 
in Revsine, Replacement Cost Accounting, Chapter 4. 
14 For a discussion of the characteristics of such economies, see, for example, 
Kalman J. Cohen and Richard M. Cyert, Theory of the Firm: Resource Allocation in a 
Market Economy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 49-51. 
15 See, for example, Norton Bedford, Income Determination Theory: An Accounting 
Framework (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), 
pp. 25-27. 
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the product of the market rate of return (r) and the beginning of the period 
present value of net assets (Vi). Thus: 
(2)16 Ye = rVi 
The other component of economic income, i.e., unexpected income, is equal 
to the discounted present value of the change in expectations concerning the 
amount and timing of future operating flows. 
In similar fashion, replacement cost income can also be fragmented into 
two components: (1) an operating profit segment, and (2) a price change 
segment. These components are typically referred to as current operating 
profit and realizable cost savings, respectively.17 (Current operating profit is 
the difference between realized revenues and expired current replacement 
costs. Realizable cost savings are measured as the change in the market 
prices of owned assets.) If replacement cost income is computed using eco-
nomic depreciation (i.e., a concept which measures the periodic decline in 
the discounted earning power of an asset) the resulting actual operating rate 
of return on net assets is given by 
C i 
(3) ra = -
P i 
In (3), ra represents the actual operating rate of return, Ci is the current oper-
ating profit, and Pi as before, denotes the market price of net assets. Given 
a perfectly competitive environment, the following relationship should hold in 
equilibrium: 
(4) ra = r 
Substituting Vi for Pi and r for rn in equation (3) and rearranging gives: 
(5) C i = rVi 
A comparison of equations (5) and (2) indicates that: 
(6) C i = Ye 
Thus, in a perfectly competitive economy, the current operating profit com-
ponent of replacement cost income is equal to the expected income com-
ponent of economic income.18 
16 This relationship is easily demonstrated. See Revsine, "Replacement Cost In-
come and Economic Income," p. 516. 
17 See Edwards and Bell, Business Income, pp. 88-97. 
18 Note that the condit ions under which this relationship holds are rather limited. 
First, this relationship is valid only for economies in which all characteristics of 
perfect competit ion are satisfied and, because of equation (4), only in equil ibrium. 
Second, equation (6) is valid only if the specific depreciation concept used in the 
replacement cost model is that of economic depreciation. However, Edwards and 
Bell (Measurement of Business Income, pp. 178-180) exclude economic depreciation 
from their model on both theoretical and practical grounds. Therefore, current operat-
ing profit as computed by Edwards and Bell need not necessarily equal expected 
income. Finally, a change in the composit ion or level of ending inventory of processed 
goods can destroy the equation (6) relationship. (See Edwards and Bell, Measure-
ment of Business Income, pp. 105-108.) This is the case since the entry value 
replacement cost concept promulgated by Edwards and Bell specifically excludes 
value added by production. 
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In similar fashion the second component of replacement cost income— 
realizable cost savings—is a direct counterpart to the second component of 
economic income—unexpected income. Realizable cost savings are equal 
to the change in the market price of assets held during the period. Unex-
pected income consists of the discounted value of the changes in the amount 
of future flows expected from operating owned assets. In a perfectly com-
petitive economy, such changes in cash flow expectations are directly trans-
lated into changes in asset market value [equation (1)]; therefore, the realiz-
able cost savings component of replacement cost income is equal to the 
unexpected income component of economic income.19 Since each com-
ponent of replacement cost income is equal to its counterpart component of 
economic income, it is apparent that total replacement cost income would 
equal total economic income in a perfectly competitive economy. 
Expected Income and Distributable Operating Flow. It is easily demon-
strated that a firm could distribute the entire amount of expected income as 
a dividend in each period and—provided all original expectations were met 
and there are no changes in future prices—still maintain physical operations 
and future dividends at their existing levels.20 In other words, expected in-
come is akin to the concept of distributable operating flow introduced above. 
It represents one measure of the maximum amount of resources which the 
firm can distribute to owners and still maintain operating and dividend levels. 
Given this relationship, the theoretical relevance of replacement cost 
income for predictive purposes immediately follows. Since replacement cost 
income is equal to economic income in a perfectly competitive environment, 
the equity value shown on a replacement cost balance sheet would be equal 
to the net present value of the firm (equation 1). Multiplying this net present 
value by the market rate of return (equation 2) allows one to generate an 
estimate of expected income, which is equivalent to future distributable oper-
ating flow. 
Replacement Cost as a Lead Indicator in Imperfectly Competitive Econo-
mies. In contrast with perfectly competitive economies, there are numerous 
frictions and other market imperfections in imperfectly competitive econo-
mies. These imperfections transform the equalities in (1) and (4) to mere 
19 This correspondence between realizable cost savings and unexpected income 
is precise only if replacement cost depreciation is measured as the periodic decline 
in the earning power of an asset (economic depreciation). Only then will the differ-
ence between the book values of assets and ending market values correspond to 
the unexpected income component of economic income. If replacement cost depre-
ciation is computed on a basis other than economic depreciation, realizable cost 
savings will vary from unexpected income by the amount of the divergence between 
economic depreciation and replacement cost depreciation as actually computed. 
20 To demonstrate, assume that a firm has a single asset with a three-year life 
and no salvage value. The asset costs $299.55 and is expected to generate annual 
net cash inflows of $110. The internal rate of return, given these facts, is 5 per cent. 
If the firm distributes all of its expected income as a dividend in each year—and if 
original expectations are realized—then the income pattern would appear as follows: 
[Fn. 20 continued on page 186] 
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approximations. Substituting these approximations back into (3) similarly 
makes the equation (5) relationship an approximate one. That is, 
(5) C i = rVi 
Thus, current operating profit is merely an approximation for expected income 
in an imperfectly competitive economy. 
A similar surrogate relationship might also be said to exist between 
realizable cost savings and unexpected income in imperfectly competitive 
environments. That is, it seems reasonable to suggest that asset prices will 
approximate the net present value of asset revenue generating potential even 
in imperfectly competitive economies. It follows that perceived changes in 
this revenue generating potential should theoretically precipitate appropriate 
changes in asset prices. Thus, realizable cost savings—measured by refer-
ence to market price changes over a period—should approximate unexpected 
income—measured by reference to perceived changes in asset revenue 
generating potential over the same period. 
[2 0 Cont.] 
Year 
1 2 3 Total 
Book value and market value of asset at 
beginning of period, Vi1 (Book value 
and market value are presumed equal 
since economic depreciation is used.) 
Undistributed cash flow, V l 2: 
$299.55 $204.53 $104.76 — 
From year 1 




Total Assets $299.55 $299.55 $299.55 
Net cash inflow: 
From asset operation $110.00 $110.00 $110.00 $330.00 
From reinvestment of undistributed cash 
flows of previous periods 0.00 4.75 9.74 14.49 
Total cash inflow 110.00 114.75 119.74 344.49 
Expected Income: 
From asset operation (rV i1) 
From reinvestment of undistributed cash 
14.98 10.23 5.24 30.45 
flows (rV i2) 0.00 4.75 9.74 14.49 
Total expected income (equals dividend 
paid) 14.98 14.98 14.98 44.94 
Undistributed cash flow (equals 
economic depreciation) $ 95.02 $ 99.77 $104.76 $299.55 
We see that if the firm distributes the total amount of expected income as a divi-
dend at the end of each period, the fol lowing consequences result. First, the accu-
mulated undistributed cash flow at the end of the third year ($299.55) is precisely the 
amount needed to buy a replacement asset and thus maintain physical operations at 
their existing level. Second, when the dividend distribution is equal to the amount 
of expected income, then future expected income (and thus future dividends) remains 
constant. Thus, expected income is definitionally equivalent to distributable operating 
flow. Assuming stable prices, it is the maximum amount which the firm can distribute 
as a dividend and still maintain physical operations and future dividends at their 
existing levels. 
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In summary, the argument can be made that replacement cost income 
is a surrogate for economic income even in more realistic, imperfectly com-
petitive environments. The basis for this contention would rest on two sub-
correspondences: (1) that current operating profit is a surrogate for expected 
income, and (2) that realizable cost savings are a surrogate for unexpected 
income. 
Goodwill. Imperfect competition introduces the possibility that there may 
be persistent differences in the rates of return earned by firms. The ability to 
earn these extraordinary profits, which ability we will call goodwill, would 
seemingly lessen the predictive ability of replacement cost statements. Be-
cause of the existence of goodwill, the equity value shown on a replacement 
cost statement might diverge significantly from the present value of the firm. 
Accordingly, estimates of distributable operating flows (which must use the 
equity value of the firm as a base) might be adversely affected. 
While this problem is very real, there is reason to believe that it may not 
be as serious as it first appears. The explanation is that, were replacement 
costing adopted for external reporting purposes, users might be better able 
to discern the existence of goodwill and perhaps even estimate its magni-
tude.21 
The existence of goodwill might be seen more easily because replace-
ment costing facilitates valid interfirm comparisons. That is, the use of a 
market-based accounting measure reduces the number of possibilities for 
artificial accounting-induced differences between firms' reported results. 
Firms with basically similar net assets and operating performance would be 
more likely to reflect similar financial statement asset values and income 
figures on a replacement cost basis. There are two reasons for this: 
1. The use of market valuations obviates the need for certain arbitrary allo-
cations (e.g., Lifo versus Fifo) that, in traditional accounting, could cause 
two firms with identical assets to report different asset valuations and 
income figures. Such differences are less likely to occur on a replace-
ment cost basis.22 
2. The use of market valuations reduces the distortion caused by differences 
in the timing of asset purchases. For example, two firms that bought an 
21 This statement assumes that it is not the intended purpose of accounting to 
directly provide users with estimates of internally generated goodwil l . Instead, esti-
mates of extraordinary earnings potential should be derived by users themselves 
from available financial data. Existing reporting standards are in conformity with 
this notion regarding the responsibility for goodwil l estimates. As a practical matter, 
however, traditional, historical cost reports provide users with little basis for develop-
ing their own estimates of internally generated goodwill. Some of the reasons for 
this are explored below, along with a brief discussion of why replacement costing 
does provide information which makes user estimates of goodwil l feasible. 
22 While this is true on the balance sheet for all items valued by reference to actual 
market prices, certain arbitrary allocations will often be necessary for valuing fixed 
assets when there is no active market for used assets. 
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identical asset in the same market at two different points in time could, 
in traditional accounting, report different asset valuations if the price at 
the time of each purchase differed. If these assets have identical service 
potential, and if both firms buy these assets in the same market, they 
would be valued similarly on a replacement cost basis.23 
Since similar asset positions and operating performance are likely to 
generate similar results on replacement cost statements, the replacement 
cost operating rate of return measure (i.e., ra in equation 3) constitutes a 
valid basis for estimating the relative earning power of a firm. By definition, 
goodwill represents the ability to earn extraordinary profits. A simple com-
parison of replacement cost rates of return across firms will disclose the 
existence of this extraordinary profitability. This provides a far better gauge 
than traditional, historical cost rate of return measures because of the 
absence of previously mentioned artificial allocation and timing differences. 
Once the existence of goodwill has been determined, a user must next 
try to estimate its magnitude. By observing the amount of the extraordinary 
return and movements in this rate over past periods, some estimate of the 
persistence of goodwill and its rate of decay is gained. Armed with this 
data, a user has a basis for developing an estimate of the magnitude of 
goodwill. This figure, when added to the replacement cost equity value, pro-
vides the figure needed to generate estimates of future distributable operating 
flow.24 
Covariance Between Price Changes and Changes in Operating Flow 
Potential. While the need to estimate goodwill may be troublesome, the major 
difficulty with this lead indicator hypothesis in imperfectly competitive 
economies lies elsewhere. Specifically, if replacement cost income is to be 
a lead indicator for future distributable operating flow, then there must be 
positive covariance between changes in asset prices and changes in an 
asset's operating flow potential for the individual firm. Only if this is true 
will realizable cost savings equal unexpected income for the period, thus 
maintaining the hypothesized lead indicator relationship. 
For the economy as a whole, this covariance between changes in asset 
prices and changes in the operating flow potential of assets must hold. But 
23 If the two firms buy these assets in different markets, then different valuations 
could result if the current replacement cost in each market differs. This gives recog-
nition to the fact that, while each firm's physical asset may be identical, their eco-
nomic positions are not similar; that is, one is situated in a generally higher cost 
market. 
24 This approach presumes that the sum of original replacement cost equity plus 
goodwil l is multipl ied by the prevailing normal rate of return for firms of similar 
riskiness. In this fashion, an estimate of distributable operating flow is generated. 
A totally equivalent procedure that avoids the need for explicit goodwil l estimates 
is also available. Following this approach, the firm's observed past replacement cost 
operating rate of return (ra) is multiplied by replacement cost equity (ignoring good-
will) in order to develop an estimate of distributable operating flow. Obviously, both 
approaches will yield the same operating flow estimate. 
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due to market frictions, there is seemingly no necessary relationship between 
changes in specific asset prices and changes in the operating flow potential 
of these assets to any individual firm. 
At the individual firm level, three possible relationships between changes 
in prices and changes in flows theoretically exist: 
A. Future flows expected from asset operation could change in the same 
direction as the price change. 
B. Future flows expected from asset operation could remain constant, 
despite the price change. 
C. Future flows expected from asset operations could change in the oppo-
site direction. 
It is easy to demonstrate that Type B and Type C asset price changes can 
destroy the correspondence between replacement cost income and economic 
income and thus negate the reputed lead indicator advantage of replacement 
costing.25 
Given the normative investor model introduced above, it follows that 
investors are concerned with changes in firms' operating flow potential, since 
such changes may be expected to lead to changes in future dividend flows. 
To be useful for such information needs, an income concept reported to 
investors should ideally vary in the same direction and by the same magnitude 
as variations in operating flow potential. But if a replacement cost report 
includes Type B and Type C price changes, it is possible for reported income 
to be moving in a direction exactly opposite to movements in operating 
flow potential. This would cause errors in estimates of the present value of 
the firm and, as a consequence, affect forecasts of future distributable op-
erating flows.26 
There is currently no empirical evidence regarding the extent and fre-
quency of Types B and C price changes. Such evidence is absolutely neces-
sary for an evaluation of the validity of the theoretical lead indicator advan-
tages of replacement costing. If Type A changes are found to predominate 
in the real world, then the reputed predictive ability of total replacement cost 
income would be affirmed. However, if significant Types B and C changes 
25 Revsine, Replacement Cost Accounting, Chapter 4. 
2 6 To illustrate the importance of this problem, assume that the distributable operat-
ing flow estimate is made using the second approach outlined in footnote 24. That 
is, a firm's December 31, 19X1 replacement cost equity (ignoring goodwill) is multi-
plied by the firm's observed past replacement cost operating rate of return during 
19X1 (ra) in order to generate an estimate of distributable operating flow for 19X2 
and subsequent years. This approach implicit ly assumes that future ra will exactly 
equal observed, past ra. But if a Type C price increase has occurred, say during 
December of 19X1, future years' ra will be lower than 19X1's ra. Since the level of 
this future ra is not yet known at the end of 19X1, past ra must be used to generate 
the estimate. That is, the new higher 19X1 equity value (which includes the Type C 
price increase) is multipl ied by the existing ra, rather than by the unknown, but 
lower, future ra. As a consequence, the distributable operating flow estimate is over-
stated. This prediction error is, of course, caused by the Type C price change. 
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frequently occur, then the purported lead indicator advantages of replacement 
cost income would be seriously undermined. 
The Extrapolation Approach 
In addition to the lead indicator approach, there is another—totally 
independent—reason for ascribing predictive ability to replacement costing. 
This view, which we will identify as the extrapolation approach, involves only 
the current operating profit component of total replacement income. This 
second approach suggests that replacement cost current operating profit 
can be extrapolated in order to generate an estimate of succeeding years' 
distributable operating flows. 
The logic which supports this position can be summarized as follows: 
1. In the absence of contrary evidence, the actual current operating profit 
figure for any given year constitutes the best estimate of the current 
operating profit which will be realized in the succeeding year. 
2. This estimate of the succeeding year's current operating profit is the best 
ex ante measure of that succeeding year's distributable operating flow. 
Figure 1 
Year 0 Year 1 
Current operating profit Current operating profit 
of year 0 predicts of year 1 
which is a 
surrogate for 
Distributable operating flow 
of year 1 
These relationships, which are depicted in Figure 1, can be explained 
in the following fashion: 
1. Estimating the succeeding year's current operating profit. We sug-
gested earlier that future operating profit levels are a function of two variables: 
first the physical level of future operations, and second, the future prices for 
the firm's inputs and outputs. In an environment in which technological 
processes, consumer preferences, and input supplies are constantly chang-
ing, it is difficult to forecast the amount of future operating profits. In the 
absence of a better predictive basis, one approach is to extrapolate the 
current level of physical operations on the assumption that no further changes 
in input or output prices will occur. If the succeeding period's unit operating 
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margin is stable,27 and if volume is constant,28 then the succeeding period's 
current operating profit will indeed equal the base period's current operating 
profit. Furthermore, even if price changes do occur, unless such changes 
represent a shift in the trend of past price changes, then in a relative sense, 
current operating profit provides the best basis for predicting itself in future 
periods. 
2. Future current operating profit as a measure of future distributable 
operating flows. We have already demonstrated that where asset prices and 
asset values are identical, current operating profit is equal to expected 
income [see equation (6), above]. Since expected income is definitionally 
equivalent to distributable operating flow, it follows that, where asset prices 
and values are identical, current operating profit is a precise measure of dis-
tributable operating flow. In more realistic environments, where the corre-
spondence between prices and discounted present values is only approxi-
mate, it seems reasonable to suggest that current operating profit is a 
surrogate for distributable operating flow. 
Thus, there are two distinct reasons for suggesting that replacement 
cost information might provide a predictive basis to long-term equity in-
vestors: (1) the lead indicator approach discussed earlier in the paper, and 
(2) the extrapolation approach. The former method employs total replace-
ment cost equity as a basis for generating predictions, while the latter bases 
its predictions only on the current operating profit component of replacement 
cost income. 
Notice that, in generating estimates of future distributable operating 
flows, the extrapolation approach takes no cognizance of realizable cost 
savings. In contrast, the lead indicator approach presumes that there is 
covariance between asset price changes (realizable cost savings) and the 
flow generating potential of assets. Since future distributable operating 
flows will be higher when the expected operating flow changes occur, lead 
indicator estimates of future distributable operating flows accordingly include 
the cost savings element in replacement cost equity and, thus, in the re-
sultant forecast. 
There are two conceivable means for explaining why the cost savings 
element is ignored in the extrapolation approach. One alternative is that 
proponents of the predictive ability of current operating profit may reject the 
validity of the assumed correspondence between changes in asset prices and 
asset flows. They may believe that Types A, B, and C price changes are each 
2 7 This will obviously occur if there are no price changes in the ensuing period. 
Alternatively, operating margins will be stable if, say, input price increases are 
exactly offset proportionately by output price increases. 
28 Obviously, this constant volume assumption is used only for ease of exposition. 
Often, a user may have good reason to anticipate a certain volume change. Insofar 
as replacement cost income statement items are segregated by degree of variability, 
these anticipated volume changes can easily be built into the extrapolation. 
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equally likely and that no one type predominates. If true, this would mean 
that there is no necessary relationship between changes in asset prices and 
operating flows. Accordingly, cost savings could be ignored in generating 
distributable operating flow estimates. The other alternative is that advocates 
of this extrapolation method do believe that Type A changes predominate, but 
they feel that the operating flow effect of such price changes is so rapid that 
it is already reflected in the current period's operating profit figure. Since 
the operating flow effect has already been incorporated, simple extrapolations 
of current operating profit would suffice. This makes the realizable cost 
savings data superfluous. 
Empirical evidence regarding the nature and rapidity of prevailing price 
changes is necessary to settle the issue. Such knowledge would provide 
indirect evidence needed to support either the inclusion or exclusion of 
realizable cost savings data in generating estimates of future distributable 
operating flows. 
Technological Change 
An important theoretical concern in the computation of replacement cost 
income relates to the treatment of technological changes. Normally, firms 
using older assets will replace these assets with technologically improved 
models only when the present value of the savings to be generated exceeds 
the net cost of replacement. Accordingly, many firms continue to use assets 
which have been superseded in the marketplace by improved models. This 
raises the issue of how replacement cost should be defined under such 
circumstances. Is the cost to be matched against revenues the current cost 
of replacing the older asset actually used in production? Or, alternatively, 
is replacement cost governed by the current cost of obtaining the equivalent 
services in the most economical manner, i.e., by buying the technologically 
improved asset? 
Edwards and Bell have suggested that replacement cost be defined by 
reference to the actual assets used in production. Such information is neces-
sary, they contend, to evaluate the efficiency of existing operations; further-
more, it does not necessitate implicit forecasts of a firm's future investment 
actions.29 Their position has been attacked because it seemingly ignores 
technological change.30 Of course, this issue cannot be solved by appeals 
to the intuitive "correctness" of one or another income construct. Income is 
a totally artificial concept. One measure can be defended as preferable to 
another only by reference to some well-defined information needs which 
the concept satisfies. 
By avoiding the need to estimate a firm's future investment actions, the 
Edwards and Bell approach implicitly adopts objectivity as an important 
2 9 Edwards and Bell, Measurement of Business Income, p. 186n. 
30 See, for example, Kenneth W. Lemke, "Asset Valuation and Income Theory," The 
Accounting Review, (January 1966), p. 38. 
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criterion to be possessed by the resultant measure. Since we have no quarrel 
with this criterion, a method which possesses this attribute will be deemed 
superior to one which does not, provided that this method simultaneously 
generates information relevant to the normatively derived predictive needs 
of equity investors. Thus, the crucial question is whether an income concept 
which defines replacement cost by reference to the actual assets used in 
production can generate useful information for predicting distributable op-
erating flows for a nonadopter during a period of technological change. 
A theoretical answer to this question can be developed by examining 
the various market effects which could arise as a consequence of technolog-
ical change. When a technological change occurs, any one of the following 
benefit distribution patterns can result: 
1. The ultimate consumers of the final output could be the sole beneficiaries 
of the technological change. 
2. The producers (or inventors, or suppliers of raw materials) of the im-
proved asset could be the sole beneficiaries of the technological change. 
3. Those manufacturers of the final product who adopt the technological 
change could be the sole beneficiaries of the technological change. 
4. Two or more of the above groups could share the benefits in various 
proportions. 
A reasonable presumption—that can be examined in later empirical 
tests—is that the market prices of older, technologically more primitive assets 
reflect the diminished productivity of these assets vis-a-vis more tech-
nologically advanced models. It can further be presumed that each change 
in technology causes a whole series of price changes for all older, somewhat 
obsolete assets. 
Given this presumed market price structure, the predictive ability of 
replacement cost reports prepared for nonadopters would depend upon the 
circumstances surrounding the technological change. For example, consider 
a technological change that affects the production process used in Industry 
A. Assume that Firm 1 is a member of Industry A, and that Firm 1 does not 
adopt the change. If replacement cost statements are prepared for Firm 1 
during the period of the change, the predictive ability of these statements 
is dependent upon which group gains the benefits of the change. If the 
ultimate benefit accrues to either consumers of final product or to the equip-
ment producers who introduced the change, then replacement cost state-
ments would provide a basis for predicting Firm 1's future operating flows. 
That is, a firm that continues to use older equipment in the face of a tech-
nological change would generate a replacement cost figure that tends to 
covary with changes in its expected future distributable operating flows. 
However, when all of the benefits from the technological change are captured 
by the users of the new equipment in Industry A, then replacement cost in-
come would not provide a satisfactory predictive basis for nonadopters like 
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Firm 1. While the analysis underlying these conclusions is rather lengthy,31 
the crucial issue is whether the rate of return earned on the new equipment 
equals that previously earned on the old. When this happens (e.g., cases 1 
and 2, above) there will be positive covariance between total replacement 
cost income and expected future distributable operating flows. Furthermore, 
under these conditions, current operating profit would also provide a good 
extrapolation basis for predicting future distributable operating flows. How-
ever, if the rate of return rises, replacement cost would seemingly not perform 
adequately. 
Realistically, the entire gain from a technological change will probably 
not accrue to any single group. Instead, these gains will usually be shared 
by equipment manufacturers, producers, and consumers. Whenever the 
producer's benefit share is significant, the technological change will serve 
to increase the industry rate of return and diminish the predictive ability of 
replacement costing for users of unimproved assets within the industry. 
Thus, to evaluate the utility of a replacement cost system which "ignores" 
technological change, it is important to determine the frequency with which 
such changes will raise the rate of return in the industry in which the change 
occurs. 
Obviously, the precise rate of return effects of a technological change 
depend upon the competitive structure in both the equipment manufacturing 
and producing industries as well as the elasticity of demand for production 
equipment and for the final product. Thus, individual circumstances will 
determine whether rates of return will change and thus negate the utility of 
replacement cost statements for nonadopters. In general, however, we know 
that the greater is the freedom of entry into an industry, the smaller is that 
industry's share of the benefits from technological change. If this condition 
is met, then the producing industry's benefit share from a technological 
change will be small and the industry rate of return will change little. This 
constancy would appear to preserve an approximate correspondence between 
replacement cost income and future distributable operating flows even for 
those firms that do not adopt the technological change. 
Required Empirical Evidence 
In the preceding pages, a theoretical foundation for the relevance of 
replacement cost accounting to long-term investors has been presented. 
While an a priori basis for this foundation exists, the theory is crucially de-
pendent on several economic relationships whose validity has yet to be 
tested. Hopefully, this theoretical analysis will serve to guide future empirical 
research efforts. Until such evidence is available, little can be said about the 
absolute utility of replacement costing. (Furthermore, until similar studies 
are undertaken for other measurement systems and for other user groups, 
31 For a detailed development of these conclusions, see Revsine, Replacement 
Cost Accounting, Chapter 6. 
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it is impossible to evaluate the relative utility of alternative measurement 
systems.) 
The economic evidence necessary to assess the predictive ability of 
replacement costing relates primarily to asset price movements. The specific 
price movement characteristics required to validate the extrapolation method 
differ from those required for the lead indicator method. For simplicity, our 
discussion of needed empirical evidence will concentrate on the lead in-
dicator method.32 
Theoretically, in order for the lead indicator method to generate accurate 
forecasts, there must be perfect covariance between aggregate asset price 
changes and aggregate changes in an individual firm's flows from operating 
owned assets.33 This condition of perfect covariance is so restrictive that 
one would not expect it to be met precisely in practice. Realistically, then, 
the research issue is to discover how well this required condition may 
approximate real-world conditions. If some approximate relationship between 
changes in prices and flows does exist, then a replacement cost system may 
provide a basis for generating tolerably accurate forecasts of future events. 
However, if the required condition is greatly at variance with observed, real-
world conditions, then replacement cost data would probably not provide an 
accurate predictive basis. Clearly, empirical evidence is necessary in order 
to answer this question. 
32 As discussed earlier, the price change condit ions that are necessary to validate 
the extrapolation method are not identical to those required to validate the lead 
indicator method. That is, the mere prevalence of Type A changes is not sufficient 
for the extrapolation approach; not only must price changes be predominantly of 
Type A, but also the operating flow effect of the price change must occur so rapidly 
that it is reflected in the reported operating margin of the pr ice-change period. Under 
these condit ions current operating profit of one period would provide a basis for 
predicting current operating profit of the fol lowing period. 
Of course, there is another, totally different, pattern of price changes that would 
also validate the extrapolation method. Specifically, if Types A, B, and C price 
changes are perfectly balanced, then, on average, price changes and flow changes 
would cancel out; under such circumstances, one period's current operating profit 
would provide a basis for estimating the succeeding period's current operating profit. 
Thus, two different types of price change behavior are potentially in accord with 
the extrapolation method. Obviously, empirical evidence is needed to determine 
whether either of these condit ions is met. 
33 Notice that for multiple-asset firms, aggregate correspondence between changes 
in prices and flows is sufficient. This aggregate correspondence may exist because 
each individual price change experienced is of Type A. Alternatively, aggregate 
correspondence may exist if Types B and C price changes are exactly offset by an 
opposite Type B or C price change in the same period. (For example, if one asset's 
price goes up while its flow potential goes down, then some other asset's price must 
go down as its flow potential goes up. Obviously, the amounts involved must also 
be equal.) Thus, what we are saying is that for the firm as a whole, Type A price 
changes must predominate. However, individual asset price changes may depart 
from this pattern so long as, in the aggregate, the net effect of all price changes 
experienced in a given period is of Type A. 
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One possible test for the prevalence of aggregate Type A price changes 
involves monitoring movements in replacement cost operating rate of return 
ratios34 for individual firms over time.35 When, say, asset price increases 
occur, the denominator of the rate of return ratio will increase. If there is 
positive covariance between changes in prices and flows, one would expect 
the numerator, current operating profit, to increase also. Thus, if the magni-
tude of replacement cost operating return over time was found to be relatively 
stable, this would be consistent with the existence of aggregate correspond-
ence between changes in asset prices and changes in operating flows.36 
Empirical evidence of this nature is necessary to support the very 
foundation on which the reputed predictive ability of replacement costing 
rests. However, before the lead-indicator and/or extrapolation approaches 
are accepted, additional empirical evidence is needed. Such evidence, for 
35 The pattern of movements in industry-wide rates of return over time has been 
examined in previous studies; for example, see George J. Stigler, Capital and Rates 
of Return in Manufacturing Industries (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 
1963). While Stigler's study disclosed a large amount of short-term stability in rates 
of return for all industries, and long-term stability in concentrated industries, these 
f indings are not directly relevant for assessing covariance between asset price 
changes and changes in operating flow potential. There are two reasons for this. 
First, the covariance assumption relates to individual firms, whereas the available 
evidence is on an industry-wide basis. In order to test this assumption, movements 
in individual firms' operating returns must be examined. Second, while Stigler 
adjusted for price changes, his adjustment technique used highly aggregated econ-
omy and industry-wide data. Thus, the income and asset values employed probably 
do not approximate the replacement cost data needed to test the covariance assump-
tion. 
36 Obviously, ra, the actual replacement cost operating rate of return, will be per-
fectly stable only if four condit ions are met: (1) in the aggregate, price changes 
experienced are of Type A, (2) firms use economic depreciation for long-l ived 
assets, (3) the time pattern of asset inflows is relatively smooth, and (4) manage-
ment's operating efficiency is constant. 
Since most firms do not use the economic depreciation method, we would be 
surprised to find absolutely stable ra 's, even if the three other condit ions were met. 
Thus, even if Type A changes predominate, at best this test would disclose only 
relative stability in rates of return. Insofar as economic depreciation is not used, 
irregular operating inflows can also cause the pattern of ra 's to fluctuate from year 
to year, even if Type A changes predominate. Because of this problem, this test 
must define stability of ra 's to mean stability of a moving average of replacement 
cost operating return over time. Also notice that the effects of changing efficiency 
would be inextricably intertwined with the types of price changes experienced. The 
test must, accordingly, either presume that efficiency is constant over the period 
examined, or recognize that there is another reason why ra 's may fluctuate even if 
Type A changes predominate. These factors indicate that the suggested test repre-
sents only a coarse screening device for determining the types of price changes 
experienced by actual firms. 
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34 Equation (3) denotes this operating return to be: 
ra = Ci 
pi 
example, would deal with issues like the ability of current operating profit 
to predict succeeding years' current operating profit, and the conditions under 
which a technological change tends to raise the rate of return in those indus-
tries that employ the change. 
Summary 
At the start of this paper we described a four-stage research process 
that is necessary for a complete analysis of the relevance of replacement 
cost accounting. Of necessity, however, our analysis was limited to stages 
one and three. That is, we first selected a normative decision model for 
long-term equity investors and specified the information needs of this model. 
Given these information needs as a benchmark, we then presented a theoret-
ical model that explained the relevance of replacement cost reports to long-
term equity investors. 
While this theoretical foundation specifically relates only to the informa-
tion needs of long-term equity investors, it is possible that other user groups 
may have similar information requirements (for example, a desire to predict 
future cash flows). If later research discloses such commonality of needs, 
this finding would broaden the applicability of the theoretical foundation 
developed herein. (Whether this required research to discern information 
needs ought to be empirical or normative is currently a controversial issue.) 
[3 6 Cont.] 
There is one systematic cause for instability in ra which could conceivably be 
isolated and which, if isolated, might preserve the predictive ability of replacement 
cost numbers. Specifically, if r—the prevailing market rate of return—changes, then 
theoretically, this should precipitate changes in ra as well. If the empirical test 
discloses instability in individual firms' ra 's over time, and if a large portion of this 
instability is found to be related to changes in r, then we can conclude that changes 
in ra tend to covary with shifts in prevailing market return levels. This would suggest 
that there is some basic underlying association between changes in asset prices 
and operating flows that is obscured, on occasion, by changes in r. If, by observing 
the past relationship between r and ra, one can forecast the effect on ra of changes in 
r, then predictive ability might be maintained as long as shifts in r are incorporated 
into the operating flow forecast as soon as they are anticipated. 
One additional difficulty with the proposed test must be mentioned. When capital 
structure is altered, intertemporal movements in an ra may provide an inadequate 
means for assessing the covariance between changes in prices and changes in 
operating flows. For example, assume that a firm is successfully using leverage, 
that is, its operating rate of return exceeds its interest rate on debt. If this situation 
persists, and if the firm then issues additional debt during the period under analysis, 
one would expect ra (the return on net assets) to rise even if there is perfect 
covariance between asset prices and operating flows. Thus, whenever capital struc-
ture has changed over the period being examined, instability can be injected into 
the ra pattern. In order to test the covariance assumption when capital structure has 
changed, stability of the preinterest return on gross assets should be examined, 
rather than stability of ra. The operating return on gross assets will not be affected 
by leverage changes; stability in this figure will tend to suggest—subject to the 
caveats introduced above—covariance between changes in asset prices and changes 
in operating flows. 
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It is evident that the developed theoretical foundation for replacement 
cost reporting to investors rests on several crucial assumptions regarding 
the economic environment. Unfortunately, empirical evidence relating to the 
validity of these assumptions is not yet available. Insofar as this paper pro-
vides a heretofore absent rationale for replacement cost proposals, it 
simultaneously provides direction for needed empirical testing. Only after 
relevant empirical evidence is available will it be known whether this the-
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The company selected for the study is engaged in the production of electronic 
equipment. Since the purpose of the study was to explore feasibility rather 
than to assess the significance of differences between methods, the re-
searchers were instructed to dispense with adjusting for (1) change in the 
general price level and (2) the discounting of sums to be received or paid 
in the future which would normally be reflected in order to prepare current 
value accounting statements. These adjustments were believed to be un-
necessary to meet the objectives of the study because the adjustments are 
defined operations using known adjustment factors. 
Description of Inventory System 
The test company is essentially a batch manufacturing processor. The 
inventory system employed is a variant of a standard cost job-order system.1 
Standards are determined quarterly by reference to prevailing prices for raw 
materials and labor. 
Materials. The company purchases a large number of raw material 
items to be used in the manufacture of system modules which, in turn, are 
assembled into completed systems. The company negotiates blanket con-
tracts for the purchase of most of its high volume inputs in order to maintain 
a definite source of supply and to gain the benefit of volume discounts. 
These blanket contracts are in force for a one-year period. During the year, 
the prices of all inputs included in a contract are fixed. Delivery orders are 
placed as needed. The expiration dates of blanket contracts are staggered 
throughout the year. 
1 While the procedures employed resemble those of a standard cost system, the 
company does not isolate certain variances. The impact of these departures from a 
true standard cost system will be discussed, where necessary, in the individual 
papers. 
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A separate raw materials inventory account is not maintained. The 
company uses a periodic inventory system, and all purchases are recorded 
in a combination raw materials/work-in-process account at actual purchase 
prices. Usage variances are not computed. The standard cost of completed 
units is transferred to a finished goods account based upon the number of 
units completed during the period. 
Labor. Assembly labor is relatively homogeneous with regard to skill 
and pay level. Wage rates are changed annually at the balance sheet date. 
Direct labor is charged to the raw materials/work-in-process account at 
actual hours and cost as taken from the payroll records. 
Overhead. Manufacturing overhead is absorbed on the basis of a fixed 
rate determined by reference to expected actual direct labor hours. These 
costs include supervisory salaries, fringe benefits, and other selected indirect 
expenses. 
Determining standards. A computer run is prepared quarterly which 
lists all purchases of raw materials and outstanding purchase orders by item, 
quantity, and average unit price per item. This purchase-order listing is 
reviewed by company personnel who select a long-term inventory price for 
each inventory item.2 (On the average, these prices change infrequently 
since blanket contracts with fixed prices for the contract period govern the 
purchase of many inputs.) Emergency purchases of a small number of units 
at a higher than normal price are ignored in determining this long-term inven-
tory price. From these prices for input components, current standards for 
modules and complete systems are constructed. This reconstruction of 
inventory components (i.e., the bill of materials) is computerized and includes 
all materials used in the manufacture of completed goods. In essence, 
standard materials cost closely approximates current replacement cost of 
the materials components of inventory. 
Labor and manufacturing overhead standards are computed in similar 
fashion. Standard labor hours for each module and system are determined. 
Since labor rates change only once a year, unit labor cost is virtually constant 
during the year. Manufacturing overhead included on the bill of materials 
is developed by multiplying the predetermined rate by the standard labor 
hours required. 
Inventory records. The company employs an ABC inventory system in 
which detailed perpetual records are maintained only for the high dollar 
value raw material items. All purchases of materials and direct labor costs 
2 This price will always be based on current purchase orders. However, it is not 
necessary for the goods to be physically received in order for this " long- te rm" pur-
chase price to be used. For example, where a seemingly nontransitory increase in 
price has occurred in a recent purchase order, all similar goods on hand at the end 
of the period would be priced by reference to that purchase order, even if the higher 
priced goods are not yet in stock. However, company personnel indicated that this 
circumstance occurs infrequently. 
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are charged to the raw materials/work-in-process account at actual price. 
Manufacturing overhead is applied at the predetermined rate for the direct 
labor hours actually used to produce the output. Production costs are trans-
ferred to finished goods upon completion of orders. The transfer is effected 
at the predetermined standard cost for the output completed. Variances are 
thus left in the raw materials/work-in-process account. Price variances are 
small since standards are recomputed quarterly, and transfers to finished 
goods are based upon current prices. Usage variances are another matter. 
Material usage variances are usually small since defective parts can be re-
worked. However, labor usage variances could conceivably be important. 
These variances remain in the raw materials/work-in-process account and 
are not analyzed at the end of the period. 
Cost of goods sold is determined by reference to the standard cost of 
items appearing on sales invoices, and finished goods inventory is reduced 
by a corresponding amount. 
The company takes a physical inventory twice each year. After the 
year-end count, the book inventory figures are adjusted to reflect actual 
physical units. However, the resulting valuation of ending inventory closely 
approximates current replacement cost. As indicated above, the inventory 
valuation is determined quarterly on an item-by-item basis for all raw mate-
rials. These replacement costs for raw material inputs are accumulated in 
accordance with engineering specifications in order to determine the current 
replacement cost of modules and entire systems. The current replacement 
standards for labor and overhead are computed annually. Since labor rates 
change at the end of the fiscal year, the ending inventory is adjusted to 
reflect labor rates that will be in effect in the ensuing period. 
It is necessary to emphasize that the inventory system described above 
has been developed primarily for internal management use at the test com-
pany. In the event that financial statement figures that result from applica-
tion of the above procedures differ materially from generally accepted 
accounting principles, they are adjusted to conform with results which would 
be generated from the application of generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples. Thus, external accounting reports always conform to generally 
accepted reporting requirements. 
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A Test of the Feasibility of Preparing 
Discounted Cash Flow Accounting Statements 
Joshua Ronen 
This paper examines the feasibility of applying the discounted cash flow 
system of accounting to an actual firm. In particular, it attempts to provide 
some insight into the time and effort required to implement such a system. 
In this sense, valuable information will be gained relative to the cost of 
implementing the system. 
Brief Description of the Discounted 
Cash Flow (DCF) Accounting System 
The DCF system quantifies the firm's value (or wealth) by discounting 
its expected net cash flows over a specified time period. The total value of a 
firm would thus be communicated in the annual report as the present value 
of cash flows as of the report date; this value may be separated into specific 
assets and liabilities reflecting for each asset and liability the present value 
of their expected contributions to the cash flows of the firm. Nevertheless, a 
separate communication of their relative contributions to cash flows is con-
sidered useful for evaluating management performance in relation to the 
individual assets and liabilities. The discounted cash flow accounting system 
is most useful when the discounted value of both the firm and its individual 
assets and liabilities are communicated along with the exit values of the 
assets and the liabilities. An elaborate description of such a combined 
system is provided in the preceding conceptual paper, "Discounted Cash 
Flow Accounting," pages 143-160. The exit-value system (without DCF) has 
been investigated by another researcher in "A Test of the Feasibility of Pre-
paring Exit-Value Accounting Statements"; the financial data presented in 
this paper, therefore, relates to discounted cash flows only. 
Future cash flows are discounted at a rate which reflects average market 
risk. In this case average market risk was approximated by the average in-
dustrial rate of return for the period 1953-1970. This discount rate, though 
in a sense arbitrary, causes the discounted value to reflect the average 
market risk and thus to constitute a standard against which firms charac-
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terized by different levels of risk can be compared. The discount rate is 
applied to expected cash flows over whatever time period the firm chooses 
for its own planning purposes. Clearly, the longer the period, the more the 
specific nature of the firm's particular operations is reflected in the resulting 
value. To approximate the expected flows beyond the firm's period, the exit 
value of the firm's assets less its liabilities is used as a surrogate for the 
present value of future flows expected beyond the period. These exit values 
constitute the market consensus of the expected flows attributable to the 
net assets. 
As indicated, in addition to the total net value of the firm, management 
can estimate the net cash flows attributable to specific assets or groups of 
assets. The attributable flows are the net incremental cash flows which can 
be related to owning and operating the assets. They are measured as the 
difference in the cash flows generated by the firm without the particular asset 
or group of assets and the cash flows generated with the asset or the group 
of assets. For the purpose of discounting, cash flows estimated for one-year 
periods can be assumed to fall at the middle of each year. The availability 
of data and the specific assumptions made in the preparation of the DCF 
accounting statements for the test firm are described below. 
Data Availability 
The firm recently prepared forecasts of financial statements on an annual 
basis for a three-year period. Prior to December 1971, forecasts were not 
explicitly made with respect to either cash flows or any other accounting data. 
The forecasts, which are based on product lines and plants, were available 
for the years ending December 31, 1972, 1973, and 1974. They include the 
following: (1) projected results of operations (which include sales, gross 
profit, pre-tax income or loss, and net income or loss), (2) projected balance 
sheets and (3) projected source and application of funds for three years. 
Preparation of Discounted 
Cash Flow Accounting Statements 
The methods of forecasting the income statement and balance sheet 
items and the cash flows were as follows: 
Income Statement Items. A moderate growth in sales was projected in 
order to determine the sales figure. No formal forecasting method was used. 
Rather, past sales were extrapolated in a rather simple and straightforward 
manner. The projections for 1972 were based on existing orders plus 
specific orders expected to be received during the year. Forecasts for 1973 
and 1974 were made without reference to specific orders. The sales forecast 
reflected the differential rates of growth for different plants and departments. 
Gross profit and pre-tax income were based on fixed estimated percentages 
of sales: 55 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively. (Notice that the estimate 
for the pre-tax income was not derived from the gross profit previously 
estimated, but was based on the original sales estimate.) The 10 per cent 
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estimate of pre-tax income is admittedly on the conservative side. Also, no 
separate budgets for purchases and production were derived from the sales 
budget. Rather, as indicated, fixed percentages of gross profit and pre-tax 
income to sales were assumed. 
Balance Sheet Items. Most of the current assets were primarily projected 
with reference to sales. Based on past experience, accounts receivable were 
forecast at the level of 120 days of average daily sales. Similarly, inventory 
was determined to be 50 per cent of annual sales computed on a quarterly 
basis, i.e., the inventory at year-end was estimated at an amount equal to 
total sales of the past two quarters. This percentage is presumably based on 
a turnover ratio of two. For the other current assets a constant growth was 
projected at $40,000 a year, based on historical increases. 
For the fixed assets, no specific projections were made relative to 
particular assets. The forecasts were made only in the aggregate. According 
to the company's officers, no retirements were expected during the three-year 
horizon except for insignificant assets approximating $25,000 in total. All 
expected increases are therefore new purchases of equipment (buildings 
were not expected to be increased).1 Thus, the expected equipment in-
creases were $100,000 in 1972, $200,000 in 1973, and $200,000 in 1974. 
Since information about the useful life of separate assets was not readily 
available it was not feasible to forecast increments in fixed assets by exam-
ining the retirement age of specific assets. The group depreciation procedure 
is employed by the test company. The annual group depreciation rate is 
10 per cent for equipment and 2 per cent for buildings (on a straight-line 
basis). Other assets which traditionally include patents, capitalized research 
and development costs and goodwill, were written off in 1971. The forecast, 
consequently, does not include amounts for these elements of cost. 
The projected accounts payable were determined to reflect an amount 
which approximates 45 days of the average daily direct costs (primarily raw 
materials), excluding labor, involved in the manufacture of products. This 
estimation procedure is also based on past experience. The current portion 
of long-term debt is determined by reference to the contracts. The bank debt 
was projected according to the estimated need to draw on an open credit 
line of $2.5 million. 
The Discounting Procedure. Since forecasts are available for only three 
years through December 31, 1974, surrogate figures are needed to approxi-
mate the cash flows after that date. As surrogates, estimates of the exit 
values of assets and liabilities as of December 31, 1974 (and as of December 
31, 1973 for comparative purposes) were made. The estimates were based 
on the exit values as of December 31, 1971 as computed for the purpose of 
preparing the exit value accounting statements. Certain adjustments were 
1 No growth was expected in the buildings although at the time of preparation of 
the forecasts, the possible addition of a new building was discussed by management. 
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made as explained below. Since the methods of computing the exit values 
of assets and liabilities as of December 31, 1971 are discussed elsewhere 
in this volume, this paper only describes how these values were adjusted to 
arrive at an estimate for exit values as of December 31, 1974 (and December 
31, 1973). 
Estimated Exit Values. Exhibits 1, pages 205-206, and 2, pages 207-208, 
show the forecasted balance sheet items at both their book value according 
to historical cost accounting and their estimated exit values as of December 
31, 1973 and December 31, 1974, respectively. As can be seen from the ex-
hibits, the exit values of accounts receivable and other current assets were 
Exhibit 1 
Test-Firm 
Forecasted Balance Sheets 
at Historical Cost and Exit Value 
as of December 31, 1973 




Cash $2,081 $2,081 
Accounts receivable 1,715 1,715 
Inventory 2,384 2,393 
Other 210 210 





depreciation 131 891 991 952* 
Equipment 700 
Less: Accumulated 
depreciation 249 451 284* 
Total fixed assets 1,442 1,236 
Total assets $7,832 $7,635 
* Figures reported are net of tax liability (refund) which would arise from sale: 




Historical Cost Exit Value 
($000) ($000) 
Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity 
Current Liabilities 
Accounts payable $ 690 $ 690 
Accrued expenses 170 170 
Accrued taxes 50 50 
Current portion of long-term notes payable 150 150 
Total current liabilities 1,060 1,060 
Long-term Liabilities: 
Notes payable 242 242 
Stockholders' (Residual) Equity: 
Preferred stock 1,500 
Common stock 390 
Additional paid-in capital 2,397 
Retained earnings 2,243 
Net exit value (assets less liabilities) 6,333 
6,530 6,333 
Total liabilities and stockholders' equity $7,832 $7,635 
assumed to be identical to their conventional book values. The inventory at 
historical cost was adjusted to its estimated exit value by applying to it the 
ratio of the estimated exit value to the historical cost of inventory as of De-
cember 31, 1971 (as computed and shown in the separate paper on the 
exit value method).2 The exit values of land and buildings were assumed to 
be (both at December 31, 1973 and December 31, 1974) identical to the 
exit value as of December 31, 1971, that is, $1,200,000 less the tax liability 
that will be incurred if the land and buildings are sold at the corresponding 
balance sheet dates for $1,200,000. Note that it was assumed that no addi-
tional buildings will be acquired although, as indicated earlier, such an 
acquisition may take place. (See footnote 1 above.) 
In estimating the exit value of equipment as of December 31, 1973, and 
1974, it was assumed that (1) gross equipment purchases during 1972, 1973, 
and 1974 are composed of the same proportions of different kinds of equip-
ment as the stock of equipment as of December 31, 1971; (2) no equipment 
will be retired during the forecast horizon; and (3) the exit value of equipment 
2 The company's personnel do not expect either the inventory's composit ion in 
terms of product lines or its cost and market-value relationships to change signifi-
cantly in the future. 
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as of the forecasted balance sheet dates bears the same ratio to their costs 
as their estimated exit value bears to gross costs as of December 31, 1971, 
with appropriate adjustments for age. 
Liabilities, both current and long-term, were assumed to have the same 
exit value as their conventional book value. The difference between the exit 
value of the assets and the exit value of the liabilities constitutes the net 
exit value of the firm's assets. 
Computation of the Discounted Value. Exhibit 3, page 209, shows the 
discounting procedure. This Exhibit shows the net cash inflows forecasted for 
fiscal years 1971, 1972, 1973, and 1974. As indicated, the net cash inflow 
for any year was assumed to fall on June 30 of that year (at the year's mid-
Exhibit 2 
Test-Firm 
Forecasted Balance Sheets 
at Historical Cost and Exit Value 
as of December 31, 1974 




Cash $2,375 $2,375 
Accounts receivable 1,715 1,715 
Tax refund 335 335 
Inventory 2,384 2,393 
Other 230 230 
Total current assets 7,039 7,048 
Fixed Assets: 




depreciation 151 871 971 928* 
Equipment 900 
Less: Accumulated 
depreciation 324 576 374* 
Total fixed assets 1,547 1,302 
Total assets $8,586 $8,350 
Figures reported are net of tax liability (refund) which would arise from sale: 




Historical Cost Exit Value 
($000) ($000) 
Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity 
Current Liabilities: 
Accounts payable $ 690 $ 690 
Accrued expenses 230 230 
Current portion of long-term notes payable 369 369 
Total current liabilities 1,289 1,289 
Long-term Liabilities: 
Notes payable 986 986 
Stockholders' (Residual) Equity: 
Preferred stock 1,500 
Common stock 390 
Additional paid-in capital 2,397 
Retained earnings 2,024 
Net exit value (assets less liabilities) 6,075 
6,311 6,075 
Total liabilities and stockholders' equity $8,586 $8,350 
point). These net cash inflows are then discounted for the period indicated 
to their present value at December 31, 1971. The discount rate applied was 
12 per cent (the average rate of return earned on industrial stock traded on 
the New York and the American Stock Exchanges for the period 1953 through 
1970.) To the discounted value of these net cash inflows is added the 
present value of the net exit value of the firm's assets. When we add to these 
resulting figures the net cash balances as of December 31, 1970, and 
December 31, 1971, respectively, we obtain the total discounted cash value 
of the firm. 
No separate cash inflow estimates were obtained for land, buildings, 
and equipment. The net cash inflow attributable to current assets and 
liabilities are probably identical to their exit values. (See the balance sheet 
in Exhibit 4, page 210.) The reason that separate estimates were not obtained 
for land, buildings, and equipment was not the infeasibility of obtaining such 
estimates. The firm's personnel were capable of making these estimates; 
time constraints precluded them from doing so while this empirical investi-
gation was being undertaken. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
While the forecasts prepared by the firm were not based on complex 
mathematical models, they reflect the best estimates of the future cash flows. 
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To that extent the resulting discounted value reflects management's expecta-
tions with respect to the firm's future performance, While the forecasting 
horizon only extends to three years, the results are different from either the 
conventional valuation or the exit valuation. Of particular interest is the 
comparison of the discounted cash value of the firm with either the net exit 
value of its assets or the conventional book value of its equity. The DCF 
value for December 31, 1970 of $4,975 million is significantly less than either 
the conventional net asset value of $6,262 million or the net exit value of 
$5,789 million. (See the exit-value empirical paper contained in this volume.) 
The discounted cash flow approach suggests that, had the same forecasts 
been available as of December 31, 1970, the firm may have been better off 
to sell its assets and cease operations or to take an alternative course of 
action. For December 31, 1971, the DCF value ($4,921 million) exceeds both 
the conventional net asset value ($4,529 million) and the net exit value 
($4,593 million), indicating that the firm should continue its operations. 
Note that there is no inconsistency in the different indications for the 
two dates. Given that the firm has already incurred a large loss for 1971, it 
is no longer better off by ceasing its operations at the end of that year since 
the exit value has decreased (reflecting the loss) to an extent that makes the 
continuation of operations the better option. The important thing is that, over-
all, the firm may have been better off if the forecasts had been available as 
of December 31, 1970, and a decision had been made to cease operations 
or to pursue an alternative course of action. This result can be explained in 
a different way by looking at the changes in the DCF value of the firm during 
Exhibit 3 
Test-Firm 
Computation of Discounted Cash Flows 
as of December 31, 1970 and 1971 
Present Value as of Present Value as of 
Net Cash Inflow December 31, 1970 December 31, 1971 
Year ($000) Years ($000) Years ($000) 
1971 $1,922 ½ $1,816 
1972 40 1½ 34 ½ $ 38 
1973 83 2½ 63 
1½ 
70 
1974 294 2½ 221 
Total discounted cash flows 1,913 329 
Add: Cash as of Balance Sheet date 36 1,958 
Present value of net exit values 
(assets, excluding cash, less 
liabilities): 
as of December 31, 1973 ($4,252) 3,026 
as of December 31, 1974 ($3,700) 2,634 
Total discounted value of the firm $4,975 $4,921 
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1971, as reflected in the income statement (Exhibit 5, opposite). The firm in-
curred a net decrease of $54,000 in its DCF value ($4,975 million—$4,921 
million). But the loss is really greater than that since normally the firm would 
expect to earn 12 per cent (the discount rate) on its initial value of $4,975 
million or $597,000 to reach a total value as of December 31, 1971 of $5,572 
million. Compared with the DCF value of $4,921 million, a net loss of 
$651,000 is indicated. It must be noted that for December 31, 1970 the 
horizon was assumed to extend only through 1973, i.e., a constant three-
year horizon was assumed. Thus, actual cash flows of 1971 were assumed 
to be accurately forecasted as of December 31, 1970. On the other hand, 
the projection for 1974 was assumed not to be known until December 31, 
Exhibit 4 
Test-Firm 
Comparative Discounted Cash Flow 
Balance Sheet 




Cash $ 36 $1,958 
Accounts receivable 3,584 1,761 
Tax refund — 1,296 
Inventory 2,549 3,097 
Prepaid Expense * * 
Fixed Assets: 
Land and building * * 
Equipment * * 
Other * * 
Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity: 
Current Liabilities: 
Accounts payable 1,103 1,361 
Taxes 268 — 
Current portion of long-term debt — 37 
Short-term note payable — 2,750 
Other 175 31 
Long-term Liability: 
Note payable — 759 
Total Discounted Value of the Firm $4,975 $4,921 
* As explained in the text, no separate estimates were obtained for the incremental 
cash flows attributable to these assets; the total DCF value of the firm need not equal 






Change in the Value of the Firm 
($000) 
Imputed return on the DCF value of the Firm1 
Opportunity Cost2 






1 This is the discount rate of 12 percent applied to the DCF value of the firm as of 
December 31, 1970 ($4,975). 
2 This is imputed interest on $1,922 for one half year ($112) and on $36 (beginning 
cash balance) for 1 year ($4); it reflects the interest-equivalent earnings foregone 
as a result of not having reinvested the year's cash flows at the market rate of return. 
3 This is the difference between $5,572 million, the DCF value of the firm that would 
have resulted from the passage of one year and the receipt of cash inflows during 
1971 had there been no changes in expectations, and $4,921 million, the DCF com-
puted as of December 31, 1971, less the opportunity cost of $116—the earnings 
foregone for 1971. In this case, the revision of expectations results from the addition, 
as of December 31, 1971, of one year (1974) to the horizon. See also the explanation 
included in the foregoing analysis. 
1971. In this sense, the addition of the projections for 1974 into the DCF 
value for December 31, 1971 (and moving the expected net exit value one 
year further to December 31, 1974), constitutes, by construction, a revision 
of expectations by the firm's management. 
The market value of the stock as of December 31, 1970 (the average 
January 2 quote was applied) amounted to $17,752 million, much above the 
DCF value, indicating higher expectations by the market as compared to the 
firm's expectations.3 And, indeed, as of December 31, 1971, the market value 
of the stock declined to $10,870 million, significantly closing the gap. 
The researcher's time and involvement approximated 40 hours.4 Since 
the forecasts were already available, only minimal time was required on the 
part of the firm's personnel. It is believed that estimates of cash flows 
attributable to specific assets or groups of assets could be obtained at a 
relatively small amount of time and cost, especially if the system were to be 
widely and systematically applied by many firms. 
As to auditing discounted cash flow statements, it should be noted that 
only the methods of forecasting need to be assessed and evaluated by the 
auditor. Auditors should clearly have no responsibility in relation to the cash 
flow estimates. Such cash flow estimates should reflect management's ex-
3 Note that the firm's expectations extend to only a three-year horizon. The market's 
horizon may be longer. 
4 The exit values as of December 31, 1971 were already estimated by another 
researcher, and time to compute them is not included in this estimate. 
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pectations to be validated and assessed as a result of comparison with actual 
cash flows. The auditor's function would be restricted to expressing an 
opinion on the forecasting methods and whether the same methods were 
applied in internal and external reports. The difficulties that can be en-
countered in auditing predictions of future exit values are somewhat similar 
to those encountered in estimating present exit values; the latter are dis-
cussed in the "Exit Value" empirical paper, pages 213-228, contained in this 
volume. 
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A Test of the Feasibility of Preparing 
Exit-Value Accounting Statements / 
James C. McKeown 
Although the usefulness of exit-value information for accounting statement 
readers has been advanced, and defended against theoretical arguments,1 
very little empirical research has been done to examine the difficulties en-
countered in preparing accounting statements based upon exit values.2 This 
almost total lack of evidence of feasibility has provided little response to the 
criticism that an accounting system based upon exit-value information is 
1 The principal proponent has been R. J. Chambers in his Accounting Evaluation 
and Economic Behavior (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), and responses to comments by— 
Larson and Schattke ("Current Cash Equivalent, Additivity and Financial Act ion," 
The Accounting Review, October 1966, pp. 634-41), response R. J. Chambers, "Con-
tinuously Contemporary Account ing—Addit iv i ty and Act ion," The Accounting Review, 
October 1967, pp. 751-7; George Staubus ("Current Cash Equivalent for Assets: A 
Dissent," The Accounting Review, October 1967, pp. 650-61), response R. J. 
Chambers, "Measures and Values," The Accounting Review, April 1968, pp. 239-47; 
and separate papers by Iselin, Solomons, Dein, Hendriksen, and Thomas, response 
R. J. Chambers, "Second Thoughts on Continuously Contemporary Account ing," 
Abacus, September 1970, pp. 39-50. 
2 The only attempt at preparation of a complete set of accounting statements on 
the exit-value basis is reported in James C. McKeown, "An Empirical Test of a Model 
Proposed by Chambers," The Accounting Review, January 1971, pp. 12-29. Other 
researchers have examined the availability of resale prices in specif ic markets: George 
J. Foster, "Min ing Inventories in a Current Price Account ing System," Abacus, Decem-
ber 1969; Daniel L. McDonald, "Feasibi l i ty Criteria for the Measurement of Long-Lived 
Assets with Test Appl icat ion to Automobi les" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford 
University, 1967). 
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impractical.3 The study reported here was undertaken to examine the diffi-
culties encountered when preparing exit-value statements for a company 
engaged in a different type of business than those examined in previous 
studies. The results of this study will neither prove nor disprove the general 
feasibility of preparation of exit-value accounting statements, but rather will 
provide additional evidence toward the accumulation necessary to make a 
judgment as to general feasibility. 
Two revised balance sheets and the income statement for the intervening 
year were prepared on an exit-value basis. The statements were prepared 
with information available before May 1, 1972, since that would be the normal 
time of preparation of statements covering the year ended December 31, 
1971. The assets were reported at the net amount which could be realized 
from their disposal within a short period of time (operationally one operating 
cycle) after the balance sheet date. Net amount is the selling price less dis-
position costs including tax effects. Liabilities are reported at the amount 
for which they could be settled shortly after the balance sheet date. The 
derivation of income statement items will be defined as they are discussed 
below. 
The conventional and revised balance sheets are shown in Exhibit 1, 
pages 216-217. The only items modified were inventory, fixed assets, other 
assets, long-term notes, and stockholders' equity. Two new items, liability for 
stock options and additional exit value due to tax carryforwards, appear on 
the revised statements. (The receivables and other liabilities would have been 
modified if the discounting operation were being performed.) 
3 " I t is my opinion that realistic market prices are not nearly so widespread as 
would be necessary if your theory were to be adopted." Comments of Will iam W. 
Werntz, on Robert R. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz. " A Tentative Set of Broad 
Accounting Principles for Business Enterprise," Accounting Research Study No. 3 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1962), p. 81. 
" I t appears to me, therefore, that either there are no markets for most of these 
goods (accounts receivable, raw materials, work in process, f inished goods, and 
plant and equipment) or the firm is active on the buying side of the market and 
really has no contact with the sell ing side." Discussion by Carl L. Nelson, on R. J. 
Chambers, "The Foundations of Financial Account ing," Berkeley Symposium on the 
Foundations of Financial Accounting (School of Business Administration, University 
of California, Berkeley, 1967), pp. 51-52. 
"This must be a very limited per cent of the total assets we are talking about [that 
have readily determinable market values]. It must be a fraction of one per cent." 
The Measurement of Property, Plant and Equipment in Financial Statements (Grad-
uate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1964), p. 51. 
"If Ross could be convincing on this point [that the problem areas are minor], it 
would go a long way toward persuading those of us who can see the merit of current 
value statements, but doubt whether they can be achieved as easily as he [Ross] 
suggests." Discussion by Paul Kircher, on Howard I. Ross, op. cit., p. 97. 
"My preference for current cost of replacement over sales prices is based in large 
measure in the belief the former is more readily determinable and more object ive." 
Discussion by Charles T. Zlatkovich, on R. J. Chambers, op. cit., p. 49. 
"The majority of those who are responsible for preparing financial statements are 
opposed to fair value accounting on the grounds of difficulty, impracticabil ity, and 
the possibilit ies of manipulat ion," "Addit ional Views on Accounting Objectives." 
(Ernst & Ernst, May 1972), p. 15. 
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Inventory 
The measurement procedure for inventory under an exit-value system 
can be defined in either of two ways: 
1. The exit value of inventories is the amount that could have been 
generated by their immediate sale in the condition in which they existed at 
the balance sheet date. This is the procedure now favored by Chambers.4 
It does not assume anything about the company's future action but merely 
reports the amount obtainable from immediate sale of inventory. Alternatively 
this procedure yields the immediate receipts which must be foregone to com-
plete production and sale of the inventory. 
The difficulties with this procedure are— 
(a) For most work-in-process and many raw materials inventories, the 
immediate exit value is zero. This may not provide useful information to the 
statement reader. This is a conceptual rather than practical difficulty since 
the unit prices can be determined and aggregate prices can be derived by 
extension. 
(b) The immediately realizable price of finished goods inventory may 
be impossible to determine because the market is saturated. If the company 
could have sold its finished goods at the usual price on or before the balance 
sheet date, it would probably have done so. Therefore, the possession of 
finished goods at the balance sheet date is partial evidence that they could 
not be sold at the usual price. It would not then be valid to compute the 
exit value of finished goods as the unit market price times the number of 
units held. The proper exit value under this procedure would be the amount 
that could be received if the entire finished goods inventory were sold imme-
diately after the balance sheet date. This would require determination of the 
effect on market price of the company's decision to sell all finished goods. 
This will, in general, be a very difficult determination. 
This procedure could have been applied to the raw materials and work-
in-process inventories of X Company. The resulting exit value for raw 
materials would have had an exit value of zero. Since the output of X Com-
pany is highly specialized, a large proportion of finished goods would prob-
ably have had no exit value. An attempt to determine the exit value of finished 
goods by this procedure would have yielded an estimate of highly question-
able validity. 
2. The exit value of inventories is the difference between cash receipts 
from future sales and costs of completion and sale, all discounted to the 
balance sheet date.5 This procedure assumes that the company will continue 
its present operations long enough to complete the normal processing of 
raw materials and work-in-process inventories and will hold the finished 
goods until sale at normal prices. The discount rate used would be the 
4 R. J. Chambers, "Second Thoughts on Continuously Contemporary Account ing," 
Abacus (September 1970), pp. 53-54. 
5 Although this procedure is similar to the discounted cash flow method of valuing 
inventories, it is used in the exit-value system since the time to disposal was limited 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































normal internal rate of return earned on the product. The figure resulting 
from the computation will be an estimate of cost plus that part of the normal 
profit earned by the balance sheet date. As an example of this procedure 
consider the following situation: 
Date Cost incurred Collection 
Nov. 30 $10 
Dec. 31 7 
Jan. 31 8 
May 31 15 (point of sale) 
June 30 $41.71 
If the internal rate of return is estimated as 1 per cent per month, the inven-
tory at December 31 would be $17.10 computed directly as follows: 
Collection discounted to December 31 
$41.71 x 1.01-6 $39.29 
Costs discounted to December 31 
$15x1 ,01 - 5 (14.27) 
$ 8 x 1 . 0 1 - 1 (7.92) 
$17.10 
The first step in this measurement procedure would be determination 
of the future sales revenue which will be received on sale of all products in-
cluding those resulting from processing of the raw materials and work-in-
process inventories. Unfortunately, in the case of X Company this sales 
revenue could not be determined because the final products which would 
result from processing of raw materials and work-in-process inventories could 
not be determined.6 Because most of the materials and sub-assemblies could 
be used in many positions in the larger assemblies, the number of possible 
combinations of finished goods which would be produced from the existing 
combination of materials and work-in-process was very large and not deter-
minable. Therefore procedure 2 could not be applied directly. Instead an 
alternative procedure which leads to the same result was developed. Exit 
value was measured by accumulation of past cash flows plus interest charged 
at the internal rate of return for the normal length of time which must have 
passed between date of flow and balance sheet date.7 Using the data from 
the example above, the alternative procedure would also result in a measure-
ment of $17.10: 
6 Since the alternative measurement method which will be described would be 
difficult to apply to a straight merchandising firm, it should be pointed out that this 
difficulty would not exist when measuring the inventory of a merchandising firm. 
7 The correspondence of the direct and surrogate measures is derived in the 
Appendix. 
2 1 8 
Costs plus imputed interest to December 31 
$ 1 0 x 1 . 0 1 1 




This measurement procedure was followed except that the interest cal-
culation was not performed because of the instruction to omit discounting 
operations. The charging of interest could have been performed without 
difficulty since X Company maintains computerized inventory records. It 
should be emphasized that this is an alternative way of measuring exit value, 
not an adoption of another system. 
Except for the use of historical cost depreciation, the Company's in-
ventory valuation system yields a measurement which closely approximates 
current replacement cost. Therefore, the only adjustment necessary for in-
ventory was a conversion from historical cost depreciation to exit-value 
depreciation to be charged to inventory. (Computation of exit-value depre-
ciation will be discussed below.) 
Since the adjustment of the beginning inventory would have required 
measurement of the exit value of fixed assets at December 31, 1969, and 
since the information and the manipulation (of that information) required to 
adjust the December 31, 1970 inventory were similar to the information and 
computations used for the adjustment of the December 31, 1971 inventory, 
it was felt that adjustment of the beginning inventory was not necessary to 
achieve the purpose of this study. 
To adjust ending inventory, the difference between exit-value deprecia-
tion and historical cost depreciation ($27,337) was added to manufacturing 
overhead.8 A new overhead rate was computed and applied to ending in-
ventory. The difference in ending inventory measurements after adjustment 
for excess over tax basis (see footnote 9) was $5,932 or about 0.2 per cent. 
Fixed Assets and Depreciation 
Land and Building. The measurement of the exit value of the land and 
building was made easier by the existence of a valid offer for the land and 
building during August 1971. The price which could have been received 
for these assets was $1,200,000 ($1,000,000 for land, $200,000 for building). 
This amount was reduced by the amount of the increase in tax liability which 
8 Explanation of the differences in depreciation under the two approaches is pre-
sented as follows: 
Depreciation 
Historical Exit 
Cost Value Difference 
Land and building $20,430 $27,379 $ 6,949 
Equipment 35,095 55,483 20,388 
Total $55,525 $82,862 $27,337 
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would have occurred had the sale been made.9 These amounts ($127,736 
and $150,642) could have been presented as liabilities, but were deducted 
from the asset price so that (1) exit-value depreciation can be computed 
more simply and (2) the net amount which could be realized from disposal 
can be determined easily from the balance sheet.10 
Exit-value depreciation was computed as the decline in exit value occur-
ring during the year. For the land and building this amounted to $27,379 as 
compared to the historical cost depreciation of $20,430 on the building only.11 
Equipment. The exit value of X Company's equipment was measured in 
three different ways. The largest group of equipment (approximately 60 per 
cent of book value, Exhibit 2, opposite) was measured by obtaining direct 
quotations from used-equipment dealers. This group was mainly electronic 
test equipment with some tools. These quotations were then compared with 
catalogs of other dealers. Since they were all closely grouped, indicating 
some validity, the maximum was chosen. 
The second group of equipment (20 per cent of book value) was deter-
mined to be salable, but no direct quotations were solicited. The items in 
this group were mainly furniture and work benches. Used industrial furniture 
dealers indicated that the basic resale value of this type of used furniture 
ranged from 25 per cent to 15 per cent of current list price. Appraisal would 
have cost 5 per cent of appraised value. Therefore these items were meas-
ured by first computing their current cost new by application of a specific 
price index for metal products. This current cost new was then reduced to 
the percentage estimates obtained from the dealers. 
The third group of equipment (20 per cent) was determined to be un-
salable either because no used dealer would bother with it (steel shelves, 
9 If the net proceeds which could be received from sale were greater than the 
tax basis (tax basis was different from book value for all fixed assets except land), 
it was assumed that the company's tax liability would be increased by sale of the 
asset. This increase was computed using capital gains or ordinary income (for 
taxable income over $25,000) rates where each would apply. (Most depreciable 
assets were subject to depreciation recapture.) This amount was deducted from the 
estimated amount which could be received from sale to compute exit value. 
If the net proceeds which would be received from sale were less than the tax 
basis, it was assumed that the company's tax liability would be decreased (computed 
in the same manner as the increase due to available gains) by sale of the asset. 
This difference was added to the net proceeds from sale to arrive at exit value. 
10 Any costs which would be incurred upon disposal of the asset due to con-
tractual obligations either to hold the asset or continue certain phases of business 
or to retain certain employees would be deducted from the asset price also. None 
of these condit ions existed in relation to X Company's assets. 
11 Land differs from other fixed assets only in that it is presumed to have indefinite 
life. Thus, there has been presumed to be no way of allocating any part of the cost 
of land to individual periods. However, in an exit-value sense depreciation for a 
period is the cost of holding and using an asset during the period. In this sense there 
is a cost of holding and using an asset during the period. This cost is best measured 
as the decl ine in exit value during the period and can be called depreciation for 
convenience, although some accountants may object to the idea of negative depreci-
ation (or appreciation). 
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etc.) or because it (special test equipment used in research and development 
of new products) was so specialized that the demand was not stable enough 
to establish a market value. These items were assigned a resale price of 
zero. The exit value was not zero because disposal of an item with a tax 
basis greater than zero would yield a refund or a reduction of tax liability. 
Depreciation of equipment was $55,483: 
December 31, 1970 exit value $100,547 
Plus purchases during year 87,008 
$187,555 
Less December 31, 1971 exit value 132,072 
$ 55,483 
This was over 50 per cent greater than historical cost depreciation of 
$35,095. 
Other Assets 
Patent and Product Development Expense. Although the patents shown 
at $1,330 on the December 31, 1970 unadjusted balance sheet had no resale 
price, the exit value is $638 because disposal of this item, which has a tax 
basis of $1,330, would yield a refund or reduction of tax liability. 
Exhibit 2 
Equipment Grouped by Measurement Method 
December 31, 1970 
Conventional Market Exit2 % by 
Method Book Value1 % Price Value Exit Value 
Index $ 40,838 19.2 $15,365 $ 21,317 21.2 
Direct quotation 116,567 54.8 51,538 62,854 62.5 
Zero market value 55,286 26.0 0 16,376 16.3 
Total $212,691 100.0 $66,903 $100,547 100.0 
December 31, 1971 
Index $ 42,806 16.2 $15,525 $ 20,974 15.9 
Direct quotation 168,375 63.6 81,477 96,576 73.1 
Zero market value 53,422 20.2 0 14,521 11.0 
Total $264,603 100.0 $97,002 $132,072 100.0 
1 The figures in the Conventional Book Value (cost less accumulated historical 
cost depreciation) column are the conventional measurements related to assets whose 
exit values were measured by the indicated methods. These figures are presented 
to allow better evaluation of the results of application of these methods of estimating 
exit value as compared to conventional accounting measurement. 
2 Exit value of some items was greater than market price because sale of an item 
for an amount less than its tax basis would yield a refund or reduction of tax liability. 
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The product development expense shown on the beginning conventional 
balance sheet also had no resale price. However, the product development 
expense had already been expensed for tax purposes and had no tax basis. 
Therefore, the exit value is zero because disposal of this asset would yield 
no tax benefit. 
Additional Exit Value Due to Tax Carryforwards. X Company had an un-
absorbed tax loss carryforward of over $1,000,000 at December 31, 1971. 
The existence of this loss carryforward means that the net of tax computa-
tions of exit values of certain assets and liabilities must be adjusted.12 
The adjustment was not applied directly to the items involved but was 
reported, instead, as a separate asset on the balance sheet. There are sev-
eral reasons for this procedure: 
1. The adjustment is not tied to the particular asset but rather is a 
result of previous losses suffered by the entity. Therefore both the asset and 
the loss carryforward must exist for the additional exit value to exist. 
2. If this procedure were not followed, the current cash equivalent of 
an asset would vary depending on the taxable income of the entity. This 
result seems neither reasonable nor useful especially in light of (1). 
3. The amount of the additional exit value (which is in some respects 
a valuation of the loss carryforward) should be disclosed separately. If the 
two figures were not reported, a reader would not know the valuation of the 
assets exclusive of the loss carryforward; that is, the question "How much of 
the exit value of the assets will remain after the loss carryforward is absorbed 
by profitable operation?" can only be answered if the loss carryforward and 
assets are reported separately. 
The measurement of the additional exit value due to tax carryforwards 
is limited to the lower of (1) the maximum benefit possible from the carry-
forward and (2) the benefit which could be realized by offsetting the carry-
forward against the gains expected to be realized on the sale of the assets. 
The reason for limitation (1) is obvious. Limitation (2) is needed because 
the amount described there represents the maximum benefit the management 
could realize by action at the balance sheet date. The only course which 
would generate a greater amount from the carryforward would be to sell the 
firm itself. This course is not considered relevant because the management 
can not take it, and the selection of this course by the owners would not 
12 Thus, the exit value of the asset would be equal to the proceeds from the sale. 
The previously computed tax effects of disposal (see footnote 9) are appropriate 
whenever a subject firm does not have an unallocated tax loss carryforward on the 
balance sheet date and available losses do not exceed taxable income in the carry-
back period because losses from sale of assets immediately fol lowing the balance 
sheet date could at least result in refund of prior tax payments. Since this was the 
case for the beginning balance sheet, no further adjustment was made. However, 
the company was in a tax loss carryforward situation at December 31, 1971. Further-
more, the carryforward was greater than the sum of all potential gains available at 
that date. Since gains from sales immediately fol lowing the balance sheet date 
would be offset against the carryforward and losses would not result in a refund, 
sale of assets for gain or loss would have no effect on the tax liability of the company. 
2 2 2 
affect the financial position of the entity (except by possible creation of a 
new entity if a merger was effected). 
Liabilities 
Notes Payable. One of the long-term notes payable had a prepayment 
penalty of $2,750 which would have had to be paid to satisfy the liability at 
December 31, 1971. Thus, the notes payable account was increased by 
$2,750, and then reduced by $1,320 to reflect the tax effect. 
Liability for Stock Options and Compensation Expense. X Company had 
a stock option plan for key employees in operation at each balance sheet 
date. Holders of exercisable options could, by paying the option price, 
receive shares of X Company common stock. Assuming that the option price 
was lower than the market price, X Company would have to either buy shares 
at market price and resell for a lower amount or issue shares (either un-
issued or treasury) for an amount lower than could have been received on 
the open market. In either case X Company would incur a sacrifice equal to 
the difference between market price and option price. Since X Company 
could at any time limit its liability under the option plan to the number of 
options exercisable at that time, the liability is computed as the difference be-
tween market price (average of high and low on each January 2) and option 
price for options which had option prices lower than the current market price 
and were exercisable at the balance sheet date. This amounted to $149,112 
at December 31, 1970 and $8,664 for December 31, 1971.13 
The compensation expense is the ending liability less the beginning 
liability plus the amount capitalized by exercise of options during the year:14 
December 31, 1971 liability $ 8,664 
December 31, 1970 liability 149,112 
($140,448) 
Capitalized by exercise 185,428 
Compensation expense $ 44,980 
Deferred Income Taxes. Under generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples, the deferred income taxes account contains the adjustment necessi-
tated by the difference between conventional book value and tax basis. Under 
13 When an option becomes exercisable, the company commits itself to accept 
the exercise price in full payment for the stock. Thus, the company agrees to give 
up the difference between market price and exercise price. This liability could be 
recorded on the date the options become exercisable and then adjusted at the end 
of the year. The simpler procedure that was fol lowed was to simply compute the 
liability for all exercisable options at end-of-year market price. 
14 The expense is the sum of the liability at the date the options become exercisable, 
the adjustment to liability related to these options from that date to the end of the 
year, the adjustment to the liability related to options exercised from beginning of 
the year to exercise date, and the adjustments to options exercisable throughout 
the year from beginning to end. (This procedure would also automatically adjust for 
options which become exercisable and are exercised during the year.) 
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the exit-value presentation used here, this function is performed by deduct-
ing from the specific asset the tax liability related to the difference between 
selling price and tax basis. Therefore the deferred income tax is not used 
under this presentation scheme. If a different presentation scheme had been 
used, the liability presented would have been $92,982 at December 31, 1970 
and 0 (because of the unabsorbed loss carryforward) at December 31, 1971. 
This discrepancy in presentation of the difference between book value 
and tax basis makes it more difficult to evaluate the differences in measure-
ment of specific assets because the unadjusted statements present assets 
before considering tax bases, and the exit-value statements present indi-
vidual assets after adjustment for the difference between selling price and 
tax basis. Since the amount shown as deferred income taxes cannot be 
related to specific assets, the comparison of unadjusted and exit-value 
measurements (if desired) can best be made by adding back the deductions 
for tax liability (shown in footnotes to Exhibit 1) to the exit-value measurements 
of specific assets. (For a more detailed before-tax adjustment comparison 
of conventional and selling price measurements of equipment, compare the 
Conventional Book Value and Market Price columns in Exhibit 2). 
Stockholders' Equity 
Contributed Capital. The amount shown as contributed capital would 
normally be the amount invested in the company adjusted for changes in the 
general price level. No distinction is made between par value and additional 
paid-in capital. Although the segregation could be made, it would mean little 
after the price level adjustment. Since the price level adjustment was not 
made, the revised beginning contributed capital is the same as the con-
ventional.15 
The ending contributed capital is higher by the amount of the liability 
for stock option, which was capitalized upon exercise of some of the options. 
The assumed entry was— 
Cash $ 52,050 
Liability for stock option 185,428 
Contributed capital $237,478 
instead of the conventional entry— 
Cash $ 52,050 
Contributed capital $ 52,050. 
Retained Earnings. The revised retained earnings is simply a residual. 
Total stockholders' equity is computed as assets less liabilities, and retained 
earnings is total stockholders' equity less contributed capital. 
15 The treasury stock could be shown separately, but is more consistent when shown 
as a return of contributed capital. 
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The Income Statement 
The revised income statement (Exhibit 3, below) required changes in 
cost of sales and general administrative expense plus the addition of four 
new items. Although it can be stated in a pure exit-value sense that the cost 
of sales equals the sales revenue, gross profit under this interpretation would 
be zero with all "gross profit" getting into the income statement as holding 
gains on inventory. Since this may obscure useful information, a better defi-
nition of cost of goods sold might be—Beginning inventory (at exit value at 
beginning of fiscal year adjusted for change in factor prices to date of sale) 
plus costs of production (at rates current to the time of sale) less ending 
inventory (at rates current to the end of the year—not the amount which 
appears on the balance sheet). Holding gain would be the adjustment to 




For the Year Ended December 31, 1971 
Unadjusted Exit Value 
Sales $3,994,256 $3,994,256 
Cost of Sales (pp. 225-226)* 2,938,542 3,039,636 
Gross Margin $1,055,714 $ 954,620 
Period Expenses: 
General and administrative (p. 226) 619,170 627,572 
Research and development 1,046,706 1,046,706 
Marketing 2,011,414 2,011,414 
Corporate general and administrative 331,260 331,260 
interest 158,553 158,553 
Special items (pp. 221-222) 301,389 638 
Adjustment to additional exit value 
due to tax carryforwards (p. 226) (119,729) 
Loss of flexibility due to long-term 
loan (p. 226) 1,430 
Compensation expense (p. 223) 44,980 
Gain on holding inventory (pp. 225-226) (88,092) 
$4,468,492 $4,014,732 
Income (Loss) before Taxes ($3,412,779) ($3,060,112) 
Income Tax ( 1,626,300) ( 1,626,300) 
Net Income (Loss) ($1,786,478) ($1,433,812) 
* Page numbers in parentheses refer to text discussion of those items adjusted. 
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between ending inventory at exit value and ending inventory at cost. The 
adjustment, using the latter interpretation, was computed by first segregating 
the holding gains which had been buried in cost of sales by the company's 
practice of putting manufacturing costs into inventory at actual cost and 
removing ending inventory at current replacement cost. The second part of 
the adjustment was the change in depreciation from historical cost to exit 
value. The resulting figure is an underestimation of cost of sales because of 
the omission of the accumulated interest charges from beginning inventory. 
They would be more meaningful if the interest had been charged. 
The adjustment to general and administrative expense was simply the 
allocated portion of the increased depreciation charged under exit value. 
The adjustment to additional net realizable value due to tax carryforwards 
simply indicates an additional effect upon income of the loss. It is so closely 
related to the income tax refund that it could have been placed with the tax 
refund. The loss of flexibility expense results from the firm's increased cost 
of altering its capital structure if it wishes to do so. Compensation expense 
was discussed under liabilities. 
Cost 
Revision of existing statements took approximately 150 man-hours of 
which at least 60 were spent deriving information which would be available 
under an accounting system designed for exit-value statements, and another 
30 were clerical. No costs were incurred for the direct quotations, although 
appraisal of the furniture or real estate would have required some expense. 
Alternatively some time would probably have been saved if many companies 
were preparing exit-value statements, since market information would become 
more readily available. 
Auditing Exit-Value Statements 
There is no apparent reason why exit-value accounting statements could 
not be effectively audited. There are only two possible areas which would 
be more difficult than auditing conventional statements. 
1. The obvious problem of confirming resale prices of fixed assets. In 
many cases this problem could be handled by the use of published infor-
mation or employment of an appraiser (possibly at three- to five-year intervals 
and/or appraising a sample of assets). If neither of these methods is con-
venient, the auditor should have little trouble locating experts such as used 
asset dealers, specialists, etc. It should be pointed out that the researcher 
was not an expert in electronics equipment. 
2. The determination of the internal rate of return for inventory measure-
ment normally depends on management estimates. The auditor could, how-
ever, in the great majority of cases validate management's estimates by 
referring to records indicating the rate of return experienced by the client 
on the same or similar products. 
To compensate for the additional difficulties, the auditor would be re-
lieved of any problems related to allocation of fixed assets (depreciation 
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methods, life, etc.) or the future benefits to be derived from such items as 
rearrangement cost, product development costs, etc. 
Conclusions 
Preparation of two exit-value balance sheets and an exit-value income 
statement for X Company demonstrated that in this case readily available 
market prices could be determined at very little cost for the land and building 
and most of the equipment. Market prices for the rest of the equipment 
(mainly metal furniture) were estimated again at nominal cost by use of 
general guidelines suggested by used furniture dealers. A more accurate 
estimate for these items might have been obtained by employing an appraiser. 
However, the cost of appraisal of these items would have been significant 
(five per cent of appraised value) and would probably be incurred every 
three to five years if at all. This procedure of relatively infrequent appraisals 
should yield accurate estimates because, according to the used furniture 
dealers, the resale price is determined mainly by the type and quality of the 
asset rather than the age. Thus, barring major changes in the used asset 
market, an appraisal of a particular item (possibly adjusted by a specific 
price index) should be valid for several years. 
Measurements of items other than fixed assets were readily computed 
at nominal cost.16 The only way management would have had any effect on 
the exit-value figures reported would have been solicitation of special offers 
for particular assets. Although this activity could be called manipulation, the 
economic fact remains that management could realize the offered amount.17 
Further the effect of these offers could easily be segregated. Other than the 
solicitation of special offers, management cannot manipulate the exit-value 
figures because the measurements are taken from the markets rather than 
management estimates. This provides less opportunity for manipulation of 
profit figures than is available under conventional accounting procedures 
(alternative depreciation methods, sale of particular fixed assets to realize 
an available gain or loss, etc.). 
The conclusion must be reached that critics of exit value who base 
their opposition on lack of feasibility of implementation will find no evidence 
to support their position in this case. Preparation of exit-value statements 
for X Company was possible at a reasonable cost. 
Appendix 
The direct measure of the exit value of an inventory item at time n ' would 
be expressed as: 
16 This cost would have been increased, but no additional difficulties imposed, if 
the discount and price level adjustments had been performed. The additional cost 
of these adjustments should not be counted as incremental cost of exit value since 
most academicians and many practitioners believe these adjustments should be 
applied to historical cost statements. 
17 This assumes the accountant is satisfied with the validity of the offer(s). 
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EV = 2 
Σ CFi (1) 
i = n ' + 1 (1 + r) i-n' 
where EV = exit-value measurement at time n ' 
CFi = cash or cash equivalent flow related to the product at the end of period 
i under a normal production and holding schedule. (The periods may 
be as short as desired.) CFN would be receipt of full or last partial 
payment 
N = normal number of periods between purchase of raw materials and 
receipt of cash from sale 
r = normal internal rate of return which is the solution of 
The indirect measurement can be expressed as 
n ' 
EV = Σ CF, (1 + r ) n ' - i, 
i = 0 
This amount can be shown to be equivalent to EV in equation (1). Re-
arranging equation (2): 
N 
Σ CF i = 0 . (2) 
i = 0 ( 1 + r ) i 
Σ CFi + 
i = o ( 1 + r ) i 
N 
or Σ CFi 
n' N 
Σ CFi = 0 
n ' + 1 ( 1 + r ) i 
n ' 
- Σ CFi 
i = n ' + 1 (1 + r)i = 
Multiplying by (1 + r) n ' 
N 
Σ CFi 
i = 0 (1 + r ) i 
n ' 
Σ CF, (1 + r) n ' - i . 
i = 0 i = n ' + 1 (1 + r)i - n' 
Substituting from equation (2): 
n 
EV = Σ CFi (1 + 0 n'- 1 = EV' . 
i = 0 
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A Test of the Feasibility of Preparing 
Replacement Cost Accounting Statements 
Lawrence Revsine 
This study represents a first step in a lengthy research process required to 
determine the feasibility of alternative measurement processes, such as re-
placement costing. The objective of this study was to discover what, if any, 
were the major difficulties which would be experienced in attempting to pre-
pare replacement cost statements for an actual firm. 
We must emphasize that this study does not address the issue of the 
materiality of differences between replacement costing and historical costing. 
Our sole objective was to test the feasibility of implementing replacement cost 
accounting in an actual business enterprise. Logically, implementation studies 
should precede detailed analysis of the characteristics of alternative informa-
tion systems. The reason, of course, is that, if the alternative information can-
not be provided, there is little point in studying its potential impact. 
Since there are many variables which could conceivably influence the 
feasibility of replacement cost statements, the findings of a single implementa-
tion study cannot be regarded as conclusive. On the contrary, before defens-
ible generalization is possible, implementation must be tested in a cross-
section of industries having diverse operating characteristics. Only after this 
evidence is available will it be possible to assess the feasibility of replacement 
cost accounting. This study must thus be viewed as providing some sorely 
needed initial evidence in a lengthy, iterative research process. 
The following sections contain a discussion of the major issues which 
arose during the implementation effort. 
Inventory Feasibility 
It should be emphasized at the outset that the inventory accounting sys-
tem described in this paper has been developed for internal management use 
at the test company. Under certain circumstances, this system could generate 
data which differ from generally accepted accounting results. Accordingly, for 
external reporting purposes, management compares the inventory numbers 
generated by the internal system with those which would result under identical 
conditions using generally accepted accounting principles. If this comparison 
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discloses no material differences, then the internally generated inventory 
numbers are also used for external reporting purposes. However, if material 
differences do exist, then company figures are adjusted for external reporting 
purposes to conform with results which would be generated from the applica-
tion of generally accepted accounting principles. 
For purposes of inventory accounting, the primary objective of replace-
ment costing is to differentiate between normal operating profits and holding 
gains. The test company was already using an internal inventory system which 
was closely related to—and entirely compatible with—replacement cost ac-
counting. That is, the standard costs which were used to value opening and 
closing inventories were based upon the then current replacement cost of the 
inventory input. Cost of goods sold for internal management reporting pur-
poses was also measured by reference to the most recent quarterly revision 
of the replacement cost standards.1 In analysis form, the test company's 
inventory accounts for internal management reporting purposes would contain 
the following inflows and outflows. (For ease of exposition, manufacturing 
overhead is temporarily ignored.) 
Beginning inventory: This would represent the then current replace-
ment cost for all inventories, i.e., raw materials, work-in-process, 
and finished goods. 
Add: Purchase of raw materials at actual purchase prices and labor 
used in production at actual labor rates. 
Subtract: Cost of goods sold, based upon replacement cost stand-
ards in effect at the time of sale. 
Equals: Ending inventory per books. 
The ending inventory per books as computed above will not satisfy the 
company's internal accounting objective; that is, book inventory will not equal 
the current replacement cost of the ending inventory. Aside from inventory 
shrinkage and usage variances, which we temporarily ignore, the reason for 
this difference is that the prices in effect at the end of the period will not 
necessarily correspond to those which were used to price beginning inventory, 
or to those which were in effect during the period as reflected in purchases. 
In other words, the ending inventory per books as computed above will not 
equal the ending inventory valued at end-of-period replacement cost because 
of price changes which arose during the period. Accordingly, an adjusting 
entry is necessary in order to reflect ending inventory at current replacement 
cost. It can be demonstrated that the amount needed to adjust the ending 
inventory per books to the current replacement cost of the units in ending 
inventory (disregarding shrinkage and variances) is precisely equal to the 
holding gain or loss during the period. That is, the existing system is entirely 
1 Company personnel stated that the prime motivation for using this inventory 
system was to provide a better pricing basis. Furthermore, budget projections were 
thought to be improved since costs are reflected at levels more likely to prevail in 
future periods. 
230 
compatible with replacement cost accounting requirements. However, for 
external reporting purposes, the company does not treat this inventory adjust-
ment as a holding gain or loss. Rather, it is credited or charged against cost 
of goods sold. After this is done, the externally reported results are essentially 
similar2 to those of Fifo historical costs. 
We will now demonstrate the equivalence between holding gains and the 
amount of the inventory adjustment. Also, the operation of the test company's 
inventory accounting system will be illustrated with a highly simplified example. 
For ease of exposition, assume that the test company sells only one 
product and that this product requires no conversion costs to make it sale-
able. Also assume that purchases and sales take place on the same dates. 
The company's assumed inventory experience over the year is as follows: 
Beginning inventory, 100 units @ $1 each (replacement cost at start of 
current period) 
Purchases (assumed to be at the same date) Sales 
50 units @ $1.10 each 30 units 
50 units @ $1.26 each 30 units 
50 units @ $1.30 each 30 units 
150 units 90 units 
Ending inventory, 160 units (100 + 150 - 90) @ $1.30 each (replace-
ment cost at end of current period) 
Since the unit price of the inventory rose throughout the period, the 
company has obviously experienced holding gains on inventory. The exact 
amount of the holding gains can be computed as follows: 
Holding Gains Total 
On price increase from $1 to $1.10 per unit: 
100 units (beginning inventory) @ $.10 each = $10.00 
On price increase from $1.10 to $1.26 per unit: 
120 units (100 + 50 — 30) @ $.16 each = $19.20 
On price increase from $1.26 to $1.30 per unit: 
140 units (100 + 50 — 30 + 50 — 30) @ $.04 each = $ 5.60 
Total Holding Gains = $34.803 
2 The correspondence would be precise only if there were no unrealized holding 
gains during the period. Notice that unrealized holding gains can arise in at least 
two different ways: (1) if inventory levels increase over the period, or (2) if prices at 
year-end are higher than those which prevailed at the time of the last inventory 
purchase. 
3 Edgar O. Edwards and Philip W. Bell (The Theory and Measurement of Business 
Income, University of California Press, 1961, p. 146) suggest two equivalent short-cut 
procedures for computing holding gains. In their first method, they assume that " the 
initial inventory is held over the entire period while its current cost changes from 
that prevailing at the beginning to that prevailing at the end . . ." and that "any excess 
of final inventory over initial inventory was acquired at the average purchase price 
and held to the end of the period." [Fn. 3 continued on page 232] 
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Given this simplified data, we will now illustrate the method that the 
test company uses in its inventory accounting. Recall that the test company's 
internal system carries opening inventory at its then current replacement 
cost. Purchases are charged to inventory at actual cost and cost of goods 
sold is determined by reference to the replacement cost at the time of sale. 
Using our illustrative data: 
Beginning inventory (100 units @ $1.00 each) $100.00 
Purchases 
50 units @ $1.10 each = $55 
50 units @ $1.26 each = $63 
50 units @ $1.30 each = $65 183.00 
Goods Available for Sale $283.00 
Cost of goods sold (at replacement cost at 
time of sale): 
30 units @ $1.10 each = $33.00 
30 units @ $1.26 each = $37.80 
30 units @ $1.30 each = $39.00 $109.80 
Ending inventory per books $173.20 
Because of price changes, this ending book inventory figure of $173.20 
does not equal the ending market value of the inventory. In order to deter-
mine the market value of ending inventory, the units reflected by the physical 
[3 Cont.] 
Using this method to compute holding gains, the average purchase price must be 
determined. For our example, this is 
50 @ $1.10 each = $ 55 
50 @ $1.26 each = $ 63 
50 @ $1.30 each = $ 65 
$183 ÷ 150 = $1.22 average purchase price. 
The computation of the gain is thus: 
Initial inventory 100 ($1.30 — 1.00) = $30.00 
Excess 60 ($1.30 — 1.22) = 4.80 
Total holding gain $34.80 
In their second short-cut procedure, Edwards and Bell assume that " the initial 
inventory is held while its value changes from its current cost at the beginning of 
the period to the average purchase price, and . . . the final inventory is acquired 
at the average purchase price and held while its value rises to current cost at the end 
of the per iod" (p. 146). 
Following this method, the computation is 
Initial inventory 100 ($1.22 — 1.00) = $22.00 
Final inventory 160 ($1.30 — 1.22) = 12.80 
$34.80 
The Edwards and Bell approach gives the same answer as the direct computation 
only under two circumstances (which are both met in our illustration): 
" . . . [1] sales and purchases (not of the same goods) take place on the same 
dates (or continuously), and [2] the ratio of the quantity sold to the quantity 
purchased on each date is equal to the ratio of the total quantity sold to 
the total quantity purchased during the period." (Edwards and Bell, p. 144n.) 
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inventory must be valued at the end-of-period replacement cost per unit. 
Assuming no inventory shrinkage, the replacement cost of the physical in-
ventory on hand at the end of the period is $208.00 (160 units @ $1.30 each). 
The company would then make the following entry to bring the ending in-
ventory per books into agreement with the ending physical inventory at 
current replacement cost: 
DR Inventory $34.80 
CR Inventory increase $34.80 
(Amount required to bring book inventory of $173.20 up 
to its current replacement cost of $208.00. The test 
company eventually closes the credit balance to cost of 
goods sold.) 
It is important to notice that the dollar amount of this adjustment is precisely 
equal to the already computed amount of holding gains during the period 
($34.80). 
While this is a somewhat simplified version of the test company's actual 
system (i.e., overhead is ignored in the example), the essential character-
istics of the accounting method are evident. Of primary importance is the 
fact that the test company is effectively using a replacement cost system for 
its internal inventory accounting. Ending inventory is valued for internal 
management purposes at current replacement cost on the balance sheet; 
cost of goods sold is measured as the replacement cost of each sale at the 
time it is made; and holding gains or losses can easily be segregated in the 
book-to-physical inventory adjustment. For external reporting purposes, any 
significant differences between historical and replacement cost would be 
adjusted so that the externally reported financial statements conform to 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
Implementing Replacement Cost 
For Inventories 
It is clear that the basic characteristics of the system just outlined are 
sufficient for the development of replacement cost inventory accounts. How-
ever, our discussion was simplified and did not incorporate certain techni-
calities that existed at the test company. We will now explore the impact of 
these complications. 
Overhead. Management felt that there were only minor changes in the 
replacement cost of overhead items incurred during the year. In part, this is 
attributable to the fact that over 60 per cent of manufacturing overhead 
consists of wages and related payroll expenses. Since wage increments are 
granted only at the end of the fiscal year, this portion of manufacturing over-
head expense does not change during the year. Of the remaining 40 per cent 
of overhead expense, the researcher adjusted only the depreciation figure 
to a replacement cost basis. This seemed to be a reasonable approach, 
given management's comments regarding the stability of other overhead 
items and the immateriality of the amounts involved. However, the replace-
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ment cost of both beginning and ending inventories was adjusted to reflect 
the new indirect wage rates which would be in effect for the ensuing year. 
(The company had itself adjusted its ending standard replacement cost to 
reflect scheduled increases in direct wage rates.) 
Holding Gains. In the simplified example described above, holding gains 
were precisely equal to the amount of the adjustment required to restate 
book ending inventory to a replacement cost basis. In the absence of com-
plicating factors, one could implement a replacement cost system by simply 
treating the inventory increase (decrease) as a holding gain (loss). 
In the test company, however, the amount of the inventory adjust-
ment potentially incorporated other factors in addition to the holding gain or 
loss. For example, it will be remembered that direct labor was charged to 
the raw material/work-in-process account at actual and removed at standard. 
Since labor rates are fairly uniform and since they do not change over the 
year, there is no labor rate variance.4 However, labor usage variances could 
exist. To the extent that such variances do exist and do not cancel out over 
the year, the accumulated effect of the variance is reflected in the ending 
book inventory figure and would influence the amount of the adjustment 
required to bring the ending inventory into agreement with replacement cost. 
Thus, the reported holding gain or loss would not reflect the true holding 
gain or loss for the period. 
In this case study, there were no means for determining the existence 
or amount of this variance. Accordingly, the reported holding gain on the 
replacement cost income statement could include the effect of a nonzero 
accumulated labor usage variance over the year. It would appear, however, 
that, if a replacement cost system were implemented in similar firms, this 
problem could be overcome in one of two ways. First, if the labor standards 
in effect were truly attainable, and if the process were closely monitored to 
assure its continued efficient operation, then one might expect the net vari-
ance to approach zero over the period. A second, and preferable, alternative 
would involve actual isolation of the labor usage variance. In the test com-
pany, it would be relatively easy to accumulate such variances since direct 
labor time-tickets by job are already prepared. Indeed, accounting personnel 
at the company stated that they are currently considering isolating this vari-
ance. In addition to aiding the implementation of replacement costing, this 
change would obviously improve management control over labor cost. 
Another nonholding gain factor which was potentially reflected in the 
inventory adjustment is the effect of material usage variances and/or in-
ventory shrinkage.5 Insofar as such events actually occurred, the reported 
holding gain is understated. Since holding gains and usage variance-
4 Material rate variances are also inconsequential for two reasons. First, the blanket 
contracts guarantee price stability for high volume inputs. Second, standards are 
adjusted quarterly to reflect current replacement prices. 
5 As a practical matter, material usage variances were thought to be small in the 
test company since defective production could often be reworked. 
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shrinkage result from different causes, their individual effects ought to be 
separately reported. In the test company, however, this was not possible 
for the period studied. 
Once again, it would be relatively easy to remedy this defect by gener-
ating information which would simultaneously strengthen the internal control 
process of the firm. Recall that the inventory accounting of the firm is already 
computerized. However, the computerized system deals with dollar values 
only; that is, unit information is not accumulated. However, discussions with 
data processing personnel suggested that it would be relatively easy to 
incorporate unit data into the existing system. At present, cost transfers 
between inventory accounts and between finished goods and cost of goods 
sold, are accomplished by accumulating—item by item—the cost of various 
materials input components. If this already existing accumulation were ex-
panded to incorporate units of input in finished goods and goods sold, the 
combined usage variance and shrinkage could easily be isolated. To illus-
trate, this expanded system could record purchases in units as well as 
dollars and identify such units by part number. (This is already done for 
high dollar-value items.) Since engineering specifications already enumerate 
all raw materials components of modules and completed systems, subsequent 
transfers could relieve the appropriate materials account for both dollars and 
units when goods are sold. At year-end, the books would reflect the total 
units that should be on hand. An explosion of the physical inventory into its 
various input components would show the actual units on hand.6 A com-
parison between physical and book units would reflect missing and/or wasted 
materials for the period. Such shrinkage could be removed from the book 
inventory valuation figure using a separate adjusting entry.7 Then, the sub-
sequent adjustment of this new book inventory figure to reflect replacement 
cost would incorporate only the effect of inventory holding gains. 
It is important to recognize that the test company's method for comput-
ing replacement cost of goods sold approximates Edwards' and Bell's "ideal" 
method. Because of this, certain assumptions and approximations needed 
to compute holding gains and losses in other situations are avoided. 
According to Edwards and Bell, the ideal method for computing replace-
ment cost of goods sold requires determination of an item's current cost at 
the date of sale. Edwards and Bell apparently believe that this information 
will not be available under certain circumstances and therefore suggest an 
alternative computational technique. In their alternative computation, replace-
ment cost of goods sold is measured only at the end of the year and is 
computed by applying the weighted average replacement cost to the units 
sold. Certain assumptions are necessary for this technique to yield the same 
answer as the "ideal" approach. These assumptions are that "sales and 
6 This explosion is already prepared in order to value the ending inventory at 
current replacement cost. 
7 Shrinkage and waste would be presumed to have occurred evenly over the period 
and thus would be valued at average replacement cost for the year. 
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purchases (not of the same goods) take place on the same dates (or con-
tinuously), and the ratio of the quantity sold to the quantity purchased on 
each date is equal to the ratio of the total quantity sold to the total quantity 
purchased during the period" (p. 144n). Furthermore, if cost of goods sold 
is computed using the approximation technique (rather than the "ideal" 
method), then these same assumptions must hold in order for Edwards' and 
Bell's holding gains computations (see footnote 3, pp. 231-32) to equal the 
true holding gains or losses for the period. 
The assumptions required to validate Edwards' and Bell's alternative 
computation technique are not unreasonable and would seemingly be appro-
priate for all but the most highly seasonal patterns. But, in contrast to that 
approach, the test company's techniques are superior since they reduce the 
need for making any assumptions regarding the regularity of inventory in-
flows and outflows. Since the test company recomputes current replacement 
cost for all inputs and final products each quarter, its measure of cost of 
goods sold is, for all practical purposes, equal to the replacement cost of 
goods sold at the sales date.® When this "ideal" method is used, the end-of-
period adjustment of book inventory to current replacement cost will reflect 
the actual holding gains or losses irrespective of the pattern of inventory in-
flows and outflows. Thus, this method is of general applicability and would 
provide accurate cost of goods sold and holding gain information even for 
highly seasonal types of businesses. (Of course, these comments presuppose 
that the methods suggested above for isolating inventory shrinkage and labor 
usage variances are adopted.) 
Implementing Replacement Cost 
For Long-Lived Assets 
The test company's fixed asset records were kept on a historical cost 
basis and thus required adjustment. Three general categories of fixed assets 
existed—manufacturing equipment, building, and land. The replacement 
costs shown on the financial statements are net of the tax shield which is 
unavailable to the test company. That is, since the company did not pur-
chase the assets at their current replacement prices, the company's future 
tax deductions will be less than those of other companies which did buy 
identical assets at current prices. Subtracting this tax shield thus makes 
interfirm statement comparisons more meaningful. Since land is generally 
not depreciated and thus provides no tax shield, the carrying value for land 
is equal to its unadjusted market value. 
The adjustment procedures for each fixed asset category will be de-
scribed separately. 
8 This is especially true because of the company's blanket buying contracts for 
materials. Only a few blanket contracts expire each quarter. These changes are 
reflected in the new replacement costs. Most other material prices remain unchanged. 
Similarly, labor rates do not change during the year. For these reasons, a quarterly 
redetermination of replacement costs would seemingly provide a very good estimate 
of the current replacement cost of goods sold. 
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Manufacturing Equipment. The manufacturing equipment used by the 
company can be divided into two general categories. One category (which 
represents 62 per cent of the December 31, 1971 equipment employed at 
original historical cost) was general purpose electronic equipment. The other 
category represents self-constructed equipment, work benches, and special 
purpose items. Different adjustment procedures were used for each category. 
The general purpose electronic test equipment consisted of items such 
as oscilloscopes, pulse generators, and wave analyzers. This equipment had 
a ready market with dealers in used electronic equipment. These dealers' 
price lists were used to generate the replacement cost balance sheet values 
(at both the beginning and end of the year) and to compute replacement 
cost depreciation for the year. 
No problems were encountered in determining asset carrying values for 
the general purpose equipment. Price quotations were available for all items. 
The only assumption necessary was that the condition of the company's 
equipment approximated that of the reconditioned equipment being offered 
by dealers. Since reconditioned equipment sold for only 10 to 15 per cent 
more than unreconditioned equipment, the potential error is small. 
Turning to the second category of manufacturing equipment, replace-
ment costs for self-constructed equipment, work benches, and other special 
purpose items were not readily available. It is possible that replacement 
costs for some of these items could have been ascertained; however, given 
the time constraints facing the researcher, no protracted effort was made. 
As a consequence, index numbers were used to develop balance sheet 
replacement values and to compute replacement cost depreciation. 
The price indexes used were taken from Business Statistics, the supple-
ment to the Survey of Current Business (1971). Our objective was to choose 
the most specific index possible for each category of assets. Obviously, the 
more specific the index, the closer the correspondence between index move-
ments and movements in the actual prices of the assets under scrutiny. The 
Electrical Machinery and Equipment Index was used for self-constructed and 
special purpose assets. The Metal and Metal Products Index was used for 
work benches and shelves. 
Building and Land. The test company had recently received an offer for 
its building and land. Since this offer was rejected, management apparently 
believed that the use value of the property was higher than the offer price. 
The offer for the land and building together totalled $1,200,000. Of this 
amount, $1,000,000 applied to the land and the remainder applied to the 
building, which the offeror intended to raze after a short period of use. While 
there is no reliable method short of direct appraisal for determining the 
replacement value of the land, this value is obviously in excess of the 
$100,021 historical cost carrying value of the land. Accordingly, the offer 
price of $1,000,000 was used to value the land. While this figure probably 
understates true replacement cost (since the offer was rejected), it does 
represent a reasonable estimate of current value. 
Because replacement cost is intended to be a surrogate for use value, 
the $200,000 offer price allocable to the building cannot be treated as a valid 
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representation of current replacement cost. That is, the building apparently 
had little use value to the offeror, who intended to demolish it. Accordingly, 
some other means for determining current replacement cost was required. 
Direct appraisal represented one possibility; index adjustment represented 
another. Index adjustment was selected because of time and cost consider-
ations. The News Record Building Index was used to perform the calcula-
tions. Notice that this procedure generates a combined replacement cost for 
the land and building which exceeded the total offer price ($2,073,512 versus 
$1,200,000). 
Comparison of Differences. Determining the amount of difference be-
tween conventional and replacement cost values is complicated by differ-
ences in the treatment of tax effects under each method. On a conventional 
basis, the expected cash flow effects of differences between tax basis and 
book values are segregated in a deferred income tax account. In contrast, 
the effect of differences between tax basis and carrying values are offset 
against the asset value itself in a replacement cost system. (The reason for 
this difference is that the tax effects are deemed to reduce the service 
potential values of the assets. In accordance with the theoretical rationale 
for replacement costing, these service potential effects are directly offset 
against the asset itself.) Thus, to measure the extent of valuation differences, 
the deferred income tax amount must be deducted from conventional book 
values and this net amount compared with replacement cost carrying values. 
Alternatively, the comparison may be made before any adjustment for tax 
effects. Exhibit 1, opposite, presents a summary of fixed asset values on each 
basis before tax adjustment effects are considered. 
Depreciation. Replacement cost depreciation was computed using the 
same depreciation methods and useful lives employed by the test company 
for its external accounting statements. However, the depreciable basis for 
the replacement cost computation represented the average annual current 
replacement costs of the fixed assets in service rather than their original 
historical costs. On this basis, replacement cost equipment depreciation 
totaled $30,428, as compared to historical cost depreciation of $35,096. 
Replacement cost depreciation on the building amounted to $28,402 during 
1972, while historical cost depreciation on the building totaled $20,430. 
Bank Loans 
The objective of replacement cost accounting for bank loans is to adjust 
the balance sheet and income statement to reflect, respectively, the market 
value of the debt and the current replacement cost of the interest expense. 
If the interest payment on the liability is fixed at the time of issuance, 
then all subsequent movements in the company's effective interest cost will 
affect the market value of the obligation. For example, if the interest rate 
increases, the market value of the liability will decline. This would be re-
flected on a replacement cost basis by debiting a liability contra-account 
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* Note: To facilitate comparison, figures in this column do not reflect the adjustment 
for the absent income tax shield. Hence, they do not correspond to the replacement 
cost balance sheet figures presented below, which are net of the absent tax shield. 
The holding gain reflects the discounted present value of the future benefit 
to the firm from having borrowed at lower rates than those which currently 
prevail. The replacement cost interest expense would be the product of the 
average current replacement interest cost and the face amount of the liability. 
The excess of replacement cost interest expense over historical cost expense 
(when rates have increased) would also be credited to holding gains. This 
excess represents the average savings during the current period from having 
borrowed at an interest rate lower than that currently in effect. 
No adjustment was needed to put the test company on a replacement 
cost basis for bank loans. The reason is that the test company's interest cost 
was not fixed; instead such costs were tied to the prevailing prime interest 
rate. That is, its loans were originally granted at, say, a one per cent incre-
ment over the prime rate. As the prime rate of the bank changed, so did the 
company's interest payments. Given these terms, then, ceteris paribus, the 
market value of the liability should be fairly constant9 and interest expense 
should automatically be carried at average replacement cost. 
However, even when interest payments are variable (e.g., tied to move-
ments in the prime rate) there is still one possible reason for adjustment 
9 The market value might change slightly since the proportionate relationship 
between the prime rate and the interest cost will change if the increment over prime 
is stated in terms of a fixed amount, for instance, one per cent. 
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when replacement cost statements are prepared. If the company's credit 
worthiness had changed between the time of the loan and the period for 
which the statements were prepared, then the terms of the loan would prob-
ably be altered were it renewed upon expiration, and the market value of the 
existing debt would also change. Thus, even though the interest payments 
in the test company were variable, it was necessary to determine whether the 
same increment over prime which was granted when the loans were made 
would be granted at the balance sheet date. 
Direct evidence was available to make this assessment. The test com-
pany was continuously rolling over its short-term loans, and the bank kept 
the increment over prime constant for these renewals. This indicates that the 
increment was unchanged for short-term loans. Furthermore, the company 
was exploring options to refinance its long-term loans. In the course of these 
explorations, another bank offered the company the same increment over 
prime for a long-term loan of similar magnitude to its existing loan. On the 
basis of this information, it seemed reasonable to conclude that money could 
be borrowed currently at the original increment over prime. Accordingly, no 
adjustment was warranted for replacement cost purposes. 
Additional Items 
Tax Carryforward. The company's income tax carryforward is included 
as an asset on the replacement cost statement. 
While enterprise continuity is usually assumed on a historical cost state-
ment, accepted traditional principles suggest that a tax carryforward be 
recognized only when realized. There is no counterpart prohibition against 
recognizing these carryforwards in replacement cost theory. Rather, the con-
tinuity assumption dominates until there is evidence to the contrary. Since 
this continuity was not questioned for the test company, profitable future 
operations are assumed and the tax carryforward is treated as an asset. 
Similar reasoning applies to the investment tax credit carryforward.10 
Stock Options. The test company did have stock options outstanding to 
employees. Stock options obviously represent a portion of total employee 
remuneration. It is difficult, however, to measure the value of this consider-
ation. Theoretically, its value is approximated by the employee's own per-
ception of the value of the option, since it is this value which, when added 
to actual salary payments, induced the employee to provide his services. 
Because there are no reasonable means for estimating employees' expecta-
tions at the time the option was granted, no value was assigned to the options. 
1 0 T h e difference between the treatment of these items on the replacement cost 
statements and the historical cost statements is attributable to the continuity assump-
tion used to prepare the replacement cost statement. Since this treatment is not con-
sidered to be generally accepted, it was not used in the unadjusted statement. Thus, 
the difference shown on the comparative statements is attributable to our desire to 
use generally accepted accounting procedures on the unadjusted statements; it 
is not a function of inherent differences in the two measurement methods. 
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Product Development Expense. This item consisted primarily of salaries 
of engineering personnel and materials cost. The traditional rationale for 
treating such items as assets is that they are expected to provide future 
benefits to the enterprise. Since it is unclear whether the amounts expended 
(either on a historical or replacement basis) bear even a loose correspond-
ence to the discounted present value of these benefits, no attempt was made 
to restate this item. Because this item has no tax basis, it is shown net of 
the absent income tax shield on the replacement cost statement." If it had 
been deemed advisable to adjust this item, a procedure similar to that used 
for wage adjustments in ending inventory would have been followed. 
Cost 
The adjustment procedures necessary to prepare replacement cost state-
ments required approximately 160 hours of effort. Half of these hours were 
spent performing clerical activities and deriving figures which would have 
been available if market based accounting measures were adopted for 
reporting purposes. 
Conclusions 
The sole objective of this study was to determine the feasibility of 
implementing a replacement cost accounting system in an actual business 
situation. Studies of this nature represent the initial stage of a lengthy proc-
ess necessary to accumulate evidence regarding the practicality of replace-
ment cost reporting. Our objective was to provide initial evidence relevant 
to the question "Are the data available?" Questions relating to the materi-
ality of differences between traditional and replacement cost reports and 
the objectivity (or dispersion) of replacement cost data are also important 
and must be addressed after more evidence regarding data availability is 
gathered. 
Very few implementation problems were encountered during the course 
of the study. In those cases where data were initially absent, it was usually 
possible to reconstruct the missing information or to develop some surrogate 
approach. One might reasonably expect that even these occasional problems 
would diminish were market based measures widely adopted for reporting 
purposes. 
This study has indicated that the test company was already employing 
what is essentially a replacement cost system for internal inventory account-
ing. This itself indicates the practicality of the replacement cost inventory 
procedures more forcefully than any academic study ever could. 
With regard to fixed assets, the results were less equivocal but still 
essentially favorable. Market prices for 62 per cent of the manufacturing 
equipment (as a percentage of original historical cost) were readily avail-
11 On the historical cost statements, the absent tax shield is depicted in the deferred 
income tax account. Obviously, this account also reflects the income tax allocation 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparative Historical Cost and Replacement Cost Income Statements 
Year Ended December 31, 1971 
Replacement 
Historical Cost Cost 
Sales $ 3,994,256 $ 3,994,256 
Cost of goods sold (pp. 229-236)* 2,938,542 3,051,705 
$ 1,055,714 $ 942,551 
Period Expenses: 
General and administrative $ 619,170 $ 621,173 
Research and development 1,046,706 1,046,706 
Marketing 2,011,414 2,011,414 
Corporate general and administrative 331,260 331,260 
Interest 158,553 158,553 
Special items (product development 
expense (p. 241)) 301,389 157,361 
$ 4,468,492 $ 4,326,467 
Operating loss ($3,412,778) ($3,383,916) 
Holding gains (pp. 234-236) 188,420 
Loss before income taxes ($3,412,778) ($3,195,496) 
Federal and state income taxes (1,626,300) (1,626,300) 
Net loss (ignoring carryforwards) ($1,786,478) ($1,569,196) 
Income tax and investment credit 
carryforward (p. 240) 601,200 
Net loss ($1,786,478) ($ 967,996) 
* Page numbers in parentheses refer to text discussion of those items adjusted. 
able. While the remaining portion of the equipment was valued by index 
adjustment, this was largely dictated by time constraints. It is possible that 
some portion of these assets could also have been valued directly. 
Land was valued directly, although conservatively, by reference to a 
rejected offer that the test company had recently received. While cost con-
siderations led to an index adjustment for the building, direct appraisal is a 
preferable, and obviously available, alternative in realistic circumstances. 
On the basis of these results, it would appear defensible to conclude 
that the data necessary to prepare replacement cost financial statements 
were generally available. Thus, this case study did not disclose any ob-
stacles which would impede the implementation of replacement cost reports. 
Whether this conclusion can be generalized to other situations is a subject 
for future research. 
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4. The Risk of Liability 
for Forecasting 
The Risk of Liability for Forecasting* 
David Ft. Herwitz 
Summary and Tentative Conclusions 
This is a first cut at the question of potential liability for forecasting. It in-
cludes a brief look at the common-law background and the current securities 
law setting, an analysis of the few relevant cases to date, and a little fore-
casting of its own about possible future developments. 
As urged by the Study Group at an earlier meeting, the emphasis is 
upon the risks that management would run in publicly disseminating fore-
casts, especially if this were to become a regular feature of corporate report-
ing (whether as a result of pressure from the accounting profession or 
otherwise). The various possible roles of auditors in the forecasting process, 
and their corresponding exposure to liability, are left for another day. 
Further, in order to avoid intruding on the deliberations of the Study Group 
on the merits, the paper does not attempt to appraise the various pros and 
cons of forecasting apart from the legal issue, or to delineate the various 
approaches to forecasting, ranging from the item-by-item projections to 
one-line estimates of future net income. 
On principle it would appear that management would not be liable for a 
forecast merely because it turned out to be wide of the mark, if it were 
made in good faith and for a proper purpose, if it represented management's 
actual belief as to the future prospects, and were prepared with reasonable 
care and skill; the few cases to date support the conclusion. However, this 
optimistic prognosis must be tempered with the caveat that, if management 
forecasts became a regular feature of the reporting scene, at least in the short 
run there might well be a significant increase in the risk of being sued, as 
distinguished from the risk of liability, because forecasts that go awry will 
present a very inviting target to potential shareholder litigants. Hopefully, 
* This paper was submitted as a memorandum to the Study Group on the Objectives 
of Financial Statements on June 23, 1972. Its style remains unchanged for this print-
ing. See footnote 1, p. 248, which reflects SEC action on forecasting during 1973. 
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judicial pronouncements would soon make the game not worth the candle 
when nothing more than erroneous projection is involved. 
There is little reason to doubt that most managements could and would 
routinely meet the tests of good faith, proper purpose, and honest belief; 
but carelessness is a fact of life, and hence the real nub of this issue may 
be the extent of liability when there is a failure of due care in the preparation 
of the forecast. It is an open question whether, under general legal principles, 
negligence in the preparation of a forecast otherwise made in good faith in 
the normal course of management's reporting function should or would give 
rise to liability to the entire universe of existing shareholders and prospective 
investors for losses allegedly resulting therefrom. This question is equally 
unsettled under the securities law provisions, like Rule 10b-5, which are 
addressed in general terms to fraud or deception and accordingly would 
seem to require something akin to intentional or at least knowing misrepre-
sentation, rather than mere negligence, at least in a civil action for damages 
rather than a suit for rescission or an SEC injunction action. Resolution of 
this question will have to await further clarification by the courts. Section 11 
of the Securities Act, dealing with registration of stock for sale to the public, 
stands on a special footing since the statute appears to expressly require 
due care and to lay particular onus on anyone cast in the role of an expert, 
as might be true in the case of a forecast if it were prepared or "certified" by 
an analyst or, perhaps, an accountant; but, at the moment, the SEC does not 
permit forecasts or projections in a prospectus under Section 11 anyway.1 
Common-Law Background 
The law relating to liability for providing inaccurate or insufficient 
information in the securities field has, of course, been largely taken over by 
the federal securities legislation. Nevertheless, in seeking to appraise the 
risks of liability associated with a relatively new phenomenon like forecasting, 
a quick look at the applicable common-law principles is a good starting point. 
Under the common law of torts, a distinction has always been drawn 
between statements of opinion and statements of objective fact, so far as 
liability for error is concerned. The basis for this distinction is that in the 
1 Since the date when this paper was prepared, the SEC has revised its policy 
on forecasts, with the promulgation, after extensive public hearings, of Sec. Exch. 
Act Rel. No. 9984 (Feb. 2, 1973). Under this Release, the Commission would allow, 
though not require, issuers who are reporting companies and who meet certain 
standards relating to earnings and budgeting experience to include projections in 
various fil ings with the Commission. The Release also announces that the Commis-
sion will promulgate rules relating to the liability provisions of the securities laws, 
to define the circumstances under which a projection would not be considered to 
be a misleading statement of a material fact. In this connection, the Release con-
tains the fol lowing observations (which seem to be in accord with the main thrust of 
this paper): " I t is contemplated that [the new rules] would embody the concept that 
a projection is not a promise that it will be achieved nor per se misleading if not 
achieved. A projection would not be considered to be a misstatement of a material 
fact if it were reasonably based in fact, prepared with reasonable care and carefully 
reviewed." 
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classic "one on one" bargaining situation that the common law normally 
contemplated, a reasonable person would not, or at least should not, rely 
upon the opinion of his adversary since such an opinion could be expected 
to be self-serving, and even exaggerated, within fairly wide limits. This view 
is embodied in the so-called "puffing" doctrine, under which a seller is 
allowed broad latitude to commend his own wares in an effort to persuade 
another to buy. 
However, most of the recent authorities, particularly in the securities 
field, have tended toward narrowing the permissible scope of opinions. For 
one thing, the courts have become quicker to parse statements of inter-
mingled fact and opinion to find one or more misrepresentations of fact. In 
addition, there has been greater recognition that even a pure statement of 
opinion involves at least one implied representation of fact, that is, that the 
speaker actually holds the opinion expressed. Between two parties with fully 
equal bargaining power, this may be an immaterial fact, with no liability for 
misrepresentation of it. But where one party has greater knowledge or 
expertise than the other (as is commonly true in securities transactions), 
reliance may be justifiable; in such cases the implied representation that the 
opinion is honestly entertained may also carry with it the implied assertion 
that there is some reasonable basis in fact for the view expressed. Courts 
have become more willing to find justifiable reliance on these implied 
representations of fact embodied in an expression of opinion, especially 
where the complaining party only seeks rescission of the transaction to get 
back to where he started, rather than damages for deceit, which would 
normally entitle him to recover an amount measured by what the transaction 
would have been worth to him if it had been as described. 
Where do forecasts fit into this framework? While such a prediction as 
to future events does amount to merely a statement of opinion, a forecast 
may well include an implied representation that it represents the forecaster's 
honest belief about the future and that there is some reasonable factual basis 
for that belief, especially if the forecast is promulgated by the management 
(or anyone else with special access to information). Meeting this standard 
would presumably require at least that the forecast be based upon a reason-
able analysis of the available data, and perhaps also that it reflects the product 
of such professional competence as those who publicize it appear to possess. 
On the other hand, where a forecast (or other prediction) is made in 
good faith for proper purposes, actually represents the forecaster's best 
estimate, and is prepared with reasonable care, there should not be any 
common law liability merely because the results turn out to be quite different 
from those forecast. After all, one who makes a forecast does not thereby 
undertake to warrant the future; hence, there would be no breach of duty 
upon which liability could be predicated. 
There seems little reason to doubt that, in the main, managements could 
and would meet these standards of good faith, proper purpose, actual belief 
in the estimate, and reasonable care in preparing it. Nevertheless, the reason-
able care requirement must give us some pause, since experience teaches 
that "to err is human," and with any increase in activity comes an increase 
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in negligence, even with the best of will; hence, it would be foolhardy not 
to expect some careless projections, if forecasting becomes far more wide-
spread. Moreover, it is predictable that there would be a heavier concentra-
tion of alleged and actual carelessness during the early period of any 
transition to widespread forecasting, while managements are getting used 
to what for many will be a new activity (although perhaps this would be 
offset by the courts' adopting a somewhat lower standard of reasonable care 
at the outset, which could be raised as the state of the forecasting art 
develops). This ties in with the point made earlier, in the summary, that a 
considerable proliferation of lawsuits relating to forecasts must be expected 
when and if they become a regular feature of corporate reporting, just 
because they will present such an inviting target. The combination of these 
two factors suggests an inevitable and uncomfortable chorus of "I told you 
so," at least in the short run, from opponents of forecasts if their opposition 
is overridden, a point of some force though obviously not conclusive. 
In any event, on the merits it is not entirely clear to what extent there 
would be liability for a forecast which turned out to be erroneous because 
of carelessness in preparation. The question of liability for negligent but 
unintentional misrepresentation has been one of the most troublesome in 
the law of torts; and here we are not even dealing with a direct factual mis-
representation, but only a failure in the implied representation that a forecast 
is the product of reasonable care. The courts have long been wary of 
imposing liability for pecuniary loss from misrepresentations that are merely 
negligent because, unlike the case of physical injury, which is generally at 
least somewhat localized, misinformation may be so widely disseminated 
and circulated that the resulting losses could be virtually unlimited, thus 
creating the prospect of "a liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde-
terminate time to an indeterminate class." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 
Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). The result could be a 
crushing burden of liability, out of all proportion to the magnitude of the 
defendant's fault where he has done no more than fail to use reasonable care. 
The best-known cases of this kind are, of course, those (like Ultramares) 
involving the liability of accountants for negligence to parties other than the 
particular client for whom erroneous financial statements were prepared or 
certified. Of late there has been a marked tendency away from the so-called 
"privity" doctrine, under which an accountant's liability for negligence 
(apart from securities law provisions) was pretty much confined to his client 
or other person with or for whom he had specifically dealt, and in the direction 
of making the accountant liable at least to "limited classes of persons" whose 
likely reliance on the statements involved could be readily foreseen. See 
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (holding an 
accountant liable to a prospective lender who had been specifically identified 
as one to whom the statements would be shown). The latest version of the 
Restatement of Torts (Second) has taken the lead in this development, with 
the following provision in section 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966): 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or em-
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ployment, or in a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, 
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their busi-
ness transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to 
them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails 
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or com-
municating the information. 
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in 
subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by the person or one 
of the persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply 
the information, or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; 
and (b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends 
the information to influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, 
or in a substantially similar transaction. 
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the 
information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons 
for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in 
which it is intended to protect them. 
Though its primary role to date has been to help extend the liability of 
accountants, Restatement section 552 is certainly not confined to such cases 
but applies to negligent misrepresentations by anyone. Hence negligent mis-
representations by corporate officers, in the course of forecasting or other-
wise, would fall within its ambit; and, of course, forecasting is an excellent 
example of a situation where the defendants could face liability to untold 
numbers of investors for untold amounts of market losses allegedly resulting 
from a careless mistake in the forecast. Since it is quite likely that, just as 
they have recently in the case of accountants' liability, the common-law courts 
would look to this Restatement provision for guidance in setting limits on the 
liability of management for negligent forecasts, we should do the same; but 
unfortunately section 552 provides no ready answer. One of the Reporter's 
comments to section 552 makes it clear that the beginning phrase is not 
intended to confine the section to statements made in the course of a pro-
fessional engagement: "Thus the officers of a corporation, although they 
receive no personal consideration for giving information concerning its affairs, 
may have a pecuniary interest in its transactions since they stand to profit 
indirectly from them." Moreover, the words "the persons for whose benefit 
and guidance he intends to supply the information" in paragraph 2 (a) of the 
section certainly could encompass the entire investing public in the case of 
a forecast disseminated by management for the general information of the 
investing community. On the other hand, it seems clear that section 552 is 
intended to confine the scope of potential liability to something less than all 
of those who might foreseeably rely upon the statements made. Precisely the 
same question arises, of course, with regard to accountants: Will they be 
liable for negligence under section 552 to all of the stockholders of the com-
pany (and perhaps also prospective investors) on the ground that they are 
the primary intended beneficiaries of the accountant's engagement? On this 
question we do not have any judicial intimations as yet, but some light is 
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shed by the Reporter's illustrative examples under section 552, which seem 
to indicate an intention to confine liability to a more limited class of persons: 
Illustrations 
* * * * * 
2. A is negotiating with the X Bank for a credit of $50,000. The Bank 
requires an audit by certified public accountants. A employs B & Company, 
a firm of accountants, to make the audit, telling them that it is to meet the 
requirements of the X Bank. B & Company agree to make the audit, with the 
express understanding that it is for transmission to X Bank only. The X Bank 
fails, and A without any further communication with B & Company submits 
their certification to the Y Bank, which in reliance upon it extends a credit of 
$50,000 to A. The audit is so carelessly made as to greatly overstate the 
financial resources of A, and in consequence the Y Bank suffers pecuniary 
loss through its extension of credit. B & Company is not liable to Y Bank. 
3. The same facts as in Illustration 2, except that nothing is said about 
supplying the information for the guidance of X Bank only, and A merely 
informs B that he expects to negotiate a bank loan, and has the X Bank in 
mind. B & Company is subject to liability to Y Bank. 
4. The same facts as in Illustration 2, except that A informs B that he 
expects to negotiate a bank loan, but does not mention the name of any 
bank. B & Company is subject to liability to Y Bank. 
* * * * * 
7. A, a certified public accountant, is employed by B Company to pre-
pare and certify a balance sheet for the corporation. A is not informed of 
any intended use of the balance sheet, but A knows that such certificates are 
customarily used in a wide variety of financial transactions with the corpo-
ration, and that it may be relied upon by lenders, investors, shareholders, 
creditors, purchasers, and the like, in numerous possible kinds of trans-
actions. In fact B Company uses the certified balance sheet to obtain a loan 
from X Bank. Because of A's negligence the balance sheet presents an in-
accurate picture of the finances of B Company, and through reliance upon it 
X Bank suffers pecuniary loss. A is not liable to X Bank. 
It would seem that the limitation implied in these examples should be 
equally applicable in the case of management forecasting (and maybe even 
more applicable, since forecasting would constitute only a minor aspect of 
management's activities, rather than the primary product of a professional 
engagement for a fee, as in the accountant's case). However, an eye must 
be kept on paragraph 3 of section 552, since management forecasting might 
arguably become a "public duty" if it came to be required, for example, by 
the SEC. 
Thus, the most that can be said about liability for negligent forecasts at 
the moment is that the matter is very much in flux, as part of the general 
uncertainty relating to negligent misstatements. It should also be kept in mind 
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that even if there are limitations on liability operative in the case of "mere" 
negligence, they may be lost in the event of gross carelessness, such as a 
substantial failure to do the spadework necessary to form a meaningful 
opinion, which could be characterized as constructive fraud rather than 
simply negligence. See, e.g., State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N. Y. 104, 
15 N.E. 2d 416 (1938). For the sake of completeness, it might be added that 
there could, of course, be difficult questions in attempting to measure the 
amount of loss "caused" by a negligent forecast, as, for example, where a 
carelessly over-optimistic forecast is followed by sharp drop in stock prices 
in conjunction with an overall market slump. But causation represents a story 
all its own, which we need not pause to consider since forecasting would not 
appear to present any special problem in this area. 
The Impact of the Securities Laws 
Of course, suits concerning forecasts, like everything else in the securi-
ties field these days, will in fact be lodged not under the common law but 
rather under one or more provisions of the federal securities laws. There is 
no need for a detailed catalogue of these various provisions at this point; 
suffice it to note that except for Section 11 of the Securities Act, which affirma-
tively requires accurate information in connection with registration of securi-
ties for sale to the public, subject to a defense of reasonable care for every-
one but the issuer, all of the securities law provisions amount to some variant 
of a prohibition against fraudulent or deceptive conduct. The prime example 
is the famous (or infamous) SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Commission 
pursuant to § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which prohibits 
the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contra-
vention of rules prescribed by the SEC. For convenient reference, here is the 
relevant language of Rule 10b-5, making it unlawful, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security: 
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) to make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Where do forecasts and other predictions stand under such securities 
law provisions? The starting point, at least, is the same as under the common-
law analysis above. Most of the cases in point, to date, have involved over-
optimistic predictions by securities salesmen as to the likely future price of a 
stock (not infrequently interspersed with observations about likely future 
sales, net income, and the like); and while the courts have recognized the 
distinction between "mere predictions and opinions" and representations of 
fact, they have been quick to find a knowing factual misrepresentation when 
there was no reasonable basis for the opinion expressed, e.g., SEC v. F. S. 
Johns & Co., 207 F. Supp. 566 (D.C.N.J. 1962) ("Nor may refuge be sought in 
the argument that representations made to induce a sale of stock dealt merely 
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with forecasts of future events relating to projected earnings and the value 
of the securities, except to the extent that there is a rational basis from exist-
ing facts upon which such forecast can be made, and a fair disclosure of the 
material facts."); SEC v. Broadwell Securities, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965) ("Mere predictions and opinions" unlawful under Rule 10b-5 where 
"the salesmen knew, or should have known, that there was no basis in fact 
for such optimistic representations."); Irwin v. United States, 338 F2d 770 
(9th Cir. 1964) (Even if forecasts of future profits were merely opinion, 
"implicit in any such expression of opinion . . . is the representation of fact 
that such opinion is honestly entertained," which requires a showing of some 
basis in fact.). The emphasis on a "reasonable basis in fact" which recurs in 
the foregoing cases is merely a variant on one of the common-law themes 
referred to above; and, of course, such a standard should not pose any 
threat to a management properly doing its job in the forecasting area. 
What about liability for negligent misrepresentation under Rule 10b-5? 
The answer is as uncertain here as under the common law, although for 
somewhat different reasons. Because the roots of Rule 10b-5 lie in a statu-
tory prohibition against fraud and deception, concepts which have always 
imported the element of intentional, or at least knowing, misrepresentation 
(or perhaps reckless disregard of whether the statement is true or false)— 
the so-called "scienter" requirement—there is much force in the contention 
that negligence alone cannot constitute a violation of the Rule. The majority 
of the judicial comments on the Rule are consistent with this view, so far as 
private suits for damages are concerned, although it appears to be generally 
agreed that negligent conduct may be enjoined. On the other hand, many of 
the commentators have favored a right of action for negligence, subject to 
varying limitations, and there are few decisions which hold or assume that 
negligent misrepresentations are actionable under the Rule, e.g., Drake v. 
Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. III. 1967). (Allegations of errone-
ous financial statements against a company and its accountants by an open-
market purchaser of stock can "be sustained as either an intentional mis-
representation or as a negligent misrepresentation.") 
As to the old common-law requirement of privity, and the current version 
of that limitation embodied in Restatement Section 552, there has been little 
discussion in the Rule 10b-5 cases involving negligence. To be sure, the 
Drake case, cited above, does state expressly that "notions of privity cannot 
apply" in actions under Rule 10b-5, because that would impede the objec-
tive of the Rule to protect investors and the public interest, and a number of 
the commentators reach the same conclusion. Unfortunately, however, the 
Drake court relies primarily on cases involving alleged intentional or knowing 
misrepresentation, where there has always been a good deal less disposi-
tion to limit a defendant's liability. In any event, there is certainly no basis 
for optimism that, if there is liability for negligence under Rule 10b-5 at all, 
it will be limited in a manner akin to Restatement Section 552 or otherwise. 
As noted in connection with the common-law analysis, there will be 
troublesome questions of causation in connection with liability for forecast-
ing, and that is no less true under Rule 10b-5. While this question need not 
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be labored now, the comments of a leading Rule 10b-5 authority, Bromberg, 
are worth noting: 
Causation is much the trickiest of 10b-5 elements to evaluate, both 
in terms of what the law is (since so few cases have reached the 
stage of dealing with the questions), and in terms of what it should 
be (especially in open market cases, because of the complex of 
factors which may join in causing losses and the large number of 
persons who may be affected). To dispense with it entirely would 
expose issuers, insiders, and perhaps others to immense liabilities 
for relatively minor misconduct. To insist that it be strictly proved 
would immunize them from civil liability in most instances, regard-
less of how major their misconduct. Some middle ground needs to 
be found, perhaps differing from case to case.2 
The Relevant Cases to Date 
(a) There have been thus far some four cases which are sufficiently rele-
vant to the legality of management forecasts to call for analysis here. The most 
straightforward of them, and hence the best starting point, is Milberg v. 
Western Pacific Railroad Co., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). There, a stock-
holder of Western Pacific brought an action under Rule 10b-5 against Western 
Pacific, together with Dow Jones, as publisher of Barron's, on account of an 
article about Western Pacific which appeared in the May 19, 1969 issue of 
Barron's and contained the following: "Western Pacific got off to a slow start 
this year. . . . Net for the June quarter, however, is expected to show some 
improvement over the $1.7 million, or 84 cents per share, earned in the like 
three months of 1968." Earnings for the June quarter turned out to be only 
25 cents per share. 
The plaintiff purchased 65 shares of Western Pacific common on June 
12, 1969, at a cost of $35% per share. She made no claim of having read 
the article in question, but maintained that her purchase was influenced by 
the general market climate created by that article. Subsequent to her pur-
chase, the market price of the stock dropped considerably, and the plaintiff 
sought to recover for her market losses, claiming that Barron's, or Western 
Pacific if it had supplied the information in the statement, had acted with 
"careless, reckless, and wanton disregard as to truth or falsity." 
The specific issue at this stage of the proceedings arose out of plaintiff's 
efforts to bring the suit as a class action, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all persons who bought common stock of 
Western Pacific between May 19 and July 31, 1969. As such a class action, 
the amount of the potential recovery could be quite large (assuming, of 
course, there was any recovery at all), which would mean a contingent fee of 
sufficient potential to induce counsel to pursue the suit; an individual plaintiff 
would often not have enough at stake to justify the expense of such a liti-
gation. While of course a decision on whether to allow the suit to proceed 
as a class action is not the same as a decision on the merits, there is a close 
2 Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud (1967), p. 220. 
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relationship between the two, because one of the tests imposed by the courts 
for qualification as a class action under Rule 23 is whether the plaintiff can 
make a preliminary showing that there is a substantial possibility of success 
on the merits. Applying this test, the court found that the plaintiff had little 
chance of succeeding in this case and hence refused to permit a class action. 
The court's observations on the merits of the plaintiff's claim are illuminating: 
What plaintiff is apparently attempting to do by this action is estab-
lish a new rule of law to the effect that, when a financial publication 
prints an estimate of a company's earnings, the company must earn 
at least that amount or both the publication and the company will be 
held strictly liable for any loss in market value of the stock after the 
date when the estimate is printed. This would be a most unusual 
rule of law to say the least, but it is the only framework within which 
the plaintiff can claim a cause of action. 
It should be observed that the case is not squarely in point with regard 
to management forecasts since the court noted that Barron's did not purport 
to quote Western Pacific. (The court added that imposing liability on Western 
Pacific in such a case would mean that a corporation would have to read 
every article written about it to detect and disavow any inaccuracies.) But the 
court's comments with regard to Dow Jones would seem equally applicable 
to management forecasts made in good faith. After noting that no proof had 
been offered to show that Dow Jones deliberately or recklessly mistook the 
facts, the court added that "the estimate of earnings was no more than an 
estimate and could not reasonably have been expected to be infallible." The 
court characterized the plaintiff's effort as one of seeking "strict liability," 
that is, absolute liability for any error, which the court clearly seemed to 
regard as inappropriate. (The plaintiff's appeal from the denial of a class 
action was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on the 
procedural ground that such an appeal will not lie unless a class action is 
essential to a continuation of the suit, and here the plaintiff's loss, together 
with that of her husband, the attorney in this case, was large enough to 
justify their continuing the action on their own.) 
(b) The major case to date on forecasts is Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 
F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), involving an action by stockholders of Monsanto 
Chemical, under various securities law provisions including Rule 10b-5, 
against the company and some of its directors and officers. The alleged 
ground for the suit was that, in order to sell some of their own holdings at 
higher prices, the individual defendants had manipulated the price of Mon-
santo stock by publishing false and misleading forecasts of earnings while 
concealing inside information that would have indicated a likely decline in 
earnings. The plaintiffs sought damages for the losses they suffered as a 
result of their purchases of Monsanto stock during the period of alleged arti-
ficially high prices. 
The facts relating to the forecasts require some detail. Monsanto's net 
sales and net income for the four-year period 1961-1964 had grown rapidly, 
and 1964 was a record year, with net sales of nearly $1.4 billion and net 
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earnings of approximately $115 million, or $3.72 per share. At the end of 
1964, in the normal course of its program of periodic presentations to, and 
interviews with, financial analysts and commentators, Monsanto projected 
that 1965 results would surpass 1964. At the end of each of the first three 
quarters of 1965, with record results being logged in each one, Monsanto 
projected increased sales and earnings for the year as a whole. During the 
fourth quarter of 1965, Monsanto experienced some temporary start-up diffi-
culties in plants using new processes, but despite these problems net sales 
and net income both set all-time highs in 1965, with sales rising to $1.5 
billion and net income to $123 million, or $3.89 per share. 
At the end of 1965 Monsanto anticipated that the operations in 1966 
would show an increase over 1965's record results. In the first half of 1966 
sales and income did continue to climb, setting new records for any six-
month period, and Monsanto continued to estimate that overall 1966 results 
would exceed those of 1965. However, during the second half of 1966 the 
chemical industry in general, and large synthetic fiber producers like Mon-
santo and Dupont in particular, were especially hard hit in a general business 
and stock market recession. Synthetic producers experienced a number of 
severe and unanticipated setbacks, such as the austerity program in Great 
Britain which curtailed consumer spending, sharp reductions in the prices of 
nylon and polyester, and a fall-off in the consumption of acrylic fibers in the 
United States caused by the lack of housing starts and tight money. 
As a result of these unanticipated difficulties, even though Monsanto's 
1966 sales were some 10 per cent higher than in 1965 its income for the year 
declined to just over $112 million. (At the same time Dupont, which also had 
expected its 1966 earnings to increase, suffered a decline in net income from 
operations during the third and fourth quarters of 1966, and its overall net 
income for 1966 was less than that of 1965.) 
During 1966 market prices of securities generally declined, with the Dow 
dropping more than 200 points from 955 on February 9 to 744 on October 7. 
The decline among the chemicals was even greater, and during the last half 
of 1966 the prices of Monsanto and Dupont stock declined more than those 
of the overall chemical industry. One of the plaintiffs (the only one whose 
own claimed loss was more than nominal) had bought 300 shares of Mon-
santo in April 1965, and sold them in October 1966, at a loss of more than 
$14,000. 
The primary issue before the court in this case, as in the Milberg case, 
was whether the plaintiffs had shown a sufficient possibility of prevailing on 
the merits to entitle them to bring the suit as a class action. However, the 
procedural setting was a good deal more complicated than in Milberg, and 
requires some explanation for a full appreciation of the significance of the 
decision. In a prior opinion (which incidentally tells you all you ever wanted to 
know about class actions in the securities field—and then some!), the court 
had decided that the plaintiffs' likelihood of success (and consequent right 
to a class action) should be determined by holding a preliminary hearing at 
which the plaintiffs would have to show (1) that there was a material dis-
crepancy between the defendants' predictions as to Monsanto's future pros-
257 
pects and what actually occurred, and (2) after submission of evidence by 
the defendants as to their transactions in Monsanto stock during the period 
in question and the internal corporate memoranda containing the information 
on which they relied in making their predictions, that there was a "suspicious" 
pattern of securities transactions by the defendants during the period in 
question, and that, on the basis of information before them, the estimates by 
the individual defendants were not reasonable. 43 F.R.D. 472 (1968). 
After a lengthy hearing, the trial court not only disallowed a class action 
but also entered a summary judgment on the merits for the defendants, based 
upon the finding that there was no evidence to support the plaintiffs' charges. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should not have 
granted summary judgment on the merits for the defendants; in addition, 
apparently fearing that the class action issue might have been observed by 
the erroneous summary judgment decision, the Court of Appeals ordered a 
reconsideration of the class action question also. 438 F. 2d 825 (2d Cir. 
1970), 438 F. 2d 833 (1971). (On rehearing, the Court of Appeals softened 
its decision to a remand of the case to the trial court for the purpose of 
making express findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court 
had not done. 438 F. 2d 833 (1971).) 
It was in this rather complex procedural framework that the matter finally 
came on for decision in the instant case (and the procedural background has 
been set out in this almost dizzying detail because it does focus sharply 
the difference between allowing a class action and a decision on the merits, 
a distinction which is likely to continue to loom large in securities law litiga-
tions). The trial court reaffirmed its refusal to allow a class action, re-
iterating its finding that there was no substantial possibility of the plaintiffs 
succeeding on the merits, but also emphasizing its conclusion that the in-
dividual plaintiffs had enough at stake in the suit, particularly in the light of 
their claims for substantial punitive damages, to make it likely that the case 
would go forward even though it was not a class action. (The court expressly 
reserved judgment on whether its decision on the class action issue would 
have been the same if its conclusion had been different as to the amount 
at stake.) 
With regard to the forecasts, the court explicitly rejected the plaintiffs' 
claim that the internal data of Monsanto did not justify the issuance of fore-
casts of substantial earnings gains during the 1964-66 period. Rather, the 
court held, the "information available to defendants as shown by the material 
submitted to the court and available through extensive discovery indicates 
that those forecasts were sound when made and that the subsequent failure 
of earnings to meet predictions was due to market and other changes that a 
reasonable businessman would not have foreseen or would have discounted 
in making predictions." 
In addition, the court commented favorably upon Monsanto's program 
of public disclosure, which included its annual and quarterly reports, periodic 
distribution of press releases containing information regarding Monsanto 
developments, and various presentations to, and interviews with, financial 
analysts, members of the press, and shareholders to report on the current 
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situation at Monsanto and to indicate prospects for the future. The court 
observed that the temporary plant start-up difficulties which Monsanto ex-
perienced in the fourth quarter of 1965 had been reported in public state-
ments which appeared in various financial news media. In addition, during 
the last quarter of 1966, when Monsanto, as well as the entire fiber industry, 
was experiencing severe and unanticipated set-backs, there were numerous 
public statements reporting these difficulties in the news media. The court 
concluded that Monsanto's program of public reporting was appropriately 
calculated to inform its stockholders, the financial community, and the public 
generally, in a fair, current, and timely manner, of the company's results, 
prospects, and current developments and problems, including any changes 
in prospects and problems, without disclosing confidential information that 
might have been of greater interest to competitors than investors. 
In connection with examining the correlation between the public pro-
jections by the individual defendants and the internal Monsanto information, 
the court undertook a lengthy analysis of the company's internal budgeting 
operations (which are worth reviewing because if they are not now common-
place they may well become so after having received judicial approval in 
this case). The basic internal documents consisted of "Corporate Long-
Range Plans," yearly "Budgets," quarterly "Budget Reviews," and so-called 
"Capital Appropriation Requests." The Corporate Long-Range Plan, which 
covered a period of five years and was revised annually, was the product of 
input from every level of the company, from the salesmen in the field all the 
way to the general managers of the various Monsanto divisions. In addition 
to this long-range plan, each year in the fall every division of Monsanto pre-
pared a budget for the next year, indicating among other operating data the 
budgeted sales and earnings for the division. These divisional budgets were 
extensively reviewed by budget committees at various levels, and then con-
solidated into an overall corporate budget which was presented to the Board 
of Directors for approval. This work involved the effort and judgment of many 
people in each division who assembled cost and price data: The marketing 
people estimated the number of pounds of each product which might be sold 
at various prices based on discussions with customers; the manufacturing 
people calculated the cost of manufacturing these products; accounting 
personnel assessed overhead, research and other charges. The quarterly 
"Budget Review" was regularly prepared at the end of the first and second 
quarters of each year and included forecasts of sales and earnings as of 
that time for the balance of the year. 
The court made an express finding that these internal records were 
appropriately prepared and extensively reviewed for the purpose of fairly and 
realistically reflecting Monsanto's results and the estimates of its future pros-
pects. The court also found that the Monsanto management insisted that 
these internal documents and estimates be as honest and accurate as 
possible, and that as a result these internal projections were reasonable and 
actually represented the best estimates of the future by the Monsanto people 
most qualified to make such estimates. 
The court then concluded with its ultimate findings that (1) all of the 
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statements and forecasts complained of by the plaintiffs were consistent with, 
and fairly and accurately reflected, the information in the internal documents; 
(2) the public statements and forecasts were intended to accomplish the 
proper objective of informing Monsanto's stockholders and the public of the 
results of operations and other matters of interest concerning Monsanto; and 
(3) Monsanto's results, prospects, developments, and problems were fairly 
and timely reported to its stockholders and to the public. (Of less relevance 
to us are the court's other two conclusions: First, that the sales of Monsanto 
stock by the individual defendants during the period in question were mostly 
for the purpose of raising funds with which to exercise Monsanto stock 
options, so that on balance the defendants were buyers during this period 
rather than sellers and second, that the transactions of the individual defend-
ants were undertaken in good faith, and based on the same information as 
had been made available to outsiders.) 
The opinion concludes with some rather sympathetic observations about 
the impact of lawsuits, especially class actions, on managements in cases 
like this. The court noted that if cases as doubtful as the instant one were 
allowed to continue as class actions, it would encourage and prolong such 
litigation, subjecting many corporate managers to the considerable financial 
burden of defending, which the court thought might prove particularly difficult 
for men who had risen recently in the corporate hierarchy and hence might 
have relatively limited financial resources. In addition, the court commented 
that, especially these days when corporate executives are encouraged to 
publish information and to open their doors to analysts, a rule of law that 
was too restrictive and inflexible (presumably meaning a rule that could give 
rise to liability merely because predictions do not come true) might tend to 
over-inhibit managers without providing any gain to investors in the form of 
more reliable predictions. The court added, apparently in response to a 
contention by the plaintiffs that the Monsanto management should have been 
more alert to the potential down-turn in the company's affairs in 1966, and 
in any event with evident admiration, that among the attributes of the success-
ful executive are his enthusiasm and his "conviction" that any business 
problem he may encounter can be solved. 
Having decided that the suit could not go forward as a class action, 
about a week later the trial court reinstated its grant of summary judgment 
on the merits to the defendants. Since the Court of Appeals had already 
indicated grave doubt about the propriety of this step, we may well not have 
heard the end of this case. 
It is worth pausing to consider some of the implications of the Dolgow 
decision (which, unlike Milberg, is unequivocably a management forecast 
case). First, note that the plaintiffs did not simply charge the defendants with 
making a forecast which turned out to be erroneous. (This was equally true 
in Milberg, where the plaintiffs alleged "careless, reckless, and wanton dis-
regard as to truth or falsity," but the court found no evidence of deliberate 
or reckless mistake, and made it clear that mere error in the forecast would 
not give rise to liability.) The plaintiffs' allegations were much more serious, 
that is, that the forecasts promulgated by the defendants were inconsistent 
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with the interna! data, and that the defendants were thereby seeking to 
feather their own nests. Of course a claim that corporate officers and di-
rectors were acting in their own self-interest rather than for the benefit of 
the corporation amounts to a charge akin to fraud under any standard. Of 
much greater interest to us in this inquiry is the claim that the published 
forecasts were inconsistent with the available internal evidence, since that 
would appear to spell out a classic case of misrepresentation in connection 
with an opinion. That is, the publication of the forecasts by the defendants 
carried with them the implied representation that the defendants actually 
held the opinions expressed and had a reasonable basis for those opinions, 
and one or the other of those representations, or perhaps both, would be 
false if the defendants were in possession of reliable data inconsistent with 
the forecasts made. 
Of course this question became moot in Dolgow with the court's finding 
that there was in fact no inconsistency between the published forecasts and 
the internal records (along with the finding that the defendants were not 
seeking to favor their private interests in the market, which was the only 
motive advanced by the plaintiffs for the alleged departure of the published 
forecasts from the internal data). But the court's painstaking comparison of 
the published forecasts with the in-house figures stands as a strong warning 
of the danger of departing from the internal data, which would have serious 
implications for any management preferring to use for publication figures 
more conservative than its interna! projections, either out of desire to pub-
licize a more readily reachable goal or because the internal budget figures 
themselves were more in the nature of a target than a realistic projection 
of future results. 
Also of some significance is the court's detailed analysis of the com-
pany's internal budgetary procedures, leading to the conclusion that the 
internal figures were the product of thoughtful and conscientious efforts by 
the people in the company best qualified to do this work. It would appear that 
the court thought it relevant to demonstrate the absence of negligence in 
preparing the internal data which formed the basis of the published forecasts, 
thus perhaps implying that there could indeed have been liability merely 
for negligence (for example, if the interna! work, in which most of the de-
fendants had presumably participated, had been careless or inadequate). 
However, we are left entirely to inference with regard to possible liability for 
negligence, since the opinion does not deal specifically with the issue, either 
in the foregoing context or in connection with the plaintiffs' claim, referred 
to in one of the earlier opinions in the case, that the defendants should have 
foreseen a decline in Monsanto's earnings for 1966 because of the expiration 
of certain license rights that year, which sounds like an express charge of 
negligence. 
(c) Less directly in point but still instructive is the case of Butler 
Aviation International, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 
910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affirmed, 425 F. 2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970). Butler Aviation 
sought a preliminary injunction against CDI's tender offer for Butler shares on 
the ground that CDI had artificially inflated the market price of its stock by 
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making misleading projections of future earnings and later misrepresenting 
past earnings. At CDI's annual meeting in September 1968, the president 
of the company had predicted (with what he claimed were "numerous 
hedges") earnings for the last quarter of fiscal 1969 (ending April 30, 1969) 
of nearly 20 cents per share and earnings for the year of about 60 cents per 
share. This prediction was repeated without any qualifications in a press 
release shortly thereafter and was somewhat reinforced by another press 
release in December 1968, which reported second-quarter earnings and said 
they bolstered the company's "confidence in previously projected improve-
ments" during the balance of the year. Earnings for fiscal 1969 actually 
turned out to be only 33 cents per share, compared with 52 cents for fiscal 
1968. In addition, earnings for the last quarter of fiscal 1969 would have 
been lower than those of the third quarter, but for a change in the method 
of accounting for year-end adjustments (allocating them among all four 
quarters instead of entirely to the last quarter, as in the past), which was 
adopted for the purpose of making sure that fourth-quarter earnings were 
at least a little higher than third-quarter earnings. Nevertheless, CDI's annual 
report referred to an improvement in earnings for the fourth quarter over the 
third quarter, without any disclosure of the change in accounting practice. 
The trial court allowed the preliminary injunction because of the great 
likelihood that the plaintiff would ultimately succeed in establishing mis-
representations under Rule 10b-5 [as well as section 14(e) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, regulating tender offers] in connection with the unqualified 
earnings projection for fiscal 1969, and the bald statement that fourth-quarter 
earnings for fiscal 1969 had exceeded those of the third quarter. In affirming, 
the Court of Appeals agreed that CDI deserved censure but was more doubt-
ful as to the effect of these "delinquencies" on the exchange offer for Butler 
stock, since that did not come until November 1969 and was pursuant to a 
full prospectus on file with the SEC which was not alleged to contain any 
misrepresentations. The Court of Appeals noted that the price of CDI stock 
had actually fallen from $18 at the time of earnings projections in September 
1968 to $15 in November, although it then rose steadily to $35 in May 1969. 
Moreover, the Court thought that all of the forecast damage would have been 
dissipated by the issuance of the Annual Report for fiscal 1969 on August 20, 
showing the actual earnings of only 33 cents per share for the year. The 
Court was more troubled by the statement about improved fourth-quarter 
earnings, but noted that this had not been repeated in the tender offer pros-
pectus. However, the Court of Appeals decided that a company intent on 
an acquisition program should be especially careful to guard against mis-
statements and so, with some reluctance, affirmed the trial court's decision. 
This case is clearly not primarily concerned with inaccurate forecasts, 
in view of the presence of the factual misrepresentation as to fourth-quarter 
results, which alone would have justified the decision. But the case is cer-
tainly not inconsistent with the notion advanced herein that a management 
forecast is not a warranty of the future, although to be sure the court never 
says this expressly. There was sufficient reason to condemn the forecast 
in this case that it was allowed to be disseminated without the qualifications 
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the president concededly thought were called for, with the result that the 
forecast implied greater assurance than the forecaster actually felt (to say 
nothing of whether the forecast had been prepared with reasonable care, 
as to which the court had no occasion to comment at this preliminary stage 
in the proceedings). A forecast in unqualified terms here, in other words, was 
a misrepresentation of the actual state of mind of the person making the 
forecast, and that does amount, as we have seen, to a misrepresentation of 
fact. 
(d) The last of the cases worth noting is Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil 
Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), which involves a suit under Rule 10b-5 
and the common law against three directors of a company, its accountants, 
and its public relations firm for losses allegedly suffered in buying (or failing 
to sell) stock of the company in reliance upon projections made in a speech 
in February 1965 before the New York Society of Security Analysts. The 
speech, made by two of the directors, "with the consent and approval" of 
the third, estimated that the company's total income for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1965, would exceed $10,000,000, cash flow would approximate 
$6,000,000, and net income would be $3,500,000, or about double the income 
for the first six months of the year (subject to some reduction in case of 
acquisitions). The figures upon which these predictions were based had been 
prepared by the accountants; the public relations firm was employed by the 
company to distribute copies of the speech to shareholders and others. The 
plaintiffs claimed that the purpose of the speech and its distribution was to 
induce dealers to promote the sale of the stock, and to induce stockholders 
and others to retain or purchase shares. Plaintiffs charged that defendants 
"knowingly and intentionally, with intent to deceive," had failed to disclose 
in the speech that the accountants had underestimated the provision for 
depletion and depreciation for the first six months of fiscal 1965. Accordingly, 
the company's 1965 results were much lower than had been predicted, and 
the publication in late April 1965 of the nine-month's report showing the 
actual figures precipitated a drop in the market price of the stock. 
The decision itself in Sprayregen deals only with procedural matters, 
its principal holding being that stating a case under Rule 10b-5 does not 
require an allegation that the defendants made the misleading statements in 
order to enhance their own positions in the securities market; it is enough 
that the statements might cause reasonable investors to rely and thereby 
purchase or sell securities. (The court was not sure that merely holding on 
to shares satisfied the apparent requirement of Rule 10b-5 that there be a 
purchase or sale but found that the plaintiffs' alternative claim of having pur-
chased stock was sufficient to clear this hurdle.) The court also held that 
the director who did not actually participate in the speech was as subject to 
liability under Rule 10b-5 as those who did if it was shown that he consented 
to and approved of their actions. 
On the merits of forecasting, the case is useful only as an example of 
the close relationship between projections of the future and the financial 
statements for the past (which necessarily include their own "estimation" 
component, such as here for depreciation and depletion). The case affords 
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no guidance as to negligence, since it was alleged that the defendants had 
acted "knowingly and intentionally." 
Subjects for Further Reflection 
First, a brief comment about the relatively small number of cases in-
volving attacks on forecasts thus far. While this could mean that forecasts 
are not quite as inviting a target as suggested earlier, my own guess is that 
the paucity of cases is due to the fact that wide-scale forecasting is still a 
relatively recent phenomenon. For obvious reasons, litigation often lags 
the state of the art by several years; and, the fact that cases are already 
pending in connection with the forecasts for Bausch & Lomb and Wrigley, 
two of the better-known recent subjects of forecasts, may be a more accurate 
harbinger of things to come. The legion of cases involving over-optimistic 
predictions by brokers or other salesmen to potential buyers about the future 
of a stock, oftentimes interspersed with observations about future sales, net 
income, and the like, are not particularly relevant for our purposes. These 
cases have almost always included not only some specific factual misrepre-
sentations, but also a lack of any sufficient basis for the predictions made 
(a lack which should not often characterize a management forecast); in 
addition, the broker cases also present the issue of justifiable "puffing" of 
goods offered for sale, see e.g., Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 
1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969), a defense to which the courts have displayed increasing 
hostility in the securities field of late, [see Loss, Securities Regulation, Vol. 
VI (1969 Supp.) 3541] but which would in any event scarcely be permissible 
in connection with management forecasts designed to inform and advise the 
investing community. 
Second, reference has already been made to the fact that at the present 
time the SEC does not permit the inclusion of forecasts in registration 
material or in connection with proxy solicitations. The given reason, often 
expressed in SEC opinions, is that forecasts, particularly when reduced to 
specific dollar figures, give a false appearance of precision which makes 
them inherently misleading. (See, for example, Thomas Bond, Inc., 5 SEC, 
60, 1939.) Similarly, the SEC's Proxy Rule 14a-9, prohibiting false or mis-
leading statements in proxy solicitations, gives as its first example of what 
may be misleading: "Predictions as to specific future market values, earnings 
or dividends." This rule was the subject of the following comment in Union 
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 226 F. Supp. 400, 
408-409 (N.D. III. 1964), enjoining a shareholder vote on a choice between 
competing merger offers because of violations of the proxy rules: 
There is good reason for this emphasis on prediction. Bald 
statements contrary to concrete and historical fact run the risk of 
ready refutation and exposure, and to that degree are self-policing. 
Predictions, estimates, and opinions are more elusive and may 
present graver dangers of misleading the investing public. They 
lend themselves to this evil by allowing facts to be suggested or 
implied without direct statement. Even if they do not tend to induce 
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belief in any particular fact, they nonetheless import the existence 
of unspecified facts which support the conclusion. The share-
holder may be led readily to assume, contrary to fact that the pre-
dictor has special knowledge or unique information to bear out 
fully his prediction, and be induced to rely upon a supposed expert 
judgment of the mysteries of finance. "Since an expert can speak 
with authority only as to subjects upon which he has professional 
knowledge and since no engineering course or other professional 
training has ever been known to qualify anyone as a clairvoyant, 
attempts by companies to predict future earnings on their own or 
on the authority of experts have almost invariably been held by the 
Commission to be misleading because they suggest to the investor 
a competence and authority which in fact does not exist." Heller, 
"Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulations," 
XVI, The Business Lawyer, 300, 307 (1961). Whether the prediction 
is the product of an intent to mislead or of innocent overenthusiasm, 
the misleading effect upon the investing public is the same. 
If these characterizations of forecasts were to be taken literally, then 
any forecast would seem to fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 10b-5 
against misleading statements, which in turn could lead to virtually absolute 
liability for any loss resulting from a forecast that proved inaccurate. On the 
other hand, it does not appear that such a theory has ever been advanced 
by the SEC or anyone else, and perhaps the basis for it will soon evaporate, 
in view of the SEC's current intensive reexamination of its position and Chair-
man Casey's recent speeches indicating a favorable disposition toward per-
mitting the inclusion of forecasts in material filed with the Commission.3 
At the opposite end of the Rule 10b-5 spectrum is the question of 
whether the Rule could be construed to impose an affirmative obligation on 
companies to publicly disclose their internal forecasting data. It was, after 
all, in imposing on corporate insiders the duty to disclose their special in-
formation when purchasing the company's stock that Rule 10b-5 first made 
its mark, before it became the general policeman of all misrepresentations. 
And of late there have been a number of developments in the direction of 
extending the disclosure obligation well beyond the case of insiders dealing 
with the company's stockholders, making it applicable to all information 
that would be relevant to the investing community at large—in other words, 
a kind of generalized obligation to the integrity of the securities markets. 
For example, the New York Stock Exchange's disclosure policy calls for a 
corporation "to release quickly to the public any news or information which 
might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for securities."4 
To much the same effect is the now classic decision in this field, SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), and under Judge 
Friendly's definition of "materiality"—any information which would prompt a 
3 See footnote 1. 
4 New York Stock Exchange, "Company Manual A-18" (1968). 
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reasonable man to make an investment decision—there seems little doubt 
that a company's internal forecasting data could qualify.5 
Of course, the primary objective of disclosure requirements is still to 
prevent unfair advantage to insiders, tippees, and the like (which incidentally 
means that unpublished internal forecasts not only must not be used by 
insiders but also must not be made available to a favored few stockholders 
or potential investors),6 hence a showing that no such people were trading 
with knowledge of the undisclosed information would make the risk of liability 
under Rule 10b-5 for failure to publicize more theoretical than real. But 
this would provide little comfort in the case of internal projections, if they 
were found to be subject to the disclosure obligation, since they exist con-
tinuously, subject to constant review and revision, and the result would be to 
permanently bar insiders from trading in their company's stock. And this 
result would not be altered even if it could be shown that the decision not to 
disclose internal projections had been made to further the best interests of 
the company, because of the possible benefits to competitors from publica-
tion; such a contention might be accepted, as was the alleged business need 
to acquire adjoining lands in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case, but at the cost of 
excluding insiders from the market until the information was disclosed, which 
in the case of internal forecasts would mean permanently. 
Professor Bromberg, in the article cited in note 5, contends that pro-
jections do indeed fall within the disclosure obligation, at least where they 
are for the short-term future and there is reasonable basis for confidence 
in them on the basis of previous experience or otherwise. Even so, he sug-
gests that, except when current projections indicate a very significant varia-
tion from past performance, the risk of withholding projections may be less 
than the risk that releasing them will result in suit by investors who place 
undue reliance on them. (Perhaps this quite legitimate concern should in-
stead be advanced against finding any obligation to disclose forecasts in 
the first place.) 
Would there be any impact on this question of a possible disclosure 
obligation if the SEC reversed its stand and decided to allow forecasting in 
registration and proxy material? In theory perhaps not, since the present 
SEC strictures do not constitute a legal justification for failing to disclose (if 
any duty to do so were found) in contexts other than registration and proxy 
solicitation. But in practice this could help to support a disclosure obligation 
since it would at least eliminate the awkwardness of insisting upon disclosure 
of information that the SEC would not permit to be included for its purposes. 
Not that such inconsistencies have bothered the SEC much; in Gerstle v. 
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. N.Y. 1969), the SEC contended 
that the estimated liquidating values of certain of a company's assets likely 
to be sold off should have been disclosed in the textual material (though 
not in the financial statements) in a proxy solicitation for approval of a merger, 
5 See, generally, Bromberg, "Disclosure Programs for Publicly Held Companies— 
A Practical Guide," Duke Law Journal (1970), p. 1139. 
6 SEC Litigation Release No. 4080, August 8, 1968. 
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although the SEC staff had rejected a suggestion that such information be 
included at the time of the filing of the proxy material with the Commission. 
If a company does undertake to publish forecasts, whether voluntarily 
or pursuant to a disclosure obligation, it may then have the duty to con-
tinuously review the data and publish periodic revisions if called for. Just 
how often such revisions should be made is far from clear, but probably on 
some regular basis, plus immediately upon any significant and unexpected 
development (which of course might require disclosure even if the company 
were not publishing forecasts). Such an additional responsibility would create 
another level of potential claims for damages, quite independent of the merits 
of the forecasts actually made, and might well constitute a further objection 
from management's point of view to publishing forecasts in the first place. 
Compare Financial Industrial Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, CCH 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 93,004 (D. Colo. 1971) (defendants who had issued 
optimistic earnings reports were obligated to publicize deterioration in the 
company's condition). 
Appendix 
British Forecasting Practice 
Because so much of our literature on forecasting makes reference to the 
British practice, it may be useful to summarize just what that is. In Great 
Britain there are three primary sources of so-called "profit forecasts": 
1. In take-over bid circulars and merger proposals. 
2. In the prospectuses issued in conjunction with an offering of securities. 
3. In annual reports, Chairmen's statements, and the like. 
Since most of the notoriety about the British experience relates to take-
over bids, we might look there first. The starting point is the City Code on 
Take-overs and Mergers, a voluntary system of self-regulation adopted by 
representatives of leading institutions of the City of London as a guide to 
good business practices in the conduct of take-overs and mergers. While 
the City Code does not have the force of statute law, it is very influential as 
a practical matter because breach of its provisions could result in public 
censure, or, in an extreme case, delisting of a company's securities from 
an exchange. The Code has been revised twice since its adoption in 1968, 
and in the latest version (the third edition of the Code), Rule 16 dealing with 
profit forecasts (Rule 15 in prior editions) provides as follows: 
Without in any way detracting from the imperative necessity of 
maintaining the highest standards of accuracy and fair presentation 
in all communications to shareholders in a take-over or merger 
transaction, attention is particularly drawn in this connection to profit 
forecasts . . . . Notwithstanding the obvious hazard attached to the 
forecasting or profits, any profit forecasts must be compiled with the 
greatest possible care by the directors, whose whole responsibilities 
they are. When profit forecasts appear in any document addressed 
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to shareholders in connection with an offer, the assumptions, in-
cluding the commercial assumptions, upon which the directors 
have based their profit forecasts, must be stated in the document. 
The accounting bases and calculations for the forecasts must be 
examined and reported on by the auditors or consultant account-
ants. Any financial adviser mentioned in the document must also 
report on the forecasts. The accountants' report and, if there is an 
adviser, his report, must be contained in such document and be 
accompanied by a statement that the accountants, and, where 
relevant, the adviser, have given and not withdrawn their consent 
to publication. Wherever profit forecasts appear in relation to a 
period in which trading has already commenced, the latest un-
audited profit figures which are available in respect of the expired 
portion of that trading period together with comparable figures for 
the preceding year must be stated. Alternatively, if no figures are 
available, that fact must be stated. 
The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, which administers and enforces 
the City Code, has issued interpretations, called "Practice Notes," in con-
nection with this Rule. Practice Note No. 4 (revised edition, February 16, 
1972) deals with the question of what constitutes a profit forecast for the 
purpose of the Rule, in the following terms: 
It is impossible to generalize but broadly whenever a form of 
words puts a floor under (or, in certain circumstances, a ceiling on) 
the likely profits of a particular period or whenever a form of words 
contains the data necessary to ascertain an approximate figure 
for future profits by an arithmetical process, the Panel takes the 
view that there is a profit forecast. . . . 
Practice Note No. 6 (revised edition, February 16, 1972) is a good deal 
more extensive, dealing with the assumptions on which a forecast is based. 
The Practice Note calls for listing the assumptions, together with information 
that would help shareholders reach their own decision as to the reasonable-
ness and reliability of the forecast, and then adds, "This should include a 
summary of the conclusions reached by the directors on matters which 
required judgment as to the likely outcome of events, and should draw the 
shareholders' attention to, and where possible quantify, those uncertain 
factors which could materially disturb the ultimate achievement of the fore-
cast." Practice Note No. 6 goes on to suggest that some indication be in-
cluded as to how the profit forecast would be affected if certain of the major 
assumptions prove to be ill-founded: "For example, the effect might be shown 
if sales volume, selling prices, raw material costs, etc., were Y% above/below 
estimate, or if full production from a new factory were delayed by Z months. 
It may be appropriate for maximum and minimum forecast profits to be given 
rather than a single figure." 
While profit forecasts are not required by the City Code, they are very 
likely used in take-over situations, on behalf of both the offeree company 
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and the offeror. Since May 1, 1969, the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers 
has been actively policing profit forecasts in these situations by keeping 
records of the forecasts made and comparing them with the actual results. 
In its Report for the year ending March 31, 1972, the Panel stated that of 
the 210 cases of forecasting which had been checked, 170 had proved to be 
accurate within 10 percent. The Panel undertook to investigate the 40 cases 
in which the forecasts had not been that accurate, and of the 19 cases where 
the investigation had been completed there were only 3 where there was no 
satisfactory explanation (such as unforeseeable developments, reflecting no 
discredit on those who had been responsible for making or reporting on the 
forecasts). 
With regard to the role of accountants and other advisers in profit 
forecasts, the original version of Rule 16 (Rule 15 at that time) required that 
"the calculations and the bases for the forecasts must be examined and 
reported on by the auditors or consultant accountants." However, the report 
by the accountants was to go only to the directors; it was not expected that 
their report would be made public (except perhaps if it took strenuous issue 
with the forecast made), and the Council of the Institute of Chartered Account-
ants promulgated guidelines on the proper role of accountants, stressing 
that "the name of the reporting accountants is not to be directly associated 
with the profit forecasts."7 In the 1969 revision of the City Code, Rule 16 
was amended to change the subject of the accountants' examination and 
report into its present, narrower form: "the accounting bases and calculations 
for the forecasts." (Emphasis supplied.) In this same revision the account-
ants' report was required to be made public as part of the document 
addressed to stockholders concerning a take-over offer and containing the 
forecast; but, perhaps as a corollary, language was added making clear that 
the forecasts were the "sole responsibility" of the directors (subsequently 
changed to the present awkward phrase, "whose whole responsibilities they 
are," in the third edition of the City Code). 
The role of the "financial adviser" under Rule 16 has had a somewhat 
similar history. The original version of the Rule required that "the forecasts 
and the assumptions on which they rest must be corroborated, as far as 
possible, and reported on by the company's merchant bank or other ad-
visers." In the 1969 revision this was softened to require only that "any 
Merchant Bank or other adviser maintained in the document must also report 
on the forecasts," but any such report had to be included in the document to 
the stockholders; and in the third edition of the Code the phrase "any Mer-
chant Bank or other adviser" was collapsed into the present simple "any 
financial adviser." 
Incidentally, it might be noted that the April 1969 revision of Rule 16 to 
require that the reports of the accountants and financial adviser be made 
public by way of inclusion in the document to stockholders coincides with 
the date when the Pane! on Take-overs and Mergers launched its program of 
7 See Statement by the Council of ICA, "Accountants' Reports on Profit Forecasts," 
The Accountant (July 27, 1968), pp. 123, 125. 
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carefully checking the record of forecasts against the actual events. The 
Director-General of the Panel in a 1971 article strongly implied that this 
"requirement for accountant and merchant bankers to stick their names on 
to the profit forecasts on a take-over bid" may have been responsible for the 
fact that in the "two years plan of policing, we have in fact been rather 
pleased with the results," whereas before this policing of forecasts began in 
1969 "the record was poor."8 
The other major occasion for dissemination of a profit forecast in England 
is the issuance of a prospectus in connection with a public offering of securi-
ties (the very situation, it may be recalled, where forecasts are least likely to 
appear under our practice, because of the SEC's current refusal to permit 
their inclusion). Although in theory such prospectuses are subject to the 
basic English corporation legislation, the Companies Act of 1948, in practice 
they are governed by the self-regulation of the Federation of Stock Ex-
changes, because the Companies Act exempts offerings made through a 
member of the stock exchange in compliance with the rules of the exchange 
(and since there is virtually no over-the-counter market in England, most 
offerings are made pursuant to the exchange requirements). The Rules of 
the Federation of Stock Exchanges relating to "Admission of Securities to 
Quotations" (which appear in a book with a canary-yellow cover, sometimes 
referred to as the "Yellow Peril") contains a section entitled "Contents of a 
Prospectus" (Schedule II, Part A), which requires "a statement as to the 
financial and trading prospects of the Company." Though this is hardly a 
clear-cut requirement of profit forecasts, the general practice in England, 
according to a 1972 article by John Grieves, a London solicitor (publication 
whereabouts unknown), is for the prospectus to contain forecasts with re-
gard to the profits of the financial year in which the prospectus is issued 
(commonly accompanied by a statement as to the dividend expected to be 
recommended). A typical form of language as to expected profits might be 
as follows: "The Directors expected that, in the absence of unforeseen cir-
cumstances, the pre-tax profits of the Company for the financial year ending 
30th June 1972 will not be less than £350,000." 
It should be noted here that profit forecasts in prospectuses are cus-
tomarily quite conservative, and it is unusual for these forecasts not to be 
met. According to the Director-General of the Panel on Take-over and 
Mergers, in the article cited above, the reason for this is that a company 
will get a much better market rating over the long run if its original market 
flotation was done on a somewhat conservative basis, whereas "no harm is 
done to the old shareholders if the forecast is exceeded, even by a large 
amount [since their] benefit accrues in the enhanced market value of the 
shares which they have retained." He contrasts this with take-overs, where 
"both the attack and the defense tend to overestimate," but where, con-
versely, undue conservatism could do a real disservice to a company's own 
8 Fraser, "Account ing and the Merger Movement," The Accountant (September 9, 
1971), pp. 353, 355. 
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stockholders in terms of reflecting the real values they would be contributing 
to the proposed combination. 
Finally, as to profit forecasts in annual reports and the like, directors 
are not normally anxious to commit themselves to an estimate of the profit 
or loss for the current year, and hence do not do so unless there is some 
special occasion for it. And when forecasts are included in the annual 
report, according to Grieves, in the article noted earlier, they are "custom-
arily couched in vague and general terms and hedged with broad qualifi-
cations"; hence, he concludes that forecasts in annual reports do not have 
the significance of forecasts in prospectuses or take-over bids. 
Turning now to the question of possible liability for mistaken forecasts, 
as to take-over bids, it has already been noted that the City Code does not 
have the force of law; hence the language of Rule 16 calling for the com-
pilation of profit forecasts "with the greatest possible care by the directors, 
whose whole responsibilities they are" must be regarded as principally horta-
tory in nature (subject to the extra-legal sanctions referred to above). There-
fore, any liability on the directors in these circumstances would have to be 
predicated either on particular statutory provisions or general legal prin-
ciples. Great Britain has no Rule 10b-5, but it does have a Prevention of 
Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, which, in section 13, provides that "any 
person who, by any . . . forecast which he knows to be misleading, false or 
deceptive, . . . or by the reckless making (dishonestly or otherwise) of any 
. . . forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive" induces or attempts to 
induce another person to buy or sell securities shall be guilty of a crime. 
Obviously, a knowing or reckless exaggeration of estimated profits, as might 
occur in a take-over bid (or in a prospectus for that matter, although, as 
noted, under current practice, that is far less likely), would run afoul of this 
statute as to whether an action for damages would lie, that would depend on 
whether the English courts find that this statute gives rise to implied civil 
liability for violations (the theory on which civil actions are brought under 
Rule 10b-5 in this country). 
What about liability for negligent error in a forecast? There may be more 
risk of such liability for a forecast in a prospectus than in other situations, 
because of section 43 of the Companies Act, which imposes civil liability for 
misstatements in a prospectus unless the defendants had reasonable ground 
to believe the statement was true, an approach quite reminiscent of our 
section 11 of the Securities Act. Apart from that provision, liability for negli-
gence would have to be based upon common-law principles. Grieves sug-
gests that, whatever might be the case with stockholders who act pursuant 
to a prospectus or a take-over bid, "it is unlikely that a person who pur-
chased securities in the market in the ordinary way, on the strength of a 
profit forecast made by a company, would have any remedy." This sounds 
like an application of the privity doctrine, which may still have force in 
England although it seems to be evaporating here. In any event, Grieves 
notes that "civil actions based upon profit forecasts not being met have been 
conspicuous by their absence." But this probably says more about the still 
rudimentary state of stockholder's suits in England than it does about liability 
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for forecasts. There are several differences between the English practice 
and ours that account for the lag in the development of stockholder's suits 
there: particularly, (1) the fact that contingent fees, which have proved such 
a strong inducement to shareholder's suits here, are shunned by English 
lawyers; and (2) that under the English approach an unsuccessful plaintiff 
might be required to pay the defendants' legal expenses, rather than merely 
costs as is the custom here. Obviously, therefore, as a practical matter the 
English forecasting practice was able to be developed with a good deal less 
concern about liability than would be true here, especially today. 
As to possible accountants' liability in connection with forecasts, that 
depends, as it would in this country also, on just what role the accountants 
play. In take-over bids, Rule 16 of the City Code makes the forecast and the 
underlying assumption the responsibility of the directors; while accountants 
are required to report on the "accounting bases and calculations," it is 
assumed that they do not have any responsibility for the figures. The State-
ment of Guidance of the Council of the ICA, "Accountants' Report on Profit 
Forecasts" (The Accountant, May, 1969) seeks to confirm this, noting that 
profit forecasts are not capable of confirmation and verification by reporting 
accountants in the same way as financial statements for past periods, and 
that there is no question of their being "audited." The Statement of Guidance 
continues as follows: 
It is important that reporting accountants . . . in the wording of their 
report . . . should take care to avoid giving any impression that they 
are in any way confirming, underwriting, guaranteeing, or otherwise 
accepting responsibility for the ultimate accuracy and realization of 
forecasts. . . . Reporting accountants can however, within limits 
[discussed in the Statement], properly undertake a critical and ob-
jective review of the accounting bases and calculations for profit 
forecasts, and can verify that the forecasts have been properly com-
puted from the underlying assumptions and data and are presented 
on a consistent basis. 
Presumably, if accountants were negligent in their discharge of this function, 
they could be liable to stockholders who had acted on the tender offer to 
their loss (since the stockholder recipients of the tender offer would seem to 
be squarely within the group whose reliance on the accountants' report was 
clearly foreseeable). 
In addition, Practice Note No. 6, "The Assumptions on Which a Profit 
Forecast is Based" (one of the memoranda "of interpretation and practice" 
under Rule 16 of the City Code, promulgated by the Panel on Take-overs 
and Mergers) observes that accountants and financial advisers have sub-
stantial influence on the information given about assumptions, and adds, 
"Neither should allow an assumption to be published which appears to them 
unrealistic (or one to be omitted which appears to them to be important) 
without commenting on it in their reports." However, the nature of the re-
sponsibility imposed by this statement seems somewhat more removed from 
the normal accounting function than, say, "accounting bases and calcula-
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tions," and to that extent liability for negligence in discharging this responsi-
bility might well be less likely. 
It may be worth noting that in investigating cases of badly missed fore-
casts the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers asks the company's accountants 
and other financial advisers for a formal written explanation of how the fore-
casts went so wrong. A novel feature of such inquires, by the way, is that 
the Panel has itself employed leading firms of chartered accountants to act 
as consultants in considering the explanations given. 
Turning to forecasts in prospectuses, it does not appear that accountants 
play any part in the process. The Stock Exchange rules governing the con-
tents of a prospectus, which deal extensively with the required report by the 
auditors with respect to the company's profit or losses for the previous ten 
years, its assets and liabilities, and "such other matters which appear to the 
auditors to be relevant," do not seem to call for any comment on profit fore-
casts. Nevertheless, according to an article by Metz in the New York Times 
on February 24, 1972, on the English practice, accountants are unwilling to 
put their names on a document if the projection is out of line. 
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5. Accounting for Social Factors 
Accounting and Social Reporting 
Claude S. Colantoni, W. W. Cooper and H. J. Dietzer* 
Introduction 
The developments we shall be concerned with have been called "social 
accounting" or "social audit"1 and may have been accorded other names 
as well. They have appeared in the economic and social spectrum of 
national income2 as well as in individual company reporting and accounting 
of both external and internal nature. We shall not pursue all aspects of 
these wide ranging developments but will restrict our focus to company 
(as distinct from the society-wide) levels. We will use the term "social re-
porting" for the activities that we will discuss in order to avoid confusion 
with areas like national income and its social accounting extensions3 and 
to reserve the term "audit" for the customary usage that associates it with 
independent examination and verification (or validation) of accounting re-
ports. 
Extensions in accounting can be (and have been) effected in a variety 
of ways. They have occurred when established practices or principles are 
extended to such new areas as the extension of double-entry principles to 
national income accounting. They may also occur when concepts or methods 
* This document is based on research conducted for and sponsored by the Study 
Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, Robert M. Trueblood, Chairman. The authors express their 
appreciation to George H. Sorter and Martin S. Gans for their comments on this sub-
ject and also to E. L. Kohler for his editorial suggestions on the original version of 
this report. 
1 See, e.g., R. A. Bauer and D. H. Fenn, Jr., The Corporate Social Audit, Social Sci-
ence Frontiers, No. 5 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972). 
2 See, e.g., Will iam Nordhaus and James Tobin, " Is Growth Obsolete?", Cowles 
Foundation Discussion Paper No. 319 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1971). See also Nestor Terleckyj, National Goals Accounting (Washington, D. C.: 
National Planning Association, forthcoming). 
3 See, e.g., W. W. Cooper, et al; "Social Accounting: An Invitation to the Account ing 
Profession," The Accounting Review (July 1949), pp. 233-264. 
2 7 7 
are altered or otherwise extended, such as the extension of stewardship 
reports in a single measure (i.e., a scalar) to multi-dimensional (or multiple 
metric)4 uses, as may be found in areas such as cost/benefit analyses in 
public management. Having effected these distinctions, however, we should 
also indicate that their separation in practice may be difficult, and even con-
ceptually it may also be advantageous to consider them simultaneously as 
in, e.g., the portrayal of Figure 1, opposite, taken (with permission) from an 
article by Leo Herbert.5 
We have already indicated that both national income and corporate 
accounting are presently being reexamined and studied for possible altera-
tion and extension to areas that are of concern in this paper. It is useful 
therefore to commence by observing that both have been restricted, by and 
large, to the categories of economics and commerce such as sales, invest-
ments, and other such expenditures that are (a) market related and (b) 
measured or evaluated in the dimension of money prices. This was also the 
main orientation of managers, investors, and other like users of these reports. 
It seems natural, at least as a matter of history, to take the foregoing as 
a point of departure. Thus, we may regard social reporting as being con-
cerned with phenomena that are not adequately (1) reflected in the market 
mechanisms and (2) directed to audiences that extend beyond those custom-
arily concerned with company reports. 
We can observe that this characterization admits possibilities for chang-
ing the way social reports are developed and presented over time. Consider, 
for instance, the case of the FICA contributions associated with the U.S. 
Social Security legislation, first enacted in the 1930's, and contrast this with 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) legislation enacted in 1970.6 
The latter may be singled out for special attention in a social report while the 
former is not.7 It may be argued that this is entirely proper because the FICA 
contributions have now "shaken down" into an equilibrium. They have thus 
become a part of the structure and are considered a cost of doing business by 
virtually every firm. The OSHA administration, however, is sufficiently recent 
so that there are large "transients" with attendant differentials in costs in 
different firms. Some firms may be ahead and others behind in meeting these 
4 We are not drawing the usual mathematical distinctions between the concepts 
of "d imens ion" and "met r ic " ; they also extend to nonmetric and nonlinear spaces, 
as may be required. See Appendix A in A. Charnes and W W. Cooper, Management 
Models and Industrial Applications of Linear Programming (New York: John Wiley, Inc., 
1961). 
5 Leo Herbert, "The Environment in Governmental Accounting in the Seventies," 
The GAO Review (Fall 1972), pp. 22-32. 
6 Occupational Safety and Health Act, USCA, Title 29, Chapter 15, section 654(a): 
"Each employer—(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a 
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or 
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees; (2) shall comply 
with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this Act. . . . " 
7 Practices vary, as we shall see in some of the examples that follow. 
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"social responsibilities" and hence there may be an interest in distinguishing 
these features in a "social report." 
As another example we may consider an "externality" which occurs 
because the operation of a factory produces a pollutant that damages third 
parties (local residents) who do not enter into the market as transactors with 
this company. One possibility might be to impose a tax in order to deal with 
this "externality" in a socially acceptable way, and another approach might 
be to enact a regulation requiring the company to alter its behavior. Suppose, 
however, that a technological innovation converts the pollutant to a valuable 
commercial product at some subsequent time. Just as we indicated for FICA, 
then, one might argue that this situation is adequately reflected in the market 
and hence ought to make its appearance in the regular manner of ordinary 
financial statements. Failure to allow for such developments may weaken 
the dimensions of ordinary financial reporting and could conceivably open 
the way to a variety of abuses as well. 
As we have already indicated, the character of new audiences may also 
need attention. Such audiences may also shift in time, but in any event, there 
may be a need to recognize interests whose information requirements are not 
adequately served by the dimension of financial information and its customary 
categories. For instance, minorities may be primarily interested in the number 
of persons employed from their groups, while environmentalists may be con-
cerned with the emission and disposal of certain pollutants and have only an 
ancillary interest in related economic consequences. However, as we shall 
indicate toward the end of this paper, it may be possible to relate these differ-
ent categories and dimensions (or metrics) to their economic consequences 
(as well as to each other) and to do so in a way that is perhaps more illumi-
nating than simply treating each interest in isolation from the others. This is to 
say that some experimentation in extending the nature of accounting reports 
may be in order if we are to effect the indicated extension of accounting to 
the new areas that are represented by the interests of these groups. Hopefully 
this can be done in ways that will enhance the intelligence of all concerned, 
a main purpose of accounting insofar as the information it supplies leads 
directly or indirectly to actions by the management of these corporate entities. 
Background and Assumptions 
In Accounting Orientations 
Under the idealized assumptions of perfect competition, a regime of 
free market prices is supposed to provide requisite information for dealing 
with the twin problems of (i) economic coordination and (ii) efficiency. Tied 
to suitable means for conveying the information which is pertinent to such 
transactions and related to suitable motivation (income maximization) a 
certain optimum is supposed to result via the prices that (a) relate each deci-
sion to all others which are pertinent, as required for "coordination," and 
(b) evaluate, or motivate each such decision to proceed toward a least-cost 
orientation in every case. 
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This very formal summary from economic theory has also been given 
reflection in accounting in statements such as this one:8 
The social importance of accounting is clear, especially in relating 
to the income statement, since dependable information about 
earning power can be an important aid to the flow of capital into 
capable hands and away from unneeded industries. 
This is to say that ordinary accounting accomplishes what is socially desir-
able, and this relates such decisions not only to a current management and 
its methods but also to the decisions that affect scales of plants and com-
panies and hence to conditions for future management as well. 
Lying behind these considerations is the free trade supposition intro-
duced by Adam Smith—a trade occurs only when all transacting parties gain. 
Note, however, that this says nothing about third-party effects such as may 
appear when externalities are present in such transactions. It also says 
nothing very much about the rules or the general social structure under which 
such transactions may take place. For instance, even though all parties gain 
from a free trade, they need not gain equally and a recourse to regulations, 
taxes,9 or like devices, may then appear to be necessary, or desirable, in 
order to deal with the inequities that are perceived to be a consequence of 
such transactions. 
The foregoing characterizations have all been related to economic 
transactions or at least to economic considerations (such as, resource alloca-
tions) which will need to be dealt with in one way or another. Other calls to 
social action may also be encountered, of course, and these, too, may need 
to be dealt with, as is indicated by statements like the following:10 
In the past year or so, U.S. business leaders have been asked 
earnestly, and sometimes urgently to take on all kinds of bewilder-
ing new burdens which have previously been thought of as the 
responsibility of government. Companies from AT&T to Xerox have 
been urged—and in many cases have willingly accepted—the chal-
lenges to educate our children, police our streets, clean up our 
polluted air and water, teach our disadvantaged citizens how to 
earn a living, rebuild our slums, and even tell us how to run our 
cities more efficiently. 
These kinds of developments have, perhaps very naturally, led to a 
debate on whether business and accountants should, in fact, undertake any 
such activities and, naturally also, to some discussion of the nature of the 
8 From W. A. Paton and A. C. Littleton, An Introduction to Corporate Accounting 
Standards, (Columbus, Ohio: American Account ing Association, 1940), p. 3. 
9 See, e.g., H. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1938). 
10 Hazel Henderson, "Should Business Tackle Society's Problems?", Harvard Busi-
ness Review (July-August 1968), pp. 77-85. 
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responsibilities (if any) which they might assume along with ways in which 
they might then be handled and accounted for, etc. David Solomons,11 for 
instance, distinguishes between economic efficiency and business efficiency 
and indicates why profit maximization (and hence purely financial perfor-
mance measurement) may be "myopic." He concludes that "performance 
measurement means more than profit measurement, that our [accountants'] 
responsibilities are not confined to the private sector, that even within the 
private sector we cannot confine our attention to profit." This broader view 
of performance measurement is also described by the president of the Bank 
of America. 
We know we need the social cost budget as well as the conventional 
economic cost budget. We've taken the beginning step in asking 
our accountants to attempt to place detailed cost estimates on what 
management considers its major social responsibilities. We don't 
know how successful we will be, but we're certain some estimates 
are better than none. We're certain that they will enable us to 
make better business judgment and thereby avoid abrupt changes 
in significant programmes.12 
At the other end of the spectrum is Milton Friedman, who contends that 
"There is one and only one social responsibility of business . . . to increase 
its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game."13 That is, social 
costs and benefits (departures from economic efficiency) should not be 
cause for concern or a guiding principle of individual managers in the private 
sector. Hence, accountants should be concerned with business efficiency, 
not social or economic efficiency and allow for the fact that the latter will 
ultimately infringe on the former in one way or another.14 
Evidently, the role of business in achieving social (as well as economic) 
efficiency remains a source of debate. It is not clear either what role 
accountants should play in leading or serving such developments. It is also 
not clear how much choice they will have since responsibilities may be thrust 
11 David Solomons, "Performance Measurement—A Broader View" (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School of Finance and Commerce). See also 
David F. Linowes, "Social Responsibility of the Profession," The Journal of Account-
ancy (January 1971), pp. 66-69 and "Account ing for Social Progress," The New York 
Times, Point of View, March 14, 1971, where it is argued that accounting is a tool of 
all the social sciences and not only economics. 
12 A. W. Clausen, "Toward an Arithmetic of Quality," The Conference Board Record 
(May 1971), pp. 9-13. 
13 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962). 
14 For a slightly different counter argument to Friedman, see Henry C. Wall ich and 
John J. McGowan "Stockholder Interest and the Corporations' Role in Social Policy," 
A New Rationale for Corporate Social Policy (New York: Committee for Economic 
Development, 1971), pp. 39-60, where it is argued that corporate diversification has 
now proceeded to a point where undertaking such activities is now worthwhile from 
a stockholder's point of view. 
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upon them by government as well as business. Witness, for instance, the 
often quoted opinion of Judge Henry Friendly in the Continental Vending 
Machine case. In at least some interpretations15 this decision has been 
interpreted to mean that it is full and fair disclosure which is controlling in 
an accounting report rather than adherence to generally accepted accounting 
principles.16 Such interpretations can, in the temper of the present times, 
also be extended to situations such as are envisioned in the following quota-
tion extracted from a statement by (then) SEC Commissioner William J. 
Casey:17 
We will require disclosure of any material litigation against an 
issuer under various air, water, and other antipollution laws. More 
than that, in the examination of filings made with the Commission, 
we will look to the nature and character of the business to see if 
significant capital outlays are likely to be required in order to elim-
inate pollution of streams or atmosphere, or if significant product 
redesign seems likely to be called for to meet antipollution stand-
ards. The same kind of inquiry will be made with respect to the 
impact of safety standards on a company's product line. Where 
these problems potentially exist, the burden should be put on the 
company to represent that they do not exist, or that they do not 
materially affect the capital needs or earning power of the business. 
Scope 
With this background in mind, we may now outline the scope of this 
paper as follows: We do not propose to enter the debate on whether business 
15 See, e.g., Business Week (April 22, 1971), p. 55. See also D. B. Isbell, "The 
Continental Vending Case: Lessons for the Profession," The Journal of Accountancy 
(August 1970), pp. 33-40 and "AICPA Brief in Continental Vending," The Journal of 
Accountancy (May 1970), pp. 69-73. 
16 Analogous positions have also been advocated by others. For instance, in the 
critical "Comments of Leonard Spacek," p. 57 of Maurice Moonitz, The Basic Postu-
lates of Accounting, Accounting Research Study No. 1 (New York: CPA, 1961), the 
fol lowing constructive suggestion is also offered: 
My own view [i.e., Spacek's view] is that the one basic postulate underlying 
accounting principles may be stated as that of fairness—fairness to all seg-
ments of the business community (management, labor, stockholders, cred-
itors, customers and the public), determined and measured in the light of 
the economic and political environment and the modes of thought and 
customs of all segments—to the end that the accounting principles based 
upon this postulate shall produce financial accounting for the lawfully 
established economic rights and interests that is fair to all segments. 
In further confirmation of the same point as the one examined by Judge Friendly, 
Spacek then goes on " . . . to confirm the necessity of recognizing this postulate as 
the only one on which pronouncements on accounting principles can be based if 
such principles are to serve the needs of the public. . . ." See also The Postulate 
of Accounting—What It Is, How It Should Be Determined, How It Should Be Used 
(New York: Arthur Andersen & Co., 1960), pp. 25-26. 
17 The Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1971, p. 2. 
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firms should undertake responsibilities for achieving social (as well as eco-
nomic) efficiency. We propose only to examine some of the practices that 
have been developing along with possible guidelines and pitfalls. By and 
large, we shall also restrict our attention to the role of the accountant as it 
bears on issues of disclosure in reporting socio-economic events that have 
significant financial consequences for the firm. Admittedly, this position is 
only a first step, but it is at least consistent with the goal of "profitability re-
porting" and the goal of improving the economic judgment abilities of busi-
nessmen and investors. 
We shall not confine ourselves to practices that have already been 
evidenced but shall also examine some of the characterizations that have 
been provided for guiding such developments. Also, we shall subsequently 
indicate possibilities that we (among others) have suggested for extending 
such characterizations and for broadening the kinds of reports that have thus 
far been presented. In particular, we shall suggest extending such reports 
into multi-dimensional accountings that can be used by minority groups, 
environmentalists, or others besides those (investors and businessmen) who 
have been the customary recipients of corporate accounting statements. 
En route to these developments we shall also treat other topics, such as 
human resources accounting, as a part of social reporting even though, from 
some standpoints, they may have been regarded as being only pointers 
toward better utilization of such information by members of the business 
and investment community. Other treatments, however, including those of a 
multidimensional nature can also be accorded to these human resources and 
developed in ways that are of potential value to these groups (i.e., the busi-
ness and investment community) and others as well. We shall find a back-
ground discussion of human resources accounting useful in assessing these 
alternatives. But, of course, even this does not end the matter since still 
further extensions are possible which include recourse to disclosures of a 
budgetary (future projection) as well as an accounting (historical) variety.18 
Pursuit of such additional topics, however, is not in order for a paper such as 
this, which is intended to stay fairly close to existing practices and past 
concepts from the literature of accounting." 
Audits of Social Reports 
The social accounting literature contains occasional references to a 
social audit in the sense of review by an independent agent who attests to 
18 Only a few synoptic comments will be made about such possibil it ies in this 
paper. A more detailed discussion may be found in C. Colantoni, W. W. Cooper, and 
H. J. Dietzer, "Budgetary Disclosure and Corporate Social Report ing," Proceedings of 
a Conference on Social Accounting (Seattle: Battelle Research Center, 1973). 
" T h e idea of budgetary disclosure has been discussed in the literature, of course, 
but mainly with reference to the usual dimensions of financial accounting. See, e.g., 
W. W. Cooper, N. Dopuch, and T. F. Keller, "Budgetary Disclosure and Other Sug-
gestions for Improving Accounting Reports," The Accounting Review (October 1968), 
pp. 640-648. 
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or ascertains the state of the social environment or the social consequences 
of particular actions. In some cases, the referent is the entire social scene, 
as when the quality of life in a society is the topic of interest.20 In other cases 
the center of attention is, as in the present paper, the reports of private 
corporations.21 Even in the latter class of cases, however, there is some 
question not only about the content of such reports but also about who should 
perform the reporting and attest functions. 
Historically, an audit has been performed so that the stockholders or 
other investors22 might have an objective opinion concerning the condition 
of their investment. Hence, one would expect these same stockholders and 
investors to be the prime audience for an audited corporate social report, 
at least if such audits (and reports) are developed from the context of present 
accounting practices. To some extent this is the point of view taken in the 
present paper but, of course, other points of view and approaches are also 
possible. In this view, a social audit would be designed to provide informa-
tion which might affect stockholder and investor behavior. The resulting 
information is not meant to be a public relations document used to smooth 
opinions within the community or a government—although it may well serve 
this purpose too—but, in any case, an auditor or accountant would attest to 
social measurements and information deemed relevant and significant. 
What are these events and how should they be measured? In an address 
at the Northeast Regional Meetings of the AAA, Professor Lee Seidler pre-
sented three effects caused by an economic transaction which are capable 
(in theory) of being measured.23 These are (1) the direct effect, (2) the social 
effect, and (3) secondary or other effects. This is to say that there are two 
"direct" effects: (1) the one with which accountants have been customarily 
20 See, e.g., A. Charnes, W. W. Cooper, and G. Kozmetsky, "Measuring, Monitoring 
and Modell ing Quality of Life," Management Science (June 1973), pp. 1173-1188. 
See also N. Johnson and E. Ward, "Cit izen Information Systems," Management 
Science (December 1972), pp. P-21-P-33; and Nestor Terleckyj, National Goals 
Accounting (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1973, forthcoming) or 
"Measuring Progress Toward Social Goals: Some Possibilities at National and Local 
Levels," Management Science (August 1970), pp. B765-B768. 
21 R. A. Bauer and D. H. Fenn, Jr., The Corporate Social Audit, Social Science 
Frontiers, No. 5 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972). See also Raymond A. 
Bauer, Social Indicators (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973). 
22 They have also been performed on government agencies and programs. See, 
e.g., Standards tor Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities and 
Functions, by the Comptroller General of the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1972), p. 1: " . . . The interests of many users of reports on 
Government audits are broader than those that can be satisfied by audits performed 
to establish the credibil i ty of financial reports. To provide for audits that will fulfill 
these broader interests, the standards in this statement include those prescribed by 
the AICPA and [also] additional standards for audits of broader scope. . . ." 
23 Lee Seidler, "Toward an Accountant 's Concept of Social Profit." Paper pre-
sented at the Northeast Regional Meeting of the American Accounting Association, 
Garden City, New York, April 1972. 
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concerned as it might be measured by the dollar value of exchanges between 
transacting parties and (2) the social effect, which involves people who don't 
participate in the transaction. An example of the latter involves the physical 
well being, say, of persons who live in the vicinity of a highly polluting 
production facility. The secondary effects, which form Seidler's third cate-
gory, are also concerned with effects that indirectly influence persons who 
don't participate in the transaction. Examples would include, say, an altera-
tion of land values in a region caused by the announcement of a firm's 
decision to relocate. Note, however, that the latter, as a so-called economic 
externality, is translated into market measures that can be identified relatively 
easily, at least by subsequent transaction possibilities, whereas the former 
effects, in the form of health or social esthetics, are not. 
Viewing these three classes of possibilities, Professor Seidler argues 
that the current focus in accounting reports should shift toward the inclusion 
of social variables. This is consistent with the goal of a corporate social 
audit, of course, but Seidler also cautions against assuming that accountants 
are currently capable of measuring indirect effects of either an economic or 
social variety. He further questions whether a private firm, as contrasted 
with government or some independent agency, should assume such respon-
sibilities. The cost-benefit evaluation of the worth to society of a given plant 
location is the responsibility of the political governing body and should be 
associated with their reporting procedures, not those of the firm whose plant 
location is in question. 
Fundamental to any meaningful audit is the ability to secure validation, 
including measurement and the reporting of pertinent information. Such 
problems increase in complexity when dealing with such social variables 
and, indeed, the formidable character of these difficulties has led some 
persons to contend that "social accounting doesn't exist."24 The customary 
"signal" to an accountant to record a given event may be absent, or the 
requisite audit trail may be inaccessible—as when consequences that are 
remote or evanescent are involved, or when these consequences depend 
on activities by others as well as the entity under audit.25 From an auditor's 
perspective the problem can be even more severe if the attest is to conform 
to the tests of fairness and completeness with respect to all who might be 
concerned with the pertinent events. 
Even questions of consistency and comparability also pose new prob-
lems for consideration. Internal consistency between the reporting of financial 
and social events must be an important consideration in any accounting dis-
closure accompanied by an audit certificate. Does it then follow that social 
events must be at the same level of detail and reliability as the financial 
transaction? Comparability between firms, of course, is another important 
24 Quoted from Frederick Andrews, in The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1971. 
25 An example of such a situation might be dangerous atmospheric pollution levels 
resulting from the simultaneous activities of more than one firm. 
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consideration. Carefully stated standards, perhaps by industry, might be 
necessary to obtain the comparability that might be needed for evaluations. 
Even when this is all done, the valuation problems also pose formidable 
challenges to those who suggest that nonappropriable social benefits should 
be an objective for corporate performance measurement.26 
One might try to reduce all such valuations to a single (dollar) dimension 
or one might provide more than one measure and, of course, other ap-
proaches are also possible. In attempting to present possibly expanded or 
modified dimensions of corporate behavior, Professor N. C. Churchill27 pro-
vided a scheme for classifying various available measures which we may 
summarize as follows: 
1. A primitive approach would be to take an inventory of current activi-
ties (e.g., XYZ tries to stop pollution) in order to identify and list them. This 
view focuses on the nature of what is being done. 
2. A second level would focus on measurement of how much or the 
extent of efforts expended. In this context an example becomes XYZ spends 
$30 million on pollution control devices. 
3. An alternative or complementary measure would be directed toward 
a process measure or an examination of the transformation of inputs into 
outputs. In this form XYZ is characterized as creating .25 tons of sulfur per 
ton of finished products. 
4. A final form of measurement involves the worth or value of the 
outputs. For example, it could cost $.50 per ton of product to remove the 
.25 tons of sulfur from the air. As an alternative one might expect a 2% rise 
in local health costs as a result of the .25 tons of sulfur emissions. 
Notice that this last measure attempts to assess both what is being 
accomplished and what the worth or cost of that accomplishment is to 
society. This is a sophisticated (and perhaps reasonably effective) way of 
considering the measurement of corporate responsibility but it is perhaps 
best to begin by considering the other possibilities first. This we shall do 
below in the form of what we shall refer to as the following approaches: 
(1) an inventory (or listing) of representative actions; (2) a traditional financial 
approach which attempts to associate a dollar cost (of an historical or oppor-
tunity cost, perhaps discounted, variety) with such activities in order to 
identify them as economic events with economic consequences that are con-
gruent with the usual categories identified in accounting reports; and (3) 
still other extensions to social events or events with social consequences 
which may be either identified with related economic characterizations or 
else (and better, we think) admit of extensions to other metrics, perhaps of 
a multidimensional variety. 
2 6 See, e.g., Solomons, Performance Measurement—A Broader View. 
2 7 Neil C. Churchil l, "The Accountant's Role in Social Responsibil i ty," presented 
for discussion in the Distinguished Accountant's Lecture Series, University of Florida, 
February 17, 1972. 
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The Inventory of Representative Actions 
The "inventory" approach involves, for the most part, only a listing of 
events or transactions that characterize the involvement of the corporation 
in the community. As such, it is usually selective rather than exhaustive and 
is intended only to highlight selected aspects of a company's social concerns. 
(Such an approach is consistent with Churchill's first measure of perform-
ance, as listed above, except that identification of costs incurred or resources 
allocated is usually also included in this format.) A primary advantage of 
such a report is the relative ease with which a collection of diverse activities 
may all be presented and supported at various levels by possibly disparate 
sets of measures. Such diversity may also be considered a weakness, of 
course, by making it difficult to effect comparisons over time or between 
firms and, additionally—as Churchman, for instance, has observed28—such 
an inventory approach offers little in the way of standards for judging the 
behavior of a firm. 
A recent report by Sidney Jones of the University of Michigan sum-
marizes a research plan and the preliminary results of a study of corporate 
social reporting activities.29 His empirical results, based on an examination 
of the annual reports of 55 major corporations taken from Fortune's list of 
500 large corporations, are shown in Exhibit 1, pages 290-291. Jones' study 
is restricted to the analysis of annual reports which, although of limited value, 
remains a primary means of corporate communication to investors. Almost 
without exception, these corporations used the inventory approach to dis-
closing social information in their annual reports. Note, however, that even 
for such annual reports and even for the loose standards of disclosure that 
such inventory listings permit, it is not the case that "social accounting" 
disclosures appeared in all of them. Professor Jones attributes nonreporting 
to at least the following factors: The company has nothing to report; the 
amount of financial commitment and qualitative effort is not significant 
enough to report; or the company has decided to avoid criticism by not 
reporting any of the activities it is involved in. 
The foregoing background characterizations should provide some per-
spective in evaluating the following examples of inventories of representative 
action, an approach currently favored by many corporations. 
Bank of America Fact Sheet, May 1972: Linking the well being of the 
community it serves to the success of the Bank of America has been an-
nounced as fundamental in guiding the Bank's activities. The significance 
of this function was also highlighted by the appointment of an executive 
vice-president in charge of social policy, who is responsible for monitoring 
and coordinating all aspects of the Bank's activities involving social per-
28 C. W. Churchman, "On the Facility, Felicity and Morality of Measuring Social 
Change," The Accounting Review (January 1971), pp. 30-35. 
29 Sidney L. Jones, "Report ing Corporate Social Responsibility Activit ies," Financial 
Management Association National Conference, October 8, 1971. 
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formance. The areas of concern include housing, minorities, environment, 
social unrest, and specialized financial support. 
Exhibit 2, page 293, is the so-called Fact Sheet excerpted from this bank's 
report (presumably an annual or at least a periodic report) entitled "Social 
Problems and the Bank of America." The exhibit provides buttressing detail 
for this summary which is, in fact, a listing of the topics covered in the report. 
The area entitled New Opportunity Home Loan Program under "Housing" 
will give some idea of what is involved. The Bank's report cites this program 
as an attempt to make a tangible contribution to fostering home ownership 
and servicing a need for funds for single-family dwellings in disadvantaged 
areas. Approximately $125 million has been provided to 7,400 families 
during the past four years in this program. The Bank also reports, however, 
that during the 1960-69 decade an average of over $500 million per year 
was extended in financing residential housing in California, and this is 16 
times greater than the yearly extension rate for the New Opportunity Home 
Loan Program. Of course, this does not mean that the Bank is not pursuing 
both its regular and New Opportunity Programs vigorously. Something fur-
ther, however, is evidently required. Bank of America could be doing an 
outstanding job, and there might be very good reasons underlying these 
differences (e.g., it costs more to build a home in Marin County than East Palo 
Alto, or the $5 billion includes a sizable portion of multiple-family dwelling 
money, etc.). However, such reasons need not be obvious or easily identified 
and audited, and even the issue of full (or adequate) disclosure remains to 
be resolved under this, or any inventory approach to reporting corporate 
social behavior. 
U.S. Steel Corporation: "Response to Social and Urban Problems in 
America," October 1970: U.S. Steel holds the position that, although profit 
maximization is a good and reasonable objective to follow, it also carries a 
parallel duty to help build and maintain the kind of stable, healthy society 
that is necessary to the successful operations of any business—or other 
groups in society. It is not wholly clear whether these parallel objectives are 
always compatible, or, as might then be implied, that they then reduce to a 
single objective or even the linked objectives articulated in the Bank of 
America's report.30 In any event, this is the impact of the above document 
in which U.S. Steel attempts to report some of the steps it has taken to meet 
its view of these responsibilities. The report includes activities which U.S. 
Steel has taken or which it has sponsored in areas such as providing job 
opportunities (including opportunities to youth and minorities), aid to educa-
tion, urban housing, urban transportation, environmental control, social agen-
cies, and governmental affairs. Descriptions follow the same form as those 
in the Bank of America report, but the information supplied is mainly only 
qualitative and hence provides an even less adequate basis for numerical 
analyses and comparisons. 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Dollar Adjustments and Accruals in 
Traditional Financial Statement Form 
There seems to be little point in going on to still other variants of inven-
tory listing.31 Hence, we now turn to the second of the three approaches 
which we have indicated we would consider. One such approach to report-
ing corporate activity in the social area would simply extend the boundaries 
of accounting to include certain types of economic events not presently 
recorded. Another approach would extend the present entity concepts to 
account for transaction consequences in other parts of a total economic 
system. The first of these two approaches would include additional costs, 
or expenses, such as pollution costs or expenses, but would also retain 
not only the format but also the categorizations presently found in financial 
reports such as the balance sheet and the income statement. The second 
approach would also retain such statements but would extend them to include 
new categories and also to value imputations (or estimates) that extend to 
other entities, such as customers and subcontractors, and their transactions 
as well.32 
For purposes of further reference, we may now distinguish these two 
approaches as (1) imputation to the entity and (2) imputation beyond the 
entity, or entity extensions, as we shall describe them in the two examples 
that follow. 
Imputation to the Entity: Pollution Control Through Social Cost Conver-
sion: Under suitable conditions, as we have already observed, the motive 
for profit maximization will also provide for minimization of costs, both private 
and social. The former are borne directly by the corporation while the latter 
are distributed through the community, perhaps via other corporations or 
markets. Social costs include the depletion, contamination and deterioration 
of resources such as air, water, and land used in production processes, and 
these may or may not take the form of "free goods" to the users. 
A firm interested in maximizing its own private profits has little incentive 
to conserve these resources when they are free goods from its internal point 
of view. Note, however, that such free goods to the transactors may not 
be free to others, and that in a recent article by Beams and Fertig,33 it was 
indicated that the damage arising from at least some of these externalities 
can be identified and measured for consistent applications in a full-fledged 
system of accrual accounting. Costs of neutralizing damage to the environ-
ment are costs of production and should be expensed or capitalized as the 
situation warrants. These transactions would be audited in normal fashion and 
their impact would be displayed in the traditional financial statement manner. 
As might be expected, the Beams-Fertig suggestion can be (and has 
been) disputed, even when its technical feasibility is admitted. The account-
31 See the study by Jones as discussed for Exhibit 1, above. 
32 Supposedly these could all be audited, at least in principle, once the measure-
ments and valuations are accomplished. 
33 Floyd A. Beams and Paul E. Fertig "Pollut ion Control through Social Cost Con-
version," Journal of Accountancy (November 1971), pp. 37-42. 
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ant, William A. Paton, for instance, comments, "I also find it difficult to 
accept the widening of the scope of accounting, per Beams and Fertig, to 
include responsibility for measuring pollution of air, water, and so on, and 
allocating the 'costs' to particular business entities for specific periods. I 
like to view accounting in fairly broad terms, but we can't cover the water-
Exhibit 2 
May 1972 
Bank of America Fact Sheet* 
Housing 
General Home Loan Information 
New Opportunity Home Loan Program 
Housing Projects in Minority Areas 
Minorities 
Areas of Aid to Minorities 
Jobs and Job Training 
Scholarships and Educational Programs 
Banking Services for Small Businesses 
Small Business Administration Support 
Job Development Corporation Support 
Small Business Reporter 
Branches in Minority Areas 
Environment 
State and Municipal Bonds: Purchases and Investments 
Loan Policy: Special Environmental Consideration 
The Envirotech Approach to Pollution Control 
Use of Recycled Paper for Bank Publications 
Environmental Reports and Publications 
ECO-LOGIC Cartoons 
Social Unrest 
Social Unrest as a Priority Area 
Student Relations Program 
Loans to Students 
Social Advocates for Youth 
Placer Community Action Council 
Other Activities 
Economic Reports 
Emergency Action After Disasters 
* Source: Bank of America, "Social Problems and the Bank of America," Bank of 
America Fact Sheet, May 1972. 
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front, and we surely don't deserve to be viewed as partners in acts of pollu-
tion."34 Beams and Fertig counter Paton with, "It is simply a matter of 
accounting for all of the costs of current production. The cost of polluting the 
environment is (or should be) a private cost of current production, in exactly 
the same sense that the cost of paying retirement benefits to current workers 
who will eventually retire is a private cost of current production." That is, 
they are arguing that this should all be considered as a "rule-of-the-game 
alteration" or as a change in the structure or conditions of doing business 
just as though a new regulation or social attitude had come into existence. 
Of course, the latter is not the only possibility and other recourses to 
the market or to "price-like" mechanisms may be brought into play. Many 
economists argue, for instance, that this should be done in a direct way by 
governmental use of tax and subsidy instruments.35 This would settle the 
difference between Paton and Beams and Fertig, perhaps, although it might 
not resolve the social problems that the latter are addressing. For instance, 
one difficulty that needs to be considered is the possibility of multiple sources 
of effluent so that such charges or subsidies may need to be varied in terms 
of the levels (dangerous or not) that the surrounding ambience may permit. 
Possibly the Beams and Fertig approach might also take this into account by 
varying their estimates accordingly. This would again cause them to differ 
with Professor Paton unless, of course, a coordinating governmental unit were 
established that could vary its tax or subsidy rates and communicate them to 
separate decision-making units via suitable metering and communication 
devices.36 
Of course, the alternate possibility of straightforward regulation or even 
a government takeover of all the pertinent decision-making institutions might 
also need to be considered. Unless such social effects can be separately 
identified37 with each firm's own decisions, however, then a correct imputa-
tion (or valuation) would require simultaneous consideration of the behavior 
of other firms, maybe not even in the same industry. Finally, apart from the 
society-wide (i.e., "governmental") considerations such as might be asso-
ciated with pollution, it is not clear how such imputations are supposed to 
inform and thereby affect the decisions of either management or the various 
interested social groups. Given the differing characteristics and interest of 
these groups, it is by no means clear that each will assign the same weights 
34 Will iam A. Paton, "Pollut ion Cost" (Letter), Journal of Accountancy, (May 1972), 
pp. 28-30, with a reply by Floyd A. Beams and Paul E. Fertig. 
35 See, e.g., A. M. Freeman, III and Robert Haverman, "Residual Charges for Pollu-
tion Control: A Policy Evaluation," Science (July 1972), pp. 322-329. 
36 Including related (possibly nonlinear) models for evaluation or estimation. See, 
e.g., Terry A. Ferrar, "Nonl inear Effluent Charges," Management Science, vol. 20, 
no. 2 (October 1973), pp. 169-177. 
37 This is related to the property that A. Whinston refers to as "separabi l i ty." See 
A. Whinston, "Price Guides in Decentralized Organizations," in W. W. Cooper, H. J. 
Leavitt, and M. W. Shelley, eds., New Perspectives in Organization Research (New 
York: John Wiley, Inc., 1963). 
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(or tradeoff values) as the others or even the same weights that are assigned 
by management (and accountants) to current market imputations and the 
social structures that underlie them. On the other hand, a governmental unit 
(such as was described above) might well be interested in, and might also 
be able to supply, the requisite data to produce what is wanted in the interests 
of a total social effort. 
Imputations and Entity Extensions: The Example of Abt Associates, Inc.: 
We now turn to an example from Abt Associates, Inc., in order to examine a 
case in which an attempt is made to trace, as far as is possible, the social 
effects of the many operations of a single entity and their consequences for 
other entities and the total social scene. This has all been done under the 
leadership of Clark Abt, the firm's founder and president. 
It is Clark Abt's contention that there is a need to apply rational manage-
ment techniques to the task of increasing social return on corporate invest-
ment.38 Arranging an accounting in dollar equivalents provides a rational 
basis for assessing the social costs and benefits of various activities from an 
investment point of view. Using the mythical Flinthard Corporation, Mr. Abt 
indicates how this might all be done in a way that extends to uses of panel 
data and a linear programing approach to optimizing the mix of social 
programs. 
We do not propose to pursue these social reporting extensions as 
applied to Flinthard Corporation, partly because they lead into issues like 
planning and budgetary disclosures and hence away from the accounting 
issues that are the concern of this paper.39 We propose rather to focus on 
the Social Income Statements and Balance Sheets of Abt Associates itself. 
These are presented in Exhibits 3 and 4, pages 296-299, and also in the notes 
in Exhibit 5, pages 300-301, all of which were taken from what is called the 
Social Audit portion of the Company's Annual Report. 
This Social Income Statement, it may be observed, proceeds in terms 
of dollar valuations that are presumed to be additive. It also alters the usual 
income statement categories and replaces them with ones that distinguish 
between social benefits and costs to (1) staff, (2) community, and (3) general 
public. In each category a net social income (or cost) is recorded. The net 
dollar values in each category are then totalled to a net social income to 
staff, community and public. These are then distinguished from a category 
entitled "net social income to clients" obtained through estimates of savings 
or other benefits over the cost of contract services supplied by Abt Associates. 
38 Clark Abt, "Managing to Save Money While Doing Good," Innovation (No. 27, 
1972), pp. 38-47. 
39 We have, in any event, dealt with these topics elsewhere in greater detail. See, 
e.g., C. Colantoni, W. W. Cooper and H. J. Dietzer, "Budgetary Disclosure and Cor-
porate Social Reporting," Proceedings of a Conference on Corporate Social Reporting 
(Seattle: Battelle Research Center, 1973). See also A. Charnes, C. Colantoni, W. W. 
Cooper and K. O. Kortanek, "Economic, Social and Enterprise Accounting and Math-
ematical Models," The Accounting Review (January 1972), pp. 31-37. 
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Exhibit 3 
Abt Associates, Inc. Social Income Statement* 
Year ended December 31, 1971 with comparative figures for 1970 
Social Benefits and Costs to Staff: 1971 1970 
Social Benefits to Staff: 
Health Insurance, Life Ins., Sick Leave $ 93,492 $ 67,271 
Career Advancement (Note A) 345,886 173,988 
Company School & Tuition Reimbursement . . 6,896 — 
Vacation, Holidays, Recreation 207,565 163,994 
Food Services, Child Care, Parking 57,722 41,292 
Quality of Life (Space and its Quality) 61,002 70,551 
Total Benefits to Staff 772,563 517,096 
Social Costs to Staff: 
Layoffs and Involuntary Terminations (Note B) 9,560 7,560 
Overtime Worked but Not Paid (Note C) 654,000 474,000 
Inequality of Opportunity (Note D) — 3,600 
Total Costs to Staff 663,560 485,160 
Net Social Income to Staff: $ 109,003 $ 31,936 
Social Benefits and Costs to Community: 
Social Benefits to Community: 
Local Taxes Paid (Note E) $ 38,952 $ 31,091 
Environmental Improvements . . 10,100 8,367 
Local Tax Worth of Net Jobs Created 20,480 15,750 
Total Benefits to Community: 69,532 55,208 
Social Costs to Community: 
Local Taxes Consumed in Services (Note E) 55,700 34,400 
Net Social Income to Community: $ 13,832 $ 20,808 
* Source: Abt Associates, Inc., Annual Report and Social Audit, 1971. 
Of course, this does not end the matter since the company also pro-
vides services that are of value to its clients. This is not merely a matter of 
cost or market imputation only—although constructs related to them are 
freely used—and an effort is made to estimate the dollar value of benefits 
beyond those which are represented by the contract revenues received. See 
Notes G and H in Exhibit 5. 
This seems to be about as far as Abt Associates has carried the latter 
estimates. A case might be made for extending them to the clients of their 
clients (as well as the suppliers and suppliers to suppliers). This might 
quickly get unmanageable and would almost certainly become unauditable 
under any system resembling the present "free market type."40 Carried to 
4 0 Even the use of a statistical (or other) sampling scheme would probably become 
unfeasible if extended to remote tiers of the company's customers and suppliers. Cf. 
W. W. Cooper and R. M. Trueblood, "Research and Practice in Statistics Applied to 
Accounting, Auditing and Management Control," Accounting Review (April 1955), pp. 
221-229. . 
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Exhibit 3 (continued) 
Abt Associates, Inc. Social Income Statement* 
















other parts of this statement, moreover, it is not even clear how such imputa-
tions can (or should) be made—as witness, for example, the inclusion of 
governmental units which are the recipients of this company's taxes.41 
41 In this connection, we might, for instance, quote the following item from Harry 
Magdoff, "The American Empire and the U. S. Economy," Monthly Review Press, as 
published in Warner Modular Publications, Reprint No. 207, 1973, p. 296, which 
describes a report prepared by the U. S. Navy, in 1922, with the following full title: 
The United States Navy as an Industrial Asset—What the Navy had done for Industry 
and Commerce, written by the Office of Naval Intelligence, U .S. Navy in October, 1922, 
and published in 1923 by the U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 
According to Magdoff, the following excerpt, from page 4 of this report, is typical. 
" In the Asiatic area a force of gunboats is kept on constant patrol in the Yangtze 
River. These boats are able to patrol from the mouth of the river up nearly 2,000 
miles into the very heart of China. American businessmen have freely stated that 
should the United States withdraw this patrol they would have to leave at the same 
time. Our Navy not only protects our own citizens and their property, but is con-
stantly protecting humanity in general and frequently actually engages the bands of 
bandits who infest this region." 
Social Benefits and Costs to General Public: 1971 
Social Benefits to General Public: 
Federal Taxes Paid (Notes E & F) $ 165,800 
State Taxes Paid (Notes E & F) 55,500 
Contributions to Knowledge (Publications, etc.) 14,100 
Federal & State Tax Worth of Net Jobs Cre-
ated 69,800 
Total Benefits to Public: 305,200 
Social Costs to General Public: 
Federal Services Consumed (Notes E & F) . . 83,000 
State Services Consumed (Notes E & F) 31,100 
Total Costs to Public: 114,100 
Net Social Income (Cost) to General Public: . . . $ 191,100 
Net Social Income (Cost) to Staff, Community & 
Public $ 313,935 
Social Benefits and Costs to Clients: 1971 
Social Benefits to Clients: 
Added Value of Previous Contracts to 
Clients (Note G) $22,337,500 
Social Costs to Clients: 
Contract Revenues as Opportunity Costs 
(Note H) 4,572,459 
Net Social Income to Clients: $17,765,041 
* Source: Abt Associates, Inc., Annual Report and Social Audit, 1971. 
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Exhibit 4 
Abt Associates, Inc., Social Balance Sheet* 
Year ended December 31, 1971 with comparative figures for 1970 
Social Assets Available 
Staff 
Available within one year (Note I) 
Available after one year (Note J) 
Training Investment (Note K) 
Less Accumulated Training Obsolescence 
(Note K) 
Total Staff Assets 
Organization 
Social Capital Investment (Note L) 
Retained Earnings 
Land 
Buildings at cost 
Equipment at cost 
Total Organization Assets 
Research 
Proposals (Note M) 
Child Care Research 
Social Audit 
Total Research 
Public Services Consumed Net of Tax Payments 
(Note E) 
Total Social Assets Available 
1971 1970 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Abt Associates, Inc.* 
Notes to the Social Income Statement and Social Balance Sheet 
Note A: Career advancement is expressed as the added earning power from salary 
increases for merit and/or promotion. In 1971, 49 employees (18% of total staff) 
were promoted, compared to 33 (13% of staff) in 1970. In 1971, 79% of employees 
earned merit or promotion increases, versus 42% in 1970. 
Note B: The social cost of layoff is estimated to be one-month's salary for each layoff, 
i.e., the mean time to next employment is one month. 
Note C: Staff-contributed overtime worked but not paid is equal to approximately 
35% of required 40 work hours. This represents a social cost to staff in free time 
foregone. 
Note D: Equality of opportunity is defined in terms of the costs to individuals of the 
inequality of opportunity for appropriately remunerative work and advancement, as 
measured by the income loss equal to the difference between what the minority 
individual earns and what a majority individual doing the same job with the same 
qualifications earns. Minority advancement improved from 6% of blacks, Chicanos, 
Indians and orientals promoted in 1970 to 13% promoted in 1971, and from 13% 
of women promoted in 1970 to 25% promoted in 1971. This should be compared 
with 12% of white males promoted in 1970 and 10% in 1971, and a company average 
of 13% promotions in 1970 and 18% in 1971. The aggregate ethnic minority and 
female staff promoted in 1970 was 22% of total minority and women, compared to 
12% in 1970. Thus in 1971 the career advancement of minorities and women doubled, 
and was twice that of majority males. The total minority and female staff was 55% of 
the entire staff (150 of 271) in 1971, compared to 58% (144 of 246) in 1970. The 
slight drop in minority representation resulted from the loss of six American Indian 
employees who chose to remain at a terminated Utah branch location after the con-
tract on Indian education was completed and the site shut down. 
Note E: Taxes paid are considered a social contribution or benefit while public 
services paid for by taxes that are consumed by the company are considered social 
costs. When the company does not consume public services paid for in part by 
company paid taxes, such as local school services not used by the company, a net 
social income contribution is produced. The company's share of Federal and state 
public services consumed is computed by multiplying the company's fraction of total 
(Federal and state) corporation revenues times the total corporations' tax contribu-
tion to defraying public services costs, on the assumption that the tax laws tax corpo-
rations in the aggregate approximately in proportion to their aggregate consumption 
of services. The company's share of local services consumed is computed by multi-
plying the company's fraction of total local population times the total local taxes 
contributed to defraying local public services costs, on the assumption that local 
services use is roughly in proportion to the number of people using local services. 
This share is then reduced by the percentage (28%) of the local budget devoted 
to services not consumed by the company (local schools). 
Note F: In 1970 in which no taxes were paid as a result of a loss carryforward, the 
company nevertheless is estimated to have consumed the same kinds of public 
services paid for by 1971 taxes, in a proportion of 1970 to 1971 revenues for Federal 
and state taxes, and 1970 to 1971 staff number for local services. 
Note G: Benefits to clients from contract work completed are computed by adding 
multiplier effects expressible in dollar equivalent terms to contract revenues, and 
subtracting contract revenues of work not used by the client (and thus offering him 
no benefit). Multiplier effects include savings developed for clients by contracts 
beyond the value of the contracts, and resources mobilized for the client as a direct 
result of the contract and beyond its value. If there is no desirable multiplier impact 
* Source: Abt Associates, Inc., Annual Report and Social Audit, 1971. 
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Exhibit 5 (continued) 
Abt Associates, Inc.* 
Notes to the Social Income Statement and Social Balance Sheet 
of the work, but it is used by the client as information, it is assumed to be worth 
merely what was paid for it. An alternate assumption is that multiplier effects accrue 
in an as yet indeterminate way, and that therefore they should not be used to add to 
benefits. Under this assumption, contract work for clients is worth what is paid for 
it, and no more and no less. 
Note H: Costs to clients of contract work completed by the company are considered 
opportunity costs to clients. Assuming services are worth what is paid for them, the 
net social income is social value over and above the costs of the services. 
Note I: Annualized year end staff payroll discounted to present value. 
Note J: Total payroll of current staff after first year, discounted at average annual 
salary increase of 8.36%, based on mean staff tenure of 4.12 years. Long-term staff 
availability is total future payroll less unamortized training investment. (Note K) 
Note K: Training investment is estimated at 25% of first year salary for all current 
staff. This investment is depreciated on a straight-line basis over the mean staff 
tenure. (Note J) 
Note L: The social capital investment is equated with the cost of reconstituting the 
organization. It is computed as the total stockholders' equity, weighted by the con-
sumer price index (1967 = 1.00), expressed in current year dollars. This amount is 
discounted by retained earnings and the value (at cost) of land, buildings, and equip-
ment. 
Note M: A portion of the research carried out by the firm is performed in connection 
with the preparation of proposals submitted to prospective clients. The cost of this 
research is estimated at $38,280 in 1971 and $22,588 in 1970. This cost is reduced 
by the costs associated with proposal resulting in client contracts, in which the 
research developed was exploited, and any remaining amount is written off at the 
end of one year. 
Note N: Current year experience discounted to present value as of year end. These 
contract commitments are to contracts not judged as producing socially useful 
products. 
Note O: Commitments after one year are based on current experience discounted 
for salary increases and extended over mean tenure. (Note J) 
Note P: Total estimated working capital requirements based on cash flow ($800,000 
in 1971 and $650,000 in 1970) are prorated by the ratio of short term commitments 
(Facilities and Staff within one year) to the corresponding short term social assets 
(7.5% in 1971 and 9% in 1970). 
Note Q: A substantial portion of the company's activities are expressed in tangible 
form through the printed word. The company used 26 tons of paper in 1971 and 22 
tons in 1970. The company recognizes an obligation to society based on the cost of 
abatement of the water pollution created by the manufacture of this paper. This cost 
is estimated at $35 per ton. 
Note R: The company consumed 56,000 KWH of electric power in 1971 and 54,000 
KWH in 1970. The company recognizes an obligation to society based on the cost of 
abatement of the air pollution created by the production of this power. This cost is 
estimated at $.02 per KWH. 
Note S: The company generated 615,960 commuting trip miles in 1971 and 433,260 
miles in 1970. The obligation to society based on the air pollution thus created is 
estimated at $.01 per mile. 
Note T: Staff assets available less staff commitments. 
Note U: Organizational assets available less organizational commitments. 
Note V: Research assets available less environmental obligations. 
* Source: Abt Associates, Inc., Annual Report and Social Audit, 1971. 
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The extension to remote tiers of contractors and subcontractors and the 
evaluation of governmental contributions, seem better left to the broad 
reaches of the national income (and related) accounts where they may be 
dealt with more directly and conveniently. Of course, there is room for im-
provement and extension in the latter areas and this can include attempts at 
balance sheet characterizations, such as are also essayed by Abt Associ-
ates,42 and they can include other extensions as well.43 When prudently 
restricted, however, the kind of social report suggested by Abt Associates 
can certainly be an illuminating exercise for management and probably others 
as well. 
Asset Capitalization and Expenditures for 
Human Resources Accounting 
Turning to Exhibit 4, the Social Balance Sheet for Abt Associates, we 
may again observe an alteration in the standard balance sheet categories. 
Social assets available through this firm include, for example, its staff with a 
capitalized value obtained by discounting the annualized year-end payroll. 
Further categorizations include adjustments for raises and average staff 
tenure allowances as well as estimated investments in staff training and 
preparation.44 
By referring to the equity section of Exhibit 4, we can gain some further 
perspective on what is intended for these estimates. Observe, for instance, 
that the section labelled Society's Equity—at the bottom of Exhibit 4—con-
tains a category which was contributed by the staff. This amount, $8,946,887, 
was obtained by subtracting certain present and future staff commitments45 
from the total net staff assets. 
One interpretation of Society's Equity would accord it a characterization 
akin to that of Net Worth in an ordinary balance sheet. Another interpretation 
would assign these equity values to their "owners" and this would include 
the staff members themselves. To state this differently both the training and 
experience and, indeed, the very salary levels themselves are things which 
vest in the staff rather than the company. 
This point is emphasized without attendant refinements and qualifica-
tions since, in some sense, there is no conflict between the vesting of this 
equity in the staff or in the greater society to which they belong. The point 
can perhaps be made somewhat clearer, however, by turning to the area of 
human resources accounting where we shall use the often-cited case of the 
R. G. Barry Company, as exemplified in Exhibit 6, page 304. 
4 2 These will be examined in the next section where they can also be related to 
developments in human resources accounting-
43 See, e.g., Nancy Ruggles and Richard Ruggles, "A Proposal for a System of 
Social Accounts" (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1971.) 
4 4 See Notes I, J and K in Exhibit 5 and also see Note A and the career advance-
ment item to which it is related in Exhibit 3. 
45 Judged not to result in the production of socially useful products. See Notes 
O and N. 
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Before proceeding any further, however, we need to note explicitly that 
the area of human resources accounting is not concerned with social report-
ing per se. Its main concern is with drawing better distinctions between items 
to be expensed and items to be capitalized in order to provide a better basis 
for judgments by managers and investors in considering the human resources 
of a firm.46 The firm is otherwise to be handled only as an ordinary business 
entity without the extensions and extra-entity considerations such as were 
essayed by Abt Associates.47 
Exhibit 6, taken from the Annual Report of the R. G. Barry Company, 
provides an example—only pro forma, to be sure48—which will help us to 
make some of the issues more concrete. First we should observe that this 
exhibit contains a comparison between balance sheets and income state-
ments with and without Human Resources Accounting. The term "Conven-
tional," which appears in both captions, is intended to convey the notion that 
both are otherwise based on the usual accounting conventions—historical 
cost (i.e., outlay) accounting is used in both balance sheets and income 
statements. Thus, the $1,561,264 assigned to Net Investments in Human 
Resources (in the corresponding human resources baiance sheet) represents 
accumulated expenditures (net of depreciation or amortization)49 for per-
sonnel costs such as recruitment, training, development, etc. The resulting 
increase in total assets is then assigned equally to the Retained Earnings 
account in Stockholders' Equity and to Deferred Federal Income Taxes. 
Correspondingly, the Human Resources income statement bears the addi-
tional charges resulting from the current period amortizations. It is also 
relieved of the personnel expenditures that can now be charged to the capital 
account. The net effect is an increase in reported net income of $137,700 
with one-half of this increase (viz., $68,850) allocable to increased federal 
income taxes.50 
This approach is analogous to others which have been used to capitalize 
other kinds of intangibles such as advertising expenditures or related items 
such as "nonpurchased goodwill." The usual difficulties in dealing with such 
intangibles are then also encountered for human resources accounting, too, 
when assigning such asset values to equity accounts. Here, however, the 
4 6 See R. L. Woodruff, Jr., "Human Resources Account ing," Canadian Chartered 
Accountant (September 1970), pp. 151-161. 
47 This does not mean that proponents of human resources are uninterested in 
such social consequences. This, in fact, is not the case. See, e.g., Rensis Likert, 
The Human Organization: Its Management and Value (New York: McGraw-Hil l , Inc., 
1967) and "The Influence of Social Research on Corporate Responsibil i ty" in A New 
Rationale lor Corporate Social Policy (Committee for Economic Development, 1971) 
as well as Rensis Likert and David G. Bowers, "Organizational Theory and Human 
Resource Account ing," B. M. Bass and S. D. Deep, eds., Studies in Organizational 
Psychology, (New York: Allyn S. Bacon, Inc., 1972) 
48 Occasioned by SEC refusal plus the failure of the company's accountants to 
audit and certify. See footnotes to Exhibit 6. 
4 9 Arising from obsolescence in skills or training, normal attrition, or turnover, etc. 
5 0 See the amounts labeled "Net Increase in Human Resource Investment" and 
"Federal Income Taxes." 
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Exhibit 3 
"The Total Concept" 
R. G. Barry Corporation and Subsidiaries 
Pro-Forma 
(Conventional and Human Resource Accounting)* 
Balance Sheet 
1971 1971 
Conventional and Conventional 
Assets Human Resources only 
Total Current Assets $12,810,346 $12,810,346 
Net Property, Plant and Equipment 3,343,379 3,343,379 
Excess of Purchase Price over Net Assets Acquired 1,291,079 1,291,079 
Net Investments in Human Resources 1,561,264 — 
Other Assets 209,419 209,419 
$19,215,487 $17,654,223 
Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity 
Total Current Liabilities 3,060,576 3,060,576 
Long-term Debt, Excluding Current Installments 5,095,000 5,095,000 
Deferred Compensation 95,252 95,252 
Deferred Federal Income Taxes Based Upon 
Full Tax Deduction for Human Resource Costs 780,632 — 
Stockholders' Equity: 
Capital Stock 1,209,301 1,209,301 
Additional Capital in Excess of Par Value 5,645,224 5,645,224 
Retained Earnings: 
Financial 2,548,870 2,548,870 
Human Resources 780,632 — 
Total Stockholders' Equity 10,184,027 9,403,395 
$19,215,487 $17,654,223 
Statement of Income 
Net Sales $34,123,202 $34,123,202 
Cost of Sales 21,918,942 21,918,942 
Gross Profit 12,204,260 12,204,260 
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses 9,417,933 9,417,933 
Operating Income 2,786,327 2,786,327 
Other Deductions, Net 383,174 383,174 
Income Before Federal Taxes 2,403,153 2,403,153 
Net Increase in Human Resource Investment 137,700 — 
Adjusted Income Before Federal Income Taxes 2,540,853 2,403,153 
Federal Income Taxes 1,197,850 1,129,000 
Net Income $ 1,343,003 $ 1,274,153 
* Source: R. G. Barry Corporation, 1971 Annual Report. The following headnote 
also accompanies this part of the report: 
"The information presented [. . . above . . .] is provided only to illustrate the 
informational value of human resource accounting for more effective internal manage-
ment of the business. The figures included regarding investments and amortization 
of human resources are unaudited and you are cautioned for purposes of evaluating 
the performance of this company to refer to the conventional certified accounting 
data further on. . . ." 
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difficulties of such valuations are further compounded by the implications 
that one set of humans (e.g., employees) is "owned" in part or in whole by 
another group (e.g., stockholders),51 and this is not relieved by the so-called 
going-concern assumption when the latter is interpreted as transferring such 
ownership to "the entity" itself. This all seems far from any reality of the 
current market place—if, indeed, it is even consistent with the institutions of 
a free market economy—but, of course, this does not militate in any way 
against the use of such devices for internal managerial use and compu-
tations.52 
In fact, if such computations are effected outside the formal accounts, 
then they need not encounter any difficulties with respect to financial statement 
assignments although, supposedly, this should produce a variety of improved 
managerial decisions that could ultimately influence both income statements 
and balance sheet assets and equities. The argument is analogous to ones 
which have been used against explicit recognition of other intangibles—such 
as those noted at the start of this paragraph—in the financial statements. 
Other approaches are also possible, of course, and one recently sug-
gested by Lev and Schwartz53 would appear to lie somewhere between Abt 
Associates and the R. G. Barry Co. In brief, Lev and Schwartz also suggest 
a recourse to a discounted value of employee earnings streams (which they 
further refine by skill and age class) for capitalization in the financial state-
ments. This is done in the usual manner of human resources accounting by 
reference to the company itself. That is, Lev and Schwartz do not follow the 
entity extension path of Abt, and they do not confine themselves to historical 
cost (outlay) accounting as does Barry. However, for purposes of the present 
discussion, we emphasize their further departures from the practices of the 
R. G. Barry Company (in its handling of the corresponding equity accounts), 
as in the following quotation: 
. . . Human capital values may be presented on the asset side of the 
balance sheet and the present value of the firm's liability to pay 
51 This same issue arises even in the context of national wealth estimates. Witness, 
for instance, the fol lowing quotation from R. W. Goldsmith, The National Wealth of the 
United States in the Postwar Period (New York: The National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1962), p. 10: 
The omission of any estimates for the value . . . of human resources . . . is 
based [partly] on the convict ion—not shared by all students of this prob lem— 
that these items have no place in an estimate of national wealth for an econ-
omy where these resources cannot be appropriated and hence have no market 
price in an economy where slavery does not exist. 
See also R. W. Goldsmith, Studies in the National Balance Sheet of the United States, 
vol. 1 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1963), p. 15. 
5 2 See the examples reported in M. R. Cooper, J. I. Krugler, W. F. Nelson, and 
W. C. Pyle, "Human Resources Expenditures: Investments for Tomorrow" (Waltham, 
Mass.: General Telephone & Electronics Laboratories, 1973). 
53 Baruch Lev and Abba Schwartz, "On the Use of the Economic Concept of Human 
Capital in Financial Statements," The Accounting Review (January 1971), pp. 103-112. 
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wages and salaries on the liability side. The two values are equal 
by definition: changes in the values of human capital from period to 
period would not be recognized as income but would merely be 
matched by changes in the liability.54 
Since increments would thus be credited directly to this liability account, it 
is reasonable to suppose that decrements would also be debited to this 
account. The income statement would then contain only the usual charges 
and credits. This is to say that the human resource accounts would, under 
these proposals, be identified and sequestered almost as a separate entity 
in a manner analogous to the treatment of a fully funded liability reserve— 
e.g., as in a fully funded reserve for pensions. (Lev and Schwartz are mainly 
concerned with investor disclosure in the financial statements, and hence, 
in this way, too, they complement the usual human resources accounting 
emphasis on the decisions of internal management.)55 
Finally, we can also observe still other developments that bear on issues 
of social reporting as well as on the possibility of improved management 
decisions for human resources. In one such case, the Institute of Public 
Administration (working with Touche Ross & Co.) has experimented with 
extensions to ordinary cost accounting. The objective has been to adjust 
such accounts for aid in handling costs and benefits related to the subsidies 
that a company might earn under the Manpower Development and Training 
Acts administered by the U. S. Department of Labor. Categories which might 
thus be costed (and related to these subsidies) could include activities like 
"job enrichment," "supervisory training," etc., which might enable disadvan-
taged persons to proceed in careers that might otherwise be unavailable for 
them. Even though these cost accounting extensions are directed toward 
internal use, they are evidently also pertinent both for improved management 
and social reporting in such dimensions. At present, however, these develop-
ments do not appear to have proceeded sufficiently far56 so that a full-scale 
assessment can be made of their prospects and problems. 
In conclusion, we may then note that even this does not exhaust the 
range of such developments. Attempts have even been made to extend such 
accounting efforts to social welfare and education programs of a social or 
governmental variety in order to include elements of human capital account-
54 Baruch Lev and Abba Schwartz, "On the Use of the Economic Concept of Human 
Capital in Financial Statements," The Accounting Review (January 1971), p. 110. 
55 See the references to Likert, et al., which were cited above. See also R. L. Brum-
met, E. G. Flamholtz, and W. C. Pyle, eds., Human Resource Accounting: Development 
and Implementation in Industry (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Foundation for Research on 
Human Behavior, 1969), as well as their article, "Human Resource Measurement—A 
Challenge for Accountants," The Accounting Review (April 1968), pp. 217-224; and 
Eric Flamholtz, The Theory and Measurement of an Individual's Value to an Organiza-
tion, Ph.D. Thesis (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, 1969). 
56 At least by reference to the published literature such as TIPP—Training, Incentives 
Payment Program (New York: The Institute of Public Administration, 1971). 
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ing in their management and direction.57 We can only note these develop-
ments in closing this section, however, since their detailed pursuit would 
lead us away from the company reporting efforts that are the primary concern 
of this paper. 
Extensions to New Metrics and Dimensions 
In this final section, we propose to explore possible new approaches 
which, in a sense, include all four of Professor Churchill's suggestions.58 
They also include extensions directed toward some of the newer audiences 
of company reports which were discussed in section 1. Thus, our illustrations 
are directed toward groups like minorities or environmentalists, for instance, 
but this is not intended to exhaust such possibilities. 
In each case, we shall employ a different metric system (a different unit 
of measure). But we shall also do more than try to accommodate each such 
different group. In fact, we shall try to accomplish what is required in a way 
that also stays close to current financial reporting practices. In particular, we 
shall try to arrange our suggested social reports in a way that readily relates 
them to their potential economic (financial) consequences. One reason for 
doing this is that it may help to attenuate at least some of the possibilities 
that might otherwise emerge for weakening the customary financial reports 
and, of course, it can have other advantages as well.59 
Exhibit 7, page 308, with its accompanying Notes, provides an illustration 
of one possibility for social reporting as it might be used by some hypo-
thetical company. Here we have a standard income statement on the left. 
This, we may remark, is intended as only an ordinary entity statement (con-
solidated or not). That is, this statement does not attempt to extend the legal 
entity, or its consolidated counterpart, e.g., as in the example of Abt Asso-
ciates, but is confined rather to the entity whose actions are directly under 
the control of the management with which this report is associated. 
This same characterization also applies to the other columns of Exhibit 7. 
Thus, as explained in Note 2 for External Payments, no attempt is made to 
trace these funds flows60 into transactions that are beyond the control of this 
5 7 See, e.g., Robert Beyer, "The Modern Management Approach to a Program of 
Social Improvement," The Journal of Accountancy (March 1969), pp. 37-46 and Jean-
Paul Ruiff, "The War on Poverty," The Quarterly (New York: Touche Ross & Co., 1969), 
and "Poverty Programs—A Business Management Approach," The Quarterly (Touche 
Ross & Co., 1966), pp. 24-32. It is of interest to note that this proposal (really a 
budgetary/planning proposal) also contains a recourse to linear program optimiza-
tions and the use of panel data just as was the case for Clark Abt's mythical Flinthard 
Corporation as discussed above. 
58 See third section, supra, this paper. 
5 9 For example, in relating otherwise separate dimensions for social reporting to 
each other, for instance, via the resource expenditures that they each require. 
60 See the discussion of " f low statements" in Chapter 14 of E. L. Kohler, Accounting 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes Accompanying Exhibit 7 
Note 1. All items under "Traditional Income Statement" are expressed in millions 
of dollars. The statement is prepared in accordance with generally accepted account-
ing principles and present practices. 
Note 2. Funds disbursed by the firm into the economy are provided under "External 
Payments," and, as such, this column is closely related to the usual funds flow state-
ment. As a result of these payments, money is introduced into the economy to be 
respent with further contributions to GNP, but no attempt is made to trace their further 
consequences, which may be far removed from any possibility of control (or even 
tracing) by reference to this firm's transactions. 
Note 3. Sulfur and particulate emissions are yearly aggregates based upon produc-
tion and sales activity for the year. The amounts attributable to productive activities 
are listed under "Total Manufacturing" while the emissions from "Sell ing and Admin-
istrative" activities—e.g., as a result of further processing in the company's sales out-
lets—are listed under that category. 
Note 4. The Sulfur Removal column is related to Exhibit 8. (See Note 9 for this 
Exhibit where the economics of the sulfur removal program is displayed with a net 
loss resulting from this program.) 
Note 5. The continued growth of the firm rests squarely upon the performances of 
180,000 workers as displayed in the "Employment" column. Effective personnel 
policies have been the keynote of the firm and output has increased at a rate which 
is significantly higher than inputs. 
Note 6. Intense efforts in the areas of health and safety have resulted in a new low 
of only 218,000 lost work days caused by accidents in the last year. Production 
time lost and accident classifications are consistent with and, in fact, ahead of OSHA 
standards of performance. 
Note 7. Integration of blacks and females into the organization is of utmost concern 
to management. Overall black participation is well above average for the industry, 
but shortcomings exist in female employment. These are expected to change with 
the intensified recruitment program that was begun last year. (See the schedule of 
past results and projections [which could be included in some other section of the 
company's report].) 
Note 8. Semi- and unskilled labor are continually added to the personnel roster. 
While on the job they receive training and instruction in manufacturing and adminis-
trative positions. Over 40% of these people will leave the firm to accept employment 
elsewhere after their training period. Employment in this labor class was 2,000 for 
the past year and the situation is now being studied to see whether costs associated 
with this turnover can be reduced. 
Note 9. Corporate owned housing is available to employees at reduced rental rates. 
There was a net change of 40 housing units in the past year. Seventy-five blue collar 
units were liquidated while 35 white collar units were added. A changing distribution 
of employment coupled with changing employee tastes justified these changes. 
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management. Also, only the usual income statement categories and balance 
sheets are used so that, unlike some of the other approaches we have been 
examining, nothing further needs to be said here on these topics. 
Turning to the columns grouped as Physical Environment and Social 
Environment, we may observe that each column is represented in a different 
metric. This is done to make them immediately meaningful, if possible, for 
the audiences to which they might be directed. Thus, for instance, Sulfur 
Emissions are reported in million pound units while Black and Female par-
ticipation rates are reported in percentages, and so on. 
In each case an attempt is made to position these items in a way that 
relates to corresponding income-statement categories. If desired this can be 
extended still further even to the extent of using mathematical and computer-
ized models for studying further relations and tradeoff values.61 We shall not 
pursue such possibilities here, however, but turn instead to the alternate 
arrangement provided by Exhibit 8, page 312, and the detailed Notes that 
accompany it. 
Exhibit 8 may be regarded as one of a variety of additional schedules 
that might be used to augment the presentation of Exhibit 7. Here the em-
phasis is now directed toward relating the Social and Physical Environment 
variables to their financial consequences. By referring to Note 5 of Exhibit 8, 
for instance, we can see that this company is ahead of its OSHA require-
ments. The incremental costs associated with this attempt to proceed ahead 
of the OSHA requirements caused a reduction of $1.80 in reported income 
per share. It also resulted in a reduction of net income by $1.50 per ton. 
Indeed, the outlays incurred would have caused a further reduction to $2.75 
per ton except for the offset in the corporation's income tax—at a rate of 
$1.25 per ton—which occurred as a result of this program. 
From a social standpoint the desirability of thus moving ahead of the 
OSHA requirements should evidently also be weighed against possible 
alternate uses of the taxes that might otherwise have been available. Such 
considerations also enter elsewhere, of course, as when a reduction in sulfur 
emissions is accompanied by a drop in manufacturing activities with attendant 
drops in employment—perhaps for minorities and women. In fact, a supple-
mentary analysis indicates that something of this sort has been occurring in 
the category of Summer Jobs for Needy Youth. Thus, in 1968 and 1969 the 
corporation had hired some 2,500 students for employment in this category 
and this number had dropped to 828 in 1970 along with a drop in profits from 
$7.50 to $5.50 per ton. By interpolation from these past records, it seems 
that the company will hire approximately 800 students per year for each dollar 
of earnings above $4.50 per ton. This might be regarded as a social dividend 
61 See A. Charnes, C. Colantoni, W. W. Cooper, and K. O. Kortanek, "Economic, 
Social and Enterprise Accounting and Mathematical Models," The Accounting Review 
(January 1972), pp. 31-37. For a further consideration of such models as a part of 
the accounting system see A. Charnes and W. W. Cooper, "Some Network Character-
izations for Mathematical Programming and Accounting Characterizations," The 
Accounting Review (January 1967), pp. 24-52. 
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associated with each such dollar of added profit, to be sure, but a stock-
holder (or potential investor) might also be inclined to question whether this 
was justified by the resulting benefits to the company (or to society). 
Such questions might naturally extend to the other activities that are 
also depicted in Exhibit 8. To see that the arrangement for Exhibit 8 is also 
designed to facilitate answers to (or prompt) such questions, we might 
observe that a Net Financial and Economic Statement is also given on the 
right in total dollars and in dollars per ton of product. The data for this state-
ment are deduced from the Gross Financial and Economic Statement, on the 
left, by subtracting the Social Environment and Physical Environment activi-
ties that separate these two statements.62 Finally, we may observe that we 
have also included a column for the Noise Abatement Program that is just 
getting under way. Even though this column contains no entries as yet (partly 
because suitable metrics have not yet been selected), we believe it provides 
a signal for developments under way that can be of value to investors, as well 
as environmentalists or others who may be interested in such activities. 
Data, explanations and the other supporting relations we have discussed 
in connection with Exhibits 7 and 8 would appear to be amenable to modern 
audit techniques. Indeed, certain audits conducted by governmental agencies 
like the U. S. General Accounting Office have already been extended to veri-
fication and attestation for magnitudes and related explanations (or justifi-
cations) that are at least sub species genera in these classes. Furthermore, 
the experience of undertaking such audits should itself go at least part of the 
way toward developing any additional methods that may be required, and 
these tasks may also be facilitated by the activities of various governmental 
units in collecting and disseminating information on pollution effects, dis-
crimination, and so forth, as a possible further reference when required. 
Summary and Conclusion^ 
The statements we have suggested are best regarded as only initial 
attempts to meet both of the criteria that we delineated for social reports in 
our opening section. That is, (1) they should report items, such as the OSHA 
acceleration activities, which are not adequately reflected in market data with 
its associated "least cost" orientation, and (2) they should also be directed 
toward other audiences besides the customary ones for corporate reports, 
but in a way that does not weaken the latter. Naturally we expect that this is 
not a last attempt and other such suggestions should also be forthcoming. 
At least we hope that this will be the case. 
Other approaches that we have covered provide a variety of additional 
possibilities. These have included simple listings or inventories of selected 
activities, sometimes with an accompanying narrative as in the Bank of 
America examples. They have also extended to extra-entity imputations and 
estimates such as were undertaken by Abt Associates. Undoubtedly still other 
62 After multiplication, where required, by the tonnage volume given at the bottom 
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Notes Accompanying Exhibit 8 
The following notes are provided as detailed explanations for the information pre-
sented in Exhibit 8. 
Note 1. This display provides the aggregate financial information in the same fashion 
as the traditional income statement along with other flow information for various 
socially oriented programs. 
Note 2. Under the titles "Gross Financial and Economic" the usual income statement 
information is provided. The first number is dollar flow (in millions) while the second 
is the dollar flow per unit of physical output. This latter measure may involve only 
the product of greatest output or a weighted average of output levels or the like. 
However, once a value is chosen it should be used consistently in displaying all the 
data. In this case, the choice is 24.1 million tons of output where output is measured 
in terms of sales rather than other measures such as production, etc. Some of the 
latter measures might be a better basis for some purposes but would lead into 
capitalization and related issues that we want to avoid in this paper. That is, we 
want to treat these all as "per iod" costs rather than to capitalize them into inventory 
for distribution in subsequent periods. If this latter basis is preferable, some adjust-
ment must be made to these figures to account for increases or decreases in inventory 
level. 
Note 3. In an attempt to meet housing needs in a depressed area near a plant, this 
firm decided to invest $75 million in the design, engineering, and construction of a 
3,000 unit multiple family dwelling. Rental income or revenue averages $2,500 per 
unit per year or $0.31 per ton of output. Although the housing units can be rented 
by anyone in the area, employees can rent these facilities at a rental which is 60% 
of the prevailing rate in this area, with the company treating the remaining 40% as 
an employee benefit. The total amount treated by the company as employee benefits 
converts to $.12/ton of output. Operating costs amount to $.15/ton of output for the 
year. Accelerated depreciation is scheduled over the twenty year life of this invest-
ment and interest payments are based on financing the investment through the sale 
of bonds. The tax expense is a negative $.25/ton of output because the project 
operates at a loss to the company. The net impact of this project on net income per 
ton of output is ($.28), for a total loss of $6.75 million. 
Note 4. In order to allow minority groups to participate more fully in its labor markets, 
this firm has undertaken recruiting and job expansion programs aimed directly at 
minorities. It is expected that this will raise the employment level of these groups 
to 15% from current 8% levels, with a resultant 2% net increase in total employment. 
The statement of costs (which should be provided) is only indicated here by a vacant 
column and, if desired, this note can be regarded as a verbal augmentation or elab-
oration of this exhibit or else the column itself can be regarded as a presentation for 
social reporting purposes in terms of a first development in non-metric spaces. 
Note 5. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 sets standards for health 
and safety performance in manufacturing and administrative units. Compliance with 
the law requires that an index measure of this firm's behavior be at 100. However 
the company has bettered this requirement with consequent extra costs. Costs 
delineated for this program are incremental above those which were also incurred 
to provide compliance wiith the law. 
Note 6. The manpower training program administered by this firm provides voca-
tional training to 200 people/year. Skills acquired are highly specialized and provide 
compensation to insure a middle income standard of living. Most recipients are sub-
sequently employed by other firms, some of which are competitors, upon completion 
of their training. The program is fully funded by the Federal government. 
Note 7. Many of the company's unskilled laborers have not had an opportunity to 
complete their high school training. Hence, after working hours, fully funded high 
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Notes Accompanying Exhibit 8 (continued) 
school classes are sponsored for these people. Upon successful completion of this 
program, the participants receive a high school equivalence diploma. Three hundred 
employees are currently enrolled in this program. 
Note 8. High school students over 16 who qualify on the basis of need are eligible 
for participation in summer employment programs. Eight hundred such students 
were employed, as per budget, and their wages and related items were treated as a 
direct expense at a pre-determined standard cost. 
Note 9. In order to comply with proposed regulations governing sulfur emissions, 
capital equipment worth $50 million was installed. This is part of a longer range 
investment which is ultimately expected to amount to $300 million. Part of the $50 
million already expended was designed with these longer-range considerations in 
mind. Some of this should be recaptured from subsequent byproduct sales, which 
will be credited to these expenses, as well as the higher price that the purer product 
should bring when all units are operational. At present, however, much higher ex-
penses are being experienced and hence the treatment of all of this as a period 
charge results in an overall money loss from complying with these regulations. 
Note 10. In the next year the firm will begin a noise abatement program within the 
factory for which only preliminary plans and related expenses have been incurred to 
date. To employees and neighbors the plan when realized should provide quieter 
surroundings and better health. It is also expected that continued operation of the 
proposed program for noise abatement will have a positive effect on productivity over 
time, but neither the magnitude nor the timing of these productivity increases can be 
presently assessed. Until such benefits can be identified and associated with a 
suitable costing unit, the expenditures incurred for this program will be grouped with 
other items and expensed as a period charge. 
possibilities exist or will be essayed. This is as far as we intend to go in this 
paper, however, which is itself intended only as a start and not a terminal 
point for such social-reporting studies and activities. 
The following list of questions, taken from the report of a committee of 
the American Accounting Association,63 may help to bring into focus some 
of the further problems that may also need to be addressed when considering 
these and like extensions of accounting and auditing: 
(1) What should be the auditor's responsibilities in attesting to re-
ports to interest groups such as consumers, employees, etc.? What 
are the potential legal ramifications of CPA attesting to such things 
as the degrees of water and air pollution, conformance of products 
to safety standards, etc.? What are the potential conflicts of interest 
(e.g., if the CPA becomes a government watchdog a conflict of in-
terest may arise with respect to stockholders, management and 
investors)? What are the "entities" which should be held account-
able? 
(2) How can CPA involvement in attestation for other interest 
groups be implemented? Who will bear the costs? What legislation 
63 "Report of the Committee on Non-Financial Measures of Effectiveness," The 
Accounting Review, Supplement to Vol. XLVI, 1971, pp. 165 ff. 
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is required? Will closer government regulation of CPA activities be 
required? 
(3) If CPAs are to enter these new areas, what is the CPA of the 
future? What new skills must he or she possess? What are the 
implications for college educational programs, staff training pro-
grams, specialization, and organization within CPA firms? What are 
the implications for attestation methods? 
(4) Should the CPA play a neutral role in determining what is 
reported and only concentrate upon attestation under reporting re-
quirements set by other groups? Or should he play a more signifi-
cant role in determining report content, measurement methods, etc. 
(as he does now with respect to financial reporting)? 
(5) If the CPA takes on greater watchdog roles, what will be the 
effects upon his privileged communication, his access to important 
information needed in attesting, etc.? 
(6) What uniformity standards should be established for audit pro-
cedures, report format, report content, etc.? Who should be held 
accountable? 
(7) What conflicts of interest arise if management services groups 
are involved in the design of information systems when attesting 
groups within the same or other firms are involved in auditing these 
systems? Should attesting firms be encouraged or required to divest 
themselves of consulting engagements? 
(8) What potential effects will expanded social attesting by CPA 
firms have upon student rebellion [sic], confidence in the govern-
ment, efficiency and effectiveness of social programs, etc.? 
(9) If financial measures in audited financial reports are to be sup-
plemented with nonfinancial measures, who will determine what non-
financial measures are reported, how they are reported, etc.? 
(10) To what extent are nonfinancial measures (e.g., market share, 
product quality, and attitudes) supportable by "objective, verifiable 
evidence"? What is the impact of new computers, data files, and 
mathematical modeling on this evidence? 
(11) Do the distinctions between the auditing of past events and 
auditing of future events and budgets hold with respect to nonfinan-
cial measures? 
(12) To what extent should a CPA rely on opinions from other pro-
fessional persons, e.g., lawyers, sociologists, statisticians, etc.? 
(13) What are the advantages and disadvantages of including non-
financial measures in financial reports from the standpoint of com-
parability between different reports? 
Many of these considerations bring us back to some of the arguments 
on whether business as well as accountants should undertake any such activi-
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ties at all. These arguments will undoubtedly continue, but our own best 
guess (or judgment) is that such activities will be undertaken by business.64 
Hence it is our belief that it will be prudent for the profession to begin now 
to encourage and support further studies and experiments in anticipation of 
these developments. The point, of course, is that such anticipatory studies 
can help to guide such developments into more intelligent channels. 
In concluding this discussion, we should perhaps stress that such 
studies and experiments should extend to audit as well as accounting or 
reporting activities since these, too, are capable of alteration and extension. 
Having begun this paper with a discussion of how accounting might be (and 
has been) extended, it now seems suitable to close with a quotation from 
Paul F. Lazarsfeld, one of the leaders in the development of modern systems 
of social inquiry.65 Writing in "Accounting and Social Bookkeeping,"66 Pro-
fessor Lazarsfeld notes that "The need for the attest function in society is 
growing. Not only is this true in the areas of business, as every accountant 
knows, but in the social sciences as well there are a lot of activities that 
need attesting. . . ,67 
6 4 See the discussion in E. F. Goldston, The Quantification of Concern: Some 
Aspects of Social Accounting, Benjamin F. Fairless Memorial Lecture Series (Pitts-
burgh: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1971). 
65 For example, in the development of panel techniques such as are now used in 
marketing in order to assess consumer habits or attitude and reaction. 
66 In R. R. Sterling and W. F. Bentz, eds., Accounting in Perspective: Contributions 
to Accounting Thought by Other Disciplines (Cincinnati: Southwestern Publishing Co., 
1969). 
6 7 See also DR Scott, The Cultural Significance of Accounts (New York: Henry 
Holt & Co., 1931). 
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Accounting for Social Costs and Benefits 
Joshua Ronen 
Introduction 
The need for accounting to provide information about social costs and bene-
fits has recently received increased attention.1 Evidently, whether accounting 
information should reflect social values (costs and benefits) as well as private 
values depends on what the objectives of accounting are. th is paper dis-
cusses the justification for including information about social values in 
accounting reports. Necessarily, such a justification, if accepted, implies the 
desirability of broadly defining accounting objectives to include the goals 
that measurements of social values are intended to satisfy. 
The objectives of accounting could be broadly defined to include the 
promotion of an optimal allocation of resources, or even equity or welfare 
considerations, or they could be restricted to private considerations. In the 
latter case, prescriptions about accounting principles and standards will only 
consider events that facilitate maximization of the wealth of the firm's share-
holders. Such a set of prescriptions may not facilitate the achievement of 
optimal allocation of resources within the economy or the maximization of 
social welfare. 
Loosely speaking, when the actions of the firm affect only its own costs 
and benefits, there is no divergence between private values and social 
values,2 and thus the decisions and actions taken in pursuit of the firm's own 
1 Churchil l, et al., for example, claim: "More than ever before, what one organiza-
tion does affects other organizations and society as a whole. Information regarding 
social and private costs, as well as social and private benefits, is badly needed." 
[See Neil C. Churchil l, Joshua Ronen, Robert J. Sack, George H. Sorter, and Robert 
M. Trueblood, Information for Proprietors and Others, Prepared for the Tenth Interna-
tional Congress of Accountants (Touche Ross & Co.: October 1972).] 
2 The discussion is initially restricted to the case of externalities caused by a firm 
in the sense that its activity affects the value of a production function or of a con-
sumption function of other entities directly (i.e., via the arguments of such functions). 
For an elaboration of the definition of an externality, see E. J. Mishan, "The Postwar 
Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay," Journal of Economic Literature 
(March 1971), p. 2, who restricts the term to cases where the effect produced " is 
not a deliberate creation but an unintended or incidental product of some otherwise 
legitimate activity." 
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interests will result in the optimization of both. However, when the actions of 
an individual firm do affect other firms' or individuals' actions, then pursuing 
only private benefits may not result in the optimization of social benefits or 
in an economy-wide efficient allocation of resources. In this case, an ac-
counting objective that is restricted to the consideration of private benefits 
and costs may require the communication of data that will not meet the 
social objectives. 
The emphasis on the word "may" was deliberate. It is possible that 
private profit maximization by a firm will also bring about an efficient allo-
cation of resources even when the firm's actions directly affect3 the other 
firms' actions. This would be the case when the firm takes into account 
explicitly these effects before it makes its decisions. In fact, to maximize its 
profits, the firm must consider the effects of its actions on other firms or 
individuals unless such consideration is, in itself, too costly. These effects 
fall within the normal economic definition of opportunity costs and should, 
therefore, be explicitly considered along with other costs in making rational 
decisions.4 Inasmuch as these opportunity costs are relevant inputs to deci-
sions that lead to the maximization of both private and social values, the 
benefits of systematically incorporating them in accounting information are 
clearly positive. The problem is to ascertain whether these benefits exceed 
the costs of including opportunity costs in accounting reports. 
The issue becomes more complex when the effects of a firm's actions 
on others are not or cannot be taken into consideration when making deci-
sions within the firm. This would be the case when the price mechanism of 
the market—which enables the firms to consider such facts explicitly in their 
decisions—either does not exist or is too costly. Operationally, this means 
that transaction costs such as conducting negotiations, drawing up contracts 
and inspecting are higher than the benefits of adjusting the firm's actions on 
the basis of the expected effects of these actions on other entities. In this 
case, pursuing private interests will not lead the firm to bring about a socially 
desirable allocation of resources, and governmental intervention through the 
legal determination of rights, regulations, policing, etc., may eventually be-
come desirable.5 Should the accounting objective in such cases include a 
quantification of the social effects, and, if so, how would such effects be 
measured in the absence of a smoothly operating price mechanism? 
Illustration With a Simple Case of Two Producers 
It would probably be best to deal with the above question in the simple 
case of one producer who directly and adversely affects another producer's 
3 In the sense of the externality definition, see footnote 2. 
4 The economic definition of costs refers only to opportunity costs. See, for example, 
George J. Stigler, Theory of Price, 3d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 104-110. 
5 For a lucid discussion of this issue, see R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social 
Cost," Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960), pp. 1-44. 
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output through engaging in a diseconomy-producing activity.6 
To illustrate, suppose that a machine shop, A, produces noise that brings 
about an increase in the number of defective devices produced by B, a 
neighboring manufacturer of highly specialized precision-electronic instru-
ments. B's loss resulting from the noise interfering with the skilled workers' 
ability to perform is $400 per month, while his profit in the absence of dam-
age amounts to $300 per month. A's profit from operations amounts to $350 
per month. A noise stifling device could be installed in the machines to 
eliminate the damage to B; this would cost A $250 monthly. 
Clearly, from a social viewpoint, A should continue its operations, since 
the value of its production ($350) exceeds the cost of eliminating the damage 
to B. Given that A and B can get together and bargain, the socially desirable 
solution (with A continuing its operations) will prevail irrespective of whether 
A is legally liable to pay damages to B. If A is liable to B, the corrective 
device will be installed. It would be more profitable for A to incur the $250 
monthly cost rather than produce the noise and pay $400. A's actual profit 
will be reduced from $350 to $100. The $250 are actual costs for A incurred 
to preclude the adverse effects of its operations on B. 
If B cannot sue A, a feasible alternative might be to pay A an amount not 
in excess of $300 (B's profit) to terminate operations. B would attempt to pay 
no more than $250 per month, the cost of installing a noise-stifling device. 
The exact payment will depend on B's bargaining power in relation to A. The 
$250 payment passed up (assuming that this will be the agreed-upon pay-
ment) is an opportunity cost to A, and its profits are $100: $350 from opera-
tions minus the opportunity costs of $250.7 The $100 is also A's eventual 
contribution to the social product, i.e., the value of its production ($350) 
reduced by the value of resources needed for the corrective device ($250) 
6 Certainly, this is only one of many business situations in which social costs and 
benefits can be incurred. The standard example of social costs which is typical 
of the two-producers situation is the case of the factory emitting smoke which has 
harmful effects on those occupying neighboring properties. An example of social 
benefits would be the training by a firm of its employees which benefits future 
potential employers of the trained personnel. Some social costs can be easily quan-
tifiable through the operation of a smooth market price mechanism. Other social 
costs are very difficult to quantify. Examples of the latter include the effect of noise 
or fumes caused by a factory on the health and satisfaction of the neighborhood 
residents, the benefit rendered to society through conducting educational and recrea-
tional programs by a firm, etc. Social costs are easier to quantify when the action 
of a firm affects the product of another firm. Situations like this give rise to what is 
usually known as "external economies" and "d iseconomies." But while social costs 
and benefits are more dif f icult—and therefore more cost ly—to quantify than in other 
situations, the type of analysis that justifies their quantification is similar to the one 
employed in the simple case discussed above. 
7 In any case, $250 will be the minimum opportunity cost. Since this is the only 
possible opportunity cost magnitude known with certainty to A, it is suggested as A's 
measure of opportunity cost. 
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which A will eventually install (as a result of bargaining with B), thus pre-
cluding alternative use of the resources elsewhere in the economy. 
Naturally, if the cost to A and B of reaching an agreement and enforcing 
it is more than the benefit of doing so (in this case $300) and if A is not liable 
to B, no agreement will be reached. B will terminate its operations, and the 
social product will decrease by $300. This may still be the better alternative 
(since transaction costs would have decreased the social product by even 
more) unless the government could, at a cost less than $300 per month 
(either through establishing a liability for damage or by a tax subsidy system), 
induce B to resume operations and A to install the noise-stifling device. 
The Role of Opportunity Costs 
As the above illustration demonstrates, the resource allocation is op-
timal regardless of whether the harmed party has the right to bring an action 
for damages, as long as opportunity costs are appropriately considered. To 
avoid inflicting the damage, A could increase its precautions by either in-
stalling the device or moving to another location. Either action could poten-
tially increase A's costs. In this illustration it was assumed that installation 
of the device was the least costly means of preventing the damage. Alter-
natively, A could pay for the damage. This would be done if the payments 
for damage were less than the additional costs that would have to be in-
curred to avoid the damage. In that case, the payments for damage would 
become part of the cost of manufacturing A's product. It may be possible 
that the damage could be prevented by some action on the part of B. If B's 
additional cost, in this case, is less than the amount of damage that would 
otherwise occur, it should be possible for a mutually satisfactory bargain to 
be struck by A and B. If B would have had to suffer the damage without 
compensation, the allocation of resources would not have been affected. 
Since B would be willing to pay an amount up to its loss of income to induce 
A to discontinue production, this loss of income would become a part of A's 
costs. 
Thus, in order to achieve an optimal allocation of resources, it is desir-
able that both parties consider the harmful effects in deciding on their courses 
of action. When opportunity costs are explicitly considered, the fall in the 
value of production due to the harmful effects would be a cost for both 
parties. 
Accounting information should reflect these social costs since they are 
legitimate and true costs of production for each of the two manufacturers. 
The harm which was done by A to B is a joint result of the actions of both 
parties. The increase in the number of defective devices was caused by 
noise produced in A's machine shop, but no damage would have occurred 
if B had not chosen to engage in a highly specialized and delicate activity 
that made its workers highly sensitive to noise and easily affected by it. Both 
parties caused the damage. Both should treat the harm as part of their costs. 
If accounting information is to reflect the costs of production, and if it is 
to reflect the resulting income so that the latter gives the proper indication 
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of the quality of management performance, these costs should be a part of 
accounting information. Reflecting such opportunity costs makes it possible 
for accounting report users to properly assess managerial performance, in-
asmuch as managers have to choose the best actions possible for the firm. 
But, in addition, if income figures that result from past actual transactions are 
deemed to be at all important (both in providing a record of actual past 
transactions to fulfill the stewardship function of accounting and in providing 
the means to validate past managerial expectations), it is evident that these 
opportunity costs should be treated as production costs. 
The fortunate fact that the independent actions of the parties—in pursuit 
of their own self interests (with or without predetermination of a legal right to 
impose payment for damages)—led to optimal allocation of resources was 
facilitated by a market mechanism in which transaction costs are not too 
high. A market transaction involves costly activities such as drawing up a 
contract and enforcing it. These operations can be costly to the extent that 
they may preclude some transactions that would have been carried out in a 
world in which the pricing system was costless. Once the costs of carrying 
out market transactions are taken into account, it is clear that such compen-
sating transactions would only be undertaken when the increase in the value 
of production resulting from the transactions is greater than the cost of the 
transactions. In other situations, in which transaction costs are high, such 
as the standard case of smoke nuisance which may affect a vast number of 
people engaged in a wide variety of activities, the prohibitive administrative 
cost might make impossible any attempt to deal with the problem within the 
individual firm. An alternative solution to establishment of legal rights would 
be direct governmental regulation. Instead of a legal system of rights that is 
modifiable by market transactions, the government may impose direct regu-
lation. Because of its power, the government may be able to bring about 
corrective actions at a lower cost than that of a private organization. And 
although governmental action can be extremely costly, it may be the only 
alternative to private action. 
What are the implications for accounting objectives, in the case of high 
transaction costs, which may make governmental intervention necessary or 
desirable? There are two reasons, in addition to those stated for the case 
where transaction costs were not high, why the gathering and communication 
of information about social costs are desirable even in the absence of a 
potential solution on the private level. The first is that the communication of 
such information may (subject to the determination that such information is 
best processed by the firm creating the externality) lead to the proper kind 
of governmental intervention that achieves efficient allocation of resources. 
Disclosure of such information should be helpful in determining which of the 
alternative social arrangements is optimal for dealing with externality. An 
additional reason for reporting such information rests upon the ultimate 
benefit to the private user. Assume that an efficient market will eventually 
lead to desirable social action. In this case, the communication of informa-
tion about the cost to the firm, that will probably be associated with whatever 
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social arrangement emerges, will enable users of financial statements to 
appraise the future prospects of the firm. The importance of providing data 
on social costs to make possible the carrying out of an appropriate policy 
that minimizes resource misallocation will become much clearer when the 
social-cost problem is viewed as isomorphic to the problem of transfer 
pricing. 
The Social Cost Problem Viewed in 
A Transfer Pricing Context 
Careful analysis of the problem of social costs reveals striking similari-
ties to that of transfer pricing within an individual decentralized firm. The 
problem of divergencies between social costs and private costs is the 
counterpart of the transfer pricing problem at the total economy level. 
At the individual firm level, decentralization through use of the profit 
center concept is motivated by several factors. Among these are the divi-
sion's nearness to the marketplace which provides the local managers with 
relevant information regarding changes in the prices of inputs and outputs, 
and more effective coordination of factors of production that can be obtained 
locally at the divisional level.8 The need to establish the proper system of 
transfer prices for decentralized profit centers is predicated primarily upon 
three requirements.9 First, the transfer prices must enable central manage-
ment to evaluate as accurately as possible the performance of the profit 
centers in terms of their separate contributions to corporate profits. Second, 
the system of transfer pricing must motivate profit center managers to pursue 
their own self-interests in a manner which is conducive to the success of the 
company as a whole. And, third, the system must serve as a stimulus to 
managers to increase their efficiency without restricting the autonomy of the 
divisions as profit centers. With respect to the objectives of accounting re-
ports, as related to the first of these requirements, Ronen and McKinney10 
commented: 
One of the main functions of accounting reports is to facilitate the 
evaluation of the profitability of various segments of the firm. This 
8 See the fol lowing: 
Paul W. Cook, "Decentral ization and the Transfer-Price Problem," Journal of Business 
(April 1955), pp. 87-94. 
J. R. Gould, "Internal Pricing in Firms When There Are Costs of Using an Outside 
Market," Journal of Business (January 1964), pp. 61-67. 
Jack Hirshleifer, "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing," Journal of Business (July 
1956), pp. 72-84, and "Economics of the Divisionalized Firm," Journal of Business 
(April 1957), pp. 96-100. 
Joshua Ronen, and George McKinney III, "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy," 
Journal of Accounting Research (Spring 1970), pp. 99-112. 
David Solomons, Divisional Performance: Measurement and Control (Financial Execu-
tives Research Foundation, 1965). 
9 See Ronen and McKinney, "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy," pp. 99-100. 
10 Ibid., p. 100. 
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same objective lies at the root of divisionalization. Paradoxically, 
however, when profit and loss reports are based on a typical set of 
transfer prices, they do not reflect the amount which profit center 
activities contribute to the pool of corporate profits. . . . Reflecting 
these contributions is not only important to the manager of the con-
tributing division, but also to central management who evaluates the 
division's profitability and decides whether to continue or abandon 
them. 
A series of substitutions in this quotation renders it an appropriate represen-
tation of the problem of social costs. After modification, the quotation reads 
as follows: 
One of the main functions of accounting reports is to facilitate the 
evaluation of the profitability of various segments of the economy. 
This same objective lies at the root of decentralizing the economy 
into firms. Paradoxically, however, when profit and loss reports are 
based on only market prices established through market transac-
tions, they do not reflect the amount which the firm's activities con-
tribute to the pool of the economy's increment in wealth. . . . 
Reflecting these contributions is not only important to the manager 
of the contributing firm, but also to the government that evaluates 
the firm's activities and decides on the appropriate measures re-
garding activities which are socially harmful. 
Thus, the similarity is striking—the same economic cost and benefit 
evaluations underlie the centralization/decentralization decisions within a 
firm and the centralization/decentralization decisions within the economy as 
a whole. For example, Coase argues thus:11 
It is clear that an alternative form of economic organization which 
could achieve the same result at less cost than would be incurred 
by using the market should be used whenever it would enable the 
value of production to be raised . . . within the firm individual bar-
gains between the various cooperating factors of production are 
eliminated and for market transaction is substituted an administra-
tive decision. The rearrangement of production then takes place 
without the need for bargains between the owners of the factors of 
production. . . . The firm would acquire the legal rights of all the 
parties and the rearrangement activities would not follow on a 
rearrangement of rights by contract, but as a result of an admin-
istrative decision as to how the rights should be used. . . . The 
government is in a sense a super firm since it is able to influence 
the use of factors of production by administrative decision. 
But as is the case when 
11 "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960), 
pp. 16-17; see also Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica (New Series, 1937). 
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. . . the administrative costs of organizing transactions within the 
firm may also be high, and particularly so when many diverse activi-
ties are brought within the control of a single organization . . . the 
governmental administrative machine is not in itself costless. . . . 
[and] . . . direct governmental regulation will not necessarily give 
better results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market 
or the firm. But equally, there is no reason why, on occasion, such 
governmental administrative regulations should not lead to improve-
ments in economic efficiency. 
It is these high administrative costs of organizing transactions within the 
firm when operations are centralized or within the economy where the gov-
ernment extensively intervenes that induces a firm, among other things, to 
decentralize and the government to let the free market mechanism bring 
about a desirable equilibrium. But at the same time, decentralization may 
lead to less than optimal value accumulation whenever there are inter-
dependencies among the autonomous units. 
Thus, at the individual firm level where the profit centers or the divisions 
are not economically independent, as would be the case whenever the ex-
ternal market for the intermediate product which is transferred from one 
division to the other is not perfectly competitive, decisions taken by the 
autonomous profit centers in pursuit of their self interest will likely be most 
dysfunctional from the standpoint of the profitability of the firm as a whole. 
Analogously, at the economy level, decentralization may lead—whenever 
there are producers' interdependencies—to a less-than-optimal social prod-
uct if the individual firms are left to pursue their own self interests through 
maximizing private profits when these diverge from social profits. Dysfunc-
tional decisions that result from decentralization within a firm can be avoided 
by recentralization wherein relevant economic decisions (production proc-
esses, prices, etc.) are made by central management. Similarly, at the level 
of the economy as a whole, it is necessary to completely integrate all industry 
to eliminate all divergence between private profits and public benefits.12 
Thus, profits of firms in a market economy may not lead to economic opti-
mum and, the more decentralized and differentiated the economy, the less 
they are a guide to such optimum. Would centralization—whether at the firm 
or the economy level—be the only solution to suboptimal decisions caused 
by decentralization? 
As indicated, central decision-making by a firm engaging in a diverse 
range of activities can be costly as can be governmental administrative regu-
lation. And, in any particular instance, it must be ascertained whether the 
gain that would come from regulating action that gives rise to harmful effects 
12 Thus, Rodan Rosenstein advocated that " the whole of the industry to be created 
is to be treated and planned like one huge firm or trust." ["Problems of Industrializa-
tion of Eastern and South Eastern Europe," Economic Journal (1943), p. 204.] 
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would be higher than the cost involved in governmental regulation. There are 
alternatives, and the problem becomes one of choosing the appropriate and 
least costly social arrangement for dealing with harmful effects, whether at 
the firm or the economy level. Since the alternative schemes that were 
suggested to deal with the social effects problem are similar to those that 
are discussed in the context of transfer pricing at the individual firm level, it 
should be useful to review and juxtapose these schemes. 
The need for information to be reported by a division in a decentralized 
firm on its contribution to the firm's overall profits—to facilitate continuance-
abandonment decisions—has long been established in the accounting litera-
ture. So did the need for incorporating in the accounting information data 
that made possible the determination of the optimal transfer pricing rules 
(optimal in the sense of inducing goal-congruent decisions by the profit 
centers without adversely affecting their autonomy). In a similar fashion, at 
the economy level, firms should communicate information that facilitates and 
makes possible the determination of the best social arrangement that should 
be effected to deal with externalities (unless this information is more cheaply 
provided by other sources). Information should also be provided about the 
contribution of any individual firm to the social product as a whole. While 
these individual contributions may not equal the total social product, they 
constitute a valuable guide to decisions taken on an economy-wide level 
concerning the encouragement of some economic activities within the econ-
omy and the discouragement of others. 
Indeed, the objectives of accounting cannot end at the individual firm 
level just as reporting requirements within a firm are not exhausted by de-
fining the individual profit center's needs. Accounting should consider the 
repercussions of the firm's actions on others. As in the case of a decentral-
ized firm, it should consider the repercussions of the actions of an individual 
profit center on other profit centers and thus on the profits of the firm as a 
whole. 
The Alternative Solutions to the Problem of Interdependencies. There 
are a number of possible social arrangements dealing with the problem of 
"side" effects.13 The choice of the best social arrangement naturally depends 
on the evaluation of costs and benefits associated with the arrangement. No 
particular arrangement can be said a priori to be superior to others. Rather, 
careful examination of the circumstances of any particular case is necessary. 
For example, as shown by Coase,14 if the party imposing harmful effects and 
the party suffering them are able and willing to negotiate to their mutual 
13 The term "side effects" was used by Harold Demsetz ["The Exchange and 
Enforcement of Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics (October 1964), 
pp. 11-26] rather than either "external effects" or "neighborhood effects" to avoid 
the connotations implied by these terms, 
14 In "The Problem of Social Cost." 
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advantage, governmental intervention is unnecessary in order to bring about 
the most efficient resource allocation. Thus, the imposition of a tax on the 
party imposing the harmful side effects could be a very complicated matter 
even in principle, and any prior prescription of such a tax may be unwise. 
Other alternatives are available; their advisability depends on the costs 
of effecting and policing them. These include outright government regulation 
establishing zoning rules, for example, extension of the role of the firm 
through integrating the entities affected by the diseconomy-creating activity,15 
the solution that combines the extension of the firm with combination-sale 
devices.16 Demsetz17 argues that devices like these can extend the useful-
ness of markets for revealing and measuring the value of side effects. For 
this solution (combination-sale) to be feasible, of course, the resulting under-
specialization cost should not exceed the reduction in exchange and policing 
costs (created by the solution). Finally, it may be that the market solutions 
are too costly, and the most efficient alternative is to disregard and not to 
take into account some external or side effects. 
All of the above solutions apply with some slight modification to the 
problem of ensuring efficient resource allocation among the profit centers of 
a decentralized firm. 
An attempt is made below to show how the standard economic analysis 
necessary to determine the optimal amount of externality to be produced is 
identical in the two situations, i.e., the transfer pricing and the social cost 
situations. In fact, the harmful side effect imposed by one firm on others 
which causes divergence between social costs and private costs corresponds 
to a "noxious" intermediate product that is transferred from one division to 
another within a decentralized firm in the context of transfer pricing. This 
standard economic analysis is appropriate when exchange costs are not too 
high so that the optimal allocation of resources is brought about through 
mutual exchange between the parties affected. 
As indicated earlier, when transaction costs are too high, other solutions 
may be preferable, such as governmental regulation and taxation. However, 
to ascertain which social alternative arrangement is preferable, it is essential, 
first, to apply the standard economic analysis in order to evaluate explicitly 
the benefits of engaging in exchange as opposed to the cost of exchange 
and thus to compare the alternative of exchange with other social arrange-
ments. The economic aspects of the exchange are discussed first. Once the 
identity of the analysis between the individual firm and the economy is estab-
lished, a discussion of the information requirements needed to bring about a 
necessary exchange or to make possible the valuation of the advisability of 
an exchange in the transfer pricing context is presented after which the 
15 See Coase, "The Nature of the Firm." 
16 See Demsetz, "Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights." 
17 Ibid. 
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nature of the information requirements in the social cost context is con-
sidered. 18 
Inevitably, the information requirements will be very similar. The same 
reasons that justify the communication within accounting reports of informa-
tion that facilitates the proper transfer pricing system call for the communi-
cation within accounting reports of information that makes possible the choice 
of the social arrangement that is necessary to deal with the divergence be-
tween social costs and private costs. 
The Economic Analysis in the 
Transfer-Pricing Context 
The discussion which follows is based on the analysis in Ronen and 
McKinney.19 For the purpose of the discussion, assume a simple case of a 
decentralized firm with two divisions, with no loss of generality: a manufac-
turing division and a distribution division. The manufacturing division trans-
fers some intermediate product to the distribution division. The distribution 
division sells the final product to the outside market. 
To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the divisions are technologi-
cally independent; i.e., the level of production in one division does not affect 
the cost of the other. It is also assumed that a common level of output is to be 
reached by the two divisions (either because there exists no market for the 
intermediate product or because the marginal costs of either division rise 
sharply when dealing with an outside market). 
To assure optimal profits for the firm as a whole without unduly restrict-
ing the autonomy of divisional managers,20 it was suggested (see Figures 1 
and 2, page 328) that the manufacturing division communicate to central 
management its marginal cost curve, MMC, by stating how much it would 
produce at various transfer prices. From this, central management derives the 
18 Indeed, the problem of providing information that facilitates the choice of an 
appropriate policy is of primary importance as argued by Harold Demsetz in "Some 
Aspects of Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics IX (October 1966), p. 
68: 
The costs and benefits of a prospective change in resource allocation 
cannot be treated as given datum. The marginal cost and benefit curves 
associated with a prospective realignment of resources are not known by 
the government. Each affected individual knows his benefits or costs, and, 
in the absence of high exchange cost, this information would be transmitted 
to others in the form of market negotiations. The primary problem of the 
government is the estimation problem. The compensation principle by its 
assumption that costs and benefits are known begs the most difficult question 
posed by a prospective change. 
19 "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy," pp. 103-105. 
20 In that they are not permitted to act as monopolistic buyers or sellers where a 
perfectly competitive market for the intermediate product does not exist externally. 
See Hirshleifer, "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing." 
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Figure 1 MANUFACTURING DIVISION 
Figure 2 
average cost function which is then given to the distribution division designat-
ing P1(Q) the actual transfer price it will be charged for alternative quantities. 
Similarly, central management obtains from the distribution division its 
demand schedule showing how much that division would purchase at various 
transfer prices (this equals the marginal revenue from the sale of the first 
product, MR, less the marginal distribution cost, MDC). From this, an average 
revenue function (which is the final product demand, D, less average dis-
tribution cost, ADC) is given to the manufacturing division as its demand 
schedule designating P*(Q) the transfer price offered to the manufacturing 
division for any quantity supplied. The distribution division is charged P1(Q*) 
for any quantity (Q*) transferred. The manufacturing unit is credited with 
P*(Q*) per unit, consisting of the payment from the distribution division, 
plus a subsidy from central management of [P*(Q*) — P 1 Q*) ] • Q*. 
When the manufacturing unit faces the (D — ADC) curve as its demand 
curve, it derives the curve marginal to it (MR — MDC), and chooses to pro-
duce the quantity optimal for the firm Q* where MMC = MR — MDT. 
Through a similar process, the distribution division will choose the same level 
of output. Thus both divisions will want to produce at the same level and will 
maximize their own profits as well as the firm's in doing so. Furthermore, a 
division's reported profit equals its contribution to the firm's profit, i.e., the 
amount by which the firm's profit would be reduced if the division were aban-
doned. (In this simple case, divisional contributions to the firm's profit is 
identical to the total firm's profit.) 
As shown above, through a tax and/or subsidy system applied to 
divisions of the decentralized firm, divisional managers could be induced to 
make decisions which maximize the firm's profit without unduly restricting 
their autonomy. Also, divisional profits would reflect divisional contributions 
to the firm's profits as a whole. 
What are the informational requirements of such a system and their 
implications for accounting? The divisions must communicate information 
about their cost and demand functions. While this, at first, may seem com-
plicated, it should be remembered that the same information is also essential 
for divisional management to make informed decisions. The only further 
requirement is to make this information explicit. Probably, the benefit (i.e., 
enabling central management to effect a policy whereby the divisions' actions 
in their own self-interest do not adversely affect the firm's profit as a whole) 
of incorporating such information explicitly rather than implicitly exceeds the 
cost of communicating such information explicitly and systematically. Notice 
that the function of central management is restricted, in the above system, 
to transferring information between the divisions. The divisions themselves 
are allowed to adapt continuously to changing environmental conditions; 
changing cost conditions need only be periodically reported to central man-
agement. In the absence of an intermediate market which would allow 
transactions to be conducted directly between the two divisions, it was 
thus shown that an intervention by central management (which would hope-
fully be conducted with minimal interference with the divisions' autonomy) 
may be appropriate and desirable. 
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Whether accounting should systematically communicate to central man-
agement the information essential for such desirable intervention depends 
on whether the benefits of intervention (which consist of eliminating the 
reduction in the firm's profits that result from dysfunctional decisions by 
the divisions in pursuit of their self-interests) exceed the cost of incorpo-
rating such information in accounting, communicating it, and processing it 
by a central management in order to effect the appropriate transfer pricing 
policy. Within the context of transfer pricing, as discussed above, it appears 
obvious that the benefits exceed the cost and that the necessary information 
should, therefore, be incorporated in accounting reports on a systematic and 
periodic basis. Moreover, the similarities between the transfer pricing problem 
and the social cost problem justify the conclusion that the benefits of incorpo-
rating information about social costs within accounting reports also exceed 
the costs of doing so. 
The Economic Analysis of the 
Social Cost Problem 
To illustrate the analysis of the social cost problem, two entities, A and 
B, are assumed, although the conclusion would be applicable to any number 
of entities. A engages in a diseconomy creating a harmful activity, thus 
causing damages to B. The magnitude of the damage naturally depends 
not only on the scale of A's activity but also on the way B adjusts to it. In 
fact, knowledge about the alternative activities open to both A and B with 
respect to the harmful effect is necessary to determine the optimal allocation 
of resources. Evidently the optimal allocation of resources is obtained when 
A's gain from the harmful activity less B's loss resulting from it is maximized, 
after all alternatives are considered, including discontinuance of the harmful 
activity. 
Suppose that A and B are firms, then the effects that the harmful activity 
has on their profits measure their gains or losses. In addition, assuming no 
serious market imperfections, these changes in profits would be the appro-
priate basis for the determination of a social optimum. If it is also assumed 
that each firm, in pursuit of its own self-interest, seeks to maximize profits 
and that each knows about the available alternative activity and is willing to 
negotiate, then both will achieve the optimum without governmental inter-
vention. They will either merge and internalize the harmful activity, or they 
will reach the desired level of activity by having B pay A to modify the nature 
or scale of its harmful activity. When there is liability for damage, A will 
compensate B for the optimal amount of damage imposed by A. All these 
solutions are parallel to those applicable to the transfer-pricing case between 
two divisions of a decentralized firm if these divisions were free to merge, 
to agree on a mutually optimal transfer price for the intermediate product or if 
central management were to force A to pay B the amount of optimal loss 
imposed as a "transfer price" for the noxious "intermediate product" trans-
ferred, respectively. Thus, central management can (in the transfer pricing 
case) specify the quantity of the intermediate product to be manufactured 
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and transferred or apply a dual tax-subsidy system to avoid suboptimization.21 
But similarly the government may appropriately intervene in the social cost 
case and regulate the nature and the scale of the harmful activity or apply a 
corrective tax-subsidy system. However, there are dissimilarities between 
the social tax-subsidy solution as traditionally known, and the transfer pricing 
system described above. 
According to the traditional tax-subsidy solution at the social level, the 
required excise tax for a good generating an external diseconomy is equal 
to the value of the marginal diseconomy at the optimal output, whereas the 
excise subsidy should equal the value of the marginal external economy at 
the optimal output for a socially beneficial good. But these measures are 
dysfunctional in that the suggested tax will reduce output below its competitive 
equilibrium, and the subsidy will extend output beyond the optimal level.22 
A related objection to the excise tax-subsidy solution is raised in a paper 
by P. Bohm23 as quoted by Mishan:24 
If the optimal excise tax increases with output, the firm (he argues) 
might become aware of the relationship. Subtracting the schedule 
of optimal taxes from the demand price of the product would result 
in a downward-sloping net average revenue curve from which the 
firm could derive a marginal revenue curve. By equating marginal 
cost to this "marginal revenue" curve, the firm reduces its output 
below optimal. 
However, the government is not obliged to impose a uniform dis-
criminating tax, one equal at each unit of output to the marginal 
effluent and, therefore, at any output raising a total tax equal to the 
total loss inflicted by the effluent. Such a tax, already marginal, 
effectively precludes the industry from "exploiting" it by reducing 
its output. In addition, such a discriminating tax ensures that the 
total conditions are met. Thus, heavy effluent charges properly 
imposed on the initial units of the output could well prohibit pro-
duction of the good. 
It is interesting to notice the striking similarity between Bohm's sug-
gestion at the social level and Hirshleifer's25 solution for the transfer pricing 
problem in that divisional managers are not permitted to act as monopolistic 
21 See Ronen and McKinney, "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy," pp. 
99-112. 
22 For a discussion of this issue, see Mishan, "The Postwar Literature on Exter-
nalit ies," pp. 1-28; J. M. Buchanan and W. C. Stubblebine, "Externali ty," Economica, 
XXIX (November 1962), pp. 371-384; and Ralph Turvey, "On Divergencies Between 
Social Cost and Private Cost," Economica (August 1963), pp. 309-313. 
23 P. Bohm, "Pollution, Purification and the Theory of External Effects" (mimeo-
graphed, 1969). 
24 "The Postwar Literature on Externalities," pp. 15-16. 
25 "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing." 
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buyers or sellers where a perfectly competitive market for the intermediate 
product does not exist externally. Unfortunately, this solution, for both trans-
fer pricing and the social cost problem, may unduly restrict the autonomy 
of the manager (of the division and the firm, respectively). In addition, it does 
not provide information about the contribution (of the division and of the firm) 
to the overall profits (of the firm as a whole and of the economy, respec-
tively).26 
It can be shown, however, that the dual tax-subsidy solution suggested 
by Ronen and McKinney27 for the transfer-pricing problem, as discussed 
above, can apply to the social cost case as illustrated in the figures below. 
Figure 3, opposite, illustrates the situation faced by A. The scale of the 
harmful activity conducted by A, as represented by the horizontal axis, and 
the scale of B's losses resulting from the activity, as represented in Figure 4, 
opposite, are assumed to be continuously variable. In Figure 3, the line MG(A) 
represents the marginal gain to A from the harmful activity. This is simply 
the net gain that results from producing the goods and services which neces-
sitate engaging in a harmful activity. Thus, this line reflects the revenue 
minus all the costs (including the private costs of the harmful activity) related 
to the product which creates the harmful activity to B. The area under this 
line gives the total gain to A from the harmful activity. The line ML(B) in 
Figure 4 represents the marginal loss to B from the harmful activity of A. 
This is the marginal reduction in profit resulting from the side effects of A's 
activity. The total area under this line reflects the total loss to B after making 
the best possible adjustment to A's activity. It is, therefore, the direct loss 
as reduced by adjustment plus the cost of making that adjustment. If A and 
B cannot negotiate and if no restrictions whatever are imposed on A, A would 
choose to engage in the harmful activity at a level OC. Clearly, the optimal 
level for the activity from the social standpoint is OD, which would be obtained 
if A and B could merge, as illustrated in Figure 5, page 334. When the opti-
mum level of the activity OD is produced, the net social gain is reflected by 
the area OEF in Figure 5, which is clearly greater than the area OEF minus 
ECH, which would have reflected the net social gain if A is led, in the absence 
of either negotiations or restrictions, to produce OC of the harmful activity. 
If A and B were to negotiate, B would be willing to pay up to the area OCH 
in Figure 5 to induce A to discontinue its activity. A would be willing to accept 
a payment which does not fall below the area DCE to reduce its activity to 
the optimal level OD. A would have been willing to reduce its activity to 
level O in exchange for a payment which does not fall below area ODEF, but 
for this reduction B would not be willing to pay more than ODE. Since B, 
however, is willing to pay more than DCE for a reduction in the activity level 
from OC to OD, the resulting scale of the activity will be the optimal level 
OD as a result of negotiations. 
26 These crit icisms are discussed in more detail in Ronen and McKinney, "Transfer 
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A AND B MERGED Figure 5 
If liable to compensate B for actual damages, A will voluntarily choose 
the scale OD at which the marginal loss to B which has to be paid just equals 
A's marginal gain from the harmful activity. By producing at OD, A will have 
to pay B the area ODE, but the total gain would be ODEF and, thus, A's net 
gain is OEF. This net gain will be reduced if A chooses a scale that is either 
higher or lower than OD. Thus, the gain from negotiation is the difference 
between the net social gain with negotiation, which is OEF, and the net social 
gain in the absence of negotiation, which is OEF minus CEH. The net gain 
attributable to negotiation is, therefore, the area CEH. For negotiation to 
be worthwhile from the social standpoint, the cost of negotiation should not 
exceed this gain. If the cost of negotiation exceeds this gain, society would 
be better off with A producing the harmful activity at level OC. If the cost of 
governmental intervention, however, is less than CEH,28 it would be worth-
while for the government to intervene, either through establishing a liability 
for damage or through outright regulation, thus inducing A to reduce its level 
of activity to the optimal scale, OD. Alternatively, the government could 
employ a tax or subsidy system corresponding to that suggested above for 
the transfer-pricing problem. 
If, in the case of negotiations or in the case whereby A is liable to pay 
damages to B, the payment is to be assessed per unit of damage (expressed 
in average rather than marginal terms), then A will have to operate on the 
28 The determination of whether the cost of intervention exceeds or falls below 
the net gain attributable to negotiations is not independent of the type of law that 
prevails. For an elaborate discussion of this issue, see Mishan, "The Postwar 
Literature on Externalities." 
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line AL(B) which is the line average to B's marginal cost line. By facing the 
line AL(B) as its average cost of the activity, A will construct the line marginal 
to it [ML(B)], equate it to the marginal gain, and choose level OD. Similarly, 
B will receive the payment per unit in average terms. B will face the average 
gain curve AG (A) to which will be drawn the marginal MG(A) in Figure 4, 
equate it with the marginal loss line ML(B), and choose activity level OD 
as well. 
A direct translation of this analysis into one appropriate for a transfer-
pricing problem is possible. B can be viewed as transferring an intermediate 
product to A in this case. The intermediate product is B's acceptance of A's 
harmful activity. This acceptance is again assumed to be continuously 
variable. The higher the level of the activity that B accepts, the higher its 
marginal loss and the lower the marginal gain to A. If, in the absence of 
negotiations, the government were to employ a tax-subsidy system corre-
sponding to that suggested for the transfer-pricing problem,29 information 
about the marginal loss to B, ML(B) would be needed. The government 
would provide A with the average schedule AL(B) as the supply curve for the 
acceptance of B; the government would correspondingly be provided by A 
with its marginal gain MG(A), and it would communicate the average gain 
schedule to B as the demand curve for its acceptance. If both A and B 
construct the marginal to these curves and operate on it, both will voluntarily 
and in pursuit of their self-interests choose the optimal level of OD. The total 
receipts of the government from A would be ODLM (see Figure 3). The 
government will pay B a total of ODIJ (see Figure 4), and a net subsidy 
amounting to the difference between the total net gain of A's activity (ODEF) 
and the total loss to B of the activity (ODE) will be paid by the government 
to B. 
Information Requirements. The information requirements for the admin-
istration of such a policy are identical to those arising in the transfer-pricing 
case. Information about the marginal loss and marginal gain resulting from 
the activities should be obtained and communicated. This communication 
should be preferably on a systematic basis since changing factors in the 
environment may affect the loss and the gain curve.30 In the final analysis, 
it can be concluded that accounting must communicate periodically this 
information unless the cost exceeds the benefit. The benefit can be measured 
by the net gain resulting from governmental interference, negotiation, or any 
other social arrangement that becomes desirable as a result of obtaining the 
information. The cost involves estimation of the loss by B and of the gain 
2 9 See Ronen and McKinney, "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy." 
30 Communicating this information systematically becomes crucial in a changing 
environment, because the cost of obtaining such information under these condit ions 
becomes prohibitive. Thus, in discussing the traditional tax-subsidy solution, Mishan 
argues ("The Postwar Literature on Externalities," p. 15): "The chief obstacle here 
is, of course, the costs of collecting the necessary information and the costs of 
supervision, costs which would be particularly heavy for industries in which demand 
and supply condit ions are apt to vary frequently." 
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by A. Since A and B presumably are best qualified to estimate their respec-
tive gain and loss resulting from the activity, it is reasonable to assume that 
this information can be most cheaply provided by them. In particular, a firm 
is in the best position to provide information on (a) its cost of a harmful 
activity caused by another firm and (b) its cost of eliminating or reducing a 
harmful activity which it inflicts on other entities. Certainly, whether, in any 
particular case, the benefit of communicating the information does not ex-
ceed the cost is an empirical question . But the proposition that the benefits 
do exceed the costs in the majority of the cases has great appeal. 
The reported profits of each, A and B (including the subsidy), will be 
identical to the net social gain resulting from B's acceptance of the harmful 
activity. If A ceases the harmful activity or if B does not accept it and has 
the means to enforce its discontinuation, the social product will be reduced 
by the reported profit of either A or B—the area OEF. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
It was shown that, in the situations that are purely defined as external 
economies or diseconomies, the systematic communication of information 
relevant to social costs and benefits is essential for appropriate decisions. 
But the need for systematic reporting of information about social costs 
and benefits is not limited to the cases of pure technical external economies 
or diseconomies. It extends to the broader class of what Scitovsky31 refers to 
as pecuniary external economies. These include the widespread kind of 
interdependencies that are frequently to be found in the analyses of indus-
trialization in developing nations. In these analyses, the concept is used in 
connection with the special problems of allocating savings among alternative 
investment opportunities. These externalities are usually reflected in market 
prices, but they may not lead to optimal allocation of resources until after a 
possibly lengthy period of adjustment. This is particularly true in the case of 
investment projects where the impact of a firm's investment decision on other 
producers will be characterized by a time lag. 
To elaborate, investment in an industry leads to an expansion of its 
capacity and may, thereby, lower the prices of its products and raise the 
prices of the factors used by it. Thus, these results benefit others. The 
raising of factor prices benefits suppliers of the factors. These benefits 
should be explicitly taken into account when investment decisions are made. 
Usually it is recommended that this should be done by taking as a 
maximand not profits alone, but the total of the profits yielded and the pecu-
niary external economies created by the investment.32 
This naturally conflicts with the results of equilibrium theory. According 
to the latter, market interdependence as a competitive system insures that 
the maximization of profit by each firm and the maximization of satisfaction 
31 T. Scitovsky, "Two Concepts of External Economies," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, LXII (April 1954), pp. 70-82. 
32 Ibid. 
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by each individual lead to an optimum situation where consumers' and pro-
ducers' surpluses are maximized. This paradox can only be resolved by 
recognizing that the limitation of general equilibrium theory renders it in-
applicable to the problems of investments which are typically long-run. 
The first reason for such a failure is an unrealistic assumption of divisi-
bility when large investment projects are undertaken, e.g., investment in 
public utilities such as canal zones, bridges, and railways—the typical 
examples of indivisibilities in economies which would force the producer to 
choose to produce either less or more than the output that would equate 
these marginal costs and benefits. 
Another reason for the inapplicability of general equilibrium to the 
problems of investment is the fact that equilibrium theory is static, whereas 
the allocation of investment funds is dynamic. Equilibrium theory assures 
the socially desirable optimum only when the system is in equilibrium. In-
vestments need not bring the system closer to equilibrium; when they do 
not, the result of equilibrium theory may not apply. Profits themselves are a 
sign of disequilibrium, and investment is undertaken for profit. Profits in a 
freely competitive industry lead to investment in that industry, and the invest-
ment in turn tends to eliminate the profits that have called it forth. The same 
investment, however, may induce profits in other industries, and to this extent 
it leads away from equilibrium. Thus, investment in Industry A will cheapen 
its product, and if this is used as a factor in Industry B, the latter's profits 
will increase. This is a case where the price reduction creates not a con-
sumer surplus proper, but a pecuniary external economy which benefits firms. 
The profits of Industry B created by the lower price factor A call for investment 
expansion in B, which in turn would increase Industry B's demand for In-
dustry A's products. This again will give rise to profits and call for further 
investment and expansion in Industry A. Equilibrium is reached only when 
successive doses of investment and expansion in the two industries have 
led to the simultaneous elimination of profits in both. Only then will the 
conclusions of equilibrium theory become applicable and thus, in the absence 
of direct interdependence, the amount of investment possible in Industry A 
would also be the socially desirable amount. This is greater than the amount 
which was profitable at the first stage before Industry B has made adjustments. 
Thus, in general, when an investment gives rise to pecuniary external 
economies, its private profitability understates its social desirability. Only 
when the pecuniary external economy created by investment in Industry A 
becomes "internal," and part of the profits of the investors themselves, will 
investment in A be more profitable and will, thus, be pushed further than 
in the absence of integration, but even then, without investment and expan-
sion in Industry B, it would not be pushed far enough. What inhibits the 
investment in A is, among other things, a limitation of the demand for Industry 
A's products imposed by the limited capacity of Industry B which consumes 
this product, just as investment in Industry B is inhibited by the limited 
capacity of Industry A, the supplier of one of Industry B's factors of production. 
Only the expansion in the two industries, integrated and planned to-
gether with the possibility of investment in each one of them, would be a 
337 
reliable index of its social desirability. Moreover, it is apparent that vertical 
integration alone would not be sufficient. Complete integration of all indus-
tries (considering all possible instances of pecuniary external economies) 
would be necessary to eliminate all divergence between private profit and 
public benefit. 
Profits in a market economy could thus be a poor guide to economic 
outcome as far as investment and industrial expansion are concerned, and 
the more decentralized and differentiated the economy, the poorer they are 
as a guide. 
In an economy in which economic decisions are decentralized, a system 
of communications is needed to facilitate the coordination of economic deci-
sions. Prices in a market are generally the signalling device that provides 
information concerning economic decisions. The merit of perfect competition 
is that it would cause prices to transmit information reliably and to induce 
people to respond to this information properly. Market prices, however, 
can be deficient in reflecting the economic situation as it will be in the future. 
They are thus more useful for coordinating current production decisions that 
are immediately effective and guided by short-run consideration than they 
are for coordinating investment decisions that have a delayed effect and that 
in the long run should be governed not by what the present economic situa-
tion is, but by what the future economic situation is expected to be. 
The proper coordination of investment decisions would require, there-
fore, a signalling device to transmit information about present plans and 
future conditions as they are determined by present plans—i.e., forecasts 
made by those who decide on present plans. The pricing system fails to 
provide this information (except in the case where there exists a developed 
futures market, so that future prices could provide exactly such a signalling 
device). In these cases, therefore, there is need either for centralized invest-
ment planning or—in the absence of centralized planning when decentrali-
zation is considered desirable and superior—for some additional communi-
cation system to supplement the pricing system as a signalling device. 
Where should such a signalling device come from? If it is considered 
that a systematic, periodic, and reliable communication system is desirable, 
then the most appropriate way of providing such signals is through the 
accounting information system. It is desirable for a producer, in pursuing 
maximum profits, to attempt to provide the best forecast information that 
bears upon the effect of present investment plans that may induce other in-
vestors to react in a manner which is optimal from a social point of view 
as well as from the standpoint of the producer's private, long-run goal. If a 
producer has to communicate these signals in the absence of a systematic 
information system, two problems may arise. The first is whether the pro-
ducer, given the time and the information overload pressure at the moment 
of the decision, and given the daily problems of production, would devote 
sufficient efforts to such a disclosure. The second problem which arises 
deals with the economies of information. Even assuming that the manager 
will pay sufficient attention to the signalling of estimated future effects, would 
the cost of ad hoc, spur-of-the-moment reporting not exceed the cost of 
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providing relevant information periodically and systematically through the 
accounting system? Obviously, this is an empirical issue which cannot be 
settled in general, one way or the other. In any particular instance, however, 
or for any particular firm, it may not be impossible to ascertain the cost/ 
benefit relationship so that a determination can be made whether these sig-
nals should be detected and communicated in an ad hoc fashion or on a 
systematic basis. 
It seems, therefore, appropriate that the objective of accounting systems 
should give explicit consideration to providing signals made necessary by 
the existence of pecuniary external economies or diseconomies whenever 
such provision within the accounting system is desirable from a cost/benefit 
standpoint. Explicit consideration of the desirability of incorporating the 
signalling function within the accounting system seems superior to leaving 
such signals to chance or to reliance on the belief that the inherent rationality 
of managers will ensure not only a sufficient amount of attention on an ad 
hoc basis, but also an optimal search for such signals on an ad hoc basis. 
Thus, if such signalling devices are present, investment decisions which 
exclude the signalling of possible future effects may be suboptimal and less 
than would have been socially desirable. If signals are given, producers 
affected by pecuniary externalities will adjust to the expected effects of such 
investments and probably expand their facilities and generate the expanded 
demand for the other industry's product, thus causing the chain of expanded 
investment in the other industry and shortening the period of disequilibrium 
during which the suboptimality persists. 
Summary 
/ Social costs are incurred when actions of business firms have harmful 
effects on others. Social benefits accrue when actions of business firms 
benefit others. When actions like these and their effects on others manifest 
themselves in the market prices of the goods and services provided by the 
business firms, they become part of the private costs and benefits. In this 
case, the social effects of such actions (that manifest themselves in market 
prices of goods and services) need not be considered separately in the 
formulation of accounting objectives. 
As is often the case, however, social costs and benefits are not imme-
diately reflected in the market prices of the goods and services transferred 
among business firms or to consumers. An explicit and separate considera-
tion of social costs and benefits (not manifested in market prices) becomes 
justified. Such an explicit consideration is necessary for the private parties 
concerned to assess the situation correctly and arrive at an optimal solution. 
However, in many cases more than two parties are involved in activities 
causing social costs. In these instances it can be too costly for the parties 
to come together to agree or bargain, and governmental intervention (through 
fixing liability for damages, placing taxes or outright regulation) may become 
appropriate. Whatever social arrangement is deemed best under the circum-
stances, however, periodic and systematic information about social costs is 
necessary for the government to effect a desirable and rational policy and 
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for business firms to be able to anticipate and help shape this policy. Prob-
ably, the most appropriate and inexpensive source for such information is 
the accounting system. 
Thus, when government does not have to intervene, accounting informa-
tion should reflect the social costs as part of the cost of production in such 
a way that the resulting income properly reflects the quality of management 
performance. By incorporating social costs explicitly in accounting reports, 
stockholders and creditors will be more qualified to assess managerial per-
formance inasmuch as the choice of alternative actions within the firm is 
concerned. Such costs must also be explicitly incorporated in accounting 
reports to properly reflect the firm's contribution to the social product. This 
is necessary from a social standpoint just as it is considered necessary for 
a division of a decentralized firm to reflect its contribution to the firm's overall 
profit in order to satisfy the decision needs of central management. 
The periodic communication of social costs is also necessary when 
intervention by the government may be desirable to effectively carry out its 
responsibility. Although many of these costs are difficult to quantify, the 
main question is whether omitting attempts to measure them within the ac-
counting framework can be justified. These social costs and benefits which 
are important to users such as management, stockholders, and government 
will continue to be implicitly, if not explicitly, quantified. Incorporation of 
these costs and benefits within the accounting framework will obviously 
represent an improvement. 
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6. Illustrative Financial 
Statements 
Illustrative Financial Statements 
Introduction 
The illustrative financial statements contained in this chapter were prepared 
as a part of the research made available to the Study Group. They do not 
represent illustrations of financial statements based on the conclusions set 
forth in the Study Group's Report. The statements were prepared to furnish 
the Group with a basis for considering some of the objectives during the 
process of its deliberations. Consideration of the illustrative financial state-
ments was also useful for highlighting some of the problems of implementing 
those objectives. 
It was not practicable to consider all possible circumstances for a 
manufacturing company or to display different presentations that might be 
appropriate for other types of business enterprises. Further, these financial 
statements were not designed to encompass fully the deliberations of the 
Study Group concerning disclosure of information about social goals, ranges 
of precision, reliability and other assessments of risk, uncertainty and vari-
ability. No attempt has been made to include in the notes to the financial 
statements all of the information presently required to be disclosed or deemed 
desirable to be disclosed in the future. 
The illustrative financial statements are presented in two phases. Phase 
1 utilizes historical cost as the measurement basis; current values—utilizing 
varying bases for determination—are disclosed supplementally. Dual dis-
closure of historical costs and current values is presented in Phase 2. 
In Phase 2 there are two alternative presentations of the Statement of 
Earnings (Loss). In Alternative A the cost of products sold is reflected at 
historical cost in determining "realized income" while in Alternative B the 
cost of products sold is reflected at replacement cost in determining "income 
from operations." 
Background Information and Industry Data 
XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises was founded in 1954. It produces and sells 
one line of products—cover plates for light switches, electric wall outlets, etc. 
Approximately 90 per cent of product demand relates to new construction. 
Due to changes in rates of construction of new commercial buildings and 
homes, the variation in the level of sales may approach 35 per cent from 
one year to the next. 
In 1973, the company moved from a leased factory on the East Coast 
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to a new plant in Topeka, Kansas. At that time the company scrapped its 
old machinery. The cost of the new facility, which became fully operational 
in December 1973, was: 




The estimated useful lives of the building and equipment are 40 and 20 years, 
respectively. 
The new facility was financed primarily from proceeds of 7½ per cent 
notes payable, face value $1,500,000, due January 1, 1994. The principal is 
payable at maturity, and interest is payable semi-annually. Each year the 
company has purchased $75,000 par value of municipal bonds having a 
maturity date approximating that of its liability on the 7½ per cent notes 
payable. The objective is to fund the liability by maturity date. 
In December 1978 the company purchased equipment costing $500,000 
in order to increase its plant capacity in anticipation of an upsurge in con-
struction. In December 1983 the company completed, at a cost of $700,000, 
a new cutting room and installed new equipment utilizing advances in the 
technology of cutting techniques. Each of these equipment additions also 
had an estimated useful life of 20 years. 
The company has followed the practice of depreciating its property on 
a straight-line basis for both accounting and tax purposes. Thus, annua! 
depreciation based on cost is 
1974-1978 1979-1983 
Building $10,000 $10,000 
Equipment 50,000 75,000 
Total $60,000 $85,000 
The manufacturing process consists of four operations: cutting, stamp-
ing, plating, and packaging. The in-process inventory is immaterial in 
amount. Its approximate cost of $8,000, which remains relatively constant 
between years, is reported as part of finished products inventory. 
In general, manufacturing costs account for 60 per cent of the selling 
price and are made up of: 
Raw materials and supplies 25% 
Direct labor 20% 
Overhead (including depreciation, indirect labor 
and expenses) 15% 
Total manufacturing costs 60% 
In 1981, the U. S. Government, in an effort to obtain a better balance 
of trade, placed import restrictions on certain commodities, including equip-
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ment suitable for manufacture of electric switchplates. The result was an 
additional increase of 20 per cent in the cost of replacing the company's 
equipment. 
In October 1982, the United Workers of America struck the company's 
plant. The strike lasted 60 days, during which shipments were made from 
inventory, thus causing a severe depletion of finished products by yearend. 
As of December 31, 1982, the replacement cost of the products sold 
during 1982 was $230,000 in excess of their historical costs, due primarily 
to the increase in depreciation on a replacement cost basis and to increases 
in labor costs during 1982. Significant increases in costs for raw material, 
labor, and outside services were experienced during the latter part of 1983. 
As of December 31, 1983, the replacement cost of the products sold during 
1983 was $260,000 in excess of their historical costs. 
In 1983, improved equipment suitable for manufacture of items such as 
electric switchplates became available. The effect of the introduction of this 
equipment by the end of the year was a 50 per cent decline in value of the 
conventional equipment owned by the company (except for its 1983 addition 
of $700,000). 
The following price index statistics are indicative of the changes in prices 
during the decade, 1974-1983 (1974 = 100): 
Price Indexes 
Durable Plant 
Year Wholesale Equipment Building Sites 
1974 100 100 100 100 
1975 105 101 105 105 
1976 109 103 107 112 
1977 112 104 112 119 
1978 116 106 116 129 
1979 120 110 122 137 
1980 127 116 134 147 
1981 134 122 149 155 
1982 141 126 155 160 
1983 146 135 165 166 
The index of residential and commercial construction (in terms of units) 












The sharp drop in construction after 1980 was closely related to the 
general tightness in capital markets. This was reflected in the following long-
term interest rates at each yearend: 
Illustrative Financial Statements Prepared in Terms of Evolutionary Stages: 
Phase 1—Historical Costs with Current Values Disclosed Supplementally; 
Phase 2—Dual Disclosure of Historical Costs and Current Values 
The following illustrative financial statements for XYZ Manufacturing 
Enterprises for the two years ended December 31, 1983 have been prepared 
primarily to illustrate the impact of fair value measurements and disclosures. 
Any presentation of hypothetical financial statements necessarily involves a 
choice from among alternatives, and accordingly, other presentations could 
have been developed. 
Phase 1 illustrates the supplemental disclosure of current values. It was 
submitted to the Study Group in order to evaluate disclosure of current 
values and changes therein without their direct inclusion in the determination 
of financial position or results of operations. Thus, Phase 1 is intended to 
be responsive to (a) those who believe that current value information is useful 
but should not be a part of the determination of financial position or results 
of operations, and (b) those who desire experience in measuring and report-
ing on current values before directly including such values in the financial 
statements, as illustrated in Phase 2. 
Phase 2 illustrates the direct inclusion of current values throughout 
the financial statements and permits comparison with historical costs. It was 
submitted to the Study Group in order to evaluate the effects of current values 
on the determination of financial position and results of operations. Accord-
ingly, Phase 2 is intended to be responsive to those who believe earnings 
should be measured on the basis of current values. 
In Phase 2, the Statement of Earnings (Loss) is illustrated using two 
alternative presentations. The first (Alternative A) segregates measurements 
based on historical costs from those based on current values as components 
of the determination of earnings. The second (Alternative B) reflects a deter-
mination of income from operations based on replacement costs, thus being 











Phase 1: Financial Statements Prepared on Basis of Historical Cost With 
Current Value Disclosed Supplementally 
Financial statements and supplemental schedules illustrating Phase 1 










Statement of Earnings (Loss) 
Statement of Financial Position 
Statement of Stockholders' Equity 
Statement of Financial Activities 
Earnings Forecast 
Net Valuation Loss and Unrealized Valuation Gain 
Unrealized Valuation Gain on Inventories 
Unrealized Valuation Gain (Loss) on Property 
Unrealized Valuation Gain (Loss) on Long-Term 
Investments and Liabilities 
For applicable notes to financial statements, see pages 356-359. 
Exhibit A 
XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Statement of Earnings (Loss) 
Years Ended December 31, 1983 and 1982 
1983 1982 
Revenues 
Net sales $4,140,000 $3,300,000 
Other—interest, etc. 250,000 225,000 
Total 4,390,000 3,525,000 
Costs and Expenses 
Cost of products sold, other than 
items listed below 2,280,000 2,285,000 
Selling and administrative expenses, 
other than items listed below 1,035,000 910,000 
Provision for depreciation 85,000 85,000 
Taxes, other than income 200,000 175,000 
Interest 250,000 200,000 
Other 100,000 50,000 
Total 3,950,000 3,705,000 
Income (loss) before income taxes 440,000 (180,000) 
Provision (refund) for income taxes 220,000 ( 90,000) 
Earnings (loss) $ 220,000 $ ( 90,000) 
Per common share $.44 $( .18) 
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Exhibit B 
XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Statement of Financial Position 
December 31, 1983 and 1982 
ASSETS 1983 1982 
Financial Resources 
Cash (including temporary cash 
investments—1982, $200,000) $ 300,000 $ 395,000 
Receivables (less allowance for 
uncollectible accounts: 1983, 
$65,000; 1982, $50,000) 850,000 700,000 
Refund receivable—federal income tax 90,000 
Total financial resources 1,150,000 1,185,000 
Inventories 
Raw materials 200,000 125,000 
Finished products 900,000 200,000 
Total inventories 1,100,000 325,000 
Long-Term Assets 
Investment in municipal bonds held 
for payment of principal of 
7 ½ % notes payable, due 
January 1, 1994 750,000 675,000 
Property: 
Land 500,000 500,000 
Buildings 500,000 400,000 
Equipment 2,100,000 1,500,000 
Total 3,100,000 2,400,000 
Less accumulated depreciation 725,000 640,000 
Property—net 2,375,000 1,760,000 
Total long-term assets 3,125,000 2,435,000 
Total assets $5,375,000 $3,945,000 
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Exhibit B (concluded) 
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY 1983 1982 
Current Liabilities 
Accounts payable, trade $ 500,000 $ 125,000 
Accrued liabilities 200,000 65,000 
Income taxes payable 100,000 
Total current liabilities 800,000 190,000 
Long-Term Liabilities 
7½ % notes payable, due 
January 1, 1994 1,500,000 1,500,000 
7% notes payable, due 
January 1, 1991 700,000 
Total long-term liabilities 2,200,000 1,500,000 
Stockholders' Equity 
Common stock, no par value, 
authorized, 1,000,000 shares; 
issued and outstanding, 
500,000 shares 1,000,000 1,000,000 
Retained earnings 1,375,000 1,255,000 
Stockholders' equity 2,375,000 2,255,000 
Total liabilities and 
stockholders' equity $5,375,000 $3,945,000 
Exhibit C 
XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Statement of Stockholders' Equity 




Balance, January 1 
Loss for the year 
Less cash dividends paid-
Balance, December 31 
$1 ,000 ,000 
-$.20 per share 
1,000,000 
1983 
Earnings for the year 
Less cash dividends paid—$.20 per share 












XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Statement of Financial Activities 
Years Ended December 31, 1983 and 1982 




Sales of product $4,140,000 $3,300,000 
Sale of equipment 45,000 
Total 4,140,000 3,345,000 
Other activities: 
Other revenues—interest, etc. 250,000 225,000 
Issuance of 7% notes payable, 
due January 1, 1991 700,000 
Total 950,000 225,000 
Total provided 5,090,000 3,570,000 
Applied 
Operating activities: 
Purchase of materials 1,450,000 360,000 
Employee compensation 1,245,000 600,000 
Employee benefits 420,000 270,000 
Rents 215,000 205,000 
Purchase of advertising 400,000 240,000 
Purchase of other services 460,000 265,000 
Acquisition of buildings and 
equipment 700,000 450,000 
Total 4,890,000 2,390,000 
Other activities: 
Interest on debt 250,000 200,000 
Cash dividends 100,000 100,000 
Purchase of municipal securities 
(to fund payment of 7½ % 
long-term notes payable) 75,000 75,000 
Total 425,000 375,000 
Payment of taxes 420,000 85,000 
Total applied 5,735,000 2,850,000 
Increase (decrease) in net 
financial resources $ (645,000) $ 720,000 
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Exhibit D (concluded) 
CHANGES IN NET FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
Increase (decrease) in financial resources: 
Cash $ (95,000) $ 120,000 
Receivables 150,000 (100,000) 
Refund receivable— 
federal income tax ( 90,000) 90,000 
Net change ( 35,000) 110,000 
Increase (decrease) in current 
liabilities: 
Accounts payable, trade 375,000 (475,000) 
Accrued liabilities 135,000 (135,000) 
Income taxes payable 100,000 
Net change 610,000 (610,000) 
Increase (decrease) in net financial 
resources $ (645,000) $ 720,000 
CHANGES IN INVESTMENT IN INVENTORIES 
Purchase and production inputs 
to inventories: 
Raw materials $1,450,000 $ 360,000 
Labor 980,000 390,000 
Outside services and overhead 755,000 260,000 
Depreciation 75,000 70,000 
Total inputs 3,260,000 1,080,000 
Less inventories sold 2,485,000 1,980,000 
Net increase (decrease) in investment 
in inventories 775,000 (900,000) 
Inventories, January 1 325,000 1,225,000 
Inventories, December 31 $1,100,000 $ 325,000 
PURCHASE COMMITMENTS, DECEMBER 31 
Raw materials $ 825,000 $ 483,000 
Outside services and other 240,000 315,000 
Total $1,065,000 $ 798,000 
SALES ORDERS (BACKLOG), DECEMBER 31 $ 510,000 $1,427,000 
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Exhibit D (concluded) 
AVAILABLE FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
Other than short-term borrowings for temporary cash needs, the com-
pany does not have plans or commitments to seek equity or long-term 
financing in 1984. Should the need arise for additional funds, however, the 
following is the status of available financial resources at December 31, 1983: 
The company has, with three banks, a $1,000,000 line of credit extend-
ing to October 31, 1984. The banks have agreed that up to $500,000 of 
indebtedness may be converted to a term loan maturing in five years from 
the date of conversion. 
Based on information provided by its investment bankers, the company 
believes that under current stock market conditions it could offer and sell 
an additional 100,000 shares of common stock at a price that would yield 
net proceeds of $700,000. Security offerings of larger magnitude would gen-
erally require a related expansion of the company's operations. Such an 
expansion is not presently contemplated. 
Exhibit E 
XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Earnings Forecast 
Year Ending December 31, 1984 
(Note: This earnings forecast is based on a number of assumptions 
as to future conditions and events. Accordingly, there is no assurance that 
future earnings will coincide with the forecast.) 
Estimated revenues from product sales $4,600,000 
Estimated costs and expenses: 
Cost of products 3,000,000 
Selling, general and administrative expenses 1,200,000 
Total 4,200,000 
Estimated operating profit 400,000 
Estimated other revenues—interest, etc. 250,000 
Estimated interest expense (250,000) 
Estimated realized earnings before taxes 400,000 
Estimated income taxes 200,000 
Estimated realized earnings $ 200,000 
Estimated changes in value of assets and liabilities before taxes: 
Operating items 
Other—net 
Total unrealized valuation gain 
Estimated deferred income taxes 
Estimated unrealized valuation gain 
Per share of common stock: 
Estimated realized earnings 









Exhibit E (concluded) 
Assumptions Underlying Earnings Forecast 
The forecast of earnings for 1984 is based on the following assumptions: 
1. An increase in Gross National Product of 10%, excluding the effects 
of inflation, and of 15% without such exclusion. 
2. No other major changes in the condition of the domestic economy. 
3. No change in the share of the market obtained by the company. 
4. Some resistance by customers to increases in sales prices. 
5. An increase in costs of approximately 17%. 
6. Stable labor relations and other operating conditions. 
Schedule 1 
XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Net Valuation Loss and Unrealized Valuation Gain 
Years Ended December 31, 1983 and 1982 
1983 1982 
From Operating Items 
Inventories (Schedule 2) $235,000 $(175,000) 
Buildings and Equipment (Schedule 3): 
Buildings 43,000 ( 5,000) 
Equipment (670,000) ( 27,000) 
Valuation loss (392,000) (207,000) 
From Land, Long-Term Investments, and Liabilities 
Land (Schedule 3) 90,000 
Holding gain (loss) on investment in 
municipal bonds (Schedule 4) 54,000 ( 24,000) 
Holding gain (loss) resulting from changes 
in present value of long-term notes 
payable (Schedule 4) (165,000) 112,000 
Valuation gain (loss) ( 21,000) 88,000 
Valuation loss for the year before 
reduction in deferred income taxes (413,000) (119,000) 
Reduction in deferred income taxes 147,000 23,000 
Net valuation loss for the year (266,000) ( 96,000) 
Unrealized valuation gain, January 1 598,000 694,000 
Unrealized valuation gain, December 31 $332,000 $ 598,000 
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Schedule 2 
XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Unrealized Valuation Gain On Inventories 
Years Ended December 31, 1983 and 1982 
1983 1982 
Unrealized valuation gain, January 1 $ 25,000 $ 200,000 
For the year: 
Excess of current value at date of sale 
(or yearend) over costs incurred 
during production (or current 
value at beginning of year) 742,000 287,000 
Less valuation gain realized from sales (507,000) (462,000) 
Valuation gain (loss) 235,000 (175,000) 
Inventories, December 31: 
Unrealized valuation gain 260,000 25,000 
Historical cost basis 1,100,000 325,000 
Current value basis $1,360,000 $ 350,000 
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Schedule 3 
XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Unrealized Valuation Gain (Loss) on Property 
Years Ended December 31, 1983 and 1982 
1983 1982 
Land 
Unrealized valuation gain, January 1 $ 300,000 $ 300,000 
Valuation gain for the year (Replace-
ment cost estimate not revised in 1982) 90,000 
At December 31: 
Unrealized valuation gain 390,000 300,000 
Historical cost basis 500,000 500,000 
Current value basis $ 890,000 $ 800,000 
Buildings 
Unrealized valuation gain, January 1 $ 152,000 $ 157,000 
Valuation gain (loss) for the year: 
Valuation increase 48,000 
Depreciation (5,000) (5,000) 
Valuation gain (loss)—net 43,000 (5,000) 
At December 31: 
Unrealized valuation gain 195,000 152,000 
Historical cost basis net of 
accumulated depreciation 
(1983, $100,000; 1982, $90,000) 400,000 310,000 
Current value basis net of 
accumulated depreciation 
(1983, $165,000; 1982, $134,000) $ 595,000 $ 462,000 
Equipment 
Unrealized valuation gain, January 1 $ 313,000 $ 340,000 
Valuation loss for the year: 
Valuation decrease (644,000) 
Depreciation ( 26,000) (27,000) 
Valuation loss (670,000) (27,000) 
At December 31: 
Unrealized valuation gain (loss) (357,000) 313,000 
Historical cost basis net of 
accumulated depreciation 
(1983, $625,000; 1982, $550,000) 1,475,000 950,000 
Current value basis net of 
accumulated depreciation 
(1983, $367,000; 1982, $773,000) $1,118,000 $1,263,000 
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Schedule 4 
XYZ Manufacturing Company 
Unrealized Valuation Gain (Loss) On 
Long-Term Investments and Liabilities 
Years Ended December 31, 1983 and 1982 
1983 1982 
Investment in municipal bonds 
Unrealized valuation loss, January 1 $( 37,000) $( 13,000) 
Valuation gain (loss) for the year 54,000 ( 24,000) 
At December 31: 
Unrealized valuation gain (loss) 17,000 ( 37,000) 
Historical cost basis 750,000 675,000 
Current value basis $ 767,000 $ 638,000 
Notes payable 
Unrealized valuation gain, January 1 $ 112,000 
Valuation gain (loss) for the year ( 165,000) $ 112,000 
At December 31: 
Unrealized valuation gain (loss) ( 53,000) 112,000 
Historical cost basis (2,200,000) (1,500,000) 
Current value basis $(2,253,000) $(1,388,000) 
XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Notes to Financial Statements 
December 31, 1983 and 1982 
1 . A c c o u n t i n g P o l i c i e s 
The company's basic accounting records are maintained on the his-
torical cost basis. However, memorandum records are also maintained for 
recording current values for assets and liabilities other than cash, cash 
equivalents, and short-term receivables and payables. The financial state-
ments present information on the historical cost basis with current values 
shown supplementally. 
Due to the absence of purchased goodwill and of generally accepted 
methods for valuing internally generated goodwill, the company's goodwill, 
if any, is not valued under either the historical cost basis or the current value 
basis. 
The general policies for determining current values are: 
• Assets held for sale—net realizable value as estimated from or 
determined by current market prices. 
• Assets held for production—estimated replacement cost. 
• Long-term liabilities—estimated present value. 
Estimates of current values are necessarily affected by conditions and 
circumstances at the time they are made. The company is not aware of any 
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information that would furnish better estimates than those that are presented 
supplementally. However, conditions and circumstances are likely to change, 
and ultimate results may therefore differ from those estimates. 
The company's specific accounting policies for each basis of information 
are described below. 
Inventories 
On the historical cost basis, inventories are valued at original cost 
using the "first-in, first-out" method of cost flow. 
On the current value basis, inventories are valued as follows: 
Raw materials—estimated replacement cost at yearend. 
Finished products—net realizable value at yearend. This represents 
estimated net proceeds to be received from future sales less estimated direct 
selling expenses and margin attributable to selling effort. 
Investment in Municipal Bonds 
On the historical cost basis, municipal bonds are valued at original cost 
adjusted for straight-line amortization of any purchase premium or discount. 
On the current value basis, municipal bonds are valued at quoted market 
prices at yearend. 
Property 
Significant betterments to existing facilities are capitalized as property, 
but maintenance and repairs are expensed as incurred. 
On the historical cost basis, property is valued at original cost less 
accumulated depreciation. 
On the current value basis, property is valued at estimated yearend 
costs to acquire facilities with a productive capacity comparable to existing 
facilities less accumulated depreciation. Such replacement costs are esti-
mated at periodic intervals of two to five years. The most recent estimates 
were made in December 1983. 
On each basis of valuation, accumulated depreciation is computed 
using the straight-line method over the estimated useful life of each depre-
ciable asset. Useful lives are estimated to be 40 years for buildings and 20 
years for equipment. 
Long-Term Liabilities 
On the historical cost basis, long-term notes payable are stated at their 
face amounts, which also constitute the proceeds at the dates of their 
issuance. 
On the current value basis, long-term notes payable are stated at their 
estimated present values based on prevailing interest rates for similar obliga-
tions at yearend. 
Income Taxes 
On the historical cost basis, income taxes are provided on reported in-
come before income taxes and are adjusted for any permanent differences 
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from statutory taxable income. Any provision attributable to timing differences 
between such reported and taxable income is treated as deferred income 
taxes. 
On the current value basis, deferred income taxes are provided on 
valuation gains or losses. Yearend tax rates for ordinary income or capital 
gains are applied based on the expected usage or disposition of the assets 
and liabilities that cause such gains or losses. 
2 . I n v e n t o r i e s 
A strike by the company's production personnel during the last quarter 
of 1982 resulted in a substantial reduction of inventories of finished products 
at yearend. Such inventories were restored to normal operating levels during 
the first six months of 1983. 
3 . P r o p e r t y 
During 1983, the $90,000 valuation gain on land resulted from price 
increases for comparable land suitable for plant sites in the Topeka, Kansas 
area. The $43,000 valuation gain on buildings resulted from the increase in 
costs of plant construction. The $670,000 valuation loss on equipment reflects 
primarily the major decline in current replacement costs of pre-1983 equip-
ment due to the introduction of high-speed equipment utilizing new tech-
niques for cutting metal. In view of the significant productivity gains avail-
able from use of the new equipment, in December 1983 the company com-
pleted at a cost of $700,000 a new cutting facility utilizing the new techniques. 
To satisfy current and forecasted demand levels, the company expects to use 
all of its existing equipment. 
4 . N o t e s P a y a b l e 
The $1,500,000 principal amount of the 7½ per cent notes is payable 
on January 1, 1994, and interest is due semiannually. The notes may be 
prepaid, in whole or in part, at 107½ per cent of the principal amount 
through January 1, 1986, at declining premiums to January 1, 1991, and at 
the principal amount thereafter. Payment of these notes is being funded 
through annual investments in $75,000 par value of municipal bonds due 
about 1994. 
The $700,000 principal amount of the 7 per cent notes issued during 
1983 is payable on January 1, 1991, and interest is due quarterly. The notes 
may be prepaid, in whole or in part, at 105 per cent of the principal amount 
through January 1, 1989 and at the principal amount thereafter. Payment of 
these notes is not being funded. 
No compensating balances are required under the terms of the notes 
payable. Consequently, the stated interest rates constitute the effective rates 
on the historical cost basis. 
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On the current value basis, prevailing interest rates used in computing 
yearend present values were 7 per cent in 1983 and 8½ per cent in 1982. 
Substantially all of the company's property is pledged as security for 
the notes payable. 
5. Income Taxes 
Under existing statutes, income taxes are payable only on taxable 
income on the historical cost basis. The effective income tax rates are lower 
than the full statutory rates because of tax-exempt interest on municipal 
bonds. No other significant permanent or timing differences exist. 
The Internal Revenue Service has examined the company's federal 
income tax returns through the year 1982. No significant adjustments of the 
1982 loss were proposed. In 1983, the company received a $90,000 tax 
refund on that loss. 
Phase 2: Financial Statements Using Dual Disclosure of Historical Cost 
and Current Value 
Financial statements and supplemental schedules illustrating Phase 2 
consist of the following: 
Exhibit F-A: Statement of Loss (Alternative A, cost of products 
sold reflected at historical cost) 
Exhibit F-B: Statement of Earnings (Loss) (Alternative B, cost of 
products sold reflected at replacement cost) 
Exhibit G: Statement of Financial Position 
Exhibit H: Statement of Stockholders' Equity 
Exhibit I: Earnings Forecast 
* Exhibit D: Statement of Financial Activities 
*ScheduIe 2: Unrealized Valuation Gain on Inventories 
*Schedule 3: Unrealized Valuation Gain (Loss) on Property 
'Schedule 4: Unrealized Valuation Gain (Loss) on Long-Term 
Investments and Liabilities 
For applicable notes to financial statements, see pages 369-371. 
* Indicates that the particular financial statement or schedule does not change as 
a result of dual disclosure of historical cost and current value. Accordingly, see 
indicated Exhibit or Schedule in Phase 1. Schedule 1 of Phase 1 is not applicable 
to Phase 2 inasmuch as the information presented therein is included in the State-
ment of Loss (Exhibit F-A) and the alternative Statement of Earnings (Loss) (Exhibit 
F-B). 
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Exhibit F-A (concluded) 
XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Statement of Loss 
(Alternative A—Cost of products sold reflected at historical cost) 
Years Ended December 31, 1983 and 1982 
1983 1982 
Realized Earnings (Loss) 
Revenues: 
Net sales $4,140,000 $3,300,000 
Other—interest, etc. 250,000 225,000 
Total 4,390,000 3,525,000 
Costs and Expenses: 
Cost of products sold, other than items 
listed below 2,280,000 2,285,000 
Selling and administrative expenses 1,035,000 910,000 
Provision for depreciation 85,000 85,000 
Taxes, other than income 200,000 175,000 
Interest 250,000 200,000 
Other 100,000 50,000 
Total 3,950,000 3,705,000 
Realized earnings (loss) before taxes 440,000 (180,000) 
Provision for (refund of) income taxes on 
realized earnings 220,000 (90,000) 
Realized earnings (loss) 220,000 (90,000) 
Unrealized earnings (Loss) from changes in 
current values 
From operating items: 
Inventories (Schedule 2) 235,000 (175,000) 
Buildings (Schedule 3) 43,000 (5,000) 
Equipment (Schedule 3) (670,000) (27,000) 
Net change $ (392,000) $ (207,000) 
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Exhibit F-A (concluded) 
From land, long-term investments and 
liabilities: 
Land (Schedule 3) $ 90,000 
Holding gain (loss) on investment in 
municipal bonds (Schedule 4) 54,000 $ (24,000) 
Holding gain (loss) resulting from 
changes in present value of long-
term notes payable (Schedule 4) (165,000) 112,000 
Net change (21,000) 88,000 
Unrealized earnings (loss) before taxes (413,000) (119,000) 
Reduction in deferred income taxes 147,000 23,000 
Unrealized earnings (loss) (266,000) (96,000) 
Loss $ (46,000) $(186,000) 
Per common share: 
Realized earnings (loss) $ .44 $(.18) 
Unrealized earnings (loss) (.53) (.19) 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note to Exhibit F-B 
This statement displays an alternative analysis of earnings. The cost of 
products sold (and thus income from operations) is determined on a replace-
ment cost basis. This alternative improves the usefulness of the statement 
for making comparisons of the operations of various entities by eliminating 
price, value, and other distortions resulting from different ages of plant and 
equipment and different lengths of operating cycles. The operating profit 
reflects primarily the basic operating efficiencies of the organization, as well 
as the special, often intangible and unique, benefits enjoyed by the company. 
The benefit to the company of the excess of replacement cost of products 
sold over historical cost is included with other value changes, but is trans-
ferred to realized earnings along with the "income from operations." Income 
taxes are allocated to these two elements of realized earnings. Deferred 
income taxes are provided on the unrealized portion of earnings. 
No attempt has been made in this illustrative statement to determine the 
impact (on the amount of the replacement cost of products sold during the 
period) of changes other than those due to replacement costs for raw 
materials, direct labor, costs of outside services, and depreciation incurred. 
Thus, direct and indirect labor costs, repair and maintenance expenses, light, 
heat and power, spoilage, rework, and similar manufacturing overhead ex-
penses might be affected by efficiencies related to an assumed replacement 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Earnings Forecast 
Year Ending December 31, 1984 
(Note: This earnings forecast is based on a number of assumptions 
as to future conditions and events. Accordingly, there is no assurance that 
future earnings will coincide with the forecast.) 
Estimated revenues from product sales 
Estimated costs and expenses: 
Cost of products 
Selling, general and administrative expenses 
Total 
Estimated operating profit 
Estimated other revenues—interest, etc. 
Estimated interest expense 
Estimated realized earnings before taxes 
Estimated income taxes 
Estimated realized earnings 
Estimated changes in value of assets and liabilities before taxes: 
Operating items 300,000 
Other—net 100,000 
Total unrealized valuation gain 400,000 
Estimated deferred income taxes 200,000 
Estimated unrealized valuation gain 200,000 
Estimated earnings $ 400,000 
Per share of common stock: 
Estimated realized earnings $.40 
Estimated unrealized valuation gain .40 
Estimated earnings $.80 
Assumptions Underlying Earnings Forecast 
The forecast of earnings for 1984 is based on the following assumptions: 
1. An increase in Gross National Product of 10%, excluding the effects 
of inflation, and of 15% without such exclusion. 
2. No other major changes in the condition of the domestic economy. 
3. No change in the share of the market obtained by the company. 
4. Some resistance by customers to increases in sales prices. 
5. An increase in costs of approximately 17%. 
6. Stable labor relations and other operating conditions. 
$4,600,000 
3,000,000 









XYZ Manufacturing Enterprises 
Notes to Financial Statements 
December 31, 1983 and 1982 
1 . A c c o u n t i n g P o l i c i e s 
The company's basic accounting records are maintained on the historical 
cost basis. However, records are also maintained for recording current values 
for assets and liabilities other than cash, cash equivalents, and short-term 
receivables and payables. The financial statements present information on 
both bases. 
Due to the absence of purchased goodwill and of generally accepted 
methods for valuing internally generated goodwill, the company's goodwill, 
if any, is not valued under either the historical cost or the current value 
basis of presentation. 
The general policies for determining current values are: 
• Assets held for sale—net realizable value as estimated from or 
determined by current market prices. 
• Assets held for production—estimated replacement cost. 
• Long-term liabilities—estimated present value. 
Estimates of current values are necessarily affected by conditions and 
circumstances at the time they are made. The company is not aware of any 
information that would furnish better estimates than those that are presented. 
However, conditions and circumstances are likely to change, and ultimate 
results may therefore differ from those estimates. 
The company's specific accounting policies for each basis of presenta-
tion are described below. 
Inventories 
On the historical cost basis, inventories are valued at original cost using 
the "first-in, first-out" method of cost flow. 
On the current value basis, inventories are valued as follows: 
Raw materials—estimated replacement cost at yearend. 
Finished products—net realizable value at yearend. This represents 
estimated net proceeds to be received from future sales less estimated direct 
selling expenses and margin attributable to selling effort. 
Investment in Municipal Bonds 
On the historical cost basis, municipal bonds are valued at original 
cost adjusted for straight-line amortization of any purchase premium or 
discount. 
On the current value basis, municipal bonds are valued at quoted market 
prices at yearend. 
Property 
Significant betterments to existing facilities are capitalized as property, 
but maintenance and repairs are expensed as incurred. 
On the historical cost basis, property is valued at original cost less 
accumulated depreciation. 
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On the current value basis, property is valued at estimated yearend costs 
to acquire facilities with a productive capacity comparable to existing facilities 
less accumulated depreciation. Such replacement costs are estimated at 
periodic intervals of two to five years. The most recent estimates were made 
in December 1983. 
On each basis of valuation, accumulated depreciation is computed 
using the straight-line method over the estimated useful life of each depre-
ciable asset. Useful lives are estimated to be 40 years for buildings and 20 
years for equipment. 
Long-Term Liabilities 
On the historical cost basis, long-term notes payable are stated at their 
face amounts, which also constitute the proceeds at the dates of their 
issuance. 
On the current value basis, long-term notes payable are stated at their 
estimated present values based on prevailing interest rates for similar obliga-
tions at yearend. 
Income Taxes 
On the historical cost basis, income taxes are provided on reported 
income before income taxes and are adjusted for any permanent differences 
from statutory taxable income. Any provision attributable to timing differences 
between such reported and taxable income is treated as deferred income 
taxes. 
On the current value basis, deferred income taxes are provided on 
valuation gains or losses. Yearend tax rates for ordinary income or capital 
gains are applied based on the expected usage or disposition of the assets 
and liabilities that cause such gains or losses. 
2 . I n v e n t o r i e s 
A strike by the company's production personnel during the last quarter 
of 1982 resulted in a substantial reduction of inventories of finished products 
at yearend. Such inventories were restored to normal operating levels during 
the first six months of 1983. 
During 1983, the $25,000 valuation gain on raw materials inventories 
resulted from a December price increase for chromium-plated steel, a raw 
material whose use in production is significant. 
3 . P r o p e r t y 
During 1983, the $90,000 valuation gain on land resulted from price 
increases for comparable land suitable for plant sites in the Topeka, Kansas 
area. The $43,000 valuation gain on buildings resulted from the increase in 
costs of plant construction. The $670,000 valuation loss on equipment reflects 
primarily the major decline in current replacement costs of pre-1983 equip-
ment due to the introduction of high-speed equipment utilizing new tech-
niques for cutting metal. In view of the significant productivity gains available 
from use of the new equipment, in December 1983 the company completed 
at a cost of $700,000 a new cutting facility utilizing the new techniques. To 
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satisfy current and forecasted demand levels, the company expects to use 
all of its existing equipment. 
4 . N o t e s P a y a b l e 
The $1,500,000 principal amount of the 7½ per cent notes is payable 
on January 1, 1994, and interest is due semiannually. The notes may be 
prepaid, in whole or in part, at 107½ per cent of the principal amount 
through January 1, 1986, at declining premiums to January 1, 1991, and at 
the principal amount thereafter. Payment of these notes is being funded 
through annual investments in $75,000 par value of municipal bonds due 
about 1994. 
The $700,000 principal amount of the 7 per cent notes issued during 
1983 is payable on January 1, 1991, and interest is due quarterly. The notes 
may be prepaid, in whole or in part, at 105 per cent of the principal amount 
through January 1, 1989 and at the principal amount thereafter. Payment 
of these notes is not being funded. 
No compensating balances are required under the terms of the notes 
payable. Consequently, the stated interest rates constitute the effective rates 
on the historical cost basis. 
On the current value basis, prevailing interest rates used in computing 
yearend present values were 7 per cent in 1983 and 8½ per cent in 1982. 
Substantially all of the company's property is pledged as security for 
the notes payable. 
5 . I n c o m e T a x e s 
Under existing statutes, income taxes are payable only on taxable income 
on the historical cost basis. The effective income tax rates are lower than 
the full statutory rates because of tax-exempt interest on municipal bonds. 
No other significant permanent or timing differences exist. 
The Internal Revenue Service has examined the company's federal in-
come tax returns through the year 1982. No significant adjustments of the 1982 
loss were proposed. In 1983, the company received a $90,000 tax refund 
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